King Sihanouk, in self-imposed exile in Siem Reap, September 1997.

Source: Mak Remissa.

Lao Mong Hay is Executive Director of the Khmer Institute of Democracy in Phnom Penh. He was Acting Director of the Cambodian Mine Action Center from 1993-94. From 1988 to 1992 he was concurrently Director of the Institute of Public Administration, Head of the Human Rights Unit of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front and aide to the KPLNF leadership.

Cambodia's agonizing quest: political progress amidst institutional backwardness

Lao Mong Hay - November 1998

Since independence in 1953, Cambodia has been ruled by a diverse array of governments which have successively claimed to be monarchist, republican, revolutionary, socialist and, most recently, democratic in nature. The political orientations of these governments have varied widely, as has the impact of their policies on the fortunes of Cambodians. Despite these seeming shifts, a more consistent aspect of Cambodia's political life has been the retention of power in the hands of elites. The provisions made, in the better of Cambodia's first five constitutions, to safeguard citizens' rights have never given rise to effective legal checks on the use of power.

In theory, Cambodia's 1993 Constitution, based on liberal democratic principles, goes further than preceding ones in preventing the abuse of power. But the system of 'checks and balances' it provides for is sharply at odds with Cambodia's deeply conservative political culture and its authoritarian underpinnings. While politics in Cambodia today are in some ways more open, pluralist and accountable than ever before, at the same time they have never been so violent or corrupt. Public awareness regarding the functioning of democracy has surged in recent years, yet Cambodians still face an uphill struggle to have their Constitution respected as the supreme law of the land.

Rapid social change

At the time of the 1991 Paris agreements, Cambodia had been closed to the outside world for a period of almost two decades. With the arrival of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), charged with implementing the agreements, Cambodia was opened up to a world experiencing rapid economic growth, a dramatic revolution in information technology, and the seeming triumph of democracy over communism. The Paris agreements envisaged that integrating Cambodians into this radically different, 'free' world would alert them to their fundamental rights and freedoms and help consolidate the country's fledgling peace.

Under the watchful and protective eye of UNTAC, Cambodians created or joined political parties, and many more attended political rallies. In the May 1993 elections Cambodians voted en masse, the majority of them calling for a new government and an end to their long war. While Cambodians were still perhaps unclear about the exact mechanism by which their votes would translate into political change, they were more hopeful than at any time in recent memory that the changes which lay ahead would be positive.

In the years following UNTAC's departure, many Cambodians came to enjoy the benefits of the information revolution. The local media played an important role in informing and mobilising public opinion, as did local NGOs which provided thought-provoking criticisms of government policies and offered alternatives for the public to consider. As a consequence, Cambodians not only became more aware of events and developments in their country and the wider world, but also began to have opinions on them. During this period, many Cambodians actively followed parliamentary debates and listened to political speeches. The people began to notice that their leaders, while seeking to cultivate their support, were also increasingly dependent on it to stay in power.

While UNTAC had enabled this initial political awakening to take place, Cambodians were subsequently emboldened to seek to influence government policy. After 1993, growing numbers of Cambodians demonstrated for better conditions in the factories where they worked, submitted complaints to the parliamentary Human Rights Commission and protested in front of the National Assembly to demand political reforms. Cambodian society became more dynamic and was moving ahead rapidly, though too fast for some.

The March 1997 grenade attack in front of the National Assembly which killed 16 demonstrators was a dramatic indication that the freedoms conceded to Cambodia's people during the UNTAC era were gradually being curtailed. It became clear that the lack of any meaningful mechanism to activate the grand provisions enshrined in the constitution could not protect even the most basic of human rights.

Constitutional provisions for a separation of powers

Article 1 states that 'Cambodia is a Kingdom with a King who shall rule according to the Constitution and to the principles of liberal democracy and pluralism.'

Article 51 of the Constitution provides for a separation of powers between the executive (the Royal Government), the legislature (the National Assembly) and the judiciary. The Constitution also provides for specific roles to be played by the King, the Constitutional Council, the National Congress and the Supreme Council of the Magistracy in order to ensure the separation of powers is maintained.

