

Dear Readers,

This issue begins with an article by Paul Clifford on peace talks between the Government of the Philippines and the Revolutionary Workers Party of Mindanao. Then follows an account of a workshop to explore the similarities and differences between micro and macro conflicts, written by Francesca Cerletti and Susan Morris. Next comes an article by Neles Tebay, about the violent conflict in West Papua and the need for restorative justice there. The final piece is a collection of brief reflections from Diana Francis on issues and dilemmas related to dealing with the past.

Peace Talks between the Government of the Philippines (GRP) and the Revolutionary Workers Party of Mindanao (RPM-M)

by Paul Clifford

History

Probably the best known conflicts in Mindanao are between the Government and Islamic groups. The conflict between the Government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) led to the setting up of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The conflict between the Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) continues to this day with Peace Talks taking place in Malaysia.

What is less well known is that the Government has been engaged in violent conflict with various Revolutionary Communist groups for the last thirty years or so. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) is still engaged in armed conflict with the Government. In the 1990s a breakaway group from the CPP was formed: the Revolutionary Workers Party of the Philippines (RPM-P). A further breakaway group from the RPM-P was formed in 2000: the Revolutionary Workers Party of Mindanao (RPM-M).

In 2002 RPM-M contacted a prominent Mindanao politician to explore possibilities of entering into a Peace Process with the Government. The leader of RPM-M and the politician approached the then Director, now President of a Development NGO, Balay Mindanaw, whom they both knew and trusted, to help with informal talks.

In July 2003 a formal approach to the Government was made, which led to

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo creating a panel to conduct formal peace negotiations with RPM-M.

Balay Mindanaw, was approached to be the independent secretariat for the Peace Talks. Part of their work was supported by the German Development Service (DED). Balay Mindanaw approached DED to see if they could help with finding a 'peace adviser' to work with them in this process. I was

approached by DED and spent six weeks in Mindanao working on the Peace Process in August/September 2003.

The Peace Process

There are a number of aspects to these Peace Talks that make them quite unusual. Firstly, this is the first time in the Philippines that an NGO has been given the role of Independent Secretariat. Secondly, the talks have all been held locally in Mindanao. Thirdly, and perhaps most unusual, there is a strong development agenda for the talks, which has, so far, taken precedence over the more usual political demands.

One of the key things I learned very early on is the importance of relationship in Mindanao. There are three key people involved in this process locally. The leader of RPM-M (who acts as adviser to their Peace Panel), the chair of the Government Peace Panel (the politician who was originally approached by RPM-M in 2002) and the head of the Independent Secretariat (the President of Balay Mindanaw). It is the strength of the relationship between these three key individuals or 'principals' that has been instrumental in keeping the Peace Process alive, and even to get it started in the first place. Balay Mindanaw had no experience of being involved in peace talks. The trust in the organisation and their Director was the key factor in them being asked to be the Independent Secretariat. They could always buy in someone with experience of peace talks in other places.

Thus the most important thing I had to do initially was to build relationships and trust with the three key principals. When I asked the Director of Balay Mindanaw what he wanted from me, his answer was 'to accompany them on their journey'. In other words, to experience the process with them, to learn as we went along and to offer my thoughts and ideas based on my experience elsewhere and knowledge of other peace processes.

The Independent Secretariat divided its tasks into a number of functions. There was the co-ordinator: the Director. Then there was the Political Settlement Team, comprising qualified lawyers who work in the 'alternative' or NGO sector. Then there was the Development Component Team, comprising development specialists. Then there was the Technical Support team, consisting of NGO staff who would co-ordinate, organise and undertake administrative tasks. And finally there was me as 'peace adviser'.

I spent most of my time with the Independent Secretariat, in one-to-one meetings, larger meetings and the occasional workshop I offered in conflict analysis, strategies and approaches to peace talks. We also had a series of informal meetings with the principals and with RPM-M members and Government staff.

While I was there it was hoped to get a series of documents signed. All the work was done in informal meetings. The formal Peace Talks were just to sign the formal documents and demonstrate commitment from both sides. The first formal Peace Talks were twice postponed but did eventually take place during my visit. At these talks three documents were signed: a Joint Commitment To Pursue Peace and Development, The Rules On The Conduct Of Formal Peace Talks and The Rules On The Conduct of Local Consultations As An Integral Part Of The Peace Process. It had also been hoped to sign an Agreement on a General Cessation of Hostilities, but this was not possible within the timeframe.

