The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective

Five years on from the Rome accords, Mozambique remains politically stable despite formidable levels of poverty and social dislocation. For those seeking to address armed conflict elsewhere, the country's negotiation process and the lasting agreements reached merit close study. This issue returns to key aspects of the Mozambican peace process. It shows how the initiatives driving the parties towards a negotiated settlement were diverse and complex and that the importance of each varied greatly through time. It also illustrates how the ending of the Cold War, the transition to majority rule in South Africa and other unexpected developments added vital momentum to the Mozambican transition. In emphasising dynamism, unpredictability and the broader historical context, the issue highlights the difficulties of 'crafting' political settlements to armed conflict. At the same time, it underlines that key forces favouring peace exist at all levels of societies which can and should be harnessed.

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Cover Photo: A father poses with his child at the Savane accommodation centre for mutilated Renamo veterans.
Credit: Ernst Schade/Panos Pictures

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Acronyms

AACC All Africa Council of Churches
AIM Mozambique News Agency
ANC African National Congress
CCM Christian Council of Mozambique
CIO Central Intelligence Organisation (Rhodesia)
CR Conciliation Resources
CSC Supervisory and Monitoring Commission
FADM Armed Forces for the Defence of Mozambique
FAM Mozambique Armed Forces
FLS Front Line States
FPLM Popular Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique (later FAM)
Frelimo Mozambique Liberation Front
GPA General Peace Agreement
GD Dynamising Committees
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IMF International Monetary Fund
JVC Joint Verification Committee
MID Military Intelligence Directorate (South Africa)
MNR Mozambique National Resistance (later Renamo)
OAU Organisation of African Unity
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
ONUMOZ United Nations Operation in Mozambique
Renamo Mozambique National Resistance
SADCC Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference
SADF South African Defence Force
SISE State Information and Security Service
SNASP National Service for Public Security
UN United Nations
UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WCC World Council of Churches
ZANLA Zimbabwean National Liberation Army
ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union
ZNA Zimbabwe National Army
Since the early 1980s, Mozambique has undergone a series of remarkable transitions. Where powerful neighbours once strived to destabilise the country, they now seek to guarantee and gain from its stability. Commercial interests long helped to drive Mozambique’s destructive war, but later bank-rolled efforts to end it. The churches, once marginalised from state affairs, subsequently came to play a key role in reconciling the warring parties. Guerrilla warfare and terror tactics were key opposition strategies, yet the former rebels operate today in the mainstream of parliamentary politics. Where a luta continua (the struggle continues) was the government’s Marxist battle-cry, its rhetoric is now infused with political and economic liberalism.

Five years on from the negotiated settlement which brought to a close 30 years of near-continuous warfare in Mozambique, the country remains remarkably stable. The transitions underpinning this stability merit close study by those with an interest in how armed conflicts in other countries can be prevented or resolved. While recognising that Mozambique’s story is by no means complete, this issue of Accord documents its slow retreat from war, drawing on the benefits of hindsight and a variety of local perspectives. The articles highlight that the 1992 settlement, while made possible by the ending of the Cold War and the demise of apartheid, was ultimately engineered through the diverse initiatives of a wide range of state and non-state actors.

Stepping Stones to a Durable Settlement

Martin Rupiya’s introductory Historical Context piece argues that attempts to resolve Mozambique’s civil war need to be understood with reference to the broader historical and external context in which the post-colonial state was formed and sought to develop. In the years following Mozambican independence in 1975, government attempts to consolidate power and legitimacy created significant grievances among many Mozambicans, especially in the rural areas. With Rhodesia and, later, South Africa bent on exploiting and exacerbating these tensions, the principal drivers of Mozambique’s war moved beyond its borders. Only a decade and a half later would conditions finally be right for a workable, intra-Mozambican settlement of the conflict.

The gradual evolution of the Mozambican peace process and the roles played by key national and international actors are detailed in the Chronology and Key Actors sections towards the back of the issue. The primary texts of the political settlement are laid out in the centre pages. Broadly speaking, Mozambique’s transition from war to peace can be broken down into five phases, the last of which is ongoing.

The first phase was between 1983 and 1985 when the Frelimo government first sought to end the war by signing the Nkomari non-aggression pact with South Africa and entering into a series of talks with Renamo in Pretoria. These talks were destined to fail due to South African duplicity and pressure brought to bear...
on Renamo to halt the dialogue. Nevertheless, this period marked the beginning of intense regional diplomatic manoeuvring which over the next ten years would alternately promote and hinder the search for peace in Mozambique. In *Ideological Shifts, Economic Imperatives*, Fernando Gonçalves examines the interests of key regional actors throughout the Mozambican crisis and describes how they were gradually disentangled from the strictly internal dimensions of the war.

It was only following the onset of military stalemate between the government and Renamo during 1987/88 that a negotiated settlement became a real possibility. This marked the beginning of a second phase during which President Joaquim Chissano began to heed the Mozambican churches’ persistent calls for dialogue and encouraged leading clerics to make contact with Renamo. While two rounds of talks in Kenya in 1989 between the churchmen and the rebels made little concrete progress, they forced Renamo to articulate its political demands for the first time and confirmed there was a desire on both sides to achieve a non-military solution to the war. In *A Calling for Peace*, Bishops Dínis Sengulane and Jaime Pedro Gonçalves give a unique account of their own role and that of the Mozambican churches in initiating and nurturing the dialogue between Renamo and the government.

Parallel overtures were also made to Renamo in the late 1980s through key individuals in contact with its internal leadership. Presidents Daniel arap Moi of Kenya and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe facilitated early communications with the rebels, mediated the Nairobi talks, and encouraged the Mozambican government to engage in direct dialogue with Renamo. At the same time, recognising that international support for his Marxist regime would continue to decline, and keen to establish early control over the process of political liberalisation which had to occur, Chissano initiated a far-reaching programme of constitutional reform. This would provide a crucial framework for the upcoming negotiations and the eventual drafting of a peace settlement.

The direct negotiations between the Frelimo government and Renamo which began in July 1990, hosted by the Sant’Egidio Catholic lay community in Rome, marked the start of the third phase. Coinciding with the dramatic political transition occurring in South Africa, a devastating drought throughout the Southern Africa region, and the ending of the Cold War, this phase proved a critical watershed in the peace process. After 12 — often tortuous — rounds of negotiations, the General Peace Agreement (GPA) was signed in Rome on 4 October 1992.

While the Rome talks are not examined in detail in this issue, Alex Vines’ *The Business of Peace* offers a fascinating, little-known story of the build-up and background to these events, focusing on the dynamic role played by ‘Tiny’ Rowland, chief executive of the UK-based multi-national, Lonrho. Vines highlights how, despite favourable external circumstances, the ‘political will’ to reach a final settlement could only be mustered through intense international pressure, regional diplomacy and the provision of significant financial incentives to both Renamo and the government.

Although the signing of the GPA formally ended the war, the events which followed have been no less crucial to its long-term success. Implementation of the GPA, overseen by the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), was the fourth phase in the peace process which concluded with the holding of multi-party elections in October 1994. During this phase, the presence of ONUMOZ helped build Renamo’s confidence in peace and allowed it to transform itself from a guerrilla army into a political party. Despite Renamo’s initial boycott of the elections, successful mediation efforts by regional leaders and the United Nations ensured that the rebels would proceed with the polls and, once defeated, accept their loss gracefully.

With the post-war political and economic aspirations of many Mozambicans still unfulfilled, the ‘consolidation’ phase of the peace process, which followed the departure of the United Nations in 1994, remains precarious. The eagerness of soldiers to
demobilise and reintegrate into peace-time society, along with the spontaneous return of hundreds of thousands of refugees from neighbouring countries, has confirmed a deep and generalised feeling of conflict fatigue among the population. While this has served to safeguard the new political dispensation, the widespread availability of light weapons around the country and the acute tensions surrounding the reconstruction process mean renewed violence is an ever-present threat.

Alcinda Honwana’s *Sealing the Past, Facing the Future* emphasises that the overwhelming urge for peace and reconciliation in Mozambique cannot be fulfilled unless the individual traumas and communal rifts stemming from the war are confronted and addressed. Recognising the costs and limitations of state and internationally-sponsored healing initiatives, she argues forcefully that rehabilitating Mozambique’s ravaged social fabric will depend, to a large degree, on cultural and institutional resourcefulness at the local level.

**Lessons for peace-building**

Because the Mozambican peace process has been unique in many ways, it does not offer a blueprint for other war-torn countries engaged in the search for peace. There are, nonetheless, a range of useful lessons that can be drawn from Mozambique’s experience.

- The war between Mozambicans was inextricably linked to conflicts with and among neighbouring states and to the Cold War. Efforts to thrash out the differences between the government and Renamo were severely constrained as long as outside factors continued to influence local war dynamics. Separating the internal and external interests driving the war took a long time. However, as outside military support to both sides declined in the context of the global shift toward neoliberal economics and ‘democratisation’, the parties had little choice but to negotiate.

- Multi-track initiatives were important in bringing about and sustaining dialogue between the Mozambican parties. The agendas of church mediators, state actors and individual peace brokers were not always compatible, and co-ordination was often lacking. Nonetheless, the diversity of initiatives ensured that once the peace process gained momentum, it was rarely allowed to flag. If the Mozambican case shows anything, it is that key forces favouring peace exist at many different levels of societies which can and should be harnessed.

- Once direct dialogue became feasible, the choice of third-party mediators was especially critical in building a climate of trust and confidence between the government and Renamo. Mario Rafaelli, Archbishop Gonçalves and the two Sant’ Egidio representatives had the credentials to mediate due to their long-standing familiarity with Mozambican issues and because they were well known to one or both belligerents. Whereas mediators are often chosen for their ability to apply leverage on parties in order to advance the negotiations, the strength of the Rome team was its very willingness to bear patiently with the quibbles, doubts and stalling tactics of the various parties while keeping them focused on the ultimate objective of forging an agreement.

- Key personalities also played critical roles in hastening a negotiated settlement, though they were far from disinterested players. Businessman ‘Tiny’ Rowland’s regional network of high level contacts, along with the seemingly endless resources at his disposal, made him an important matchmaker, marriage councillor, bank manager and travel agent. His involvement almost certainly quickened the pace of the peace process, as did that of Zimbabwe’s President Mugabe. Mugabe was instrumental in ‘summitising’ and ‘Africanising’ the peace process when the remaining areas of contention between Renamo and the government fell beyond the
negotiating capacities of their representatives in Rome.

- The Mozambican case underlines the crucial need for peace-making initiatives to come to terms with the underlying, often hidden, factors driving armed conflicts. From the early stages of the peace process, both sides agreed on the principles of ending the war and establishing reconciliation. Negotiations revolved therefore around who should govern and how state resources should be distributed. With the war, especially in its latter stages, sustained by the significant economic gains enjoyed or desired by groups on both sides, it became almost inevitable that aid packages and other financial incentives would be needed to cajole the parties into reaching a final settlement. The Italian government, which backed Sant’ Egidio’s mediation efforts, understood this well and was willing to provide generous incentives to move the process forward.

- While little pressure has been exerted on the warring parties to account for their past political blunders and human rights atrocities, ‘reconciliation’ in Mozambique seems to have proceeded remarkably well. The sustainability of such an approach remains questionable, however, even if the absence of any public calling-to-account has not so far undermined political stability and the reconstruction process. Many Mozambicans do not even know where the bones of their murdered relatives lie and, while the present generation may cherish stability over vengeance, there is no guarantee that their children will feel the same.

Consolidation or Reversal?

Mozambique’s political settlement holds today due to the diverse interests which coalesced over the 1980s in favour of peace. Continued stability and further reconciliation depend, however, on how far the present reconstruction process addresses the abject poverty and political divisions which helped precipitate the war, while dealing with the new tensions and traumas it engendered.

Thus far, there have been immense difficulties in translating political stability into tangible socio-economic benefits at all levels of Mozambican society. In the face of the social and physical devastation visited upon the country during 30 years of war, recovery was bound to be difficult and prolonged. Mozambique remains one of the most aid-dependent countries in the world, however, and the international role in the post-war rebuilding process must also receive scrutiny.

The ambitious political and economic reforms underway have not always been suitably tailored to Mozambique’s special circumstances. The harsh, orthodox economic policies imposed by international financial institutions have been insufficiently flexible to avoid creating further vulnerability among ordinary Mozambicans, many of whom also grumble that “democracy does not fill our stomachs”. While international assistance has gone far in cementing co-operation between Renamo and the government, it has yet to expand sufficiently the economic opportunities available to a range of social groupings including youths, ex-combatants and women, especially in Mozambique’s rural communities. As long as this situation persists, the possibility of discontent politicising and erupting violently can not be ignored.

Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson and Alex Vines, Conciliation Resources, January 1998
Mozambique’s 30 years of conflict and attempts to bring about a lasting peace are best understood within a broad historical and international framework. From the initial stirrings of nationalist sentiment under Portuguese colonial rule, through the immense developmental challenges facing the newly-independent state, to the subsequent war of destabilisation waged by the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) and its backers, efforts to find peace have remained largely out of the hands of Mozambicans themselves. With the signing of the October 1992 peace agreement, this started to change. Given the desperate state of the country’s social and physical infrastructure, however, ongoing efforts to consolidate the peace continue to depend greatly on long-term international assistance.

The Struggle for Mozambique

Although Mozambique was under varying degrees of Portuguese influence from the 15th century, systematic colonial rule only took root in the early 1900s. With the decline of the slave trade a few decades earlier, Portugal established sugar and cotton plantations in Mozambique, and developed a domestic textile industry. These commercial activities were not tremendously successful, however, and Mozambique’s formal economy soon became dependent on remittances from migrant labourers and on the transit of goods between its land-locked neighbours and the Indian Ocean. The country was dominated by the British chartered companies and other foreign concessionaries at large in Southern Africa in the early years of this century. It was only after 1941, when the last of the company charters lapsed, that Mozambique was first governed as a single economic and administrative unit.

In 1951, Mozambique became an overseas province of Portugal which, unlike most other colonial authorities of the time, stated it would never decolonise. Echoing this claim, the words Aqui é Portugal — Here is Portugal — were emblazoned in the black and white mosaic pavement outside the city hall of the capital Lourenco Marques (renamed Maputo after independence). In tune with other minority white regimes of the time in
Southern Africa, Portuguese Mozambique was also segregated along racial lines. Strict qualification criteria ensured that less than one per cent of black Mozambicans became full citizens.

In 1962, Eduardo Mondlane united various nationalist groups to form the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo), the first concerted opposition to colonial rule. In 1964, with radical African, Arab, Eastern European and Chinese aid, Frelimo launched an armed struggle against the colonial regime. In subsequent years, the movement suffered considerable political infighting which resulted in a series of violent internal purges. In 1969, the party was further destabilised by the assassination of Mondlane in Dar-es-Salaam. Despite persisting internal problems, the new leader, Samora Machel, quickly consolidated control over Frelimo and its military fortunes gradually improved.

Frelimo's expansion in the late 1960s from its strongholds near the Tanzanian border into the north-western province of Tete, represented a major psychological blow to the Portuguese. In response, the colonists launched Operation Gordian Knot in 1970, their biggest ever counter-offensive, complete with the use of napalm and ‘scorched earth’ counterinsurgency tactics. During this campaign, the rural poor were treated very harshly and many were forcibly relocated to tightly controlled settlements known as *aldeamentos*. In December 1972, Portuguese commandos massacred hundreds of civilians in an attack on the village of Wiriamu in Tete province. In an attempt to bolster its position, the colonial regime also sought to draw South Africa into the war and to create a white buffer zone across the region, involving its powerful neighbour in the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric project on the Zambezi river. By April 1974, however, domestic disillusionment over the colonial wars in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau culminated in a military coup in Lisbon. For Mozambique, the Portuguese revolution precipitated the near immediate withdrawal of the 60,000 colonial troops based there.

In response to the coup, and fearing black rule, colonial hard-liners seized the radio station in the capital Lourenco Marques (late Maputo), calling for a Rhodesian-style
Historical Context

Unilateral Declaration of Independence. This achieved little more than spark riots in the black suburbs, however, and on 7 September 1974, the Lusaka Accord was signed, formally ending colonial rule and handing power to a Frelimo-dominated transitional government. The speed of this settlement caught Frelimo by surprise. With little military success in the cities and advances in many rural areas slowing, some rebel leaders had predicted ten more years of armed struggle before independence could be achieved.

A Brave New Dawn?

On 25 June 1975, Samora Machel became president of the independent People’s Republic of Mozambique. Even by the standards of post-colonial Africa, however, the Republic was a markedly fragile entity. Physical infrastructure was not extensive and much of what did exist had been established only recently to support the colonial war effort. Much of the Portuguese professional class also fled at independence, leaving the economy and the state administration in the hands of inexperienced Frelimo cadres with little formal training. Over 90 per cent of the population was illiterate, while widespread sabotage by embittered ex-colonists further undermined the country’s ability to rebuild.

In the midst of political and administrative disarray, Frelimo asserted its own vision of national unity, swiftly consolidating one-party rule and implementing a range of other measures to limit opposition and establish control over the populace. Several opposition leaders, along with Frelimo dissidents, were immediately arrested and sent to ‘re-education camps’ in the far north. There were reports of torture and other mistreatment at some of these camps, little of which is discussed publicly today. Dynamising Committees (GD) were later set up, exercising extensive powers to supplant traditional authorities in the rural areas and to send ‘unproductive’ urban residents for re-education. The National Service for Public Security (SNASP) was also established, a secret police service with sweeping authority to detain those suspected of anti-state activities. Finally, there was a crackdown on religious groups. The Roman Catholic church, judged to have allied itself with the colonial regime, was especially targeted, though an estimated 10,000 Jehovah’s Witnesses were also despatched for re-education.