The King is the head of the Royal Government, though the important principle is that he 'shall reign but shall not govern'. He appoints the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers which govern. They are collectively responsible to the National Assembly and can be dismissed by it. The King also has the right to initiate amendments to the Constitution and to grant amnesties.

The National Assembly has the exclusive responsibility to make laws and it is only laws adopted by it that the King is required to promulgate. The Royal Government executes and implements these laws. The National Assembly must also approve all rules made by government authorities under any laws passed by it.

The judiciary is an independent power and includes the Supreme Court and all of the lower courts. Under the Constitution, the legislative or executive branches, including the Ministry of Justice, have no judicial power. Only the Supreme Council of the Magistracy, which is an independent body chaired by the King, has the right to appoint, transfer or remove judges. The King has the sole power to serve as guarantor of the independence of the judiciary.

An absence of checks and balances

Cambodia's 1993 Constitution today remains little more than a proclamation of intentions. Article 51 stipulates that 'all powers belong to the people' and that they will 'exercise these powers through the National Assembly, the Royal Government and the Judiciary'. The establishment of these three branches of government corresponds closely with the liberal democratic spirit of the Paris agreements though in practice there is not yet a separation of powers. This can be seen most clearly with regard to the National Assembly which was directly elected by the people.

During its first term, the National Assembly was unable to exercise its legislative powers effectively or to control the government as foreseen by the Constitution. Not a single private bill was considered by Assembly members, let alone adopted; all legislation passed was drafted by the government. Rarely did the Assembly question either Prime Minister, or indeed any minister at all. In most of the debates which took place, the same few members of parliament took the floor and most deputies toed the lines imposed by party leaders. The National Assembly, in short, quickly became a 'rubber stamp' of the government.

While the effectiveness of the National Assembly was undermined by a packed legislative schedule and the lack of technical expertise needed to draft laws, the real problem was the absence of conditions conducive to open debate (see Breathing life into Cambodia's Constitution) and the blatant disregard by both the CPP and FUNCINPEC for constitutional procedure. Party leaders regularly suppressed debate on sensitive issues or delayed the passage of legislation which threatened the stability of the fragile governing coalition or personal interests.

The generally tense political climate did not favour the creation of other bodies intended to serve as checks and balances on the use of power. The National Congress during the 1950s and early 1960s, was an annual open-air meeting at which the population received government reports and raised issues of concern with their government. In the 1990s it could have served as an outlet for popular grievances, and as a way for the people to interact directly with their representatives, but it has never been convened.

The role of the Constitutional Council was to interpret the Constitution and ensure the legality of all laws made by the government. It was not established until May 1998 when international pressure mounted on the government to ensure that there would be a legal mechanism to adjudicate disputes arising from the July 1998 elections. Even then the independence and legitimacy of the council was quickly called into question because it had not been formed in accordance with the procedures outlined in the Constitution.

The Supreme Council of the Magistracy, for its part, was intended to assist the King in ensuring the independence of the judiciary. It has only met once and, as a consequence, the promised reform of the judiciary has never come about. Most current judges were appointed before 1991, more on the basis of their political loyalty to the CPP than on merit. Few have adequate legal training or are considered impartial. Moreover, in blatant contravention of constitutional provisions regarding the separation of powers, the Minister of Justice - a government official - controls the judiciary.

Underlying this problem has been the inability of the King to effectively guarantee the independence of the judiciary as called for by the Constitution. In the face of a tendency by certain officials to interpret his every action as 'political interference', the King has consistently refrained from exercising his legitimate powers to the extent that is possible. Instead, he has been content to make general proclamations calling for human rights to be respected or expressing his disapproval of unfolding political events. The King's ability to check abuses of power has thus been greatly undermined and the monarchy's future role in Cambodia's political life is being called into question (see box below).

The monarchy's future public role: to reign but not to rule?

