Cambodia: Profiles

Carl Bergquist has a background in international politics and journalism and has studied at the University of Gothenburg, Georgetown University and the University of Uppsala. He has written on Cambodian affairs and has worked, most recently, at the Institute of Journalism in Transition in London, a media charity involved in Eastern Europe.

The CPP, the ruling party of the former socialist State of Cambodia (SoC) regime which had governed Cambodia since 1979 (originally under the name of the People's Republic of Kampuchea) remains the dominant political force in Cambodia today. The CPP's authority is entrenched in the state administration at both national and local levels and in the national security forces, enabling it to effectively resist UNTAC efforts to neutralise its political influence in the state administration as called for by the Paris agreements. Although coming second to FUNCINPEC in the 1993 elections, it forced its way into a dominant position in a power-sharing arrangement with the royalist party. The 1997 overthrow of Prince Ranariddh opened the way for the CPP to maintain its political dominance after the 1998 elections which it organized. It gained a relative majority of 40% of the votes, though under the shadow of widespread allegations of fraud and political intimidation.

The party's coherence stems from a tightly woven network of personal relations between its leaders, based on strong kinship and business links developed over many years in power. The two key figures in the CPP, Prime Minister Hun Sen and Party Leader Chea Sim, are both former Khmer Rouge officials who defected to Vietnam in 1978. In 1979, they returned with the invading Vietnamese force which drove the Khmer Rouge from power. The Vietnamese installed the PRK government in power and provided strong military and political backing for it throughout the 1980s.

A liberalising tendency in the CPP, led by younger faces from abroad and people such as former Deputy Prime Minister Sar Kheng, has recently come up against more hardline elements. Among the latter is Hun Sen, who retains effective control, often by use of force, over the Cambodian state. In the face of growing challenges to its grip on power, the CPP has thus far been much more successful at maintaining party unity than any of its opposition counterparts.

The National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) began as an armed movement in 1981 formed by King Sihanouk. FUNCINPEC was one of the two non-communist members of the tripartite resistance which, alongside the Khmer Rouge, fought the Vietnamese-backed PRK/SoC regime during the 1980s. In 1989 Prince Norodom Ranariddh, one of Sihanouk's sons and a university professor in France, took over the leadership of the faction. Following its transformation into a political party in 1992, the party won a surprising victory in the 1993 elections, though was almost immediately forced to concede the most power to the CPP.

With a leadership formed predominantly of educated elites, who had spent much of the 1980s in exile and hence lacked practical political experience, FUNCINPEC failed to assert its influence over the CPP-dominated government. Political pragmatism on the part of Prince Ranariddh led to a division of his loyalties between his party's interests and those of the coalition government. FUNCINPEC's unity was undermined and critics of Ranariddh's policy, such as Finance Minister Sam Rainsy, sought alternative outlets for their political aspirations. Prince Ranariddh's failure to build a strong and competent team of advisers, greatly undermined FUNCINPEC's legitimacy both in Cambodia and abroad.

Following Ranariddh's overthrow by Hun Sen, the FUNCINPEC party apparatus was left in disarray. Prince Ranariddh was nonetheless able to participated in the 1998 elections following international pressure on Hun Sen to allow his return from exile. The contested election results gave FUNCINPEC some 30% of the vote, while only one of the seven FUNCINPEC splinter parties won a sizeable share. Prince Ranariddh's royal status ensures that he will continue to command a great deal of popular support in Cambodia, though whether FUNCINPEC will be able to translate this into political power in the near future seems unlikely given the CPP's current dominance.

Sam Rainsy.
Source: Al Rockoff

Khmer Rouge

Khien Samphan and Nuon Chea

Khien Samphan and Nuon Chea (1986).