Large-scale social development programmes were simultaneously launched throughout the country to pave the way for a radical transformation of the social and material bases of Mozambican life. Privately-owned schools, hospitals and missions were rapidly nationalised, the number of primary school students doubled in just seven years, while the number of health clinics quadrupled within the decade, winning great international acclaim for the new government.

At Frelimo’s 3rd Party Congress in February 1977, the liberation movement was formally transformed into a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party with a mission ‘to lead, organise, orientate, and educate the masses, thus transforming the popular mass movement into a powerful instrument for the destruction of capitalism and the construction of socialism’. ‘Mass democratic organisations’ were set up to mobilise and ensure Frelimo control of workers, women, youth and journalists. Mozambique also established links with the Soviet Union and with Eastern European countries which provided essential political and military support.

Despite its nationalist rhetoric, certain groups received preferential treatment under the new administration and tensions sharpened in some rural areas. State farms, mainly large estates abandoned by the Portuguese, received massive investment, while peasant production for local markets fell into sharp decline. The resentment generated among rural people was heightened further by Frelimo’s largely compulsory ‘villagisation’ programme. Although the proportion of the peasant population living in communal villages never exceeded 15 per cent, this programme and the parallel marginalisation of traditional authorities provided a political environment ripe for exploitation by Frelimo’s opponents. With Rhodesian forces and internal opposition groups stepping up attacks on the government in the late 1970s, the army
further promoted the communal villages for their counter-insurgency value. This allowed greater control over the rural population, but reminded many of the colonial aldeamentos. This led to increased ambivalence and hostility towards the government which exacerbated the civil conflict.

Neighbourly Terror

Since the late 1970s, the principal group opposing the Frelimo government has been the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR, later Renamo). This group was formed in 1977 by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) in the face of President Machel’s growing support for the Zambabwean National Liberation Army (Zanla), and his enforcement of United Nations sanctions against the Rhodesians. In its early years, Renamo comprised soldiers who had fought with the Portuguese during the colonial war as well as Frelimo dissidents. Its initial objectives were to destabilise the Mozambican government and provide intelligence on Zanla guerrillas operating within its borders. In pursuing these aims, Renamo initially enjoyed limited grass-roots support and did not pose a serious military threat to Frelimo. This changed, however, after 1980.

With Zimbabwe’s transition to majority rule, control of Renamo was handed over to the South African Military Intelligence Directorate (MID). After a year or so of relative calm, while the South Africans reviewed and reoriented Renamo operations, the Mozambican war began to escalate dramatically. South Africa’s aims in revivatising Renamo were to counteract Mozambique’s support for the armed opposition to apartheid, and to block landlocked Zimbabwe’s access to the sea through Mozambique, thus increasing South African dominance of the regional economy. Under the tutelage of the apartheid regime, Renamo’s strength quickly increased from 500 to 8,000 fighters. By 1982, the rebels were active in most of Mozambique and posed a serious military threat to Frelimo. This changed, however, after 1980.

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While South African support for Renamo was reduced following the 1984 Nkomati accord, a change in strategy allowed the rebel group to continue functioning. Immediately after the agreement, the South African military covertly airlifted huge quantities of arms to Renamo bases inside Mozambique and advised the rebels to adopt new insurgency tactics. Rather than relying on rear bases in South Africa, Renamo would now have to provision itself from the local population. It would also need to increase efforts to conserve arms and ammunition and to replenish its supplies from captured weaponry.

As part of this strategic reorientation, Renamo restricted its conventional military operations to key strategic areas and began to concentrate increasingly on ‘soft’, civilian targets. In seeking to control and instil fear in rural populations, they became particularly well-known for mutilating civilians, including children, by cutting off ears, noses, lips and sexual organs. These tactics were part of a standard terrorist strategy intended to advertise the rebels’ strength, to weaken symbolically the authority of the government and to undermine the rural production systems on which Mozambique depended. A central aim was to destroy transport links, health clinics, schools, and all other infrastructure that represented social security and government provision.

The Nkomati Non-Aggression Pact

In 1984, Mozambique and South Africa signed the Nkomati Non-Aggression Pact which was meant to lay the groundwork for a cessation of hostilities. In exchange for South Africa halting its support for Renamo, Mozambique would close down ANC military operations from its territory. A series of South African-mediated negotiations also took place between Frelimo and Renamo in an attempt to reach a lasting settlement to the war. However, these talks quickly collapsed under pressure from the South African military and other groups. While Frelimo largely stuck to the terms of the Nkomati accord, the South Africans did not, publicly conceding in 1985 that ‘technical violations’ had occurred. By the year’s end, it was clear the Nkomati initiative had failed.
With bands of rebels dodging direct engagement and with morale fading fast, the Mozambique Armed Forces (FAM) stood little chance of maintaining control across vast areas of territory. By 1986, more conventional Renamo units had also consolidated their strongholds in west-central Mozambique and pushed deep into Zambézia province, routing poorly supplied army units. Stepping up diplomatic activity, the government enlisted Tanzanian and Zimbabwean support to pressure Malawi into closing Renamo bases on its soil. Though this initiative had some success, assistance for Renamo continued to come from various quarters, including elements within the South African government, Portuguese business interests, and evangelical Protestant groups channelling their aid through Malawi and Kenya.

Immediately following their expulsion from Malawi, Renamo units launched their biggest ever offensive along the length of the Zambezi valley. This threatened to cut the country in two and allow the rebels to set up an alternative government in the north. With the support of Tanzanian and Zimbabwean forces, however, the Mozambican army launched a successful counter-offensive which marked an important turning point in the conflict. Hundreds of thousands of refugees were pushed into neighbouring countries, while some of the war’s biggest massacres took place in Inhambane and Gaza provinces. By late 1988, with external support in rapid decline, it was becoming clear to both sides that the war was entering stalemate.

Talking Peace

Under Joaquim Chissano, who became president in 1986, a negotiated end to the conflict was again given serious consideration. In 1987-88, Chissano set in motion a major review of Frelimo’s economic, foreign and civil rights policies, which Machel had been considering before his untimely death. As this review unfolded, it opened the way to a number of reforms, including reconciliation with the Catholic Church and a formal retreat from Marxism.

These developments made possible some preliminary progress in the search for peace. In September 1988, President Chissano met South African President P.W. Botha at Songo in Tete province and secured a pledge to abide by the Nkomati accord which this time was largely honoured. He also gave permission to senior leaders of the Roman Catholic, Anglican and Protestant Churches to open direct contacts with Renamo leaders. This led to a significant breakthrough in February 1989 when church leaders returned from talks in Kenya with a clear message that Renamo too was tired of war and open to negotiations.

At Frelimo’s 5th Congress in July 1989, Marxism-Leninism was officially abandoned as the party ideology and the principle of negotiations with Renamo was also accepted. Meanwhile, throughout the middle months of the year, Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi and President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe facilitated talks between Renamo and the church leaders in Nairobi. In August, the government and Renamo used this forum to outline their conditions for further dialogue. In the event, these declarations highlighted how far there was still to go before direct negotiations would be possible. Nevertheless, they indicated how a measure of will to end the war now existed on both sides.

Nairobi 1989 — Renamo at the Crossroads

After years of guerrilla warfare, Renamo was poorly prepared for civilian life and for the transition to parliamentary politics. Its major challenge was to transform itself from a purely military organisation into a viable political party. To achieve this, the rebels needed to develop a coherent ideology as well as an organisational structure to explain their views. Renamo’s political pronouncements had hitherto been couched in blunt anti-Marxist, pro-capitalist, pro-democracy terms, but its capacity to debate these issues was very limited. Moreover, in exchange for offering Frelimo the benefits of peace, Renamo needed guarantees of security and financial assistance before it would give up fighting.

The 1988 Gersony Report, published by the US State Department and drawing extensively on refugee accounts, blamed Renamo for the worst human rights abuses of the Mozambican war.
Direct peace talks eventually began in Rome in July 1990, hosted by the Sant’Egidio Catholic lay community, which enjoyed the confidence of both antagonists. After five rounds of talks, a partial ceasefire was reached in December. In return for the confinement of Zimbabwean troops along the Beira and Limpopo transport corridors, Renamo agreed to cease its attacks on these strategic trade routes, effectively separating Zimbabwean interests from the Frelimo-Renamo conflict. This ceasefire was seriously weakened within the first month, with violations by both sides, but contacts between the parties continued through intermediaries.

For most of 1991-92, negotiations were stalled in the absence of a formula that would recognise the ‘sovereignty’ of the government while guaranteeing Renamo’s acceptance as a political party of equal standing to Frelimo. As fighting persisted, however, widespread drought and chronic food insecurity in rural areas injected a new urgency into the peace process. Crucially, Renamo’s ability to live off the local population was steadily undermined by the drought. As the rebels were pushed increasingly into a corner, Zimbabwe and other regional powers increased pressure on the two parties to reach a settlement.

After seven more tortuous rounds of dialogue, Chissano and Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama finally signed a General Peace Agreement (GPA) in Rome on 4 October 1992. The Italian government had hosted the talks and given Renamo significant financial incentives to secure its compliance. The United States, Great Britain, France, Portugal and the United Nations had also provided political and technical support, ensuring that implementation of the GPA would have broad international backing. This was crucial because the accord was in many ways flawed. Not only had many practical elements been insufficiently discussed, but both sides lacked the capacity to set up and operate the complex structures required for implementation.

The Perils of Implementation

One week after the signing of the GPA, the United Nations Security Council approved the establishment of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) to monitor and verify its implementation. The first task of the 6,800-strong force was to monitor the withdrawal of Malawian and Zimbabwean troops from the Beira, Limpopo and Nacala transport corridors. ONUMOZ would also be responsible for overseeing the cantonment, demobilisation and disarmament of approximately 110,000 soldiers from both sides, the creation of a new national army, the resettlement of between five and six million refugees and displaced people, and the organisation of elections. Originally scheduled for October 1993, the elections were delayed

President Chissano (left), mediator Mario Raffaelli and Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama announce an impending ceasefire between the warring parties, Rome, August 1992
by one year due to persisting distrust between the government and Renamo and the slowness of ONUMOZ deployment.

While the ceasefire was respected more or less promptly by both sides, cantonment and demobilisation were delayed as neither side wished to give strategic advantage to the other. Renamo sought guarantees that areas under its control would not be over-run by the army, while the government feared the rebels would renege on their agreement as the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgents had recently done in Angola. UN Special Representative Aldo Ajello diplomatically allowed for delays and placated Renamo with frequent high-level visits to its headquarters. In July 1993, this strategy changed, however, as the UN deployment reached full strength and the Security Council hardened its position.

In response to UN pressure, Chissano and Dhlakama met for the first time on Mozambican soil in August 1993. This summit slightly eased political tensions, although new obstacles soon appeared, notably Renamo’s insistent demand for funding to facilitate its transition into a political party. In the face of open signs of Renamo hostility to the UN, and a demand for elections before complete demobilisation, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali visited Mozambique in October to seek a breakthrough. This visit achieved a compromise on sensitive issues surrounding electoral law as well as the cantonment and demobilisation of regular troops.

With conditions in the camps poor and indiscipline widespread, the demobilisation phase was still marked by riots and mutual suspicion and, by late 1994, the national army was only half the strength envisaged in the GPA. Although the shortfall was mostly due to the large number of combatants opting unilaterally for civilian life, both sides also sought to retain a reserve military force, either hiding troops or claiming they were ‘non-cantonable’. In short, there were widespread signs of war weariness, but the threat of renewed violence and banditry remained a serious cause for concern. Although both sides had pledged to disarm completely prior to elections, the UN found it impossible to enforce the over-ambitious commitments made in the GPA.

In the run-up to elections, Dhlakama made increasingly strident demands for a bipartisan ‘government of national unity’ to be formed following the vote. In response, the churches and several Western countries sought to arrange a Renamo/government pre-election ‘deal’ to avert a walk-out by Renamo. Despite two meetings with Dhlakama in September, Chissano continued to reject such a deal. Instead, he offered his rival the status of ‘Leader of the Opposition’, complete with salary and benefits, including a diplomatic passport. Privately, he reserved the right to negotiate a deal, but only in the event of unfavourable election results.

Through October 1994, the government and Renamo waged low-key electoral campaigns. Despite some intimidation in the stronghold areas of both sides, the elections took place peacefully from 27-29 October. Of the 5.2 million registered voters, 85 per cent turned out, despite an abortive day-long boycott by Renamo. In the new 250-seat parliament, Frelimo took 129 seats to Renamo’s 112, with a rightist coalition party winning the remaining nine seats. The presidential election

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**Voting Patterns in the 1994 Elections**

The voting patterns emerging in the 1994 elections gave grounds both for optimism and caution regarding prospects for reconciliation in Mozambique. At the national level, the relative parity between the two parties could lend itself to enhanced political stability nationwide. Regional voting patterns confirmed, however, that the ethnic and regional differences traditionally dividing Frelimo and Renamo will continue to play a key role in post-war politics. In some areas, election outcomes were influenced by calls for tactical voting from community and church leaders. Reflecting a widespread desire for reconciliation, many heeded this call, voting Chissano for president, while backing Renamo for the National Assembly.
saw Chissano re-elected ahead of Dhlakama and other candidates by a slim majority of total votes cast. On 14 November, some days after the United Nations certified the elections ‘free and fair’, Dhlakama formally conceded defeat. A new, all Frelimo government was installed in late December.

A Durable Settlement?

The consolidation of peace in Mozambique depends primarily on how the reconstruction process addresses the profound social divisions, political alienation and poverty that sustained the war for so many years. It is particularly crucial that reconstruction meets the needs of Mozambique’s desperately poor rural populations who, isolated from large urban and economic centres, have so far seen few tangible benefits of peace. The resettlement of some six million displaced people and refugees continues to be a cause for some concern, raising the spectre of severe and persistent land disputes.

In the rush to raise more international funds, however, the hidden and perverse costs of this assistance have not always been sufficiently addressed. While there has been inadequate consideration of whether the economy can effectively absorb such levels of aid, the intervention styles of many development agencies and their inevitable — often unwilling — engagement in local power politics can also undermine the legitimacy and authority of the government. If government administration, social reconstruction and political stability is presently dependent on foreign ‘experts’, this raises the question of who can guarantee these necessities should aid dry up.

While enduring peace ultimately requires the fulfilment of popular aspirations for a better life, much also depends on how Frelimo and Renamo get along. Relations have swung between co-operation and confrontation since 1992, and the government’s recent postponement of local elections reflects and reinforces persistently high levels of mutual distrust. Frelimo’s refusal to grant Renamo a greater role in government signals a shift towards the mode of dominant one-party politics already established in South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. This may, in the short-term at least, open the way to a new era of political stability in Mozambique. However, with less than two years until the next national elections, much will depend on whether the Renamo leadership continues to be mollified within this system.

Women voting in the 1994 elections, Inlugo village, Zambézia Province
As Mozambique is a coastal state bordering five land-locked countries, its ‘transport corridors’ and seaports play a key role in the economy of the whole Southern African region. The strategic significance of Mozambican territory was particularly accentuated during the 1980s due to the economic and ideological struggle between the so-called Front Line States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe), and the apartheid regime in South Africa.

Starting in the late 1970s, South Africa sought to protect its perceived geopolitical interests through a policy of regional economic destabilisation which included at different times supporting and directing operations of the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo). In contrast, Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia were generally close friends of the Mozambican government, though it was Zimbabwe which became its principal ally, in return for the staunch assistance given by the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) during the struggle for Zimbabwean independence. Closely guarding its own national interests, Zimbabwe became a key player in Mozambique’s war and later the regional linchpin of the peace process. Other important players in the region included Kenya under Daniel arap Moi and Malawi under Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda. At different times, these states supported Renamo to one degree or another, and Mozambique’s relations with both ranged from ‘cool’ to openly hostile.

While the political polarisation of Southern African states continued to delay a negotiated solution to Mozambique’s war, the region-wide shift in favour of more liberal political forces in the late 1980s and early 1990s increased the chances of a diplomatic settlement. In this context, the transition to majority rule in South Africa was decisive, easing tensions around the control of the regional economy and depriving Renamo of crucial military backing.

**Total Confrontation**

With the shift to majority rule in Angola and Mozambique in 1975, the buffer zone...
separating apartheid South Africa from independent black Africa was severely threatened. With increasing international calls for economic sanctions against the apartheid regime and growing militancy from the exiled African National Congress (ANC), South Africa felt increasingly under siege. It responded with a systematic policy of regional economic destabilisation. On the one hand, this was intended to raise the cost to the Front Line States of supporting the ANC. On the other, it aimed to force these countries into closer economic co-operation with South Africa, thus bolstering its security and legitimacy.

With the collapse in 1980 of the minority regime in Rhodesia, the crisis facing South Africa intensified significantly. Soon after, the apartheid government took control of Rhodesia’s Mozambican proxy force, Renamo, and integrated the rebel group into its regional strategy. In supporting Renamo, South Africa hoped to force the Zimbabwean army to intervene more actively in Mozambique, thus over-stretching its capacity to deal with political dissidents back home. Pretoria believed this would ultimately force Zimbabwe to normalise relations with South Africa, conferring increased legitimacy on the apartheid regime. As a revitalised Renamo stepped up its activities in Mozambique in the early 1980s, South African military forces also launched their own armed raids in the country, targeting key economic installations such as the Beira oil pipeline.