By Chea Vannath

Cambodia's monarchy has undergone many changes over the years, with the 'universal sovereigns' and 'absolute rulers' of the past giving way more recently to King Sihanouk's 'constitutional monarchy.' Even though his formal political role has been reduced, Sihanouk remains a powerful and stabilizing force in Cambodian political life and has been regularly called upon by both Cambodia's politicians and international leaders to resolve recent crises. Sihanouk's role in promoting the negotiations which culminated in the 1991 Paris agreements was decisive. Following both the 1993 and the 1998 elections, he was prevailed upon to resolve the political deadlock over the formation of the new government.

The monarchy rejected

At the same time, however, the monarchy has often been perceived as a threat by Cambodia's political strongmen. Repeated efforts have been made to eliminate it, starting with King Sihanouk's overthrow in 1970 by his own government, again during the Khmer Rouge era when Sihanouk was under house arrest, and in the 1980s when the ruling State of Cambodia regime resisted efforts by armed groups, including the royalist faction founded by Sihanouk, to overthrow it.

Even though reinstated as King in 1993, Sihanouk has since been politically marginalized. Second Prime Minister Hun Sen and other anti-royalists often criticize him for interfering in government activities, while others interpret his reluctance to exercise his full constitutional powers as a sign of weakness. Other members of the royal family - Prince Ranariddh, Prince Chakrapong - Ranariddh's half-brother and Prince Sirivudh - the former Foreign Minister-have also suffered political hardship and humiliation at the hands of Hun Sen, resulting in at least temporary exile from Cambodia. This has been viewed publicly as a campaign to discredit the royal family and to keep it out of politics.

Competing schools of thought

One view of the monarchy is of an antiquated irrelevant part of political life. Proponents of this view want a purely democratic form of government where state affairs are run by elected institutions rather than individuals or privileged groups; all citizens should have equal access to top leadership positions. Moreover, it is argued that rural people remain loyal to the monarchy largely through ignorance and should be educated in the virtues of republicanism. The 1970 coup essentially emerged from the discontent of republicans and intellectuals who accused Sihanouk of autocratically handling state affairs and suppressing dissent by force.

The second school of thought argues that the majority of Cambodians still believe in the monarchy and that to abruptly break the ties between them and the monarchy would prove destabilizing. The people look on Sihanouk, who led Cambodia to independence, as a patriotic leader and the 'father' of the nation. Despite the on-going campaign against the monarchy, public polls indicate that the King remains the most popular Cambodian political personality. Out of respect for the people's will, therefore, Cambodia is likely to remain a constitutional monarchy with the King as head of state.

A non-political role?

If the monarchy is to be retained as the majority wish, certain constitutional articles should be amended to reflect contemporary Cambodian realities. First, many feel that for the monarchy to unify the nation, it requires the respect of all concerned parties. Therefore, it should not get involved in political power struggles or in formal party politics.

Second, succession procedures should be clarified. A crown prince or princess (there is a strong case for women to be allowed into the royal line) should be identified far enough in advance to allow for the grooming of new monarchs and to prepare the people psychologically. Moreover, the title 'Monarch for Life,' as employed in the Constitution, should be modified to allow a monarch to abdicate if he or she should wish. In July 1997, Hun Sen rejected the King's wish to abdicate in protest at Prince Ranariddh's violent overthrow, accusing Sihanouk of insubordination before the supreme law of the land.

As the next millennium approaches, Cambodia's monarchy has a potentially crucial role to play in unifying the nation and promoting peace. For this to come about, however, it needs a clear vision and purpose and must itself adopt a proactive attitude towards reform and adapt to present-day realities. However, it is the Monarchy's very intimacy with Cambodian politics today, which poses the biggest challenge, as it seeks to define a new, more independent role for itself.

Chea Vannath is President of the Center for Social Development, a Cambodian non-governmental organization that seeks to influence public policy and promote good governance. She holds a Master's Degree in Public Administration from Portland State University.

