
KM97 conference in London, attended by James Obita (centre)
Source: KM London
Dr James Obita is a businessman and lecturer in industrial chemistry and was the LRM Secretary for External Affairs and Mobilisation (from 1996 - 98).
First international peace efforts 1996 - 1998
James Alfred Obita (2002)
Kacoke Madit: a stimulus for new initiatives
During October and November 1996, Acholi living in the diaspora decided to convene a ‘Kacoke Madit’ (a big meeting of the Acholi) in London, bringing together Acholi communities from Uganda, the diaspora, the government of Uganda and the LRM/A to discuss the conflict. The Ugandan Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Dr Martin Aliker, stated that he had been given permission by the government to talk to the LRA. The LRA, which was represented by a delegation led by the author, the Secretary for External Affairs and Mobilisation, made it clear that they too were willing to talk peace. During the course of the conference the two delegations initiated dialogue.
Contact with Community of Sant’Egidio
Afterwards, representatives of the Rome-based lay Catholic organization Community of Sant’Egidio, which had been involved in conflict resolution and mediation in a number of African conflicts, contacted the Kacoke Madit organizers and began to explore possibilities of playing a third-party role in talks, with a particular focus on the issue of the release of the ‘Aboke girls’. An initial meeting was held in London where it was agreed that LRM representatives would discuss the proposal and seek approval for it from the LRA's 'High Command'.
The LRM/A meets in Khartoum
LRM/A officials travelled to Rome in May 1997 to discuss with Sant’Egidio representatives the details of the planned meeting with the government. It was agreed that the delegation of the LRM/A should consist of two people from the military wing and two from the political wing. (Sant’Egidio were informed later in the year that they had changed their mind and would send only people from the political wing.) LRM representatives then travelled to Sudan, where Kony and members of the LRA High Command approved the initiative. However, before the end of the Khartoum meeting LRM/A officials were joined by an unexpected visitor whose appearance was to profoundly influence the subsequent course of events and the balance of power within the LRM/A’s external political representation. Powell Onen Ojwang, a London-based Acholi businessman who had recently and inexplicably acquired substantial wealth, had been trying for years to gain access to the LRA. Onen offered to finance the LRA's military campaign and persuaded the ‘High Command’ to prioritise an increase in military capacity. In return he insisted on being appointed the LRM/A Vice-Chairman, making him the de facto number two to Kony. Despite this, the LRA leadership did not withdraw authority for the author to continue talking to the Ugandan government through Sant’Egidio. In June, after the LRM/A meetings in Khartoum, Sant’Egidio received notice from the government of Uganda that they were ready to meet the LRA delegation. LRM/A officials returned to visit Rome on 22 August 1997 for further preparatory talks.
A parallel initiative emerges
The NGO Equatoria Civic Fund (ECF), headed by Dr Leonzio Onek, a Sudanese Acholi and Kenya-based University lecturer, secured funding from the UK charity, Comic Relief, to ‘facilitate a peace process between the LRM/A and the Government of Uganda’. He made contact with the Minister for the Presidency, Dr Ruhakana Rugunda, and through him obtained agreement 'in principle' that the government would engage in talks with the LRM/A. On 18 October 1997, Onek arranged a meeting at the Lancaster House Hotel in Lancaster, UK between Ugandan Minister for the North, Mr Owiny Dollo, and the author. Also present was Professor Hizkias Assefa, an independent conflict resolution specialist collaborating with ECF.
During the meeting, Owiny Dollo informed them that the President was ready to put in place an amnesty law. He asked the LRM/A to write a letter to the government to confirm its intentions and clear the way for peace talks. The author agreed and demanded in response that the government stop insulting the LRM/A. It was decided that the author should travel to Sudan to brief Kony and to obtain his approval for further engagement, while Owiny Dollo secured Museveni’s approval. At this point the concurrent ECF and Sant’Egidio initiatives were running in parallel – with neither facilitating organization aware of the other’s initiative.
LRM/A and Museveni exchange letters
The author eventually wrote to President Museveni on 6th November 2001 (see Key Texts) and copied the letter to The Carter Center in the US, suggesting that the LRM/A might ask them to mediate and thereby introduce a third third-party. President Museveni responded to the author’s letter on 22 November 1997, declaring, 'our delegation is ready to discuss with your representatives anywhere and we are ready to reach a peaceful settlement within the confines of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda' (see Key Texts).
The 1997 Rome talks
On receiving the President's letter, the author asked Sant’Egidio to proceed with organizing a meeting. On 12 December 1997, Sant’Egidio hosted the most significant official meeting between the government of Uganda and the LRM/A since 1994. State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Amama Mbabazi, and David Pulkol, Director of the External Security organization (ESO) represented the government, while the author and Charles Laroker represented the LRM/A. Sant’Egidio's President Andrea Riccardi and Father Matteo Zuppi acted as mediators. The government delegation asked the LRM/A for a list of topics that the LRM/A would present for future talks. The author presented such a list the next day and in the signed minutes, the two sides agreed to meet again. At the close of the meeting, the Ugandan government insisted that the follow-up meeting, agreed for the 18 Jan 1998 should be attended by LRA field officers from Sudan.
During the two-day meeting Powell Onen was in regular telephone contact with the author and even contributed a number of suggestions. He assured the author that he was keeping the LRA leadership informed of progress by satellite phone. However, it later transpired that Onen had kept the LRA completely in the dark. Thus, when the events in Rome were later revealed, it appeared to the LRA fighters that the author had overstepped his authority.
Collapse of the Sant’Egidio and ECF processes
When the author returned to Sudan it became clear that Powell Onen had swayed the LRM/A increasingly towards a military approach. The author realized the magnitude of the challenge of winning support for the Sant’Egidio process from the increasingly hard-line ‘High Command’, as well as from the government of Sudan. He decided not to disclose the facts about the Rome meeting or the ECF-mediated contacts to the Khartoum-based LRM/A officials until he had talked to Kony, whom he still considered to be supportive of negotiations. Another complicating factor was that the ECF, which had facilitated significant investment in the process to-date and were kept in the dark about the progress with Sant’Egidio, were growing increasingly impatient with the lack of progress on their separate initiative. A breakdown of communication and confidence between the author and the NGO occurred. Before the author could meet with Kony, Powel Onen had phoned Kony in southern Sudan to accuse the author of having received money to betray the movement. The author travelled to southern Sudan to the LRA camps unaware of what awaited him. Onen travelled immediately from London to be present at the author’s 'trial'. Acceding to an increasingly hard-line 'High Command', Kony arrested the author and accused him of being a traitor. He was stripped of all responsibilities and sentenced to death. As the drama unfolded, Onen claimed that he had pressing business commitments in London and departed suddenly. For some time it was rumoured that the author had been killed, but he was released after a few months in detention. It is not known why his life was spared.
The difficulties within the LRM/A led to the simultaneous collapse of both the Sant’Egidio and the ECF processes. The government of Uganda delegation travelled to Rome for the planned January 1998 meeting but waited in vain for the LRM/A delegation. With the author out of the way, Onen assumed a dominant role in the LRM. But the episode led to further fracturing and the near-collapse of an increasingly hard-line external wing. This was compounded by the arrest of Onen on suspicion of fraud in July 1998. He was convicted and is presently serving his sentence. In May 1998, Sant’Egidio was again involved in an unsuccessful attempt to secure the release of the ‘Aboke girls’. ECF also persevered in its efforts, which to date have not borne fruit.
Top | Northern Uganda | Contents
|