Committee for Conflict Transformation Support |
CCTS
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Conflict, Trade and Economic AgendasDr David Keen, Reader in Complex Emergencies at the London School of Economics, examines here the interaction between the economy, the private sector and violent conflict The most common view of war and trade, at least until rather recently, has been that war is very bad for trade, and trade is very bad for war. In other words, war disrupts trade - by disrupting production, distribution and purchasing power; and at the same time trade is seen as making war unlikely - because it creates prosperity and because, according to the free trade school and the likes of Richard Cobden in the nineteenth century, for example, trade means the countries and businesses acquire such an interest in peaceful conditions that war becomes unlikely. War does indeed disrupt many kinds of trade and financial flows, while trade and commerce do indeed create important vested interests in favour of peace. An example at the international level, perhaps, is the concern of France and Russia to maintain some kind of relationship with Iraq, which owes them large amounts of money - though we have seen attempts by the US in particular to buy off those with financial interests in Iraq. I want to focus on some of the ways in which trade may feed into conflict. First, patterns of trade may fuel the grievances that fuel wars. A classic example is the seizing of land in much of Latin America for export production, for example, coffee. This laid the basis for long-term political struggles over land. The discovery of oil has often added fuel to separatist movements in oil-rich areas, for example in Sudan and Nigeria and even Scotland. In a great number of countries, trade and investment have not served to promote a widespread distribution of economic resources. Instead, we have repeatedly seen a kind of pact between foreign interests (notably multinational) and local elites. Under these implicit pacts, foreign interests have obtained local resources cheaply, while local elites have been well compensated personally and perhaps assisted in the maintenance of various kinds of autocratic regime. This system has clearly contributed to resentment and sometimes rebellions. Eventually, the corruption and acquisitiveness of local leaders can go so far that the treasury lacks the resources even to suppress rebellion. William Reno has brought out this dynamic in Sierra Leone. And the classic case of such a predatory state was Mobutu's Zaire, where Mobutu grew rich on copper, diamonds and cobalt, while the country as a whole stayed extremely poor. Second, and this is my main focus here, trade may also fuel war by providing incentives for violence and the means of carrying out violence. Making money as a means of making war may mutate into making money as an end in itself. The aim in a war is not necessarily to win. The aims in a war may mutate from the political to the economic, and perhaps back again. Significantly, and this is something noted by Valpy FitzGerald (2001), war expenditure is not always as high as you might think. A major part of the reason is predatory behaviour of various kinds. This can produce a bizarre situation where a government looks good precisely because it is waging an abusive and predatory war. In Sierra Leone in the early 1990s, civil war raged but inflation was bizarrely low. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund were impressed by this financial management of the military regime. But the low inflation reflected, in part, the fact that soldiers' predatory behaviour was helping to take the burden of war from the treasury and to make the war 'self-financing'. The case of conflict in Sierra Leone brings out clearly the importance of accumulating resources (as well as the desire to limit conflict) (for example, Keen, 2001). In a bizarre pattern, government soldiers in the early and mid-1990s were observed attacking civilians, engaging in illegal diamond mining, dressing up as rebels, selling arms to rebels, and co-ordinating movements with rebels so as to minimise clashes and maximise the exploitation of civilians. Many of the rural recruits to the army might equally have joined the rebels, under slightly different circumstances. Sending this kind of rag-tag army to diamond-rich areas to suppress a rebellion was a recipe for disaster. In peace negotiations just before the hand-over to democratic rule in 1996, witnesses reported something distasteful in the warmth with which allegedly opposing commanders embraced each other. Government soldiers and rebels - who made a joint coup in the capital Freetown in May 1997 - shared important interests not just in preserving systems of economic exploitation that had flourished under the cover of war but also in preventing recriminations or prosecutions under a democratic government. Significantly, the pattern of 'sell-game' during civil war in Sierra Leone has been a variation on a peacetime phenomenon. Collaborative conflict can be seen as a mutation of peacetime corruption, particularly in relation to the diamond economy. Prior to the outbreak of war in 1991, state officials repeatedly participated in the smuggling they were supposed to be suppressing. Anti-corruption drives proved again and again to be a fertile ground for extending corruption. Meanwhile, the corruption of government officials helped to ensure, first, a lack of genuine development in Sierra Leone (including a collapse in education) and, second, a lack of treasury revenue to suppress either smuggling or the growing discontent engendered by precisely this lack of development. This case seems to show how some peacetime processes are not necessarily a million miles