Source: Reuters

The SRP was formed in 1995, originally under the name of the Khmer Nation Party (KNP), by ex-FUNCINPEC Finance Minister Sam Raisy. Rainsy's willingness to challenge government corruption during his brief stint in government from 1993-95 earned him the wrath of both Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh and led to his expulsion from both the government and the National Assembly. The government strongly opposed the establishment of the KNP and after it split in 1996 the Sam Rainsy wing adopted his name. Sam Rainsy espouses a populist form of politics and has been particularly effective in cultivating international support and adopting the language of democracy. The party's success in capturing some 14% of the votes in the July 1998 elections shows that it has the potential to be a significant force on the Cambodian political scene, whether inside a future coalition government or in opposition.

The Khmer Rouge emerged from the Cambodian communist party, formed in 1951 with the backing of the Vietnamese. During their period in power from 1975-79, the regime known as 'Democratic Kampuchea', the Khmer Rouge presided over the deaths of some 1,000,000 Cambodians (see Cambodia's Historical Legacy). Adhering to a radical Maoist version of communism, the Khmer Rouge sought to transform Cambodia virtually overnight into a classless, rural-based society. Throughout its history, the movement's power has stemmed from its ability to harness the support of foreign patrons, in particular the Chinese, and to exploit the threat of an expansionist Vietnam which drove it from power in 1979.

The Khmer Rouge not only controlled the most powerful military of the three factions resisting Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia during the 1980s, but also benefited from Western support. Though included in the 1991 political settlement, the Khmer Rouge withdrew a year later spelling the beginning of its final demise. Most of the movement's forces were too young to have experienced their period in power and this generational gulf contributed to the movement's diminished ideology and unity. Starting in 1994, the defection to the government of thousands of its troops, together with key leaders such as Ieng Sary and many secondary commanders, all but spelt the end of the movement (see Between War and Peace).

With the death of Pol Pot in May 1998, the key surviving leaders, Ta Mok, Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea, are the likely subjects of a possible Cambodian war crimes tribunal under either the auspices of the international community or the Cambodian government. This masks the fact that many former Khmer Rouge are now integrated into the government and national armed forces. While various armed groups continue to operate in the jungle under the name of the Khmer Rouge, the political movement as it was known in the 1970s and 1980s has for all practical purposes ceased to exist.

The BLP and the Son Sann Party emerged from a split within the BLDP (Buddhist Liberal Democrat Party) which had a role in the post-1993 coalition government. The BLDP emerged from the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPLNF) which was formed in 1980 by Son Sann, a former Prime Minister during the 1960s. It was one of the three resistance factions allied against the government in Phnom Penh during the 1980s. Largely seen as a republican movement, as distinct from its more royalist and communist counterparts, it was prone to divisions which continued after 1993. After the 1995 split in the BLDP, the faction led by deputy Ieng Mouly remained aligned to the CPP, while the Son Sann Party allied itself with the opposition. Neither party gained seats in the 1998 elections.

King Norodom Sihanouk is Cambodia's constitutional monarch and as such, the formal head of state. He was brought to the throne in 1941 by the French colonial authority and is considered the 'father' of Cambodia, having led it to independence in 1953. Since then he has been the most dominant and enduring figure in Cambodian political life.

Sihanouk's dominance has stemmed as much from his own personal authority and influence as from any constitutional powers. Relying on an often autocratic style of rule during the 1950s and 1960s, Sihanouk was adept at steering a line between right- and left-wing challenges to his authority, and between the interests of North Vietnam and those of the US as the Vietnam War intensified. Sihanouk's dominance of Cambodian political life until his 1970 overthrow by his own government, helps to explain the ambiguous position he occupies today.

Reinstated as head of state in 1993 Sihanouk still enjoys huge popular support. Though he played a decisive role in bringing about the 1991 Paris agreements, his desire to resume a dominant position in Cambodian political life by leading a government of 'national reconciliation' has been actively resisted by anti-monarchists and pro-monarchists alike, including his son Prince Ranariddh, who feel the time has come for him to step down from active politics. Sihanouk suffers from a number of serious medical complaints for which he receives regular health care in China, his long-time supporter and host during much of his exile. With the selection of his successor ultimately in the hands of the politically-controlled Council of the Throne, the future role of the monarchy is distinctly uncertain (see The monarchy's future public role box).

