Given the lack of oil or mineral assets within Darfur, the major wealth-sharing provisions are:
- A Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund (DRDF), to which the GNU will contribute US$300 million for 2006 and US$200 million for each of 2007 and 2008.
- A Joint Assessment Mission supported by multilateral organisations, similar to the one for southern Sudan, which will determine reconstruction and development needs and, if required, adjust the sums allocated to the DRDF.
- A Fiscal and Financial Allocation Monitoring Commission (FFAMC), which will manage financial transfers from Khartoum to Darfur's three constituent states (Northern, Western and Southern Darfur). It reports to the national legislature but its definitive form is not yet known. Meanwhile, the agreement establishes a panel of experts to establish a formula for allocation of funds from the National Revenue Account to Darfur.
The agreement also provides for a Compensation Commission, with membership nominated by the parties, to define mechanisms for reviewing and enforcing the Commissions' decisions. The GNU has agreed to provide a first down-payment of US$30 million. Finally, a commission will have to be established to work with the UN in assisting refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes.
Most of the rebels wanted a greater financial commitment to compensate victims, and clearer engagement by Khartoum to transfer wealth to Darfur. Abdelwahid subsequently stated that he would need much more detail about the DRDF and the FFAMC before signing. This shows that the final deal was thrashed out by the mediation team and its partners, rather than won by hard negotiation.
The power-sharing provisions of the DPA have to be broken down into different levels. Nationally, the rebels get the fourth highest position within the GNU, the Senior Assistant to the President, who is also the chairperson of a new Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA). As this position was only available to the parties who signed the DPA, Minni Minnawi was appointed in August 2006. In addition, the GNU has allocated twelve seats in the National Assembly to the other signatories.
Within the state governments, the rebels obtained one of the three governors, the deputy governor of the two other states and in each state two of the eight state ministers. The GNU controls 50 per cent of the state legislature, the other signatories 30 per cent, and 20 per cent is to be shared between independent candidates and other political parties. Locally, the SLM/A and JEM (if signatory to the DPA) can nominate a commissioner in six localities, and in another locality they can designate six executive directors. Elections at every level of government will take place no later than July 2009. The TDRA, eight of whose ten members are nominated by the rebels, will run until July 2010, by which time a referendum shall be held to decide whether to establish a single Darfur regional government instead of the existing three states.
The states maintain routine responsibilities on education and health while the TDRA is responsible for the implementation of the DPA. If the TDRA's work is blocked, the matter should be referred to the Presidency, where the Senior Assistant to the President is consulted on all matters relating to Darfur.
The non-signatories of the DPA strongly opposed preserving the status quo of three Darfur states, wanting a single Darfur region immediately. The political weight of a region would be calculated by population and geographical area (Darfur covers 20 per cent of the area of Sudan), whereas under the current system states votes are calculated by population and number of states (Darfur has just 3 of Sudan's 25 states). They also claim the right to a new Vice-President, ranking number three in the national hierarchy. Finally, they demand more representation in the federal and state structures.
The security-related provisions in the DPA call for a comprehensive ceasefire, where all armed groups are to disengage and withdraw to their respective areas of control. In parallel, demilitarised zones are to be created along humanitarian supply routes and around camps for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).
Disarming the janjaweed remains the responsibility of the GNU with verification by the African Union Mission in Sudan and the Ceasefire Commission. Surprisingly, the rebels are not required to disarm until the Sudanese Armed Forces have withdrawn to their garrisons and the janjaweed are under control. The GoS is to punish ceasefire violations by their militias. A deadlock mechanism refers matters to the presidency if required.
Another clause was added in the final version in order to acquire, it was hoped, the signature of all parties. It was agreed that 4000 former combatants would be integrated into the army and 1000 into other security institutions (eg police force and border control), with 3000 combatants joining programmes of assistance and education. SLM/A and JEM would be represented in leadership positions of the SAF, and the GNU would review the security institutions, including the paramilitary forces, to ensure professionalism and the rule of law.
Although these substantial concessions were obtained within the security-related provisions on the last days of bargaining in Abuja, JEM and some parts of SLM/A continued to insist on more detail on implementation. They also demanded a greater role in security institutions in Darfur and nationally, and participation in supervising the disarmament of the janjaweed and other militias. Abdelwahid wanted greater involvement in providing security to displaced civilians as they return home.