from wartime processes and how a weak state can encourage and shape conflict. Although the prominence of economic agendas has been presented as a characteristic of 'new wars' (for example, Mary Kaldor), it is perhaps more accurate to see their prominence as associated with weak states, whether new or old. It's partly the role of weak states in shaping contemporary conflict that led Martin Van Creveld to suggest that there has been a return to the patterns of conflict of the Middle Ages when weak states were the norm. Diana Lary's study of Chinese 'warlord soldiers' in the early twentieth century shows how soldiers were selling arms to bandits and sometimes 'defeating bandits' by absorbing them. At the same time as the bizarre cooperation in Sierra Leone, the early and mid-1990s saw another kind of 'sell-game' - this time in Cambodia. After the Paris peace agreement of 1991, exporting timber and gems through Thailand helped the Khmer Rouge to resist UN pressures for disarmament. At the same time, Cambodian government officials and especially the armed forces had become heavily involved in the logging business, helping to denude Cambodia's forests. In 1994, the Defence Ministry was awarded the sole right to licence timber exports and to all the revenue received from those exports. All this gave the armed forces, particularly senior officers, a powerful interest in not eliminating the Khmer Rouge altogether, and the army in fact winked at timber concessions in areas they knew would provide funding for the Khmer Rouge. Between 1994 and 1997, elements of the army came to arrangements with the Khmer Rouge over the control of economic resources in respective areas of influence, and even co-operated in exporting, and in getting the best prices for, some commodities. Some soldiers were even reported to be selling armaments to the Khmer Rouge (Berdal and Keen). In 1996 a series of high-level defections appeared fatally to weaken the Khmer Rouge. As Shawcross shows, the threat by the US Congress to impose sanctions on countries aiding the Khmer Rouge eventually seems to have prompted Thailand to close the border in late 1996. This created incentives for Thai officials, military officers, and gem and log traders on the ground to deal directly with elements of the Cambodian government, in turn, encouraging defections from those elements of the Khmer Rouge that had benefited most from doing business with Thai officials. In other words, the defections were, at least partly, linked to 'the Cambodian government's ability to win the Thai gem and log traders to its side'. Ieng Sary and his supporters were offered a pardon and access to lucrative gem and timber concessions within the Cambodian government system (Shawcross). In Peru, the beneficiaries of continued conflict have included army officers stationed in areas where they were supposed to be suppressing both the drugs trade and the Shining Path. The army tolerated and taxed drug shipments. And army officers repeatedly released captured guerrillas (for a ransom), apparently seeking to perpetuate low-level conflict in drug production areas - thereby legitimating their continued, and highly profitable, presence in these areas (Simpson). I mentioned the pursuit of financial orthodoxy in Sierra Leone while soldiers upcountry conducted an abusive and 'self-financing' war. It's well worth looking at the 'Report of the Panel of Experts' on the Congo, April 2001. Zimbabwe lowered its defence budget at the very time when its troops were entrenching themselves in the Congo. Large profits from the cobalt, copper and diamond mines in Congo are thought to have gone to members of the Zimbabwean government and army. Zimbabwean officials have also benefited from defence contracts to supply the Congolese army. Uganda has attracted particularly favourable comment from International Financial Institutions (or IFIs). Uganda agreed with the IFIs to limit defence spending to 2 per cent of GDP. But again, its troops have been mining the war economy of the Congo. Meanwhile, donors have been praising Uganda for increasing its tax revenues, much of which has actually come from taxing logging coming out of conflict zones in the Congo. As for the Rwandan government, it explicitly describes its military activities in the Congo as self-financing. Rwanda and Uganda have been held up by Britain in particular as rare examples of good governance in Africa, and have received strong support. An added complication, which has been noted most forcefully in relation to Zimbabwean troops, is that many soldiers know they are HIV-positive and have come to rely on the profits of the Congolese war economy for continued supplies of the expensive drugs they need to control the disease. The April 2001 Panel of Experts Report states that the number of conventional battles between rival armies in the Congo has tended to decrease over time, with increased attention being paid to economic exploitation. Where there has been conflict, it has been mostly in areas rich in cobalt, copper, diamonds. The report also gives evidence of Ugandan commanders inciting violence between rebel groups, apparently so as to remain in regions rich in gold and coltan. Of course, there is every reason for Rwandans to make every effort to prevent a repetition of the 1994 genocide, and there is no doubt that many genocidaires took refuge inside the Congo. But an October 2002 UN Panel of Experts report says that while Rwanda claims to have stayed in the Congo to hunt the Hutu Interahamwe militia responsible for the 1994 genocide, in fact this is serving as cover for its army's desire to strip minerals. The Observer newspaper also made an investigation and found many diplomats, fighters, aid workers and refugees reporting that Rwandan soldiers were cynically prolonging their stay in the Congo and collaborating with their supposed enemies. Tactics appear to include stalling on the disarmament of the Interahamwe, exaggerating the numbers of Interahamwe in the Congo who took part in the genocide, persistently making little effort to engage the Interahamwe in battle, and even selling arms to the Interahamwe. One Rwandan trained rebel fighter said his orders were no longer to pursue the Interahamwe. 