In the face of continuing violence, Zimbabwe signed the first of various agreements with the Frelimo government in 1980. This gave Zimbabwe a direct role in guarding Mozambique’s ‘transport corridors’, which were economic lifelines for the land-locked country. With a significant Zimbabwean presence in Mozambique, the Front Line States in the early 1980s probably believed the war with Renamo could be won militarily. In time, however, it became clear that the rebels had sufficient external backing to inflict substantial and sustained damage on Mozambique’s railways, ports and external communications. A draining, bloody, protracted conflict was unfolding.

Summit meeting of African heads of state, Harare 1993. From the right Joaquim Chissano (Mozambique), Quett Masire (Botswana), Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe), Ali Hassan Mwinyi (Tanzania)
The Origins of Zimbabwean Military Presence in Mozambique

Although the first Zimbabwean troops were officially deployed in the Beira Corridor in 1982, guerrillas of Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwean National Liberation Army (Zanla) had operated out of Mozambique since the early 1970s and there is evidence that some never left. This arrangement stemmed from an alleged agreement between Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Mozambique’s Frelimo government reached prior to Zimbabwean independence. Through this informal agreement, it is believed that a number of Zanla combatants were permitted to remain in Mozambique after the liberation struggle had ended to help finish off Renamo and to constitute a reserve force should Zimbabwe’s 1980 election results turn out unfavourably for ZANU. The ZANU-Frelimo agreement violated aspects of the 1979 Lancaster House settlement that paved the way for Zimbabwe’s independence. Its existence was not revealed to the commanders of the new Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), which included former members of both Zanla and the Rhodesian army.

A False Dawn

While absolute antipathy for apartheid militated strongly against substantive cooperation with South Africa, circumstances at different times forced many of the Front Line States into unpopular, pragmatic compromises. The 1984 Nkomati Non-Aggression Pact, Mozambique’s first significant attempt to forge peace with South Africa, was one example of this. In the context of sustained Renamo attacks and growing drought in southern Mozambique, President Samora Machel signed the pact in large part to satisfy political conditions placed on the delivery of US humanitarian aid. As an extra incentive, he had also been promised direct negotiations with Renamo who, faced with a loss of South African backing, were thought ripe both for talks and concessions. All aspects of the Nkomati Pact were opposed by Zimbabwe and the rest of the Front Line States, who feared the South Africans were negotiating in bad faith and would not halt their support for Renamo under any circumstances.

In the event, Nkomati did fail, partly because elements within Renamo felt they could win the war militarily, but also because outside interests pressured the rebels to halt dialogue, promising continued military and financial support. Although Foreign Minister ‘Pik’ Botha and others in the South African administration had been in favour of ending the war, later events confirmed that their efforts were undermined by pro-Renamo South African and Portuguese businessmen and by conservative elements within the apartheid government, particularly among the security forces. These hard-line groups would continued to pose a stumbling block to peace in Mozambique until the dying days of apartheid.

In the wake of Nkomati, Renamo adopted more predatory military tactics, systematically targeting rural populations in a bloody bid for supplies and propaganda gains. With little hope of imminent victory, Machel had few options but to consolidate his military position and await conditions more favourable for negotiations. In the meantime, his adherence to the Nkomati pact had allowed food aid into Mozambique and won him the moral high ground for future talks. Nevertheless, within the year, Mozambique would be pushed to the brink of collapse and forced to enlist even more military support from its friendlier neighbours.

Engaging Zimbabwe

By 1985, the gravity of Renamo’s threat to Zimbabwean national security was clear. Sabotage of crucial transportation infrastructure was gradually undermining Zimbabwe’s economic independence, while the increasing possibility of state collapse in Mozambique threatened its political stability. To compound matters, elements within Renamo declared an intention to expand the war into Zimbabwe, with the seeming complicity of opposition leader Ndabaningi Sithole, then in exile in the United States.
In response to the mounting crisis, President Mugabe met President Machel in June 1985 to discuss increased military assistance to Mozambique. In August, he announced in Parliament that maintaining access to the sea was worth committing up to 30,000 troops and by the end of that month, the number deployed along the Beira corridor exceeded 10,000. Initially, the Zimbabweans took up primarily defensive positions but, as Renamo attacks intensified over the next two years, they launched an ‘offensive-defensive’ strategy. By 1987, there were 20,000 Zimbabwean soldiers stationed in Mozambique. To all intents and purposes, Zimbabwe had become a central player in the Mozambican war.

Acknowledging the enormous logistical problems faced by the Mozambique Armed Forces (FAM), the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) had agreed as early as 1985 to undertake limited offensive operations to destroy Renamo bases. Once over-run, these bases would often be handed over for government forces to defend. The FAM was reluctant, however, to deploy troops to guard isolated bases when this left other, often more populated areas, vulnerable to enemy assault. Invariably, the bases fell back into Renamo hands, confirming Zimbabwean suspicions that the FAM lacked the military capacity to match and defeat the rebels.

The Assault on Casa Banana

In August 1985, the Zimbabweans masterminded a major operation to recapture Casa Banana, Renamo’s headquarters in the Gorongosa mountains of central Sofala province. While the operation was successful, with Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama barely escaping capture, the offensive appears to have been planned, paradoxically, to emphasise that the war could not be won militarily. After seizing Casa Banana, the Zimbabweans flew President Machel into the camp to witness for himself Renamo’s high level of military organisation and to consider seriously whether even a combined government/Zimbabwean force could defeat the rebels.

The Zimbabweans also believed at this time that Machel’s generals were deliberately misleading the president to hide their weakness on the ground. While, politically, Renamo was very poorly organised, driven largely by the priorities of outside backers, its military superiority in key areas was clear. Contrary to government propaganda, the rebels’ intelligence and command structures were often highly effective. At the same time, Dhlakama had relatively firm control over many of his fighters, with whom he was linked through communications systems vastly superior to those of the government.

Diplomatic Appeals

While sustaining its draining military engagements, the Frelimo government also pursued diplomatic channels to counter the growing threat posed by Renamo. In 1986, at an emergency summit meeting of the Front Line States in Lusaka, it reviewed security agreements with Tanzania and Zimbabwe, and also with Malawi.

With its trade routes along the Nacala transport corridor under siege, Malawi undoubtedly suffered due to the Mozambican war. Nevertheless, the foreign policy of President Banda was famously idiosyncratic and his country had long harboured Renamo guerrillas on its soil. Like Malawi’s decision to maintain full diplomatic relations with apartheid South Africa, this fact enraged the Front Line States and President Machel, some months before the summit, had threatened to place missiles along the border with his disloyal neighbour. Acrimony notwithstanding, combined pressure from Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Mozambique finally convinced Banda to expel Renamo from his territory. Within the year, rebel incursions from Malawi had reduced dramatically.

In late 1986, both to symbolise its newfound good faith and to protect its economic interests, Malawi deployed a limited number of troops along the railway in the Nacala corridor. At the same time, several Tanzanian units also arrived to protect
Malawi and Renamo

Malawi’s support for Renamo is believed to have been motivated by various factors. On the one hand, President Banda had long subscribed to a peculiar reading of Southern African history which suggested that most of northern Mozambique was rightfully Malawian. It seems that Banda may have hoped that Renamo would orchestrate the break-up of Mozambique, allowing Malawi to reclaim its long-lost territories.

On the other hand, senior figures in Malawi’s military and civil administration are known to have profited substantially from their handling of foreign aid to Renamo and international relief to the million or so Mozambican refugees based in Malawi at the height of the conflict. While the country undoubtedly suffered as a result of the Mozambican war, the narrow interests of these officials clearly diluted Malawi’s practical commitment to a peaceful settlement.

Territory recaptured from Renamo. While Tanzania was a strong supporter of the anti-apartheid struggle and the Frelimo government, it also had its own security interests to attend to. Following their expulsion from Malawi, Renamo guerrillas had launched a series of offensives throughout Mozambique’s northern provinces, and had regularly breached the Tanzanian border.

Zimbabwe also increased its military presence in Mozambique at this time, though its commitment to a negotiated settlement was by now quite firm. Its strategy was to increase military pressure on Renamo to weaken the rebels relative to the government before forcing them into talks. Efforts to persuade the Mozambicans of the necessity of negotiations were also redoubled through 1986, though it was some time before Frelimo would discuss the possibility publicly.

Clearing the Tracks for Talks

On his return from the Lusaka summit, President Machel was killed in a plane crash over South Africa. His replacement, Toaquim Chissano, was Mozambique’s long-serving Foreign Minister who for some time had believed the war unwinnable. While these events opened new possibilities for a diplomatic solution, Chissano did not seek negotiations immediately, believing that conditions were not yet ripe for a settlement at once sustainable and favourable to Frelimo’s interests. On the one hand, the Mozambican army was too weak to guarantee the negotiating strength Frelimo required to control the outcome of talks. On the other, sustained efforts were still required to achieve a broad political consensus behind his negotiation strategy.

With the need for consensus clear in his mind, Chissano immediately held discussions with the top brass of the army and asked them their views on the war. The generals agreed unanimously that the problem was money and that if Chissano authorised an increase in the defence budget, they could still defeat Renamo. The president reluctantly agreed to these demands. As it happened, 1987 did see a critical turning point in the Mozambican war when a major offensive by Renamo and the South African Buffalo Brigade was routed by a combined force of Mozambican, Tanzanian and Zimbabwean troops.

Even as the FAM was regaining the military initiative, however, Mozambique’s allies in the Soviet bloc were increasingly unable to sustain their support. When the generals demanded further budget increases, Chissano told them he would refuse more money and seek a political solution if victory was not achieved by the deadline they proposed. As stalemate set in between Renamo and the FAM, this strategy was vindicated and military resistance to negotiations diminished. Capitalising on his position of relative strength, Chissano tentatively began to pursue indirect contacts with the rebels, enlisting the support of Mozambican church leaders.
By this time, Renamo started to suspect that it too could never win the war and was immediately, though cautiously, receptive of the churchmen.

In 1988-89, regional developments such as Namibia’s transition to independence, the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and the inklings of political reform in South Africa also increased the impetus for negotiations. In June 1988, President Chissano met his South African counterpart, P.W. Botha, to revive an agreement between the two countries and Portugal concerning Mozambique’s Cahora Bassa Dam and its power supply to South Africa. Discussions were also held on the status of migrant workers and the communication links between the two countries. Chissano hoped, with some confidence, that this strengthening of economic links would motivate South Africa to conclusively terminate its backing for Renamo.

In the new spirit of expectation, Chissano travelled across Mozambique to prepare the people for the prospect of negotiations. In the process, he stopped using the propaganda phrase ‘armed bandits’, and began referring to Renamo by name. At the 5th Frelimo Congress in July 1989, he shifted his focus onto Frelimo hardliners, persuading them that Mozambique’s best interests lay in engaging with Renamo politically. Frelimo resolved to liberalise the political system at this Congress, setting the stage for future multiparty elections. This move gained the party the support of international donors, and also secured its control over the political reform process. Despite its wily manoeuvring to marginalise the rebels prior to negotiations, however, many in Frelimo remained fearful of elections. While it had come to power in 1974 with overwhelming popular support, the party had been seriously discredited by its tarnished development record and its inability to protect the people during the war.

### Straining Solidarity

Besides placating his party and his generals, Chissano’s strategy to defeat Renamo politically also required a subtle renegotiation of the long-held alliance with Zimbabwe. The Zimbabweans had long been losing confidence in Mozambique’s military and political capacities and were anxious to ensure their economic interests were protected whatever the outcome of peace talks. As a consequence, from 1988, they began to tolerate, if not encourage, informal contact between Zimbabwean forces and Renamo, and stepped up intelligence operations to determine levels of rebel support within local populations. Such operations were eased by the ethnic and cultural ties between the Shona and the Ndau, the dominant ethnic groups in Zanu and Renamo respectively. They were also facilitated by the absence of formal agreements governing Zimbabwe’s military presence in Mozambique and arrangements for civil governance in the areas surrounding Zimbabwean bases.

Although Chissano himself had actually endorsed contacts between the Zimbabwean government and Renamo as a means of speeding up talks, he was increasingly wary of his ally hedging its bets on future political developments. Tensions heightened after the discovery that the Zimbabweans were keeping captured Renamo soldiers in their camps who were potentially rich sources of intelligence. Nervous of the independent Zimbabwean agenda developing in Mozambique, Chissano called for a more formal, regulated relationship to shore up the alliance and ensure Zimbabwe’s actions remained in concert with his own government’s interests. While his demands were understandable, Mozambique remained heavily dependent on Zimbabwe’s military presence and President Mugabe continued to exploit the freedom of manoeuvre this brought him. As a consequence, relations between the allies cooled markedly and Mozambican officials remained wary of Zimbabwean motives right up to the 1994 elections.
Despite and perhaps because of this cooling in official diplomatic relations, President Mugabe came to play a central role in bringing about direct negotiations between the government and Renamo. This was made possible to some degree by ‘Tiny’ Rowland, then chief executive of the UK-based multi-national Lonrho (see Alex Vines’ article, p. 66). Between July 1989 and October 1990, Rowland provided transportation as well as funds to assist Mugabe and President Moi of Kenya in mediating talks between representatives of Renamo and the Frelimo government. These meetings took place in different capitals across the region in the run-up to more formal negotiations in Rome and were supported by other regional and international actors including Presidents Banda of Malawi, Kaunda of Zambia and Masire of Botswana.

Because they lacked political skills and negotiating experience, and were weak in their knowledge of constitutional and electoral processes, Renamo had much to lose in the peace process. Wary of but needing external advice and support, the rebels remained cautious in the initial flurry of diplomatic activity. Moreover, while foreign backing and illicit activities such as trafficking in ivory and precious stones had enabled Renamo to sustain its military activities, it now needed new sources of financial support. This fact was not lost on Rowland and the Zimbabweans and, with Chissano’s acquiescence, both began to channel significant funds to Renamo to buy its co-operation. Once the rebels were convinced they couldn’t win the war, these incentives played a decisive role in their decision to make peace.

As the prospect of direct talks became increasingly likely, the South Africans too began to consider the future of Renamo. By this time, the influence of military hardliners had declined sharply and South Africa was well aware of the rebels’ weaknesses. To protect its shifting interests in the transformation of the Southern African political economy, and to facilitate Renamo’s integration into the political mainstream, South Africa reformulated its support for the rebels. High-level officials undertook several secret visits to Renamo-held areas in the late 1980s to discuss with the rebels how best to shape and articulate their political demands. ‘Pik’ Botha’s role was of particular significance in these visits, and also in facilitating access between Renamo and the Mozambican government.
A Journey Begins

As informal contacts between Renamo and Frelimo continued in the capitals of Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, official negotiations began in Rome in July 1990. Financed by the Italian government and hosted by the Sant’Egidio lay community, these talks proceeded at an agonisingly slow pace, with many setbacks. An early disagreement concerned who would serve as official mediators. Kenya placed pressure on Renamo to demand President Moi be given the role, while the government strongly favoured Mugabe. Agreement was eventually reached on a four-member mediation team drawn from Sant’Egidio, the Italian political establishment and the Mozambican Catholic Church.

After official talks began, two key events helped speed their success, reducing external involvement in the conflict and opening the way for an authentically Mozambican settlement. The first of these was the strong stance taken by Nelson Mandela following the ANC leader’s release from prison in 1990. In his first international address at Wembley Stadium in London, Mandela demanded from Pretoria a final severance of all military support for Renamo. With the established risk of alienating the ANC and its supporters in the delicate transition from apartheid, President de Klerk was motivated to confront his remaining hard-line generals and Mandela’s demands were soon met.

A second key development occurred in Rome on 1 December, when the government and Renamo agreed the terms of a partial ceasefire which, among other things, confined Zimbabwean troops to the Limpopo and Beira transport corridors. While violations of the ceasefire occurred regularly on both sides, this was another important symbolic event. Mugabe’s in-principle agreement to restrain his troops opened the way for greater trust between him and Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama, and gave him considerable influence over the rebel leader. As the risk of Renamo backing out remained the greatest threat to the peace process throughout the Rome talks, the implementation of the peace agreement and the holding of elections, this relationship proved invaluable. With degrees of support from ‘Tiny’ Rowland, the South Africans and other regional and international leaders, Mugabe would play an important role at every step in convincing Dhlakama to remain engaged.

President Chissano with President F.W. de Klerk of South Africa, Maputo, July 1992
As the ten year anti-colonial struggle waged by the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) drew to a close in 1974, the conditions were created for another war which would engulf independent Mozambique until 1992. Although strongly influenced by many outside factors, this conflict was fought largely by Mozambicans and it was they who bore the brunt of the violence. This is the story of how the Mozambican churches took up Jesus’ call to promote peace in the country during this period of intense upheaval. The work of the churches helped bring about direct negotiations between the Frelimo government and the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) that led to the formal ending of the war in 1992. Since then, the churches have pursued their peacemaking role, working for reconciliation and reconstruction throughout the country.

Early Days

The Roman Catholic Church has been active in Mozambique for almost 500 years. However, it was only in the 1940s, following the signing of the Concordat and the Missionary Agreement between the Holy See and the Portuguese government, that extensive evangelisation began. The Missionary Agreement had its roots in Vatican frustration with the 1930 Colonial Act that defined the Portuguese Catholic missions overseas as ‘instruments of civilisation and national influence’. Local Catholic churches and the Vatican were not comfortable with the level of control this gave the Portuguese over missionary activities.