Given the slow recovery of Buddhist institutions from the massive destruction suffered under the Khmer Rouge and during the long war, Buddhist associations have hitherto played a minor role in Cambodian political life (see Steering the Middle Path). Nevertheless, a growing number of politically-minded associations have recently emerged, including the Coalition for Peace and Reconciliation and the Dhammayietra Centre for Peace and Non-Violence led by the Venerable Maha Ghosananda. Their growing influence is felt most strongly at a grass-roots level through the wide range of peace and democracy activities they carry out. The peace marches led by Maha Ghosananda have been particularly important over the past seven years in focusing public attention on Cambodia's conflict. Through the Forum for Peace Through Love and Compassion, a wide range of local and international NGOs have been brought together to promote non-violence and peaceful responses to conflict.

Internationally-inspired non-governmental organizations working specifically in the human rights and democracy arena have come to play an important, though still comparatively minor role in disciplining the government since 1991. Key human rights groups in Cambodia include the Association for Human Rights in Cambodia (ADHOC), the Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LICAHDO), the Khmer Institute of Democracy (KID) and the Cambodian Institute for Human Rights (CIHR). Many of these groups have assisted the UN in monitoring and investigating human rights abuses, particularly following the July 1997 coup. The Human Rights Action Committee is a 15-member federation of NGOs active in monitoring human rights abuses. Some 75 Cambodian NGOs are members of Ponleu Khmer, a grouping formed in 1993 to monitor and contribute to debate surrounding the Constitution and efforts to promote the rule of law in Cambodia.

The RCAF was formed in 1993 to unite the armed forces of the former Cambodian government with the military forces of FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF. However, due to the failed UNTAC demobilisation, the force remains disproportionately laden with officers. With some 150,000 soldiers on the payroll, including some 25,000 Khmer Rouge soldiers who have defected since 1994, the army is much too large for Cambodia's current needs (see Business by the Gun).

Political control of the army was a sensitive issue between 1993-97. While overall command remained in CPP hands, in practice, armed units retained their former allegiance to one or other of the two prime ministers. Following the July 1997 coup, 40 military advisers to Prince Ranariddh were executed by forces loyal to Hun Sen and many other Ranariddh loyalists regrouped at O' Smach, along the Thai border, under the command of General Nhek Bun Chhay. While the 1998 Japanese peace plan made provision for their re-integration into the RCAF, this has yet to come about.

Along with a large and heavily-armed, village-based militia system and various 'special' police forces under the direct control of the CPP, the RCAF poses a significant threat to security in the country if political tensions are not quelled and if significant reform of the security forces is not undertaken.

Picture: Khmer Rouge defectors try new government uniforms for size.
Source: Al Rockoff.

From 1984, in keeping with its broader economic and strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region, the Australian government became actively involved in attempts to broker a solution to the Cambodian conflict. It was the country's then Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, who proposed a framework peace plan involving a significant UN role which became the template for the 1991 Paris agreements. In addition to contributing troops to UNTAC, Australia has provided extensive development assistance since 1993. Australia has tended to take a pragmatic stance toward recent political problems in Cambodia, favouring constructive engagement over strong actions to express its disapproval. After the July 1997 coup, Australia suspended its A$2 million bilateral Defence Cooperation Program, but not itsA$32 million aid budget.

China has consistently sought to play a major role in Cambodia, perceiving its influence and status in Southeast Asia to be at stake. Once a battleground where China sought to confront its Vietnamese and Soviet rivals, Cambodia is now seen as a means to counteract ASEAN dominance in the region. The key supporter of the Khmer Rouge after its rise to power in 1975 and its overthrow in 1979, China's cooperation was essential in achieving the 1991 settlement. China provided a home in exile to Sihanouk during the 1970s and 1980s and consistently backed his peacemaking efforts. Since 1991, as Chinese influence over the Khmer Rouge has waned and relations with Vietnam have improved, relations have also warmed with the CPP. The Chinese capitalized on the international isolation of Hun Sen after July 1997, carefully nurturing ties with him by providing military and other forms of aid.