As regards the Development component, it was decided that RPM-M would propose 'barangays' or communities where it had a strong presence. The communities themselves would decide whether they would be part of the process. The names of the barangays were submitted to Government, who would vet and approve those to be included. Balay Mindanaw would then organise a community consultation process, using Participatory Rural Appraisal

(PRA) techniques to assist the communities in identifying their priorities. Balay Mindanaw would then write these up as formal proposals which would be taken to a Stakeholders Conference to seek funding to implement the proposals. It was agreed that there would be 100 barangays included in the first round. RPM-M looked upon the consultations as confidence-building measures between themselves and the Government. There were also other issues that RPM-M wanted the Government to take action on, including illegal logging.

It was hoped to get the first round of barangay consultations concluded during 2003. It was acknowledged that there was then likely to be a break in the process, as presidential elections were due in May 2004 and the politicians would be too busy campaigning to focus on a Peace Process.

I stayed in touch with the process from afar. Then in early 2005, I was approached once again by DED to see if I could go out for a further 8 weeks between March and May. All sides had requested my presence to assist with further progress. I discovered that not as much progress had been made as had been hoped for. Consultations had only taken place in 30 barangays and none of the project proposals emanating from the consultations had been implemented. Also there had been no further formal Peace Talks. Furthermore, there had been a complete change of staff in the Government secretariat.

I was asked by the chair of the Government Peace Panel to train their Secretariat staff in conflict analysis, strategy and action planning, which I did. RPM-M was engaged in a process of training its armed wing and cadres and I was invited to participate in the training of their armed wing. RPM-M were undertaking serious consultations with their members about whether to continue in the Peace Process. I was asked to run a training session on my experience and knowledge of armed groups engaging in negotiation processes. I designed the session in consultation with RPM-M and they asked me to focus on the conflicts in Israel/Palestine,

Sierra Leone and Nagorno Karabakh, of which I have experience, and Northern Ireland, of which I have some knowledge. The training took place in one of their camps in a remote area of Mindanao.

While I was there consultations took place in a further 11 barangays and I was able to witness part of that process. It had also been hoped to have a further round of formal talks at which the Agreement on a General Cessation of Hostilities would be signed. While there was further progress made towards agreement, it was not possible to reach an agreed wording during my stay. In effect, a de facto ceasefire has been in operation for the last two years but it is still felt important to sign a formal agreement and for a renewed commitment to be made by both sides to reach a final Peace Agreement.

The situation is further complicated by the attitude of the CPP. They are opposed to RPM-M negotiating with the Government and have threatened to kill the RPM-M leadership (a threat they take very seriously). The CPP also has threatened those taking part in the barangay consultation process. It is not clear who was responsible, but unfortunately three local facilitators involved in one of the barangay consultation processes were killed within days of the process happening. (It is believed that local politicians and military officials with vested interests in the illegal logging operations were responsible for these killings)

It is planned to hold a further round of barangay consultations in June (possibly a further 47, taking the total to 88) and a Stakeholders Conference in September. Progress towards the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities agreement continues.

There are further complications because many perceive the Government to be weak. There are rumours of Ministerial and Army involvement in the illegal logging that RPM-M wants the Government to deal with and they doubt whether the Government has the strength or will to deal with this issue. There is also political plotting against the

Government by an influential group, whom many take seriously. This raises questions about how much it is worth RPM-M investing in a peace process with a Government that may not be able to deliver and may not last much longer. It also raises questions about whether a new Government (if there is to be one) would honour a peace agreement made by the existing Government.

There is thus much that remains uncertain and much that remains to be done. However, a number of things have been achieved already. The very act of holding barangay consultations has helped, in some instances, to bring communities together. The Philippines government has started to

commit financial as well as human resources to the process. The Peace Process is being documented by local journalists and others and a video on the Peace Process is being made, in order that others might learn from this process.

What is certain is that no progress at all would have been made without the commitment and courage of many local people. Attempting to bring peace is often sadly, as we know, a risky business. Three of those involved have already paid the 'ultimate price' with their lives. It is a great tribute to those people who continue to be involved that they do so in the knowledge that they are putting their lives at risk.