The Missionary Agreement paved the way for a new relationship between the Catholic Church and the Portuguese government. Although finding clergy to serve in Africa proved difficult, the establishment of the first three Mozambican dioceses opened the way for many new missionaries to come from Italy, Spain, France as well as Portugal. The Missionary Agreement also stipulated that the Catholic Church should open primary schools and seminaries for the local people. While the bishops and rectors of these institutions had to be Portuguese, the colonial government agreed to pay their salaries. The government also provided finance for explicitly religious activities in Mozambique, as long as these were conducted in line with its policies.
From the 19th century onward, other Christian groups established a presence in Mozambique including Anglicans, Methodists, Pentecostals and Reformed Protestants. While Mozambique has remained the least evangelised country south of the Sahara, its many denominations have enriched the Christian community with their diverse contributions. Over the years, a process of indigenisation has also occurred as Western religious institutions have blended with local cultures, belief systems and practices. The syncretic religious forms which have emerged play an important role both locally and in the international denominational and ecumenical fora in which Mozambican churches are represented.

The Dislocation of Church and State

Mozambican church people responded to the independence struggle in many different ways. While the Catholic missions received extensive support from the colonial regime, many enjoyed a certain amount of freedom in how they conducted their grassroots activities. In central and northern Mozambique, in particular, the Catholic Church became a major modernising and liberalising force during the colonial era. As a process of ‘Africanisation’ took root in local Catholic churches and their social networks, they soon became an important platform for Mozambican nationalism.

This was also the case with the Protestant churches and non-Portuguese missionaries. Because they had weaker links with the colonial power they were able to pursue a more independent political line. It was through their ministry that people such as Eduardo Mondlane, the first president of Frelimo, emerged to speak on behalf of the Mozambican people. However, as these independent church initiatives opened the eyes of local people to the oppressive nature of foreign rule, they were met with suspicion from the colonial government, and later with persecution.

During the liberation war of 1964-74, many clergy, including both Catholics and Protestants, were outspoken in their criticism of the colonial regime. While the Catholic Church in Mozambique made no official statements about the war, individual leaders...
such as Bishop Jaime Gonçalves and Bishop Alexandre dos Santos took individual stands against the violence. They called openly for peace and reconciliation, often to the displeasure of the government.

During this time, the World Council of Churches (WCC) gave both moral and material support to Frelimo through its Programme to Combat Racism. Pope Paul VI also provided support, receiving leaders of the liberation movement in Rome. Despite these international demonstrations of solidarity, the colonial government reacted strongly to clergy who protested against their policies. Some 20 foreign Roman Catholic priests, including the Burgos fathers, were expelled from the country or felt compelled to leave. Many Protestant ministers who remained in Mozambique were ill-treated for associating with the nationalists, and some were jailed or killed.

Many of the Portuguese clergy found themselves in a very difficult position. Due to their close links with the colonists, they did not, or could not, support the Mozambican struggle for independence. This resulted in strained relations between the clergy and local people. After independence in 1975, the dehumanising policies of ‘Portugality’ and ‘civilisation’ were quickly discredited and the churches paid the price for their unwillingness to stand up to the violence during the war. The new Frelimo government began to bear down heavily, though unevenly, on the Christian churches.

The Catholic Church, in particular, was considered a handmaiden of the old regime and many of its leaders were seen as a threat to state power. As a consequence, the new government closed churches, expelled missionaries from the country, and revoked many religious freedoms. The considerable assets of the Church were also nationalised, including schools, hospitals and seminaries, all of which were seen as essential to the government’s ambitious development programmes.

By the end of 1976, seven of Mozambique’s nine Catholic bishops were indigenous, but dialogue between the government and both the Catholic and Protestant churches had ground to a halt. While the churches remained the most influential of civic institutions, state control over the population was increasing. By the time the war with Renamo picked up in the late 1970s, the churches had largely been alienated from political life and their response to the violence was for the most part muted. At various intervals, the Catholic Church presented the Frelimo government with carefully worded and critical reports concerning the growing plight of the Mozambican people, but these did not elicit a significant response.

A Gradual Breakthrough

The Mozambican churches began to play a constructive role in promoting peace in the early 1980s in the context of its rapprochement with the government. In 1982, President Machel made some conciliatory moves towards the churches, inviting them to play a role in the revolution as humanitarian actors and as educators in ethical matters. After eight years of alienation, the churches finally received official permission to assist the victims of war and natural disaster.

In October 1982, during its synod, the Anglican Lebombo diocese decided to consult with other churches in the Protestant-dominated Mozambican Christian Council (CCM) and approach the government to seek the abolition of the death penalty. In a meeting with President Machel in December 1982, they also suggested that a peaceful way to end the devastating war needed to be found. The Catholic Archbishop of Beira, Dom Jaime Gonçalves, who was present in his capacity as president of the Episcopal Conference of Mozambique, echoed this claim and emphasised that peace needed to include Mozambicans of all ethnic, religious and political persuasions.

In July 1984, in a confidential memorandum to President Machel, the CCM repeated the call for dialogue between all Mozambicans caught up in the war. Machel’s response was unequivocal: no dialogue. In November, the CCM launched a Peace and Reconciliation Commission to use as a vehicle for peace. Members of the commission were drawn from the Methodist Union, the Free Methodists,
the Anglicans, the Church of Christ in Manica and Sofala, and the Nazarene Church. The following May, the CCM repeated the request for dialogue between the government and Renamo, but again the response was negative. Informal requests through other church contacts with President Machel continued for a few more months, but still with no result.

In October 1986, after the death of President Machel, the CCM began directing its requests to his successor, Joaquim Chissano. Around this time, the Catholic Church also became more vocal in its call for peace. A pastoral letter was circulated by the Catholic bishops in 1987 calling for dialogue and reconciliation between the government and Renamo. In response, the semi-official newspaper Notícias branded the bishops ‘the Apostles of Treason’. This was followed by President Chissano directly criticising the Catholic Church in his June Independence Day speech. This speech prompted other members of the government to attack the Church, but the president, recognising such an approach was not constructive, stopped the criticism.

In late 1987, a decisive shift in its military fortunes caused a change of mood within the Mozambican government, and a CCM delegation was finally received by Chissano in December. At this meeting, the president expressed appreciation for the CCM initiative, sending a clear message that steps towards dialogue would not be interpreted negatively. Nevertheless, Chissano was keen to control any developments and the limits of the churchmen’s role were clearly defined by the government (see box).

Overtures to the Rebels

With President Chissano’s encouragement, the CCM started pursuing contact with Renamo. Meanwhile, the All African Council of Churches (AACC) and the World Council of Churches promised to provide funds to enable CCM leaders to visit the US and Kenya to talk with Renamo representatives. Because the Catholic Church was also known to share a desire for peace, the CCM felt it was time to join forces to bring the government and the rebels together. The government, whose relationship with the Catholic Church was improving, approved this move.

The Archbishop of Maputo, Alexandre dos Santos, was invited to accompany a group of six CCM leaders on a trip to the United States at the invitation of the National Council of Churches of Christ. The council had not been informed of their intention to meet with Renamo, however, and were adamantly opposed to the idea. After some consternation on the part of the Mozambican delegation, a neutral person eventually came forward and offered to establish contact with a Renamo representative. In New York, the clergymen met with Artur Lambo Vilanculo and were promised contact with Renamo’s internal leadership.

The churchmen returned to Maputo in February 1988 and awaited word from Vilanculo. After a time, they decided a smaller task force would be more efficient and formed a new group consisting of two delegates from

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**Government Terms of Reference for Church Contacts with Renamo, December 1987**

i) The churches, working either locally or through ecumenical fora such as the All Africa Council of Churches (AACC) and the World Council of Churches (WCC), should not only feel free but are encouraged to contact ‘the other side’ (the bandits) with the clear understanding that these contacts are not to be construed as paving the way for any negotiations with them as a political entity.

ii) The main purpose of such contacts would be to persuade the ‘other side’ to stop assassinating its own people and devastating its own country.

iii) In the event of positive developments in the future, the local churches may assist the reintegration of the rebels into Mozambican society.
the CCM, Bishop Dínis Sengulane and Pastor Mucache, and two from the Catholic Church, Archbishops Gonçalves and dos Santos. In April, this new group travelled to Kenya where Vilanculo introduced them to Bethuel Kiplagat. Kiplagat was the Kenyan Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, but also an active member of the Anglican Church and had formerly worked for the Christian Council of Kenya. Kiplagat informed the Kenyan government about the churchmen’s mission and efforts were made to convey their message to Renamo leaders.

In May, several clergy, including Archbishop Gonçalves, met Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama in the bush near Gorongosa, in Sofala province. They then met with President Chissano in August to report their findings. Chissano was angry that the Gorongosa meeting had taken place without his advance knowledge. He nonetheless expressed his conviction that dialogue with Renamo’s internal leadership was the only way to achieve peace.

Several more visits were made to Kenya in 1988 in an effort to restore formal contact with Renamo representatives. In December, Kiplagat introduced the churchmen to Renamo’s Information Secretary, Francisco Moises Nota, who promised to convey a message to Renamo’s leadership inside Mozambique. By this time, the initiative to bring about dialogue had become public and the churchmen had begun to attract press attention inside Mozambique.

**Talks in Nairobi**

In January 1989, word came from Kenya that Dhlakama was interested in meeting the churchmen in Nairobi. In February, the rebel leader changed his mind, but announced that he would send a delegation instead. The churchmen duly arrived in Nairobi on 14 February and held meetings with various people, including President Moi, while they awaited the arrival of the Renamo delegation. On 26 February, the delegation finally arrived, led by Raul Manuel Domingos, the rebels’ Secretary for Foreign Relations. Kiplagat sat in on these meetings where the clergymen attempted to convince Domingos that dialogue was the only way to end the war.

**Press Criticism of the Churches’ Initiatives**

Prior to the Nairobi talks, the press had speculated that Renamo’s preconditions for dialogue would be the withdrawal of all foreign troops, and that the government would itself demand that Renamo stop fighting. In fact, the initial talks between the rebels and the churchmen took place without preconditions.

The press had also claimed that the churches were biased in favour of the government. In response, the clergymen reiterated that they represented all of the Mozambican churches as well as the country’s suffering people, and that it was only on this impartial basis that Renamo had agreed to talk with them.

They underlined that no one was benefiting from the continued fighting and that the people were suffering. Above all, the churchmen emphasised their neutrality, stressing that reconciliation was a basic vocation of the church.

With a commitment from the Renamo representatives to arrange an early meeting with Dhlakama, the churchmen returned to Mozambique and briefed President Chissano on their trip. After various abortive attempts - in March, April and July - they subsequently met with a Renamo delegation led by Dhlakama in Nairobi from 8-14 August 1989.

In preparation for these talks, the government drew up a list of ’12 principles’ for direct dialogue with Renamo which the churchmen passed on to the rebel group without comment. Renamo replied with a ’16 point declaration’ which was delivered to Maputo on 14 August. Despite the many areas of disagreement between these two documents, the major stumbling block was the government’s refusal to recognise Renamo as a legitimate political force in Mozambique. The Nairobi declarations seem to have been the first written communication between the two sides, however, and would eventually open the way to direct talks. In the meantime, the clergymen refused to answer questions
from either side regarding the other, insisting instead that the government and Renamo talk to each other directly.

A second round of talks, organised by President Moi, took place in Nairobi between 29 August and 1 September, but sadly failed to make progress. Nonetheless, the church leaders made themselves available over the next year to facilitate further contacts between the government and Renamo, provided that such involvement would not violate their pledge to remain neutral. It was because of this clarification, and the development of a bond of trust with both parties, that the churchmen were able to continue their formal role in the peace process after the official negotiations began in Rome.

**The Rome Talks**

Starting in July 1990, the Mozambican government and Renamo met in Rome for direct peace talks. The talks were initially hosted by the Sant’ Egidio lay community, which had a long association with Mozambique and had offered its services as the talks gained momentum. The Mozambican churches remained very closely involved throughout the negotiation process. Archbishop Gonçalves became part of the official mediating team because of his knowledge of Renamo and his contacts in Italy. The other mediators were Mario Rafaelli, a socialist parliamentarian representing the Italian government, and two senior members of the Sant’ Egidio community, Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi.

The talks in Rome were long and difficult. The main concern of the mediators was that, while the parties talked, Mozambicans continued to suffer and die. Another problem was the severe lack of trust between the two parties. Because both sides continued to talk with the church leaders, however, a climate of confidence conducive to dialogue was gradually built up. A third difficulty was that Frelimo’s agenda for discussion was not always acceptable to Renamo, and vice versa. The government was most interested in achieving an immediate ceasefire, while the rebels wanted to discuss sensitive political issues first, including guarantees of their security and the make-up of the new constitution.

The churches pursued various strategies to help speed up the talks. The launching of petition campaigns, with signatures gathered

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**Preparing for Peace in Nampula**

Father Pier Maria Mazzola

As the war progressed, we observed its complexity. We had contacts with both sides and, by the early 1990s, had built up sufficient trust at the local level so we could travel in Renamo zones. At the time, this was very rare. Renamo had a strong presence in some of the districts we operated in. They were keen to have access to the health care we provided and, in return, they allowed us to preach. Eventually, we acquired a permit from a local Renamo commander allowing us unhindered access to his zones, although travel conditions remained unpredictable.

“It was important to be even-handed in dealing with both sides to avoid problems. In 1989, our bishop in Nampula began to announce the names of people killed in the war during the Sunday mass. Increasingly, combatants and residents from both sides would pass us information and the list became more extensive. The reading of the lists became a powerful call for peace. When we obtained credible information, we also began to intervene by raising our concerns with senior commanders from both sides regarding war excesses. On several occasions, soldiers were disciplined or moved from the locality following our intervention.

“Following the Rome accords, we continued our work, explaining to the people what peace meant. We preached reconciliation and used our New Life pastoral newsletters, consisting of pictures and local language texts, to spread the message of peace. Because we had a good reputation, the newsletters were taken seriously. Some 15,000 copies were printed and could be seen everywhere in Nampula after the signing of the peace accords. For many people, this was the first physical symbol of peace. Later we used the newsletter to explain the concept of elections and I believe this also helped build local confidence.”
The Sant’ Egidio lay community was founded in Rome in 1968 with a vocation to help the poor. As the community has grown, it has become more involved in seeking negotiated solutions to armed conflicts. Based in a former Carmelite convent in Rome, Sant’ Egidio now numbers some 15-20,000 members spread throughout Italy and other countries around the world. From the beginning, Sant’ Egidio has enjoyed close ties with both the Italian government and the Vatican. Its leaders continue to meet with Pope John Paul II several times each year. Its strength, however, is its unofficial status and its ability to support itself on voluntary contributions. This has given it the freedom of informal diplomatic manoeuvre, which made its role in the search for a settlement of Mozambique’s war so effective.

Sant’ Egidio’s involvement with the Mozambican peace process was made possible by the informal and flexible network of relations it developed in the country. In 1976, Dom Jaime Gonçalves, then a young priest studying in Rome, became a friend of the community. In 1977, after being named Bishop of Beira, Gonçalves returned to Rome for a synod and discussed the severe restrictions being placed on the Christian churches in post-independence Mozambique. In response to Gonçalves’ visit, Sant’ Egidio worked to increase religious freedom in Mozambique over the following years.

In 1981, Andrea Riccardi of Sant’ Egidio invited Gonçalves to a meeting between Enrico Berlinguer, the head of the Italian Communist Party, and members of the community interested in Mozambique. At this meeting, Berlinguer offered to use his own moral authority and connections to persuade Frelimo to lift its restrictions on religious practice. These contacts were instrumental in opening dialogue between the government and members of Sant’ Egidio.

Sant’ Egidio also played a humanitarian role in Mozambique, developing ties with missionaries serving in the war zones. In 1982, it helped negotiate the release of priests and nuns held captive by Renamo. These were the first direct contacts with the rebels and the beginning of a relationship that, over time, developed into trust. Andrea Riccardi and his colleague Dom Matteo Zuppi travelled to Maputo in 1984 to discuss humanitarian assistance with government officials. In 1985 and 1987, Sant’ Egidio sent shipments of food and medicine to Mozambique and during this period two members of the community were killed in armed attacks. Around this time, the community also negotiated the release from jail of an Italian friar named Giocondo Pagliara, whom Frelimo had accused of being a ‘treasurer’ for Renamo.

Sant’ Egidio facilitated contacts between the government and the Holy See at several times during the mid-1980s. On several occasions, Archbishop Achille Sylvestrini, then the Vatican’s Foreign Minister, visited Sant’ Egidio for discreet talks with Frelimo officials. In 1985, the community arranged for President Machel to meet the Pope in Rome, despite Machel’s refusal to make a formal request as required by the Holy See. The meeting helped to encourage dialogue between the Catholic Church and the Frelimo government and diplomatic relations between the two were strengthened in the following years.

In April 1989, Renamo telexed the Pope and Sant’ Egidio requesting help in setting up a unilateral Renamo ceasefire in Nampula province. Sant’ Egidio responded by inviting Dhlakama to Rome for a private visit. In June, Dhlakama postponed this visit, although by October he was again open to meeting with Archbishop Gonçalves and with Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti. In February 1990, Dhlakama finally visited Rome for meetings set up by Sant’ Egidio.