Cambodia's former colonial power, France has actively sought to regain its former influence in Cambodia since the 1991 political settlement. France hosted several sessions of the Paris Conference on Cambodia and also played a key role in the implementation of the Paris agreements through UNTAC. The first European country to reopen an embassy in Cambodia following the agreements, France has consistently supported the CPP since 1991, not wavering in the aftermath of the 1997 coup. Extensive French aid has been provided to Cambodia in recent years both to promote French culture and language and other aspects of the reconstruction process. One of only three EU countries with official representation in Cambodia, France has had a strong influence on EU policy towards the country.

Indonesia's role in the peace process was particularly significant preceding the 1991 settlement, hosting two key meetings between the Cambodian factions in 1988-89. Its long-serving Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, was co-President of the Paris Conferences on Cambodia and Indonesian soldiers also formed the largest national contingent within UNTAC. Following the 1997 coup, Ali Alatas was again one of the 'troika' of ASEAN foreign ministers mandated to seek a negotiated solution between Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh. Indonesia's minimal role in the reconstruction process, and its severe political and economic problems at home, mean it will continue to endorse the pragmatic ASEAN stance.

Other than a brief occupation of Cambodia during World War II, the Japanese were not significantly involved in Cambodia again until the late 1980s when they also sought to broker a solution to the conflict. Their initial efforts showed few concrete results, but Japan came to play a major role in the implementation of the Paris agreements by UNTAC. Japanese troops were posted overseas for the first time since the Second World War, and the country played a significant role in financing and staffing the peacekeeping mission. Japanese diplomat, Yasushi Akashi, was appointed to head the mission. Since 1993, the Japanese government has been Cambodia's largest bilateral aid donor and has actively sought to enhance its profile in Cambodia. Japan's role has been marked by its close ties to the Hun Sen government which, together with the US $10.5 million it provided in electoral assistance, helped it to promote its 'four pillars' peace plan to manage the July 1997 crisis. Within days of the 1998 elections, Japan was quick to recognize Hun Sen's 'victory' and has done little to disguise its preference to continue working closely with the CPP.

Malaysia's most significant contribution to the peace process, following its contribution of troops to UNTAC, has been the substantial involvement of its commercial sector in Cambodia's reconstruction. The involvement of Malaysian companies in a series of high profile 'tourist development' initiatives and large-scale logging deals have been controversial. It exerts little official political leverage over Cambodia, carefully endorsing the ASEAN position. Close personal ties between key Malaysian business and political leaders and Cambodian politicians mean that the country will continue to play a significant role in Cambodia.

The Soviet Union provided extensive political and military support throughout the 1980s for its Southeast Asian clients Vietnam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea government. With its economic decline starting in the mid-1980s, aid to the PRK was quickly reduced and then cut. The withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, which opened the way for the 1991 settlement, was a key consequence of this. Russia remains a minor player in contemporary Cambodian affairs.

The Singaporean government, fiercely anti-communist and anti-Vietnamese during the 1980s, was the main conduit for Western arms to the non-communist resistance factions, FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF, during the 1980s. Through ASEAN, Singapore also consistently supported efforts to achieve the 1991 political settlement and contributed a small number of peacekeepers to UNTAC. Since 1993, Singapore's involvement in Cambodia has been limited to endorsing the ASEAN position as well providing small amounts of private foreign investment.

Thailand shares a long border with Cambodia and a turbulent history characterized by sentiments of both animosity and generosity toward its neighbour. Wary of Vietnamese aggression following the country's 1979 occupation of Cambodia, Thailand gave sanctuary to the tripartite Khmer resistance as well as 350,000 refugees. Thailand served as a conduit for Western and Chinese military assistance to the factions, and its own military also supported all three factions. Anxious to relieve itself of the refugee burden and the security problem on its borders, Thailand also actively supported the peace process, hosting a number of key conferences in Pattaya in the run-up to the final settlement.

While official support for the peace process has always been forthcoming from the Thai government, the close ties existing between Thai commercial and military elements and the Khmer Rouge have made it difficult to isolate the rebel movement. Despite Thailand's open condemnation of the July 1997 coup, it no longer perceives Vietnam as an imminent security threat. The active involvement of its business sector in Cambodia has meant that it is increasingly willing to support a pragmatic stance in dealing with continuing problems in Cambodia.