'Rwanda came here to fight the Interahamwe but its objectives have changed. These days, we only pretend to fight them - it's all politics.' (Astill; see also International Crisis Group, 'Storm Clouds over Sun City'). So here one gets a very sinister picture - not entirely dissimilar to the dynamic in Sierra Leone where the RUF has sometimes apparently been maintained as a useful threat that justifies abuses by parties other than the RUF. Rwanda has been withdrawing troops from the Congo, but some observers note that arrangements are being made to continue economic exploitation - for example, through the use of sympathetic militias. Let me sum up some of the means of making money in the 'war economies' that have grown up around so many contemporary conflicts. These war economies have often centred round particular regions controlled by rebels or warlords and linked to international trading networks. A war economy may involve, for example, extracting benefits by means of pillage, extracting protection money, controlling trade, exploiting labour, controlling land, appropriating aid, or through institutionalised benefits accruing to the military (such as salaries). It may also involve smuggling people and it may include remittances from an ÚmigrÚ community. ('War economy' is sometimes taken to include all the economic activities - legal and illegal - during a war.) It is helpful to distinguish different kinds of economic activities:
Even where trade in a particular sector or commodity is not more profitable under conflict, conflict can allow new groups to move in on the profits (see, for example, Martinez). These are often young armed men. Various militaries have been particularly adept at using conflict to preserve their political and economic privileges and to forestall democracy. It is difficult to think of a country with serious ongoing conflict where the military does not have some kind of involvement in the drugs trade. Trading profits in wartime usually have an international dimension. When it comes to portraying disasters and disaster-response, a common focus in the media and in aid-agency discourse is on the humanitarian intervention, usually depicting the West as (potential) saviour. However, we also need to be sure to ask: what are the interventions that are already taking place before the aid ever arrives. For example, what are the flows of resources from a disaster area, and the flows of arms into it? The profits of warfare may include loans raised on the basis of future revenues - for example, the Angolan government has repeatedly raised loans on the basis of oil deposits and the rebel UNITA movement on the basis of diamond deposits. This finance can be very destabilising. James Fairhead shows how in Congo/Zaire foreign mining interests quickly deserted Mobutu and started funding Laurence Kabila's rebels when Mobutu's number was up. The interaction of internal and external interests can also be seen in Afghanistan. Local religious, political and economic agendas have continually been complicated by external interests helping to fund conflict. For example, Russia and Iran have for some time been backing the anti-Taliban coalition, to a large extent because they have been interested in preventing the construction of a pipeline that would take oil and gas from the Caspian sea region across Afghanistan to Pakistan. Conversely, Pakistan's support for the Taliban was until fairly recently backed by the United States, which was hoping to isolate Iran from the oil supply (Iran being the quintessence of evil until recently) and to assist the commercial interests of the Saudi-US company Unocal, in which George Bush senior has had a significant interest. Falling support for governments and rebels from the Cold War superpowers has often fed into an increasing emphasis on funding fighting through internal predation (Jean and Rufin). One example is the predatory behaviour of the rebel group UNITA - cut off from Cold War funding - in Angola. In Afghanistan, it appears that most of the foreign aid and armaments supplied during the Cold War to the government and to mujahadeen resistance units were actually sold off to obtain liquid funds. With the end of the Cold War, the Afghan government found itself unable to pay for its militias, leading to the breakdown of government in 1992 and a period of more or less rampant warlordism in 1992-96, when a variety of warlords used their trading connections with neighbouring countries to pay their militiamen and fund their violence. (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, Iran). Conrad Schetter argues that looting not only promised immediate profit but helped maintain a general feeling of insecurity, underlining the necessity for the continued existence of combat units to protect particular areas and groups. It seems to have been the Taliban's ability to offer a more stable environment for traders - and a lesser number of militia checkpoints for traders to pay their way through - that helped make the Taliban regime possible and helped to raise the resources with which the Taliban could incorporate some of these militias into its own armed forces. Conversely, the sudden collapse of the Taliban which you will remember from the aftermath of September 11th and the US bombing of Afghanistan - was partly