That March, Mozambique’s Foreign Minister Pascoal Mocumbi met with the Vatican’s Archbishop Sodano and requested Vatican support in seeking direct dialogue with Renamo. In April, the Mozambican Minister of Labour, Aguiar Mazula, suggested in a meeting set up by Sant’ Egidio in Rome that if the attempted mediation efforts of Kenya and Zimbabwe failed, Sant’ Egidio might consider supporting direct negotiations. Following aborted talks in Malawi in June, Sant’ Egidio’s leaders moved quickly to convene dialogue in Rome. Both sides indicated their willingness to meet in the city and the Italian government offered financial and diplomatic support for the talks.

On 16 June, Renamo’s Raul Domingos arrived in Rome and formally asked Sant’ Egidio to mediate. The following week, President Chissano told the Italian ambassador in Maputo that he was ready to send a delegation to Rome to meet with the rebels. The two delegations first met formally at Sant’ Egidio on 8 July, although several had already met informally at a World Cup football match in Rome in June. This was the start of 27 months of negotiations hosted by Sant’ Egidio.

Sant’ Egidio’s success at the Rome talks stemmed in large part from their close links to the Mozambican parties. This significantly enhanced their ability to keep the peace process on track, despite the regular breakdown of dialogue between the government and Renamo. Criticism came from different quarters that Sant’ Egidio was too close to one party or the other. Doubts were also expressed about its ability to effectively support, rather than hinder, the parallel diplomatic efforts underway to resolve the conflict. Nevertheless, Sant’ Egidio’s modest claim that it offers no prescriptions but seeks to create opportunities for people to find solutions themselves is perhaps one key reason why the 1992 Mozambican peace settlement continues to hold today.

A Calling for Peace
in Mozambique, Italy and Portugal, as well as public prayers for peace, were a great help in drawing attention to Mozambique's plight and reminding the delegations that the people's suffering continued. The European Community supported these initiatives and applied pressure on the parties to quickly reach an agreement. Church leaders also worked closely with the American ambassadors to Mozambique and the Holy See, as well as with the governments of Kenya and Zimbabwe, to keep the parties focused on the difficult issues at hand.

In September 1991, the All African Council of Churches expressed an interest in becoming more involved in the peace process. During a courtesy call on President Chissano, the Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, Desmond Tutu, and AACC secretary-general Jose Chipenda voiced their concern that the peace process was advancing too slowly. In response, the CCM offered to contact Renamo about the delays. Once President Chissano had granted permission for this, a contact group for the new initiative was set up comprising Bishop Sengulane, Bishop João Somane Machado, the vice-president of the CCM, and Pastor Lucas Amosse Tivane. In March 1992, this group travelled to Blantyre, Malawi, where they met Kiplagat who organised a meeting with Dhlakama. At this meeting, the CCM leaders raised their concerns about the slowness of the peace process and pushed for a summit meeting between Dhlakama and Chissano as a way of accelerating the talks. On 4 March, they moved on to Kenya for a second meeting with the rebel leader. There they talked about practical issues relating to the peace process and said that now was the time to show mercy to the people of Mozambique.

By this time, the worsening drought in Mozambique was leading to increased attacks by hungry Renamo fighters on civilians and driving many to flee in search of safety and food. The irony was that the negotiating teams, enjoying the luxuries of Rome, seemed little concerned by the impact of the drought and the plight of ordinary Mozambicans. In September 1992, during an impasse in the Rome talks, Archbishop Gonçalves wondered, “Did either of the parties sense any urgency or responsibility because mass starvation threatened?”.

Against the backdrop of the growing humanitarian crisis, Chissano and Dhlakama were later brought together several times through the efforts of southern African leaders. Gradually they resolved most of the most delicate outstanding political issues and the General Peace Agreement was signed on 4 October 1992.

**Patience and Method**

The Mozambican case demonstrates how institutions seemingly powerless in the face of violence can make important contributions in bringing about an end to war. The peace initiative waged by the Mozambican churches bore fruit because they put their spiritual vitality to use, proving their faithfulness to God. It is distressing to see how evil human beings can be, hating to the point of wishing death upon one another. Yet it is also true that human beings can change. This is what the churches saw. The people of Renamo and Frelimo hated each other yet, little by little, they became compatriots and brothers.

In working for solutions to armed conflicts, it is necessary to have patience and a method. The Mozambican churches adopted the following practical principles in their quest for peace:

- Look for what unites rather than what divides.
- Discuss problems step by step.
- Keep in mind the suffering that so many people endure as war continues.
- Work with the friends and supporters of both sides; this is fundamental.
- Remember the deeper dimensions of peace such as forgiveness, justice, human rights, reconciliation and trust.
- Work with other groups; the power of the churches was much increased by their inter-denominational cooperation.

"Accord Page 33"
Primary Texts from the Mozambican Peace Process

The Nkomati Talks
Agreement on Non-Aggression and Good Neighbourliness between the Government of the People’s Republic of Mozambique and the Government of the Republic of South Africa
16 March 1984

Joint Declaration on a Cessation of Armed Activity and Conflict
3 October 1984

The Nairobi Talks
Twelve Principles for Peace of the Mozambique Government
17 July 1989

Sixteen Point Declaration of The Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo)
15 August 1989

The US Seven Point Proposal
7 December 1989

The Rome Process
Joint Communiqué
10 July 1990

Agreement on a Partial Ceasefire in Mozambique
1 December 1990

*Protocol on Detailed Agenda
28 May 1991

Protocol I - Basic Principles
18 October 1991

Protocol II - Criteria and Arrangements for the Formation and Recognition of Political Parties
13 November 1991

Protocol III - Principles of the Electoral Act
12 March 1992

*Agreed Minute on Rearrangement of Agenda
19 June 1992

Declaration on the Guiding Principles for Humanitarian Assistance
16 July 1992

Joint Declaration
7 August 1992

Protocol IV Military Questions
4 October 1992

Protocol V Guarantees
4 October 1992

Protocol VI Cease-fire
4 October 1992

Protocol VII Donors’ Conference
4 October 1992

The General Peace Agreement
4 October 1992

Copies of the General Peace Agreement are available from the United Nations Department of Public Information, New York, NY 10017, USA. (UN ref. no. S/24635).

* These texts are published to the rear of this section.
They were not included in the official General Peace Agreement.
Agreement on Non-Aggression and Good Neighbourliness Between the Government of the People’s Republic of Mozambique and the Government of the Republic of South Africa

The Government of the People’s Republic of Mozambique and the Government of the Republic of South Africa, hereinafter referred to as the High Contracting Parties;

RECOGNISING the principles of strict respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, sovereign equality, political independence and the inviolability of the borders of all states;

REAFFIRMING the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states;

CONSIDERING the internationally recognised principle of the right of people to self-determination and independence and the principle of equal rights of all peoples;

CONSIDERING the obligation of all states to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state;

CONSIDERING the obligation of all states to settle conflicts by peaceful means, and thus safeguard international peace and security and justice;

RECOGNISING the responsibility of states not to allow their territory to be used for acts of war, aggression or violence against other states;

CONSCIOUS of the need to promote relations of good neighbourliness based on the principles of equality of rights and mutual advantage;

CONVINCED that relations of good neighbourliness between the High Contracting Parties will contribute to peace, security, stability and progress in Southern Africa, the Continent and the World;

Have Solemnly agreed to the following:

Article one

The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect each other’s sovereignty and independence and, in fulfilment of this fundamental obligation, to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other.

Article two

1. The High Contracting Parties shall resolve differences and disputes that may arise between them and that may or are likely to endanger mutual peace and security or peace and security in the region, by means of negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or other peaceful means, and undertake not to resort, individually or collectively, to the threat or use of force against each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence.

2. For the purposes of this article, the use of force shall include inter alia -

a) attacks by land, air or sea forces;

b) sabotage;

c) unwarranted concentration of such forces at or near the international boundaries of the High Contracting Parties;

d) violation of the international land, air or sea boundaries of either of the High Contracting Parties.

3. The High Contracting Parties shall not in any way assist the armed forces of any state or group of states deployed against the territorial sovereignty or political independence of the other.

Article three

1. The High Contracting Parties shall not allow their respective territories, territorial waters or air space to be used as a base, thoroughfare, or in any other way by another state, government, foreign
military forces, organisations or individuals which plan or prepare to commit acts of violence, terrorism or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other or may threaten the security of its inhabitants.

2. The High Contracting Parties, in order to prevent or eliminate the acts or the preparation of acts mentioned in paragraph (1) of this article, undertake in particular to-

a) forbid and prevent in their respective territories the organisation of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, whose objective is to carry out the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;

b) eliminate from their respective territories bases, training centres, places of shelter, accommodation and transit for elements who intend to carry out acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;

c) eliminate from their respective territories centres or depots containing armaments of whatever nature, destined to be used by the elements contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;

d) eliminate from their respective territories command posts or other places for the command, direction and co-ordination of the elements contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;

e) eliminate from their respective territories communication and telecommunication facilities between the command and the elements contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;

f) eliminate and prohibit the installation in their respective territories of radio broadcasting stations, including unofficial or clandestine broadcasts, for the elements that carry out the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;

g) exercise strict control, in their respective territories, over elements which intend to carry out or plan the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;

h) prevent the transit of elements who intend to plan to commit the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article, from a place in the territory of either to a place in the territory of the other or to a place in the territory of any third state which has a common boundary with the High Contracting Party against which such elements intend or plan to commit the said acts;

i) take appropriate steps in their respective territories to prevent the recruitment of elements of whatever nationality for the purpose of carrying out the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;

j) prevent the elements contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article from carrying out from their respective territories by any means acts of abduction or other acts, aimed at taking citizens of any nationality hostage in the territory of the other High Contracting Party; and

k) prohibit the provision on their respective territories of any logistic facilities for carrying out the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;

3. The High Contracting Parties will not use the territory of third states to carry out or support the acts contemplated in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this article.

Article four
The High Contracting Parties shall take steps, individually and collectively, to ensure that the international boundary between their respective territories is effectively patrolled and that the border posts are efficiently administered to prevent illegal crossings from the territory of a High Contracting Party to the territory of the other, and in particular, by elements contemplated in Article Three of this Agreement.

Article five
The High Contracting Parties shall prohibit within their territory acts of propaganda that incite a war of aggression against the other High Contracting Party and shall also prohibit acts of propaganda aimed at inciting acts of terrorism and civil war in the territory of the other High Contracting Party.

Article six
The High Contracting Parties declare that there is no conflict between their commitments in treaties and international obligations and the commitment undertaken in this Agreement.

Article seven
The High Contracting Parties are committed to interpreting this Agreement in good faith and will maintain periodic contact to ensure the effective application of what has been agreed.

Article eight
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as detracting from the High Contracting Parties’ right to self-defence in the event of armed attacks, as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.
Article nine

1. Each of the High Contracting Parties shall appoint high-ranking representatives to serve on a Joint Security Commission with the aim of supervising and monitoring the application of this Agreement.

2. The Commission shall determine its own working procedure.

3. The Commission shall meet on a regular basis and may be specially convened whenever circumstances require.

4. The Commission shall:
   a) Consider all allegations of infringements of the provisions of this Agreement;
   b) advise the High Contracting Parties of its conclusions; and
   c) make recommendations to the High Contracting Parties concerning measures for the effective application of this Agreement and the settlement of disputes over infringements or alleged infringements.

5. The High Contracting Parties shall determine the mandate of their respective representatives in order to enable interim measures to be taken in cases of duly recognised emergency.

6. The High Contracting Parties shall make available all the facilities necessary for the effective functioning of the Commission and will jointly consider its conclusions and recommendations.

Article ten

This Agreement will also be known as “The Accord of Nkomati.”

Article eleven

1. This agreement shall enter force on the date of the signature thereof.

2. Any amendment to this Agreement agreed to by the High Contracting Parties shall be affected by the Exchange of Notes between them.

IN Witness WHEREOF, the signatories, in the name of their respective governments, have signed and sealed this Agreement, in quadruplicate in the Portuguese and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED AT the common border on the banks of the Nkomati River, on this the sixteenth day of March 1984.

Samora Moises Machel
Marshal of the People’s Republic of Mozambique President of the Council of Ministers for the Government of the People’s Republic of Mozambique

Pieter Willem Botha
Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa for the Government of the Republic of South Africa

Joint Declaration on a Cessation of Armed Activity and Conflict

1. Samora Moises Machel is acknowledged as the President of the People’s Republic of Mozambique;

2. Armed activity and conflict within Mozambique, from whatever quarter or source, must stop;

3. The South African government is requested to consider playing a role in the implementation of the declaration;

4. A commission will be established immediately to work towards an early implementation of this declaration.

Twelve Principles for Peace of the Mozambican Government

1. We are faced with an operation of destabilisation which should not be confused with a struggle between two parties.

2. The operation has been mounted through brutal acts of terrorism which provoke immense suffering falling, above all, on the population and their property. Hundreds of thousands of people have already died. Many economic and social infrastructures in the country have been destroyed or paralysed, impeding the normal life of citizens and taming millions of people into displaced persons.

3. The aim is to put an end to this inhuman situation, the first action should be to stop all terrorist and bandit actions.

4. Afterwards, conditions should be created for all Mozambican citizens to lead normal lives in such a way that they can participate on the one hand in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the country, and on the other in the discussion and definition of the policies which will guide the country in each of these aspects (political, economic, social and cultural).

5. The policies are established by national consensus, formulated through a process of consultation and debate with the people or social groups involved. The principal law relating to land, health and education were approved after consultation with the people. The on-going revision of the constitution has been taking place through a debate which aims at introducing factors of democratic participation in the working of the State. Religious institutions are being consulted in the process of the preparation of legislation on religious liberties.

6. Dialogue will aim at clarifying these positions and giving guarantees of participation in it to all individuals, including those who until then had been involved in violent actions of destabilisation.

7. This participation and enjoyment of rights applies immediately to the processes which are already underway regarding the affirmation of the principles defined in the Constitution in relation to: the protection of individual and collective liberties; the protection of human rights; the protection of democratic rights.

8. Individual and social liberties, such as freedom of worship, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, are guaranteed. They should not be used against the general interests of the nation. They should not be used to destroy national unity, national independence and the integrity of persons and property. They should not be used to propagate tribalism, racism, regionalism or any form of divisionism or sectarianism. They should not be used for the preparation of acts punishable by law, such as robbery, assassination or aggression. They cannot be used for the preparation or perpetration of violent acts against the State and the Constitution, such as secessionist movements or coups d’état.

9. Policy or constitutional changes or revisions, or changes or revisions to the principal law of the country, where in many cases debate or consultation with citizens has already occurred or is in process, can be brought and should be brought about only through the ample participation of all citizens.

10. It is unacceptable for a group to use intimidation or violence to impose themselves on the whole society. It is anti-democratic to alter the constitution and principal laws of the country through the violence of a group.

11. The normalisation of life and the integration of those until now involved in violent actions of destabilisation implies, in a general way, their participation in economic and social life through suitable ways agreed by them, and guaranteed by the government.

12. The acceptance of these principles could lead to a dialogue about the modalities for ending violence, establishing peace and normalising life for all in the country.

Taken from statement made by President Chissano in Maputo, on 17 July 1989; published by informação publico.
Sixteen Point Declaration of the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo)

1. Since 1964, the people of Mozambique are dying daily, the victims of war.

2. It is imperative therefore, that all true nationalists and peace lovers, affiliated or not with any political organisation, should make all efforts to mobilise the effective means at their disposal in order to find a genuine Mozambican and African solution conducive to lasting peace and stability.

3. The people of Mozambique need freedom. It is freedom that precedes stability, prosperity and respect for individual traditions.

4. We believe it is a prevailing principle that the people are sovereign and have inalterable rights to elect their leader that will serve their expectations and essential traditions.

5. Renamo is an active political force in Mozambique's political arena. Any peace solution must take into consideration this reality as well as traditions, culture, present stage of development and other present realities.

6. It is not Renamo's intention to change the existing order in Mozambique through armed struggle.

7. Renamo will never consent that military force be utilised in order to impose leadership or political options contrary to the will of the people.

8. None of the involved parties in this conflict has anything to gain from the continuance of this war. Only the people's suffering is aggravated every day.

9. Verbal attacks should be avoided by those who are fighting as well as by those who are directly interested in our country and the region. We should emphasise the future and not the past.

10. Propaganda against Renamo will not change the political and military reality in Mozambique.

11. The presence of the foreign forces brought by Frelimo did not bring peace or well-being for our people. We in Renamo see this presence as an obstacle to peace. Additionally, it signifies an outrage to our dignity and loss of our sovereignty and independence.

12. For the resolution of the present conflict, Renamo takes into consideration the neighbouring and regional interests to continue the process.

13. Renamo has committed itself to continuing the present peace initiative. Renamo will make all efforts to continue the process.

14. Renamo stands for the population of Mozambique and is against any massacre or violation of the population. Renamo is a people's force. Its strength lies with the people.

15. Renamo is a guerrilla force, whose survival depends on the people and therefore is by nature against massacres or violations of the people. Renamo's reason for existence is the people.

16. Renamo wants a genuine negotiation conducive to national reconciliation without victors or vanquished and without recrimination followed by constitutional reform; to unite efforts in order to form a new Mozambique where brotherhood will be affirmed by free debate of ideas and decision of consensus; a new Mozambique where armed struggle need never be the last and only resort for the solution of our problems.

Taken from Renamo’s Press Release “In Search for Peace: Renamo’s Reply to Frelimo’s Proposals,” Nairobi, 15 August 1989.

