Due to the destructive nature of past external involvement in Angola, foreigners are rather poorly placed to influence resource management practices for the better. Generally, they have little credibility within the country: most Angolans assume that foreign involvement is motivated entirely by the desire to profit from the country's oil, diamonds and other resources. This is of course absolutely true for the multinational corporations engaged in Angola. By the very nature of their commercial interests (and their fear of losing mineral concessions or business permits), they are in a weak position to question government policies or practices. Most would argue that in any case this is not a legitimate role for them to perform. However, large international companies have increasingly come under pressure in the developed world to act within the norms of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Most of the major international companies operating in Angola have tried to cultivate an image of CSR by engaging in small-scale philanthropy. At its most misguided, this has taken the form of support to the Eduardo dos Santos Foundation (FESA), a body with a purportedly charitable purpose whose main function is to promote the beneficent image of the head of state. Most of the oil companies channel some of their philanthropic assistance through a 'social fund' managed by Sonangol (a so-called 'social bonus' has to be paid to this fund alongside the signature bonuses paid to the state for new oil blocks), while some also finance projects sponsored by NGOs and UN agencies, for activities ranging from demining to localised community development projects. Worthy though many of these activities are, in financial terms they represent a minuscule fraction of the profits these companies make (or hope to make) from their investments in Angola and they also do not directly address the resource management issues that ultimately are far more important to the Angolan people's well-being. More far-reaching are the initiatives that have been taken, at an international level, to curb the trade in 'conflict diamonds' and to promote transparency in the oil industry. Although worldwide in scope, both initiatives have been strongly influenced by the situation in Angola. In the first instance, the work of the British-based NGO Global Witness helped to strengthen implementation of the UN sanctions against UNITA imposed in 1998 (a ban on the purchase of unofficial Angolan diamonds and the freezing of UNITA bank accounts). Although not fully effective, the efforts to give teeth to the sanctions by setting up a monitoring regime did contribute to raising UNITA's transaction costs and thus diminishing its resources for war. Significantly, this was accompanied by a major shift in the role played by De Beers, which controls about 65 per cent of the world trade in rough diamonds. During the 1990s, De Beers had been systematically buying up smuggled diamonds from African conflict zones, including Angola, in accordance with its policy of acting as buyer of last resort, a role it had played since the 1930s to stabilise the world diamond market. Fearful that it would become the object of an international consumer backlash, De Beers decided in 2000 to take a strong stand against conflict diamonds and joined the Fatal Transactions campaign in efforts to curb the smuggling of these diamonds, through the introduction of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. The scheme was finally launched in January 2003, after three years of negotiations among governments, the diamond industry and NGOs, although both De Beers and NGOs criticised the failure to set up an effective, independent monitoring mechanism, an omission which could fatally undermine the scheme's credibility. Little, if any attention, has been given meanwhile to the resource management issues affecting the Angolan diamond industry, such as the patrimonial nature of diamond concessions and the potential for conflict between outside interests (Angolan concessionaires, foreign mining companies and traders) and local communities in the diamond rich areas. Apart from the issue of conflict diamonds, the main focus of international attention has been on the need for full and open disclosure of the tax and royalty payments made by oil and mining companies in the developing world. Internationally, this has been championed by the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) coalition of NGOs and by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) promoted by the British prime minister, Tony Blair. However, consultations among governments and oil and mining companies have resulted in the rejection of a compulsory international framework, such as the one demanded by PWYP, which would require companies to disclose all their payments. A voluntary scheme, advocated by EITI, is unlikely to have any practical effect, as individual companies will not risk disclosing their payments unless all their rivals are obliged to do the same. Indeed, the potential risks of individual voluntary disclosure were brought home starkly to one oil company, British Petroleum (BP), in Angola in 2001. When BP decided unilaterally to publish the value of taxes paid to the Angolan government, Sonangol accused the company of breaking confidentiality clauses in its agreements and threatened to terminate its contracts. Full disclosure of tax payments would go only part of the way to improve transparency. While it would help clarify how much revenue is received by the Angolan state, it would not necessarily result in transparent management of those resources. On this broader issue, the IMF has been trying to bring about reforms in the management of public finances, notably through two 'staff monitored programmes', in 1995 and 2000-01. Both were unsuccessful, due in large part to the failure to bring all expenditure on-budget. Over the years, large and rising oil revenues have enabled the Angolan government, unlike the governments of poorer African countries, to keep IMF conditionality at bay and avoid fundamental reforms in public finance management, despite serious macroeconomic imbalances and the large external debt. This already weak external leverage will become even weaker as oil revenues soar in the next few years. Ultimately, fundamental change in resource management in Angola will come not from outside, but from within, as Angolans assert their right to benefit from the exploitation of their country's natural resources. However, by providing access to information and greater awareness of the nature of the problems facing resource-rich countries, the international pro-transparency campaign can assist those within the country (whether in parliament, in the press, in the churches, in professional associations, trade unions and NGOs) who are beginning to press for full transparency and better use of the rapidly rising resources available for reconstruction and poverty reduction.