the result of the speedy desertion of many of these forces (see, notably Schetter). There seems to be a difference between rebel movements with coherent political ideologies who feel the need to attract civilian supporters by undertaking reforms in areas they control and by limiting abuses of civilians - on the model of Mao - and on the other hand what we might call warlords, whether in early twentieth century China (as discussed by Lary) or contemporary West Africa, who have a more purely predatory agenda and often move from one area to another, forcibly extracting resources as they go. Philippa Atkinson has suggested that Charles Taylor's system in Liberia owed something to both models, and to some extent he was concerned to construct a viable economic system in areas he controlled, limiting outright abuses - perhaps helping to explain how he could actually win a Presidential election (see also Olson on 'stationary' versus 'predatory' bandits, and discussion in Mkandawire, 2002). Contemporary conflicts have often taken on a paradoxical quality. A concern with economic accumulation has often prompted actions that are counter-productive from a purely military point of view. This really underlines the point that war is not only about winning. One of these counterproductive actions is selling arms to the other side (see, for example, Thomas de Waal and Gall's book on the Russian army selling arms to rebels in Chechnya). Another paradoxical act is economically-motivated raiding that predictably radicalises its victims and encourages support for a rebel group. In Sudan, for example, northern Sudanese militia raids on a variety of groups preceded and helped to create their affiliation with the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (Keen, 1994). Similarly, attacks on civilians by the rebel Revolutionary United Front predictably alienated the very civilians that the rebels said they were trying to recruit and represent. Meanwhile, government soldiers' violence against civilians impeded any government efforts to win hearts and minds in the war against the RUF. One thing it's important to stress, I think, is that the emergence of violent criminal economies is a global phenomenon that may be here to stay, rather than an aberration in the third world that can be dismissed as temporary and marginal. Mark Duffield suggests that Africa is usually regarded as facing a problem of development and Eastern Europe and Russia as facing a problem of transition. Both are seen as progressing, haltingly, towards a liberal democratic future. Complex emergencies themselves are often seen as a temporary deviation from normality, a substantial hiccup on the road to liberal peace. But it is worth stressing that certain kinds of contemporary disorder are proving extremely durable, particularly since various kinds of illicit global trade are often successfully confronting states that lack the ability or will to control such trading. These states are not only in war-affected countries but also in neighbouring countries where the profits from smuggling may defeat and corrupt any government attempt to rein in a transnational war economy. Collapsing states have sometimes created space for new kinds of transnational conflict, with foreign countries backing factions within the collapsed state, and often getting an economic return. Examples include Congo/Zaire and Afghanistan. These strategies have political as well as economic dimensions. Institutions in the West - for example, multinationals and banks - are also likely to have some involvement in these war economies. The role of Swiss banks in the German war economy has recently been highlighted. The profits of plunder have to be put somewhere. A contemporary parallel is the role of Singapore - another country with in some ways a squeaky clean image - in banking the proceeds of Burma's destructive opium trade as well as supplying the Burmese military and lobbying on the government's behalf within the UN and the regional group of states known as ASEAN. Attempts to rein in Western corporations involved in war economies can be seen as driving business elsewhere. A good example are the recent attempts to prevent diamonds from conflict zones from being traded in the Belgian diamond market, and fears that this could drive business towards Israel and India. Countries with little or no money laundering legislation can be used as an entry points to global financial markets. Luxembourg and Austria have been among the main centres for money laundering. Lebanon's status as a key financial centre was battered by its own civil war, but has been restored, partly by making sure that the banking system offers extreme privacy for its clients and by extension a refuge for money that may be tainted (Addison et. al.). Cyprus has also benefited in this way. Again, regulation can be an economic threat. So there is a real question here about state sovereignty and the extent to which it still exists. Underlining the point that it is dangerous to draw a rigid line between war and peace is Manuel Castells' argument in his book 'End of Millenium' (which I recommend), the argument that the new criminal networks in Russia were formed in the 1987-93 period for the sake of proceeding with the pillage of Russia (in large part through privatisation). There was a wild competition to grab state assets. The partial criminalisation of business in Russia has been linked to the transition from a command economy to a market economy operated without institutions (banks, accounting systems, means of enforcing contracts) that organise and regulate markets. The process has been accelerated by the collapse of state agencies, which became unable or unwilling to control this criminalisation. In Russia, weak institutions