The US Seven Point Proposal

1. There must be a peaceful solution to the conflict and a cessation of all attacks on civilians.

2. Democracy in Mozambique is based on freedom of expression, association and economic opportunity.

3. All Mozambican citizens have the right to participate in the political, social, cultural and economic life of the nation and in the determination of national policies.

4. The people are sovereign and have the right to make decisions involving their governance.

5. National reconciliation and unity shall be guiding principles in the peace process.

6. All parties shall recognise the legitimacy of the Republic of Mozambique and its constitution, institutions, and the fundamental laws emanating from them.

7. Fundamental changes in the existing order within the Republic of Mozambique are to be brought about peacefully and democratically.

The Rome Process:  
General Peace Agreement for Mozambique

Joaquim Alberto Chissano, President of the Republic of Mozambique and Afonso Macacho Marceta Dhlakama, President of Renamo, meeting at Rome, under the chairmanship of the Italian Government, in the presence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Italian Republic, Emilio Colombo, and in the presence of:

H.E. Robert Gabriel Mugabe, President of the Republic of Zimbabwe;
H.E. Ketumile Masire, President of the Republic of Botswana;
H.E. George Saitoti, Vice-President of the Republic of Kenya;
H.E. Roelof F. Botha, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa:
The Hon. John Tembo, Minister in the Office of the President of the Republic of Malawi;
Ambassador Ahmed Haggag, Assistant Secretary-General of OAU:

and of the mediators: Mario Raffaelli, representative of the Italian Government and co-ordinator of the mediators, Jaime Gonçalves, Archbishop of Beira, Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi of the Community of Sant’Egidio;

and representatives of the observers: Dr. James O. C. Jonah, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs of the United Nations; H.E. Ambassador Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State, for the Government of the United States of America; H.E. Ambassador Philippe Cuvillier for the Government of France; H.E. Dr. Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, for the Government of Portugal; and H.E. Sir Patrick Fairweather for the Government of the United Kingdom:

at the conclusion of the negotiating process in Rome for the establishment of a lasting peace and effective democracy in Mozambique, accept as binding the following documents which constitute the General Peace Agreement:

1. Protocol I (Basic principles);
2. Protocol II (Criteria and arrangements for the formation and recognition of political parties);
3. Protocol III (Principles of the Electoral Act);
4. Protocol IV (Military questions);
5. Protocol V (Guarantees);
6. Protocol VI (Cease-fire);

They also accept as integral parts of the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique the following documents:

a) The Joint Communiqué of 10 July 1990;
b) The Agreement of 1 December 1990;
c) The Declaration of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique and Renamo on guiding principles for humanitarian assistance, signed in Rome on 16 July 1992;

The President of the Republic of Mozambique and the President of Renamo undertake to do everything within their power for the achievement of genuine national reconciliation.

The above-mentioned Protocols have been duly initialled and signed by the respective heads of delegation and by the mediators. The present General Peace Agreement shall enter into force immediately upon its signature.

(Signed) Joaquim Alberto Chissano
President of the Republic of Mozambique
(Signed) Afonso Macacho Marceta Dhlakama
President of Renamo

The mediators:
(Signed) Mario Raffaelli
(Signed) Jaime Gonçalves
(Signed) Andrea Riccardi
(Signed) Matteo Zuppi

Signed at Rome on 4 October 1992.
Protocol I

Basic principles

On 18 October 1991, the delegation of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique, headed by Armando Emilio Guebuza, Minister of Transport and Communications, and composed of Aguiar Mazula, Minister of State Administration, Teodato Hunguana, Minister of Labour, and Francisco Madeira, Diplomatic Adviser to the President of the Republic, and the delegation of Renamo, headed by Raul Manuel Domingos, Chief of the External Relations Department, and composed of Vicente Zacarias Ululu, Chief of the Information Department, Agostinho Semende Murrial, Deputy Chief of the Political Affairs Department and João Francisco Almirante, member of the President’s cabinet, meeting at Rome in the context of the peace talks, in the presence of the mediators, Mario Raffaelli, representative of the Government of the Italian Republic and co-ordinator of the mediators, Jaime Gonçalves, Archbishop of Beira, Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi of the Community of Sant’ Edigio, determined to secure the higher interests of the Mozambican people, reaffirm that dialogue and collaboration are the indispensable means of achieving a lasting peace in the country.

Accordingly:

1. The Government undertakes to refrain from taking any action that is contrary to the provisions of the Protocols to be concluded and from adopting laws or measures or applying existing laws which may be inconsistent with those Protocols.

2. Renamo, for its part, undertakes, beginning on the date of entry into force of the cease-fire, to refrain from armed combat and instead to conduct its political struggle in conformity with the laws in force, within the framework of the existing State institutions and in accordance with the conditions and guarantees established in the General Peace Agreement.

3. The two parties commit themselves to concluding as soon as possible a General Peace Agreement, containing Protocols on each of the items of the agenda adopted on 28 May 1991 and to take the necessary steps to that end. In that connection, the Government shall endeavour not to hamper international travel by representatives of Renamo and external contacts of Renamo in connection with the peace negotiations. Contacts within the country between Renamo and the mediators or the members of the Joint Verification Commission shall likewise be permitted for the same purpose. Specific arrangements for such contacts shall be made on a case-by-case basis in response to requests by the mediators to the Government.

4. The Protocols to be concluded in the course of these negotiations shall form an integral part of the General Peace Agreement and shall enter into force on the date of signature of the Agreement, with the exception of paragraph 3 of this Protocol, which shall enter into force immediately.

5. The parties agree on the principle of establishing a commission to supervise and monitor compliance with the General Peace Agreement. The commission shall be composed of representatives of the Government, Renamo, the United Nations and other organisations or Governments to be agreed upon between the parties.

For the delegation of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique:
(Signed) Armando Emilio Guebuza

For the delegation of Renamo:
(Signed) Raul Manuel Domingos

The mediators:
(Signed) Mario Raffaelli
(Signed) Jaime Gonçalves
(Signed) Andrea Riccardi
(Signed) Matteo Zuppi

Done at Sant’ Edigio, Rome, on 18 October 1991

Protocol II

Criteria and arrangements for the formation and recognition of political parties

On 13 November 1991, the delegation of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique, headed by Armando Emilio Guebuza, Minister of Transport and Communications, and composed of Aguiar Mazula, Minister of State Administration, Teodato Hunguana, Minister of Labour, and Francisco Madeira, Diplomatic Adviser to the President of the Republic, and the delegation of Renamo, headed by Raul Manuel Domingos, Chief of the External Relations Department, and composed of Vicente Zacarias Ululu, Chief of the Information Department, Agostinho Semende Murrial, Deputy Chief of the Political Affairs Department and, João Francisco Almirante, member of the President’s cabinet, meeting at Rome in the context of the peace talks, in the presence of the mediators, Mario Raffaelli, representative of the Government of the Italian Republic and co-ordinator of the mediators, Jaime Gonçalves, Archbishop of Beira, Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi of the Community of Sant’ Edigio, took up item 1 of the Agreed Agenda of 28 May 1991, concerning “Criteria and arrangements for the formation and recognition of political parties”.

(Signed) Armando Emilio Guebuza

(Signed) Raul Manuel Domingos

(Signed) Andrea Riccardi

(Signed) Matteo Zuppi

Done at Sant’ Edigio, Rome, on 18 October 1991
At the conclusion of their talks, the parties agreed on the necessity of guaranteeing the workings of a multi-party democracy in which the parties would freely co-operate in shaping and expressing the will of the people and in promoting democratic participation by the citizens in the Government of the country.

In this connection, and bearing in mind the provisions of Protocol I on “Basic principles”, the parties have agreed on the following principles:

1. **The nature of political parties**

   a) Political parties shall be independent, voluntary and free associations of citizens, national in scope, whose primary purpose shall be to give democratic expression to the will of the people and to provide for democratic participation in the exercise of political power in accordance with the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens and on the basis of electoral processes at all levels of State organisation.

   b) Associations whose primary purpose is to promote local or sectoral interests or the exclusive interests of a given social group or class of citizens shall be different from political parties and may not enjoy the status provided for by law for such parties.

   c) The Political Parties Act shall determine the conditions for the acquisition of the status of juridical person by political parties.

   d) Political parties shall be granted specific privileges, which shall be guaranteed by law.

   e) For the operation and full development of a multi-party democracy based on respect for and guarantees of basic rights and freedoms and based on pluralism of democratic political expression and organisation under which political power belongs exclusively to the people and is exercised in accordance with principles of representative and pluralistic democracy, the parties must have fundamentally democratic principles by which they must abide in practice and in their political activities.

2. **General principles**

   In their formation, structure and operations, political parties shall observe and apply the following general principles with the aim of controlling their actions:

   a) They must pursue democratic purposes;

   b) They must pursue national and patriotic interests;

   c) The political objectives pursued must be non-regional, non-tribal, non-separatist, non-racial, non-ethnic and non-religious;

   d) The members of political parties must be citizens of Mozambique;

   e) The parties must have a democratic structure and the bodies must be transparent;

   f) The parties must accept democratic methods for the pursuit of their aims;

   g) Joining a political party must be a voluntary act reflecting the freedom of citizens to associate with others who share the same political outlook.

3. **The rights of parties**

   The purpose of the Political Parties Act shall be to protect the freedom of action and operation of political parties, with the exception of those which espouse anti-democratic, totalitarian or violent aims, or which conduct their activities in a manner contrary to law.

   Parties shall enjoy the following rights:

   a) Equal rights and duties before the law;

   b) Every Party shall have the right freely and publicly to propound its policies;

   c) Specific guarantees shall be provided with respect to access to the mass media, sources of public funding and public facilities, in accordance with the principle of nondiscrimination and on the basis of criteria of representativeness to be specified in the Electoral Act;

   d) Exemption from taxes and fees as provided for by law;

   e) No citizen shall be persecuted or discriminated against because of membership in a political party or political opinion;

   f) Other aspects specific to individual political parties shall be determined in their respective statutes or regulations, which must conform with the law. Public notice shall be given of such statutes or regulations.
4. **Duties of parties**

Political parties shall fulfill the following requirements:

- a) They shall be identified by name, acronym and symbol. The use of names, acronyms or symbols which may be considered offensive by the inhabitants or which incite to violence and may have divisive connotations based on race, region, tribe, gender or religion shall be prohibited;

- b) They shall not call into question the country’s territorial integrity and national unity;

- c) They must establish their organs and organise their internal structure on the basis of the principle of democratic election and responsibility of all individuals holding party office;

- d) They must ensure that their statutes and programmes are approved by a majority of their members or by assemblies representing those members;

- e) As regards their internal organisation, Parties must fully respect the principle of free adherence of their members, who may not be compelled to join or remain in a party against their will;

- f) They must be registered and disclose annually their accounts and sources of funding.

5. **Registration**

- a) The purpose of registration is to certify that the founding and existence of parties is in accordance with the applicable legal principles and, consequently, to confer on parties the status of juridical person;

- b) For the purposes of registration, each Party must have collected at least 2,000 signatures;

- c) Responsibility for registering parties shall rest with the Government;

- d) The Commission provided for in paragraph 5 of Protocol I on basic principles shall consider and settle any disputes which may arise in connection with the registration of parties. For that purpose the Government shall make available to the Commission the documents required by law.

6. **Implementation**

- a) The Parties agree that, immediately following the signature of the General Peace Agreement, Renamo shall commence its activities as a political party, with the privileges provided for by law; it shall, however, be required to submit at a later date the documents required by law for registration;

- b) Pursuing the method of dialogue, collaboration and regular consultation, the parties agree to establish, in connection with the discussion of item 5 of the Agreed Agenda, the timetable of activities necessary for the proper implementation of this Protocol.

In witness whereof, the Parties have decided to sign this Protocol.

For the delegation of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique:
(Signed) Armando Emilio Guebuza

For the delegation of Renamo:
(Signed) Raul Manuel Domingos

The mediators:
(Signed) Mario Raffaelli
(Signed) Jaime Gonçalves
(Signed) Andrea Riccardi
(Signed) Matteo Zuppi

done at Sant’ Edigio, Rome, on 13 November 1991

**Protocol III**

On 12 March 1992, the delegation of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique, headed by Armando Emilio Guebuza, Minister of Transport and Communications, and composed of Aguiar Mazula, Minister of State Administration, Teodato Hunguana, Minister of Labour, and Francisco Madeira, Diplomatic Adviser to the President of the Republic, and the delegation of Renamo, headed by Raul Manuel Domingos, Chief of the Organisation Department, and composed of Vicente Zacarias Ululu, Chief of the Information Department, Agostinho Semende Murrial, Deputy Chief of the Organisation Department, and Virgilio Namalue, Director of the Information Department, meeting in Rome in the context of the peace talks, in the presence of the mediators, Mario Raffaelli, representative of the Government of the Italian Republic and co-ordinator of the mediators, Jaime Gonçalves, Archbishop of Beira, Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi of the Community of Sant’ Edigio, took up the item of the agenda signed on 28 May 1991 concerning the Electoral Law and agreed as follows:

This Protocol sets forth the general principles which should guide the drafting of the Electoral Act and any possible amendments to the laws in connection with the conduct of the electoral process.

The Electoral Act shall be drafted by the Government, in consultation with Renamo and all other political parties.
I. Freedom of the press and access to the media

a) All citizens shall enjoy the right of freedom of the press and freedom of information. These freedoms shall encompass, specifically, the right to establish and operate newspapers and other publications, radio and television broadcasting stations and other forms of written or sound communication, such as posters, leaflets and other media. These rights shall not be abridged by censorship;

b) Administrative and tax regulations shall in no case be used to hamper or prevent the exercise of this right on political grounds;

c) Freedom of the press shall also include freedom of expression and creation for journalists and the protection of their independence and professional secrecy;

d) The Government-controlled mass media shall enjoy editorial independence and shall guarantee, in accordance with the specific regulations envisaged in section V.3.b.1 of this Protocol, the right of all parties to access without political discrimination. Provision should be made in such regulations for access by all parties free of charge;

e) Advertisements which conform, to the prevailing commercial practice may not be refused on political grounds;

f) the mass media may not discriminate against or refuse on political grounds any party or its candidates the exercise of the right of reply or the publication of corrections or retractions. Access to the courts shall be guaranteed in cases of defamation, slander, libel and other press offences.

II. Freedom of association, expression and political activity

a) All citizens shall have the right to freedom of expression, association, assembly, demonstration and political activity. Administrative and tax regulations shall in no case be used to prevent or hamper the exercise of these rights for political reasons. These rights shall not extend to the activities of unlawful private paramilitary groups or groups which promote violence in any form or terrorism, racism or separatism;

b) Freedom of association, expression and political activity shall encompass access, without discrimination, to the use of public places and facilities. Such use shall be conditional on submission of an application to the competent administrative authorities, who must give a decision within 48 hours after the submission of the application. Applications may be rejected only for reasons of public order or for organisational considerations.

III. Liberty of movement and freedom of residence

All citizens shall have the right to move about throughout the country without having to obtain administrative authorisation.

All citizens have the right to choose to reside anywhere in the national territory and to leave or return to the country.

IV. Return of Mozambican refugees and displaced persons and their social reintegration

a) The parties undertake to co-operate in the repatriation and reintegration of Mozambican refugees and displaced persons in the national territory and the social integration of war-disabled;

b) Without prejudice to the liberty of movement of citizens, the Government shall draw up a draft agreement with Renamo to organise the necessary assistance to refugees and displaced persons, preferably in their original places of residence. The parties agree to seek the involvement of the competent United Nations agencies in the drawing up and implementation of this plan. The International Red Cross and other organisations to be agreed upon shall be invited to participate in the implementation of the plan;

c) Mozambican refugees and displaced persons shall not forfeit any of the rights and freedoms of citizens for having left their original places of residence;

d) Mozambican refugees and displaced persons shall be registered and included in the electoral rolls together with other citizens in their places of residence;

e) Mozambican refugees and displaced persons shall be guaranteed restitution of property owned by them which is still in existence and the right to take legal action to secure the return of such property from individuals in possession of it.
V. Electoral procedures: system of democratic, impartial and pluralistic voting

1. General Principles
   a) The Electoral Act shall establish an electoral system which is consonant with the principles of the direct, equal, secret and personal ballot;
   b) Elections to the Assembly of the Republic and for President of the Republic shall be held simultaneously;
   c) The elections shall take place within one year after the date of the signing of the General Peace Agreement. This period may be extended if it is determined that circumstances exist which preclude its observance.

2. The right to vote
   a) Mozambican citizens 18 years of age and over shall have the right to vote, with the exception of individuals suffering from certified mental incapacity or insanity;
   b) As envisaged by item 4 (a) of the Agreed Agenda, Mozambican citizens who are detained or have been sentenced to a prison term for a criminal offense under ordinary law shall not have the right to vote until they complete their sentence. In any event, this restriction shall not apply to individuals belonging to the Parties in respect of acts committed in the course of military operations;
   c) Exercise of the right to vote shall be conditional on registration in the electoral rolls;
   d) With the aim of promoting the broadest possible participation in the elections, the parties agree to encourage all Mozambican citizens 18 years of age and over to register and to exercise their right to vote.