Dealing with conflict from micro to macro – a one day workshop, 21st May 2005

by Francesca Cerletti and Susan Morris

Peace Direct organised this workshop to draw new people into the realm of dealing with conflict and peace building. The event explored the similarities and differences between the appearance and treatment of conflicts on the micro and macro levels, looking at personal, group, community, national and international conflicts. The event was well facilitated by Ruth Musgrave of Conflict and Change and John Lampen of The Hope Project.

There was a great demand for the event and it was quickly oversubscribed. People attended from a variety of backgrounds, including social care, public health, local government, those working and interested in mediation, and peace building, as well as international students of peace and conflict related topics.

Expectations of participants ranged from developing connections with others to learning methods of mediation, and how work at one level may be applied at another.

The facilitators introduced different tools (drawing from Galtung's and the Transcend school of thinking as well as mediation techniques) which can be used to understand the dynamics of conflict and to develop strategies to deal with it. Participants were encouraged to apply them to real case scenarios ranging from the family to the environment to war.

The event was very successful – the key to success being the involvement and enthusiasm of both facilitators and participants. Everyone agreed the event provided a wonderful opportunity for creating and renewing connections with others. We had opportunities to chat prior to the workshop, within the workshop, over a salad buffet lunch and afterwards over a cup of tea and flapjack.

On the whole there were 3 main realisations in the day. They were that:

- There is a ‘moment’ when a decision is made by parties to pursue conflict, or not. Hence the need to ‘capture the moment’.
- Conflicts are chaotic, requiring a structured strategic approach towards resolution. However, the resolution of complex conflictual situations may be facilitated by the effective use of simple tools.
- Skills applicable to a local/‘micro’ context may apply to work in a global/‘macro’ context.

We must thank all those who were involved in this workshop as everyone contributed to making it an enjoyable experience.

West Papua: The Need for Restorative Justice

by Neles Tebay

West Papua conflict and its effects

West Papua (known also as Papua or Irian Jaya) is the western part of the Island of New Guinea, sharing a land border with Papua New Guinea and a sea border with Australia. It has been a land of conflict under Indonesian rule for more than four decades. When Indonesia declared its independence in 1945, West Papua was not part of Indonesian territory, for it remained as a province of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. In the wider context of the Cold War the United States (US) pressured the Dutch to let Indonesia take over the territory. Indonesia began its occupation in 1963, and formalized it through a widely criticized ‘Act of Free Choice’ (AFC) in 1969.

The Papuans’ demand for direct voting by every eligible Papuan was raised before the AFC but was rejected by the Indonesian government with the support of the Dutch, the US, and the UN. Instead, Indonesia applied its method of *musyawarah* (reaching a consensus) where the AFC would be exercised through some representatives. Indonesian troops immediately took control of the territory, selected 1,025 representatives out of 800,000 Papuans, without the presence of the UN team, intimidated the hand-picked representatives, and threatened them into joining Indonesia. These representatives were not even given freedom of choice through the international practice of voting. In a coercive situation only 175 people out of 1,025 representatives were permitted to make an oral declaration. They were ‘instructed’ in this by the Indonesian authority as the coordinator of the AFC. Not too surprisingly they

unanimously voted to join Indonesia. The result of this fraudulent AFC was only ‘noted’ by the UN, leaving doubt as to its legality in international law. So the Dutch, the US, the UN, and the Indonesian government were collaborative in denying systematically the fundamental right to self-determination of the Indigenous Papuans.¹

The Papuans considered the AFC was simply a sham, a whitewash and little more than a farce. Therefore they have always demanded a genuine exercise of the right to self-determination. However the Indonesian government continues to claim that the AFC was conducted in a democratic and transparent way. Since the UN approved the result of the AFC they claim that West Papua is an integral part of Indonesia’s territory.

¹ See John Saltford, *The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 1962-1969: The anatomy of betrayal*, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.

The Papuans' demand for the right to self-determination is then mistakenly interpreted as separatist by the government. To eradicate the Papuan separatists the government has been conducting military operations.