Centralisation of power

In the absence of functioning checks and balances, state power has fallen increasingly into the hands of individuals. This was especially true following the ousting of Prince Ranariddh by co-premier Hun Sen in July 1997. Since that date, no one has been able to challenge Hun Sen who has consolidated control over the government, the National Assembly and the judiciary. He is also the sole commander-in-chief of the armed forces, meaning that political power in Cambodia is effectively controlled by a single individual.

A key consequence of the centralization of power has been the institutionalization of a culture of impunity in Cambodia. Both the powerful who can secure protection and the rich who can afford bribes remain above the law. They are able to secure out-of-court settlements or win law suits even when the case against them is well founded. In short, there are different rules for those with access to political power and those without. Even on issues of interest to the international community, such as drug trafficking and flagrant human rights abuse, Cambodia's powerful remain immune to outside pressure.

Another consequence is that the public service is far from politically neutral as called for by the Constitution. The 'dual' CPP/FUNCINPEC administration which emerged after 1993 was sharply divided along political lines. Even with renewed CPP domination of the bureaucracy, public interest still comes second to party or personal interests. Low salaries have forced public servants to hold second jobs and to extort bribes in order to make a living. With the complicity of corrupt superiors, public positions have in effect often been turned into private enterprises, leaving public servants trapped in a system of patron-client relations with little will or capacity to act in the public interest.

The post-1993 period illustrates that the political notions and practices of an earlier era do not simply come to an end with the promulgation of a new Constitution. Despite their rhetoric of democracy and human rights, the deeds of Cambodia's leaders have not matched their words. They pledged not to use violence to settle disputes, but have done so. They promised free and fair elections, but have not respected the will of the people. And to appease and divert attention from the real issues at stake, they have launched populist campaigns to liberalise laws on gambling, drinking and prostitution.

A 'social' check on power?

The mixed messages Cambodians are getting from their leaders have left many in a quandary. Cambodians are all too aware that, in the past, backward attitudes have carried their country to the brink of ruin. At present, this is stifling both social progress and economic development, the benefits of which many Cambodians have become accustomed to in recent years. Yet as they seek to push for political change, they are constrained by apathy, a lack of knowledge about how to act and social norms which do not encourage questioning of the status quo.

Following UNTAC's departure in 1993, a great burden was placed on Cambodia's young civil society to safeguard the fledgling democracy. Cambodia has little tradition of civil associations, however, and despite the recent proliferation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) involved in human rights monitoring and democracy education, the ability of civil society to 'discipline' the government remains limited. Though many civil associations embody and practise democratic values through their activities at a grass-roots level, civil society initiatives fall far short of the unity or the influence needed to ensure that the state upholds these values.

To conduct advocacy and represent people's interests with any real influence requires a certain autonomy which, as the case of the press shows (See box below), is still very limited. Many NGOs still rely heavily on international groups, or the government itself, for both funding and technical expertise. Though the government has been relatively tolerant of NGO activities in recent years, restrictive legislation under consideration during 1998 would reduce NGO freedom dramatically if adopted.

Moreover, even though political activism is increasing, many Cambodians are still content to accept the status quo or lack options to challenge it in the context of the extreme political and economic uncertainty gripping the country. Cambodians have become increasingly conscious of being poor or powerless, either inside or outside the ranks of the powerful and privileged. As a consequence, they are torn between acquiescence and action, between the urge to move up in the ranks of the privileged and protect personal or family interests and the moral obligation to challenge perceived injustices.

Drawn into the political maelstrom: Cambodia's nascent press

By John C. Brown

In common with other sectors of Cambodia's emerging 'civil society', the press has not remained immune from the country's culture of personality politics and patronage. During and after the UN intervention in Cambodia, a virulent opposition press emerged. Some 150 papers have been in operation at one time or another since 1993. When publication rates peaked, just before the July 1997 crisis, six dailies were publishing. In contrast, before the UN arrived, there were only seven government publications and no daily, private, or opposition press.