3. National elections commission
   a) For the purpose of organising and conducting the electoral process, the Government shall set up a National Elections Commission, composed of individuals whose professional and personal qualities afford guarantees of balance, objectivity and independence vis-a-vis all political parties. One third of the members to be appointed to the Commission shall be nominated by Renamo;
   b) The Commission shall have the following functions:
      1. To draw up, in consultation with the political parties, regulations governing election campaigning, regulations on the distribution of broadcast air time and regulations on the utilisation of public and private places and facilities during the election campaign;
      2. To oversee the compilation of electoral rolls, the legal filing of candidacies, the public announcement of candidacies and checking and recording the election results;
      3. To monitor the electoral process and ensure compliance with the laws;
      4. To ensure equality of treatment for citizens in all acts relating to the elections;
      5. To receive, consider and settle complaints with respect to the validity of the elections;
      6. To ensure equal opportunity and treatment for the different candidates;
      7. To review the election accounts;
      8. To draw up and have published in the national gazette (Boletim da Republica) the lists of the results of the final vote tally.

4. Voting Assemblies
   a) At each polling place there shall be a Voting Assembly composed of:
      - All citizens who are to exercise their right to vote at the given polling place;
      - Representative of the various candidates and parties.
   b) Each Voting Assembly shall be presided over by a Ballot Board composed of a Chairman, a vice-chairman-cum-secretary and tellers which shall oversee the electoral operations;
   c) The members of the Ballot Board shall be appointed from among the voters belonging to the Voting Assembly in question, with the agreement of the representatives of the various candidates;
   d) The ballot boards shall be responsible for monitoring all electoral operations and transmitting the results to the National Elections Commission;
   e) Delegates of the candidates or parties in the Voting Assembly shall have the right:
      1. To monitor all electoral operations;
      2. To examine the rolls compiled or utilised by the Board;
3. To be heard and to receive clarifications with respect to all matters relating to the conduct of the Assembly;

4. To submit complaints;

5. To occupy the places closest to the Assembly Board;

6. To initial and sign the official records of the Assembly and to monitor all acts related to the electoral operations,

f) Any complaints shall be included in the official records and transmitted to the National Elections Commission.

5. Election to the Assembly of the Republic

a) The country’s provinces shall constitute electoral districts. The National Elections Commission shall decide on the apportionment of seats to each electoral district on the basis of population;

b) The Electoral Act shall provide for an electoral system based on the principle of proportional representation for election to the Assembly;

c) Parties which intend to stand jointly for elections to the Assembly must submit lists under a single emblem;

d) Once the election campaign has begun, the combining of electoral lists for the purpose of pooling votes shall not be permitted;

e) Citizens 18 years of age and over shall be eligible to stand for election to the Assembly of the Republic. The parties agree, however, on the desirability of raising the minimum age to 25 for the forthcoming elections as a transitional measure;

f) A minimum percentage of votes cast nationwide shall be established, below which competing political parties may not have a seat in the Assembly. This percentage shall be agreed in consultation with all political parties in the country and shall not be less than 5 per cent or more than 20 per cent;

g) Representatives of the parties in each electoral district shall be elected in the order in which they appear on the lists.

6. Election of the President of the Republic

a) The President of the Republic shall be elected by an absolute majority of ballots cast. If no candidate obtains an absolute majority, a second ballot shall be held restricted to the two candidates who have received the highest number of votes;

b) The second ballot shall take place within one to three weeks after the announcement of the results of the first ballot. Having regard to organisational considerations, the date of the ballot shall be indicated before the commencement of the election campaign;

c) Individuals 35 years of age and over who are citizens and registered voters shall be eligible to stand for election to the office of President of the Republic;

d) Candidacies for President of the Republic must have the support of at least 10,000 signatures of Mozambican citizens 18 years of age and over who are currently registered voters.

7. Financing and facilities

a) The National Elections Commission shall guarantee the distribution to all parties competing in the elections, without discrimination, of subsidies and logistic support for the election campaign apportioned on the basis of the number of each party’s candidates and under the supervision of all parties competing in the elections;

b) The Government undertakes to assist in obtaining facilities and means so that Renamo may secure the accommodation and transport and communications facilities it needs to carry out its political activities in all the provincial capitals, and in other locations to the extent that the available resources so permit;

c) For these purposes the Government shall seek support from the international community and, in particular, from Italy.

VI. Guarantees for the electoral process and role of international observers

a) Supervision and monitoring of the implementation of this Protocol shall be guaranteed by the Commission envisaged in Protocol I on basic principles;

b) With a view to ensuring the highest degree of impartiality in the electoral process, the parties agree to invite as observers the United Nations, OAU and other organisations, as well as appropriate private individuals from abroad as may be agreed between the Government and Renamo. The observers shall perform their function from the commencement of the electoral campaign to the time when the Government takes office;

c) With the aim of expediting the peace process, the parties also agree on the necessity of seeking technical and material assistance from
I. **Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force**

i. **General principles**

1. The Mozambican Defence Force (FADM) shall be formed for service throughout the national territory.

2. The FADM:

   a) Has as its general purpose the defence and safeguarding of the country's sovereignty, independence and territory. During the period between the cease-fire and the time when the new Government takes office, the FADM may, under the FADM High Command, act in cooperation with the Police Command to protect civilian inhabitants against crime and violence of all kinds. Additional functions of the FADM shall be to provide assistance in crisis or emergency situations arising in the country as a result of natural disasters and to provide support for reconstruction and development efforts;

   b) Shall be non-partisan, career, professionally trained, and competent: it shall be made up exclusively of Mozambican citizens who are volunteers and are drawn from the forces of both Parties. It shall serve the country with professionalism and respect the democratic order and the rule of law. The composition of the FADM should preclude all forms of racial or ethnic discrimination or discrimination based on language or religious affiliation;

3. The process of forming the FADM shall begin after the entry into force of the cease-fire immediately following the inauguration of the Commission provided for in Protocol I of 18 October 1991, to be called the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC). This process shall be completed prior to the commencement of the election campaign;

4. The process of forming the FADM shall be conducted simultaneously with the concentration, disarmament and integration into civilian life of the personnel demobilised in stages as a result of the cease-fire. The Government and Renamo shall be responsible for contributing units drawn from the existing forces of each side; this process shall proceed until the new units of the FADM have been formed, with all existing units being demobilised when the FADM has reached full strength;

5. The neutrality of the FADM during the period between the cease-fire and the time when the new Government takes office shall be guaranteed by the Parties through the Commission referred to in section I.iii.1a of this Protocol;
6. By the time of the elections, only the FADM shall exist and shall have the structure agreed upon between the Parties; no other forces may remain in existence. All elements of the existing armed forces of the two Parties which are not incorporated into the FADM shall be demobilised during the period envisaged in section VI.i.3 of this Protocol.

ii. Personnel

1. The Parties agree that the troop strength of the FADM up until the time when the new Government takes office shall be as follows:
   a) Army: 24,000
   b) Air Force: 4,000
   c) Navy: 2,000

2. The personnel of the FADM in each of the service branches shall be provided by the FAM and the forces of Renamo, each side contributing 50 per cent.

iii. FADM command structures

1. The parties agree to establish a Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force (CCFADM) on the following basis:
   a) CCFADM shall have specific responsibility for overseeing the process of forming the FADM and shall operate under the authority of CSC;
   b) CCFADM is the body responsible for the formation of the FADM until the time when the new Government takes office. FADM shall be headed by a High Command (CS), which shall be subordinate to CCFADM. After the new Government takes office, the FADM shall be placed under the authority of the new Ministry of Defence or any other body which the new Government may establish;
   c) CCFADM shall be composed of representatives of the FAM and the Renamo forces as members, who shall be assisted by representatives of the countries selected by the Parties to advise in the process of forming the FADM. CCFADM shall be inaugurated on the date of the entry into force of the cease-fire (E-Day);
   d) CCFADM shall draw up directives on the phasing of the establishment of the FADM structures and shall propose to CSC:
      - The rules governing the FADM;
      - The budget to be provided for the FADM until the new Government takes office;
      - The criteria for selection and the selection of FAM personnel and Renamo forces for the formation of the FADM;
      - The names of the commanding officers of the main commands.

2. FADM High Command

   a) The general mission of CS shall be to act on the directives issued by CCFADM, taking into account the establishment of the FADM structures and support for the FADM;
   b) Until the new Government takes office, the command of FADM shall be exercised by two general officers of equal rank, appointed by each of the Parties. Decisions of the command shall be valid only when signed by these two general officers;
   c) The FADM command structure shall be strictly non-political and shall receive directives and orders only through the appropriate chain of command;
   d) The FADM shall have a single logistics service for all three branches. To that end, a Logistics and Infrastructure Command shall be established under the authority of the FADM High Command;
   e) Appointments to the FADM High Command and the commands of the three branches of the FADM and the Logistics Command shall be proposed by CCFADM and approved by CSC;
   f) Until the new Government takes office, the FADM High Command shall be assisted by the General Staff, with departments headed by general officers or senior officers proposed by CCFADM and approved by CSC.

3. Command of the Army, Air Force and Navy and the Logistics Command:

   The FADM High Command shall have authority over the Commands of the three service branches (Army, Air Force and Navy) and the Logistics Command, which shall be organised as follows:

   a) Army Command

      1. The structure of the Army Command shall encompass the military regions under the direct authority of the Army Commander, whose functions are to be determined but which may include the organisation and preparation of forces, training, justice, discipline and logistic support to assigned forces.

      2. Each military region shall have a commanding officer holding the rank of general, who shall be assisted by a deputy commander.
3. The headquarters of the military regions shall be proposed by the Commander of the Army and approved by CS.

b) Air Force Command

The Air Force shall be formed having regard to the training and skills of the personnel of the existing Air Force and the existing Renamo forces, in accordance with the provisions of the directives issued by CCFADM;

c) Navy Command

The Navy shall be formed having regard to the training and skills of the personnel of the existing Navy and the Renamo forces, in accordance with the provisions of the directives issued by CCFADM;

d) Logistics and Infrastructure Command

1. The FADM High Command on E-Day +

A Logistics and Infrastructure Command shall be set up under the direct authority of the FADM High Command.

2. The Logistics and Infrastructure Command shall have the overall mission of planning and providing administrative and logistic support for the FADM (Army, Air Force and Navy) and ensuring delivery of such support through the FADM General Services. It shall, in particular, be responsible for production and procurement logistics.

3. The Logistics and Infrastructure Command shall be headed by a general, assisted by a deputy commander and a general staff which shall, initially, include the following sections:

- Infrastructure;
- General services;
- Equipment;
- Finance.

4. The Logistics and Infrastructure Command shall have authority over such support units as may be assigned to it.

iv. Timetable for the process

a) The formation of the FADM shall commence with the appointment of the following:

- CCFADM, prior to the entry into force of the cease-fire (E-Day);
- The commanders of the three service branches and the logistics command;
- The commanders of the military regions;
- The unit commanders.

b) General staffs shall be organised immediately following the appointment of each command;

c) The system of administrative and logistics support shall be organised taking into account the new size of the FADM, in accordance with the principle of utilising or transforming existing structures on the basis of the plans of the FADM High Command, as approved by CCFADM.

v. Technical assistance of foreign countries

The parties shall inform the mediators within 7 (seven) days after the signing of the cease-fire Protocol the countries which are to be invited to provide assistance in the process of forming the FADM.

II. Withdrawal of foreign troops from Mozambican territory

1. The withdrawal of foreign troops from Mozambican territory shall be initiated following the entry into force of the cease-fire (E-Day).

The Government of the Republic of Mozambique undertakes to negotiate the complete withdrawal of foreign forces and contingents from Mozambican territory with the Governments of the countries concerned.

The modalities and time-frame for the withdrawal shall not contravene any provision of the Cease-fire Agreement or the General Peace Agreement.

2. The Government of the Republic of Mozambique shall submit to CSC the deadlines and plans for implementation of the withdrawal, specifying the exact numbers of troops present in Mozambican territory and their location.

3. The complete withdrawal of foreign forces and contingents from Mozambican territory shall be monitored and verified by the Cease-fire Commission (CCF) referred to in paragraph VI.(i).2 of this Protocol. CCF shall inform CSC of the conclusion of the complete withdrawal of foreign forces from the national territory.

4. In accordance with its mandate CSC, through CCF, will, following the withdrawal of the foreign troops, assume immediate responsibility for verifying and ensuring security of strategic and trading routes, adopting the measures it deems necessary for the purpose.
III. Activities of private and irregular armed groups

1. Except as provided in paragraph 3 below, paramilitary, private and irregular armed groups active on the day of entry into force of the cease-fire shall be disbanded and prohibited from forming new groups of the same kind.

2. CCF shall monitor and verify the disbanding of the private and irregular armed groups and shall collect their weapons and ammunition. CSC shall decide the final disposition of the weapons and ammunition collected.

3. CSC may as a temporary measure organise the continued existence of security organisations for the purpose of ensuring the security of specified public or private infrastructures during the period between the cease-fire and the time when the new Government takes office.

4. These security organisations may be authorised to use weapons in the discharge of their duties. The activities of these organisations shall be monitored by CCF.

IV. Functioning of the National Service for People’s Security

1. The parties agree that it is essential that the State information service should continue to function during the period between the entry into force of the cease-fire and the time when the new Government takes office, in order to ensure that the strategic information required by the State is made available and for the purpose of protecting the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Mozambique.

2. For the purposes indicated above, the Parties agree that the State Information and Security Service (SISE) established by Act No. 20/91 of 23 August 1991 shall continue to perform its functions under the direct authority of the President of the Republic of Mozambique and subject to the following principles:

3. SISE shall:
   a) perform its duties and functions strictly in accordance with the spirit and the letter of internationally recognised democratic principles;
   b) respect the civil and political rights of citizens, as well as the internationally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms;
   c) be guided in the performance of its functions by the interests of the State and the common welfare, in a manner free from any partisan or ideological considerations or regard for social standing and from any other form of discrimination;
   d) act at all times and in all respects in conformity with the terms and spirit of the General Peace Agreement.

4. SISE shall be composed, at all levels of the service, of citizens selected on the basis of criteria that are in conformity with the principles specified above.

5. a) The measures taken by SISE, as well as all actions of its agents, shall at all times be governed by the law in force in the Republic of Mozambique and by the principles agreed upon in the General Peace Agreement;

   b) The activities and prerogatives of SISE shall be confined to the production of information required by the President of the Republic, within the limits authorised by the juridical order and in strict respect for the principles of the State ruled by law and for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The information thus obtained may in no case be used to limit the exercise of the democratic rights of citizens or to favour any political party;

   c) In no case may police functions be assigned to SISE.

6. The Director-General and Deputy Director-General of SISE shall be appointed by the President of the Republic of Mozambique.

7. a) For purposes of verifying that the actions of SISE do not violate the legal order or result in violation of the political rights of citizens, a National Information Commission (COMINFO) shall be established;

   b) COMINFO shall be composed of 21 members whose professional and personal qualities and past record afford guarantees of balance, effectiveness and independence vis-à-vis all political parties;

   c) COMINFO shall be established by the President of the Republic of Mozambique within 15 days following the entry into force of the General Peace Agreement and shall be composed of six citizens nominated by Renamo, six nominated by the Government, and nine selected as a result of consultations to be held by the President of the Republic with the political forces in the country from among citizens meeting the requirements specified in subparagraph (b);

   d) COMINFO shall have full powers to investigate any matter relating to the activity of SISE that is held to be contrary to the legal order and to the principles specified in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 5. A request for investigation may be rejected only by a two-thirds majority of its membership;
e) COMINFO shall provide CSC with the reports and clarifications called for by the latter Commission;

f) COMINFO shall inform the competent State authorities of any irregularities detected, in order that they may take the appropriate police or disciplinary measures.

V. Depoliticisation and restructuring of the police forces

1. During the period between the entry into force of the cease-fire and the assumption of power by the new Government, the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM) shall continue to perform its functions under the responsibility of the Government.

2. The Police of the Republic of Mozambique shall:
   a) perform its duties and functions strictly in accordance with the spirit and the letter of internationally recognised democratic principles;
   b) respect the civil and political rights of citizens, as well as the internationally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms;
   c) be guided in the performance of its functions by the interests of the State and common welfare, in a manner free from any partisan or ideological considerations or regard for social standing and from any other form of discrimination;
   d) act at all times in conformity with the terms and spirit of the General Peace Agreement;
   e) act at all times with impartiality and independence vis-a-vis all political parties.

3. The PRM shall be composed of citizens selected on the basis of criteria that are in conformity with the principles specified above.

4. The basic tasks of the PRM shall be:
   a) to ensure respect for and defence of the law;
   b) to maintain public order and tranquillity and to prevent and suppress crime;
   c) to guarantee the existence of a climate of social stability and harmony.

5. a) The measures taken by the PRM, as well as all actions of its agents, shall at all times be governed by the law and the legislative provisions in force in the Republic of Mozambique and by the principles agreed upon in the General Peace Agreement;

b) The activities and prerogatives of the PRM shall be exercised within the limits authorised by the juridical order, but with strict respect for the principles of the State ruled by law and for human rights and fundamental freedoms. These activities may not be directed towards limiting the exercise of the democratic rights of citizens or favouring any political party.