The UK was a key supporter of the tripartite resistance during the 1980s and, as a permanent member of the Security Council, was also active in achieving the 1991 political settlement. It contributed a small number of troops to UNTAC's military component and has played an active role in the reconstruction programme by providing £5-6 million in bilateral assistance for a range of programmes including education, governance and mine-clearing. The UK has always adopted the EU line in response to recent events in Cambodia and its pragmatic response to the July crisis, which favoured early elections as a way out of the impasse, is indicative of this.

US policy towards Cambodia has always been subsumed within its wider geo-political agendas and has changed dramatically over time. The US bombed Cambodia extensively between 1969-73 in an attempt to destroy North Vietnamese supply routes running through the country as well as to forestall the victory of the Khmer communists. It provided active support for the Lon Nol regime which overthrew Sihanouk, who the US perceived as insufficiently supportive of US interests. The US also took the lead in isolating the PRK internationally in the 1980s to punish Vietnam for its invasion of the country and was also the key backer of the resistance factions. This involved an active role for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) working under a humanitarian guise through refugee camps along the Thai border.

The US, keen to end an increasingly costly and strategically inconsequential involvement in Cambodia, also played a decisive role in bringing about the 1991 settlement. Though the Americans backed the non-communist factions in the 1993 elections, their disillusionment with FUNCINPEC's inability to govern effectively has led to a more pragmatic position of late. Differences between the State Department and Congress have led the US to adopt a critical stance regarding recent events, though in practice, the US is focusing its attention on longer-term support for democracy and civil society. The US provided some US$7 million in assistance to local NGOs preceding the 1998 elections and was one of the few international voices urging caution in declaring the elections 'free and fair'.

Long perceived by Cambodians as their country's primary 'antagonist', Vietnam's involvement in Cambodia has been fundamental in shaping its current political landscape. The initial backing provided by the Vietnamese communists to their Khmer counterparts starting in the 1950s quickly waned after the Khmer Rouge took power in 1975. When Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979 to overthrow the Khmer Rouge regime, it gave the resistance factions, in particular the Khmer Rouge, the key to unlocking anti-Vietnamese sentiments within the Cambodia population which would underpin their popular support. The withdrawal of Vietnamese military forces from Cambodia in 1989 opened the way to the 1991 political settlement, though anti-Vietnamese feelings still pervade the political and social scene.

Ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia, many of whom have lived there for generations, continue to be the victims of discrimination and violence. Parties such as FUNCINPEC and the SRP have played the anti-Vietnamese card for political gain in response to the continuing close links between the Vietnamese government and its historic CPP allies. As a member of ASEAN today, Vietnam will continue to ensure that the regional forum desists from any harsh criticism directed at Hun Sen's government.

A regional grouping, formed in 1967, ASEAN has grown to include all ten Southeast Asian nations, with the exception of Cambodia which looks set to join when political stability returns to the country. ASEAN has consistently supported diplomatic efforts to resolve Cambodia's internal problems (see Diplomatic Pragmatism), though it has lacked the leverage to act effectively on its own given its strict adherence to a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.

While the EU provides significant development and humanitarian assistance to Cambodia, its local representative does not deal directly on a political level with Cambodia's government as do the diplomatic representatives of EU member states. Although the EU is notionally well-placed to provide consistent, critical and politically-sustained support for Cambodia's democratisation process, EU member states have relinquished little responsibility for foreign affairs to the EU. The EU has thus been forced to rely on 'toothless' statements or 'démarches', rather than close interaction with the government to convey its concerns regarding recent political events in Cambodia. This lack of political autonomy means that the EU is not well placed to link the provision of aid with political conditionalities, as became evident in the case of the assistance it provided for the 1998 elections. At the same time, some of the larger European countries such as the UK and France, which could possibly exert more political clout if they acted unilaterally, have been content to hide behind the cover of a common EU position to avoid criticism for their unwillingness to take a strong stand on Cambodia's problems.