for enforcing market transactions have fed into violence and a demand for private security. At the same time, the poor pay and redundancies in the state security sector have created an abundant supply of people ready to exercise various kinds of force on behalf of private clients. Again, there is a connection between the criminal economy and a weak state. But the state is not totally weak; indeed, individuals have used their bureaucratic positions and connections to carve out profitable spheres in a process of mass privatisation. The Russian criminal economy is linked up with global markets - through money laundering, currency speculation, and selling off oil, other precious minerals and weapons. Significantly, the globalisation of financial markets and the speed of financial transactions has assisted in money laundering, often giving criminal organisations the upper hand in their battle with more geographically-constrained national security services, among whom co-operation and information-sharing have not always been well developed. At the same time, some criminal organisations have also exploited strategic international alliances with each other. Organised crime like drug trafficking demands some kind of penetration of the state, intimidating and bribing politicians, judges, officials and journalists. In this sense, crime may be embedded in the law. The economist Paul Collier, head of research at the World Bank, has also been working on economic agendas in civil wars. Collier basically argues that recent conflicts have been driven overwhelmingly by greed rather than political grievances. The attention to international trade networks is potentially helpful. But Collier takes the 'greed' perspective to an untenable extreme. Collier chooses a number of proxies he sees as likely to produce economically-motivated violence (for example, heavy reliance on exports of primary products, low education levels) and a number of proxies for grievance (for example, economic inequality), and then finds that the first set of proxies are much more closely correlated with the occurrence of civil wars than the second set. Key reasons why grievances in themselves do not often lead to rebellions, he suggests, are variations on the collective action problem: in particular, the perception that participating in a grievance-led rebellion, especially in the early stages, carries a lot of personal risks and that the optimum outcome is that other people rebel on your behalf - a preference that doesn't operate when violence is bringing immediate pay-offs. I'll mention four main criticisms of Collier. First, grievances have not gone away just because ideological conflicts are less in evidence. Collier goes so far as to say that it is pointless asking a rebel group about their grievances since rebels will always emphasise grievances even when their motivation is greed. It is almost as if economics is trying to abolish politics, sociology and anthropology, and to declare: no more listening required! Yet if we follow this approach we may be left with a lot of numbers and very little real understanding of conflicts. As Mark Duffield has observed, the Collier/World Bank research tends to delegitimise protest. It could be a neat way to obliterate the grievances of anyone unhappy with the status quo. One should keep in mind the long and not very glorious colonial traditional of dismissing every rebellion as criminal. Second, some of Collier's conclusions rest on a rather dubious selection of proxies. Why, for example, should low literacy levels be taken as a proxy for 'greed' (as in Collier) rather than for 'grievance'? The case of Sierra Leone shows that deficiencies in education can be a major grievance, and those who take the trouble to listen will learn this soon enough. A third problem with the Collier analysis is the lack of attention to the manipulation of conflict by ruling elites for profit and power. Collier touches on this problem only extremely briefly. His whole weighing of greed and grievance focuses on rebel movements, even though governments and government forces may do as much to propel and deepen civil conflict. This includes the use of conflict by elites to make money and to suppress opposition. A fourth, related point is that we really need to understand how greed and grievance interact. Mechanistic, economistic analysis begs a number of vital questions. If economic goals are important, under what circumstances are they pursued through violence? What is the role of institutions in influencing these decisions? To the extent that violence is seen as rational, what were the conditions that led violence to be seen as rational? In many ways, it is odd that research emanating from the World Bank even uses the word greed. The pursuit of economic self-interest has been lauded and encouraged by the World Bank, and market ideology may feed into a desire to acquire commodities through violence if they are not obtainable by peaceful means. Suddenly, what had previously been lauded is now implicitly condemned as 'greed'. Looking at the political economy of war, and the functions of war, is relevant to debates about sanctions. If rulers are benefiting economically from the manipulation of shortage and politically from the suppression of dissent under conditions of conflict, then generalised sanctions may actually help them. Many in Serbia argue that Slobodan Milosevic and his cronies actually courted international sanctions, which reinforced a sense of siege in Serbia and increased the profits of trading controlled by this clique. A similar argument can be made in relation to Saddam Hussein David Keen ReferencesAddison, Tony, Philippe Lebillon and S. Mansoob Murshed, 2001. 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