Freedom without responsibility

This dramatic expansion of the Khmer press stemmed not simply from political liberalisation but from a greater tolerance of unregulated private behaviour even when it had public consequences. Cambodia still is, it has been said, a country of very few formal liberties but a great deal of anarchic freedom. Attacks against reporters have occurred in recent years, and many suspect government involvement. For the most part, however, the print press in Cambodia has exercised its freedoms without constraint and, regrettably often, with little responsibility.

As desktop publishing equipment and newly-developed Khmer language fonts have become more available, private printing houses have proliferated. However, with the market for Khmer newspapers small, dozens of Khmer-language papers competing for sales and revenue from advertising limited, most newspapers have been dependent for survival on political patrons.

Khmer newspaper publishers are most attentive to the market created by the competition between political parties and personalities. Newspapers have published articles supporting opposition politicians, one or the other of the ruling parties, personalities within various parties or the King. With the exception of the minority royalist or republican papers, these newspapers are not ideological. Their focus is not primarily on the use of policy, but rather on the possession of power and who should or should not have it.

Patron politics

In this context, Khmer newspapers are criticized - to some extent rightly so - for being politically biased, inattentive to fact, and for failing to distinguish appropriately between factual reporting and opinion. That does not mean, however, that these newspapers cannot and do not also address serious issues, even as they help to further the political aims of their patrons, promoting political division even as they despair over the violence such divisions might produce.

Publishing peaked during each of the three political crises which preceded the July 1997 events. Newspapers attacked their political opponents, often slandering them through unsubstantiated and unfair accusations or fabrications. Across the political spectrum editors worried about a breakout in fighting even as they predicted it and, at times, threatened it. But as they wondered how political difficulties could be settled peacefully, it was clear - whatever the settlement - that their patron or party had to come out on top.

Apart from their political relationships, however, editors also worried about leaders who could act without constraint, about political competition that was not channelled into peaceful confrontation, and about the build-up of armed bodyguard units bound by loyalty to their political patron but outside the law. They wondered whether there was something wrong with a Cambodia that was seemingly continually faced with crisis. Though these newspapers had not developed a shared consensus for what constitutes professional journalism, they did share a concern for peace in Cambodia.

Regulation without democracy

In the West, the press is an important part of the formal organization of democracy, exercising vigilance on behalf of an often inattentive and sometimes uncaring public. While it is criticized for its failure to do that job properly, the important fact is that shared - though often conflicting - conceptions of what the press is, what it might be, and what it should be, do exist. It is in light of these, sometimes contradictory images that its role is debated, criticized and shaped in mature democracies.

That such a press has not materialized in Cambodia should not be surprising. The remarkable post-UN proliferation of newspapers was made possible by democratic-like conditions (a political environment that was free, though intermittently - but never systematically - oppressive), but also by a Khmer political culture of personality politics and patronage. Until Cambodia's political competition is channelled into democratic confrontations, a consensus of opinion on the role of the press and how it should be regulated will be slow to emerge.

John Brown works at the Cambodian Mine Action Centre in Phnom Penh.

The risks of democratic tyranny

There is growing popular awareness in Cambodia today, as demonstrated by the public demonstrations following the 1998 elections, that direct action can lead to political change. Yet it is also clear that for political change to be meaningful and sustainable, a simple change in government is not enough. The conservative values underlying Cambodian politics must also give way to a more constructive emphasis on dialogue, compromise and mutual gain. In the absence of progress, democracy in Cambodia risks being simply a cover for a continuation of personalized rule and the abuse of power.

Cambodia's leaders can no longer hide behind the language of democracy and must realize that their people are more politically aware than ever before in their history. They realize that genuine democracy is not simply about how a government is elected, but about its goals. These must include a more competent and independent judiciary, greater equality before the law for all citizens, and the protection of constitutional freedoms and liberties. These goals are the yardstick by which Cambodia's people will henceforth measure their political leaders. Pursuing these goals is also the only way to consolidate Cambodia's fragile peace.

Top | Cambodia | Contents