Between 1967 and 1985 the government conducted a series of massive military operations, including *Operasi Sadar* (Operation Consciousness, 1965-1967), and *Operasi Tumpas* (Operation Annihilation, 1983-1984). Their names give some indication as to their deadly intent.²

Beginning in August 2004 a fresh military operation has been conducted in the Puncak Jaya district. At least some 6,000 Papuans from 27 villages have taken refuge, and been starving, in the jungle; 15 people including 13 children died in a refuge camp. The whole region is closed off. Humanitarian workers are not allowed to visit the region.³

Although no independent investigation has yet been conducted, some local and international human rights groups estimate that at least a hundred thousand Papuans have been killed by Indonesian security forces. Many other Papuans have been victims of torture, intimidation, and arbitrary detentions. Many Papuan women have been victims of sexual abuse. In every military operation, food gardens are also destroyed; domesticated pigs are killed; people's houses and church buildings are burnt down; and Papuan men, women and children are massacred.

Having conducted research on human rights violations in West Papua, the American Yale Law School confirms that the historical and contemporary evidence strongly suggest that the Indonesian government has committed proscribed acts with the intent to destroy the Papuans. The Military have engaged in widespread violence and extra-judicial killings and subjected Papuan men and women to acts of torture, disappearance,

rape and sexual violence, thus causing serious bodily and mental harm. Many of these acts, individually and collectively, clearly constitute crimes against humanity under international law.⁴

The Papuans are now being marginalized demographically, owing to the influx of Indonesian migrants, who belong to the Malay race and are mainly Muslims. In 1969, the population of 800,000 was predominantly Papuan. In 2001, of the 2.2 million people in West Papua, there were approximately 800,000 migrants and 1.4 million indigenous Papuans. The number of migrants has increased by the government-sponsored programme of transmigration, which is partly funded by the World Bank. From 1964 to 1999 nearly 250,000 households – or over 500,000 Indonesian migrants – have been settled in Papua, living in more than 200 settlements or villages built by the government. Other newcomers have been 'spontaneous migrants' who have flooded into West Papua trying to escape poverty and hoping for a better existence than that on offer in overcrowded western Indonesia. They have settled in all of West Papua's major towns. Two-thirds of the population in the major towns are now Indonesian migrants, whose number goes on increasing. If this trend continues, within a few years the Papuans, who are a tiny minority in Indonesia, will also be a minority in their own land.

Until 1999 at least, the migrants dominated government offices and political and social organizations. Almost all the economic activities were monopolized by the migrants. The migrants excel in trade, services, construction and contracting in all the towns. Indonesia's notorious capacity for corruption, collusion and nepotism, as well as the collaboration between the government officials and the migrants, strengthens the

² For more detailed information about the military operations conducted in West Papua, see Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, *West Papua: The Obliteration of a People*, London: Tapol, 1988.

³ See the joint appeal issued on November 23, 2004, by three Churches in West Papua.

⁴ See Elizabeth Brundige et al., *Indonesian Human Rights Abuses in West Papua: Application of the Law of Genocide to the History of Indonesian Control*, Paper prepared for the Indonesian Human Rights Network by the Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, Yale Law School, November 2003.

migrants' economic position. The Papuans, who suffer from a severe lack of training and access to capital, are economically marginalized. They live a largely cashless existence of subsistence farming, gathering and hunting, and many are dependent on forest products for their livelihood. Despite the forest's many profitable natural resources the Papuans remain very poor.

Papuans have also been victims of Indonesia's cultural oppression: a cultural alienation manifested largely in the programme of 'civilization'. Papuans suffer the denial of Papuan cultural identity, expression and traditional land rights, and suffer from a psychological repression resulting from 'the presumption of incompetence' and generally being looked down on by the migrants. In addition, and critical to their traditional culture and sustainable life style, their forest is being destroyed by the Indonesia's legal and illegal logging industries, supported or protected by Indonesian security forces.

The various forms of Indonesia's oppression against the Papuans have generated suspicions, divisions, and conflicts between the Papuans and the government, between Papuan tribes, between religions (Christian-Muslim), and between races (Papuan Melanesian - Indonesian Malay) in West Papua. As of today, Indonesian military operations continue to be conducted. The perpetrators of human rights violations are not only protected by impunity to any legal sanction but are even considered as national heroes. The Papuans, by comparison, are not even considered as human beings but as 'separatists' who should be eradicated. Consequently many more Papuans will become victims of human rights abuses.