The international financial institutions' focus on financial accountability, institutional reform and more general economic development has played a vital role in guiding Cambodian government policy as it seeks to rebuild. Both the World Bank and IMF have been involved in efforts to regulate the exploitation of forests and the IMF, most notably, cut its assistance and withdrew its representative from Cambodia in 1996 following the government's failure to permit greater transparency over the use of funds from timber sales. World Bank support for the planned reform of the army, a crucial element of attempts to tackle Cambodia's security problems, has so far had little success - in part due to the upheaval caused by the July 1997 crisis. With the policies of both institutions impacting heavily on the political situation in Cambodia, there is much potential for them to work more closely with other actors in the international community in tackling tensions before they erupt violently again.

The UN has had a mixed role in Cambodia, depriving it of development assistance during the 1980s though, during the same period, making efforts to bring about dialogue between the rival Cambodian factions. While it was ultimately the influence of the superpowers which made the 1991 settlement possible, the UN was vested with the responsibility of overseeing implementation of the agreements. At US $2 billion and with some 20,000 peacekeepers, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was the largest, most ambitious and most intrusive peacekeeping mission ever. Following UNTAC's withdrawal from Cambodia in late 1993, the UN's dwindling influence on the political process has been exerted through the UNDP, the UNHCHR and the Secretary General's Representative in Cambodia (SGRC).

Since 1992 some US$600 million has come to Cambodia through the UN system for a wide range of reconstruction projects covering poverty alleviation, governance, infrastructure-related and public administration reform. Some ten UN development agencies are present in Cambodia today and their activities are coordinated by the Resident Coordinator of the UNDP. Thus far, there has been little attempt to link the provision of technical development assistance to any form of conditionality to influence political events in the country (See Institutions Versus Personalities).

The appointment of a UN rapporteur and the establishment of a permanent office to monitor human rights have been the international community's most direct channels for addressing the human rights problem in Cambodia since 1993. The primary role of the office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) was to carry out human rights education programmes and provide technical assistance to the government, though its mandate has been broadened more recently to monitor and investigate human rights abuses. This has been perceived as interference in the country's internal affairs by the Cambodian government and in 1996 it asked that the UNHCHR office in Phnom Penh be phased out, (although this did not happen). Despite regular visits by the current rapporteur, Thomas Hammarberg, and the meticulous evidence which he has accumlated incriminating government elements in many recent human rights abuses, no mechanisms are in place to translate his findings into a practical political response by the international community.

The small office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General in Cambodia (SRSG) has been the only formal political link between New York and Phnom Penh since 1993. First headed by Benny Widyono, and since July 1997 by Lakhan Mehrota, it has largely focused on observing political events and reporting back to the Secretary General. While a 20-person Military Liaison Team was also left in Cambodia following UNTAC's departure in December 1993, this was reduced to three members by May 1994 and, shortly thereafter, to one. Despite clear evidence that tensions were mounting in Cambodia in early 1997, the Secretary General has largely adopted a hands-off approach to problems in Cambodia. In the absence of strong support from member countries for a more active political role, the UN role was largely limited to coordinating international observers for the 1998 elections. The JIOG (Joint International Observation Group) moved quickly to declare the elections 'free and fair' despite widespread allegations of electoral fraud and political intimidation. This was in line with the UN's general desire to avoid increased political involvement in Cambodia.

Logs

Picture source: Jean-Paul Jaslet.

With the breakdown of the state, criminal activities such as drug trafficking, money laundering, the timber trade and prostitution has increasingly come under the control of organized groups, often linked to the government or operating with complete impunity. Large-scale illegal logging in Cambodia, for instance, has been made possible by lucrative contracts signed between Cambodian political and military figures and a range of commercial companies in China, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam. While many foreign investors in Cambodia are actively supporting the reconstruction process in positive ways, the inability of the state to effectively monitor their activities or to levy the taxes which are due has been undermined. This means that the line between legal and illegal activities has become worryingly blurred and is increasingly overstepped by profit-seekers.