In such a context, Restorative Justice⁵ is deeply needed. This may offer a way to mend the broken relationships, restore the damage, heal the wounds, and prevent further crimes in West Papua.

⁵ For a simple explanation about the principles of Restorative Justice, see Howard Zehr, *The Little Books of Restorative Justice*, PA: Good Books, 2002.

Conflict Resolution through Restorative Justice

The first and determining step towards a peaceful settlement in West Papua, through the process of Restorative Justice, is that the Indigenous Papuans and Indonesian government must both commit themselves to being constructive.

Second, the stakeholders of the West Papua conflict are the Papuans as victims, the Indonesian government and military as offenders, and various institutions of civil society, amongst them being church, indigenous peoples councils, NGOs both local and international. Each of them has a significant role in the process of restoration through Restorative Justice.

Third, the Papuans should be empowered to describe how they experienced the crimes against them and what needs to be done for them to feel that their wounds are healed; and they further need to be engaged as participants in a 'problem-solving' process. They could be accompanied and supported in this by various institutions of civil society, such as the local and national NGOs, international aid agencies and other INGOs, religious institutions and the Papuan tribal chiefs' council.

Fourth, the Indonesian Government and its military need to be encouraged to describe the whole truth about the crimes committed, to comprehend its consequences, and then make things right as far as this is possible, and particularly to participate in repairing the harm to the victims. The inter-governmental organizations, such as the European Union, the Pacific Island Forum (PIF), the ASEAN, and the UN, could play their role in encouraging the government to reveal, acknowledge, and address the harms and causes of the crimes perpetrated by its forcible annexation and occupation of West Papua. The establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission could be helpful in achieving these ends.

Fifth, representing the international community, the UN, or a UN-appointed state or institution, could facilitate meetings between the various parties. These could be localized 'peace talks', whose aim is to prevent any continuation of the immediate crimes perpetrated during military operations, or a full, all-inclusive dialogue between the Papuan people's representatives and the Indonesian government, to discuss how the past and current injustices could be acknowledged, equity restored and a future conflict-prevention policy agreed and implemented. The UN would then play a vital role in ensuring that both parties keep their agreement.

Sixth, applying Restorative Justice principles, those parties involved in the 1969 AFC should reveal the truth about their conduct. The Papuan representatives, who were selected by the Indonesian authorities, should be given the opportunity to reveal their experience of 'participating' in the AFC. The Indonesian government should give an honest account of how the AFC was held, and the Dutch, the US, and the UN should review their respective conduct in relation to the AFC. An international

institute, or an independent state acceptable to all parties, could facilitate a reconciliation meeting to reveal the whole truth of the AFC and then to seek a democratic and peaceful settlement.

Unless a peaceful settlement is reached, through a process of Restorative Justice, the West Papua conflict will remain unsettled and consequently many more Papuans will become victims, not only to Indonesian military operations but also to the many other oppressions of occupation. A Restorative Justice approach is urgently needed in order to ensure the survival of the 1.4 million Papuans, now under the threat of ethnic extinction among 220 million Indonesians.

About the author

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Dealing with the Past: Issues and Dilemmas

by Diana Francis

The following is a collection of thoughts (in no particular order) that arise from work undertaken under this heading. They are not necessarily original and are not intended to detract from received wisdom on what is necessary to reconciliation. Rather they acknowledge the difficulties and complexities related to them.

- There is no such thing as pure conflict resolution in complex socio-political contexts. It is impossible to take power in the negative sense (the power to hurt in some way) out of the equation. Specifically, deals have to be dealt with or between those who have the power to make the violence continue. Typically, it is 'the men of violence' who are represented in peace negotiations and who can deliver an end to hostilities. They will want to protect their power and position, if possible, or at least their life and liberty. They are unlikely to sign up to an agreement that lands them in court under charges of human rights violations or war crimes.
- The operation of this kind of power also means that the 'justice' that is delivered after wars is usually that of the victor, where there is one, whose own crimes go unaddressed.

- Victims of human rights violations and war crimes, often marginalised and abused before the fighting, are typically excluded from the ‘peace process’, except in so far as they are instrumentalised by others as moral levers or bargaining chips. They have no say in decisions about impunity and their victimisation (for example rape or displacement) exposes them to further suffering, abuse and exclusion. Their needs in the post-war context tend to be ignored, as they were before the war began.
- In this regard, as in others, gender plays a key role. Typically, more attention and resources are given to the reintegration of combatants than to the support of affected civilians. And the needs of female ex-combatants, whose future is exceptionally difficult, are not addressed.
- At the same time, when it comes to the needs of those who are traumatised, the psychological condition of combatants and the extreme trauma of fighting (and particularly of killing) are largely ignored. Levels of domestic and social violence, vagrancy and suicide are high among ex-soldiers.
- The urgent needs of the present, for survival, stability and development, make ‘dealing with the past’ a difficult focus in the early aftermath of widespread violence, psychologically, politically and logistically – even sometimes for those who have been particular victims of the violence.
- The need for achieving continuity in social administration and services may be at odds with agendas for holding to account all public servants associated with past abuses.
- Boundaries between guilt and innocence may not be clear. Victims may also be perpetrators, and vice versa, and there will be varying degrees of collusion as well as hierarchies and degrees of participation.
- Judicial or quasi-judicial processes – dealing with crimes – is but one aspect of dealing with the past, which also involves addressing the structural inequities, hostile attitudes and violent cultures that contributed to the conflict, as well as the violence of the conflict itself.
- To achieve reconciliation it is necessary to address the broader schisms in society. This in turn implies changes in attitude, in individuals, towards each other, and wide participation in re-establishing inter-communal connections and relationships ‘on the ground’, as well as addressing (through government rhetoric, the media etc.) broad public perceptions through shifts in the public discourse.
- The more participation in political and social life before the conflict, the better the chance that it will have taken place without violence. And the more participation at any of its stages, the easier it will be to have participation in the next stage. Specifically, if there has been public participation in building a peace constituency and negotiating the peace, this will help put in place what is needed for building the peace, including dealing with the past.
- Although information about and acknowledgement of what has happened may be very important to victims and to society, many aspects of ‘truth’ will remain contested. The reconstruction of any shared sense of history is likely to be difficult and to take much time. (This has direct implications for the education system.)
- Collective memory and memorials are part and parcel both of acknowledgement and of historical construction.

- Some people and cultures in any case choose 'social forgetting' as their preferred way of dealing with the past, prioritising the re-establishment of the social fabric and avoiding the re-living of traumatic events. They may use symbolic forms of closure to achieve this, preferring to bypass legal processes.
- Human beings need to make sense of their lives in one way or another. If this psychological or spiritual dimension is not acknowledged and included in our thinking about dealing with the past, we shall not 'reach the spot'.
- It is an awkward reality that what seems to be necessary to collective agendas for restoring integrity or justifying their action – the return of refugees, the prosecution of criminals etc. – may not be what restores meaning or happiness to the lives of those who have been victims. Letting go of 'justice' may give them a better chance of a new life.
- For those who have been victims, letting go of their victim identity, or developing other identities to accompany it, will improve their chances of future reintegration and fulfilment. Victims are not served in the long term by remaining in a psychological ghetto. However, when all your life expectations have been smashed, you may need help in developing any kind of positive perspective for the future and in finding meaningful and dignified roles in society, as well as an adequate livelihood.
- What is done cannot be undone. No-one can 'make it OK' for a person who has seen her parents butchered or has been raped in front of them. It is a harsh fact of the human condition that we can do irreparable harm to each other. That is why the search for non-military ways of handling human conflict, and efforts to build nonviolent structures and cultures, are so necessary and urgent. The violence of a specific conflict is part of the global reality of violent behaviour, structures and culture: of a militarised world. Until that changes the violence of the past will be repeated in the violence of the future.

CCTS: Participating Organisations

Conciliation Resources, London

Quaker Peace & Social Witness, London

Responding to Conflict, Birmingham

War Resisters International, London

Centre for Study of Forgiveness & Reconciliation, Coventry

St Ethelburga's Centre for Reconciliation and Peace, London

International Alert, London

Peace Direct

Article19, London

Saferworld, London

International Fellowship of Reconciliation, Alkmaar

Richardson Institute for Peace Research, Lancaster

Conflict Analysis and Development Unit, London

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