6. The Commander and Deputy Commander of the PRM shall be appointed by the President of the Republic of Mozambique.

7. a) For purposes of verifying that the actions of the PRM do not violate the legal order or result in violation of the political rights of citizens, a National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL) shall be established;

b) COMPOL shall be composed of 21 members whose professional and personal qualities and past record afford guarantees of balance, effectiveness and independence vis-a-vis all political parties;

c) COMPOL shall be established by the President of the Republic of Mozambique within 15 days following the entry into force of the General Peace Agreement and shall be composed of six citizens nominated by Renamo, six nominated by the Government, and nine selected as a result of consultations to be held by the President of the Republic with the political forces in the country from among citizens meeting the requirements specified in subparagraph (b);

d) COMPOL shall have full powers to investigate any matter relating to the activity of PRM that is held to be contrary to the legal order and to the principles specified in paragraphs 1, 2, 4 and 5. On being apprised of a matter, the Commission shall conduct a preliminary internal analysis in order to determine whether it falls within the sphere of police activities. The Commission shall decide to proceed with the investigations if more than half of its members so agree;

e) COMPOL shall submit systematic reports on its activities to CSC;

f) COMPOL shall inform the competent State authorities of any irregularities detected, in order that they may take the appropriate judicial or disciplinary measures.
VI. Economic and social reintegration of demobilised soldiers

(i) Demobilisation

1. Demobilisation of the FAM and the forces of Renamo means the process whereby, at the decision of the respective Parties, soldiers who on E-Day were members of those forces revert for all purposes to the status of civilians.

2. Cease-fire Commission

   a) On E-Day, the Cease-fire Commission (CCF) shall be established and begin its functions under the direct supervision of CSC;
   
   b) CCF shall be composed of representatives of the Government, Renamo, the invited countries and the United Nations. CCF shall be presided over by the United Nations;
   
   c) CCF shall be based in Maputo and shall be structured as follows:
      - Regional offices (North, Centre and South);
      - Offices at the assembly and billeting locations of the two Parties.
   
   d) CCF shall have, inter alia, the function of implementing the demobilisation process, with the following tasks:
      - Planning and organisation;
      - Regulation of procedures;
      - Direction and supervision;
      - Registration of troops to be demobilised and issue of the respective identity cards;
      - Collection, registration and custody of weapons, ammunition, explosives, equipment, uniforms and documentation; destroying or deciding on the other disposition of weapons, ammunition, explosives, equipment, uniforms and documentation as agreed by the Parties;
      - Medical examinations;
      - Issue of demobilisation certificates.
   
   e) The United Nations shall assist in the implementation, verification and monitoring of the entire demobilisation process.

3. Timetable

   E-Day: Installation of CCF and commencement of its functions
   E-Day + 30: Definition by both Parties of the troops to be demobilised; activation of demobilisation structures and initiation of the process
   E-Day + 60: Demobilisation of at least 20 per cent of the total troops to be demobilised
   E-Day + 90: Demobilisation of at least a further 20 per cent of the total troops to be demobilised
   E-Day + 120: Demobilisation of at least a further 20 per cent of the total troops to be demobilised
   E-Day + 150: Demobilisation of at least a further 20 per cent of the total troops to be demobilised
   E-Day + 180: End of demobilisation of the troops to be demobilised.

(ii) Reintegration

1. The term “demobilised soldier” means an individual who:
   - up until E-Day was a member of the FAM or the Renamo forces;
   - subsequent to E-Day was demobilised at the decision of the relevant command, and handed over the weapons, ammunition, equipment, uniform and documentation in his possession
   - has been registered and has received the relevant identity card
   - has received the demobilisation certificate.

For all purposes, demobilised soldiers of both Parties shall become civilians and shall be accorded equal treatment by the State.

2. Reintegration Commission

   a) A Reintegration Commission (CORE) shall be established. CORE shall operate under the direct authority of CSC and shall initiate its functions on E-Day;
   
   b) CORE shall be composed of representatives of the Government and Renamo, representatives of the invited countries, a representative of the United Nations, who shall preside, and representatives of other international organisations;
   
   c) CORE shall be based at Maputo and shall be structured as follows:
      - Regional offices (North, Centre and South);
      - Provincial offices in each provincial capital.
   
   d) The assignment of CORE shall be to effect the economic and social reintegration of demobilised soldiers, and it shall for this purpose conduct the following tasks:
      - Planning and organisation;
      - Regulation of procedures;
      - Direction and supervision;
      - Monitoring.
3. Resources

The economic and social reintegration of demobilised soldiers (demobilisation allowances, technical and/or vocational training, transport, etc.) will depend on the resources made available within the framework of the Donors Conference as referred to in item 6 of the Agreed Agenda of 28 May 1991.

In witness whereof, the Parties have decided to sign the present Protocol.

For the delegation of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique:
(Signed) Armando Emilio Guebuza

For the delegation of Renamo:
(Signed) Raul Manuel Domingos

The mediators:
(Signed) Mario Raffaelli
(Signed) Jaime Gonçalves
(Signed) Andrea Riccardi
(Signed) Matteo Zuppi

Sant’ Edigio, Rome, 4 October 1992

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Annex 1: Mozambican Defence Force Command Structure

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Protocol V

On 4 October 1992, the delegation of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique, headed by Armando Emilio Guebuza, Minister of Transport and Communications, and composed of Mariano de Araujo Matsinha, Minister without Portfolio, Aguiar Mazula, Minister of State Administration, Teodato Hunguana, Minister of Labour, Lieutenant-General Tobias Dai, Francisco Madeira, Diplomatic Advisor to the President of the Republic, Brigadier Aleixo Malungu, Colonel Fideles De Sousa, Major Justino Nrepo, Major Eduardo Lauchande, and the delegation of Renamo, headed by Raul Manuel Domingos, Chief of the Organisation Department, and composed of Jose De Castro, Chief of the External Relations Department, Agostinho Semende Murrial, Chief of the Information Department, Jose Augusto Xavier, Director-General of the Internal Administration Department, Major-General Herminio Morais, Colonel Fernando Canivete, Lieutenant-Colonel Arone Julai, and Lieutenant Antonio Domingos, meeting at Rome in the presence of the mediators, Mario Raffaelli, representative of the Italian Government and co-ordinator of the mediators, Jaime Gonçalves, Archbishop of Beira, Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi of the Community of Sant’ Edigio, and the observers of the United Nations and the Governments of the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom and Portugal, took up item 5 of the Agreed Agenda of 28 May 1991, entitled “Guarantees”, and agreed as follows:

I. Timetable for the conduct of the electoral process

1. The elections to the Assembly of the Republic and the post of President of the Republic shall be held simultaneously and shall take place one year after the date of signature of the General Peace Agreement, as provided for in Protocol III.

2. Further to the provisions set forth in Protocol III, the Parties also agree as follows:

   a) By E-Day + 60, the Government shall establish the National Elections Commission provided for in Protocol III;

   b) Immediately following the signature of the General Peace Agreement, the Government, for purposes of the provisions of Protocol III, shall request technical and material support from the United Nations and OAU;

   c) The Government shall draft the Electoral Act in consultation with Renamo and the other parties within at most two months from the adoption by the Assembly of the Republic of the legal instruments incorporating the Protocols and guarantees, as well as the General Peace Agreement, into Mozambican law. The approval and publication of the Electoral Act shall take place within at most one month following the completion of its drafting;

   d) Within 60 days following the signature of the General Peace Agreement, the Government and Renamo shall agree on the observers to be invited for the electoral process. The Government shall draw up the corresponding invitations;

   e) The election campaign shall begin 45 days before the date of the elections;

   f) By the date of commencement of the election campaign, all parties taking part must have been registered and have submitted their lists of candidates as well as their respective symbols;

   g) By the date of commencement of the election campaign, the candidates for the Presidency of the Republic must have submitted their candidacies in conformity with the legally prescribed requirements;

   h) The election campaign shall conclude 48 hours before the start of voting;

   i) The elected Assembly of the Republic shall take office 15 days after the publication of the lists giving the results of the election. The lists giving the results of the election shall be published not more than eight days after the closure of voting;

   j) The investiture of the elected President of the Republic shall take place one week after the elected Assembly of the Republic has taken office.

II. Commission to supervise the ceasefire and monitor respect for and implementation of the agreements between the Parties within the framework of these negotiations: its composition and powers

1. Pursuant to Protocol I, the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) is established, which shall begin operating upon appointment of its Chairman by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

2. This Commission shall be composed of representatives of the Government, Renamo, the United Nations, OAU and the countries to be agreed upon by the Parties. The Commission shall be chaired by the United Nations and shall be based at Maputo.

3. The decisions of CSC shall be taken by consensus between the two Parties.
4. CSC shall draw up its own Rules of Procedure and may whenever it sees fit establish sub-commissions additional to those provided for in paragraph II.7 of the present Protocol.

5. CSC shall in particular:
   a) Guarantee the implementation of the provisions contained in the General Peace Agreement;
   b) Guarantee respect for the timetable specified for the cease-fire and the holding of the elections;
   c) Assume responsibility for the authentic interpretation of the agreements;
   d) Settle any disputes that may arise between the Parties;
   e) Guide and co-ordinate the activities of the subsidiary commissions referred to in paragraph II.7 of this Protocol.

6. CSC shall cease to function when the new Government takes office.

7. CSC shall have under it the following Commissions:
   a) The Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force (CCFADM)
      Its powers shall be those specified in Protocol IV, paragraph I (iii) on the formation of the Mozambican Defence Force. CCFADM shall be composed of representatives of the Parties and of the Governments selected by the Parties before the signing of the General Peace Agreement to provide assistance in the process of formation of the FADM in conformity with the provisions of Protocol IV, section I;
   b) The Cease-fire Commission (CCF)
      Its composition and powers shall be those indicated in Protocol IV, section VI and Protocol VI, section I;
   c) Reintegration Commission (CORE)
      Its composition and powers shall be those specified in Protocol IV, section VI.

III. Specific guarantees for the period from the cease-fire to the holding of the elections

1. The Government of the Republic of Mozambique shall submit a formal request to the United Nations for its participation in monitoring and guaranteeing the implementation of the General Peace Agreement, in particular the cease-fire and the electoral process, with immediate priority to coordinating and making available food, medical attention and all other forms of support necessary at the assembly and billeting locations for the forces as provided in Protocol VI.

2. With the means available to it and with the assistance of the international community, the Government of the Republic of Mozambique shall make available to CSC and its subsidiary commissions the logistical support required for their functioning.

3. The Government of the Republic of Mozambique shall send formal requests to the Governments and organisations selected by the two Parties to participate in the commissions agreed upon above.

4. The resources and facilities specified in Protocol III, paragraph 7 (b) shall be made available by the Government of Mozambique as from the date of incorporation of the General Peace Agreement into Mozambican law by the Assembly of the Republic. The major part of this process shall have been concluded by E-day.

5. The committee provided for in the Joint Declaration of 16 July 1992 shall exercise its functions before CSC takes office. CSC may if necessary decide to extend the activities of that committee, and establish guidelines for its operations to that end.

6. The Government of the Republic of Mozambique shall draw up in agreement with Renamo and the relevant United Nations agencies, in accordance with Protocol III, the plan for assistance to refugees and displaced persons, which shall be submitted to the donors' conference the holding of which is agreed upon in Protocol VII.

7. Between the entry into force of the cease-fire and the time when the new Government takes office, the entry of foreign troops or contingents into Mozambican territory shall not be permitted except in the cases agreed to by CSC.

8. Renamo shall be responsible for the immediate personal security of its top leaders. The Government of the Republic of Mozambique shall grant police status to the members of Renamo assigned to guarantee that security.

   a) The Parties recognise that the public administration in the Republic of Mozambique during the period between the entry into force of the cease-fire and the time when the new Government takes office will continue to obey the law in force and to be conducted through the institutions provided for by law;
b) The public administration shall guarantee public tranquillity and stability, and seek to ensure the maintenance of peace and the creation of the climate required for the holding of fair and free general and presidential elections in accordance with the provisions of the General Peace Agreement and the Electoral Act;

c) The two Parties undertake to guarantee that the laws and legislative provisions of the Republic of Mozambique, as well as the civil and political rights of citizens and human rights and fundamental freedoms, shall be respected and guaranteed in all parts of the national territory in conformity with Protocol I of 18 October 1991;

d) In order to ensure greater tranquillity and stability in the period between the entry into force of the cease-fire and the time when the new Government takes office, the Parties agree that the institutions provided for by law for the conduct of the public administration in the areas controlled by Renamo shall employ only citizens resident in those areas, who may be members of Renamo. The State shall accord such citizens and the institutions staffed by them the respect, treatment and support required for the discharge of their duties, on the basis of strict equality and without any discrimination in relation to others performing similar functions and institutions at the same level in other areas of the country.

The relationship between the Ministry of State Administration and the administration in the areas controlled by Renamo shall be conducted through a National Commission constituted by the Parties for the purpose of facilitating collaboration and good understanding. This Commission shall be composed of four representatives of each of the Parties and shall begin operating 15 days after the signature of the General Peace Agreement;

e) The Government undertakes to respect and not antagonise the traditional structures and authorities where they are currently de facto exercising such authority, and to allow them to be replaced only in those cases where that is called for by the procedures of local tradition themselves;

f) The Government undertakes not to hold local, district or provincial elections or elections to administrative posts in advance of the forthcoming general elections;

g) The Parties undertake to guarantee throughout the national territory the exercise of democratic rights and freedoms by all citizens, as well as the performance of party work by all political parties;

h) The Parties guarantee access by the Commissions provided for in the General Peace Agreement, the representatives and officials of the State institutions provided for by law and their officials to any part of the national territory to which they may need to proceed on official business, as well as the right to freedom of movement in all locations not restricted by any legislative measure, instrument or rule.

IV. Constitutional issues

The joint declaration of 7 August 1992 signed by Joaquim Alberto Chissano, President of the Republic of Mozambique, and Afonso Macacho Marceta Dhlakama, President of Renamo, constitutes an integral part of the General Peace Agreement. Accordingly, the principles embodied in Protocol I shall also apply with respect to the problem of constitutional guarantees raised by Renamo and illustrated in the document submitted to the President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Robert Gabriel Mugabe, at Gaborone, Botswana, on 4 July 1992. To this end, the Government of the Republic of Mozambique shall submit to the Assembly of the Republic for adoption legal instruments incorporating the Protocols, the guarantees and the General Peace Agreement into Mozambican law.

In witness whereof, the Parties have decided to sign the present Protocol.

For the delegation of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique:
(Signed) Armando Emilio Guebuza

For the delegation of Renamo:
(Signed) Raul Manuel Domingos

The mediators:
(Signed) Mario Raffaelli
(Signed) Jaime Gonçalves
(Signed) Andrea Riccardi
(Signed) Matteo Zuppi

San’ Edigio, Rome, 4 October 1992
Protocol VI

On 4 October 1992, the delegation of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique, headed by Armando Emilio Guebuza, Minister of Transport and Communications, and composed of Mariano de Araujo Matsinha, Minister without Portfolio, Aguiar Mazula, Minister of State Administration, Teodato Hunguana, Minister of Labour, Lieutenant-General Tobias Dai, Francisco Madeira, Diplomatic Adviser to the President of the Republic, Brigadier Aleixo Malunga, Colonel Fideles de Sousa, Major Justino Nrepo and Major Eduardo Lauchande, and the delegation of Renamo, headed by Raul Manuel Domingos, Chief of the Organisation Department, and composed of Jose de Castro, Chief of the External Relations Department, Agostinho Semende Murrial, Chief of the Information Department, Jose Augusto Xavier, Director-General of the Internal Administration Department, Major General Herminio Morais, Colonel Fernando Canivete, Lieutenant Colonel Arone Julai and Lieutenant Antonio Domingos, meeting at Rome in the presence of the mediators Mario Raffaelli, representative of the Italian Government and co-ordinator of the mediators, Jaime Gonçalves, Archbishop of Beira, Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi, of the Community of Sant’ Edigio, and observers from the United Nations and the Governments of the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom and Portugal, took up item 4 of the Agreed Agenda of 28 May 1991, entitled “Cease-fire”, and agreed as follows:

I. Cessation of the armed conflict

1. The cessation of the armed conflict (CAC) is a brief, dynamic and irreversible process of predetermined duration which must be implemented throughout the national territory of Mozambique.

The implementation of the process shall be the responsibility of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique and of Renamo, acting within the framework of the Cease-fire Commission (CCF). The CCF is answerable to the CSC, the organ responsible for the overall political supervision of the cease-fire.

The CCF shall be composed of representatives of the Government and of Renamo, representatives of countries accepted by them and a representative of the United Nations, who shall preside.

2. The CCF, which shall be structured as stipulated in Protocol IV, paragraph VI.i.2, shall have the following functions:

- to plan, verify and guarantee the implementation of the cease-fire rules;
- to set itineraries for the movement of forces, in order to reduce the risk of incidents;
- to organise and implement mine-clearing operations;
- to analyse and verify the accuracy of the statistics provided by the Parties on troop strength, arms and military equipment;
- to receive, analyse and rule on complaints of possible cease-fire violations;
- to ensure the necessary co-ordination with organs of the United Nations verification system;
- the functions provided for in sections II, III and VI of Protocol IV.

3. The CAC shall begin on E-Day and end on E-Day + 180.

4. The CAC consists of 4 (four) phases:
- cease-fire;
- separation of forces;
- concentration of forces;
- demobilisation.

5. The cease-fire

The Parties agree that:

a) the cease-fire shall enter into force on E-Day

E-Day is the day on which the General Peace Agreement is adopted by the Assembly of the Republic and incorporated into Mozambican law. The deployment of United Nations personnel in Mozambican territory to verify the cease-fire shall begin the same day;

b) As of E-Day, neither of the Parties shall carry out any hostile act or operation by means of forces or individuals under its control. Accordingly, they may not:

- carry out any kind of attack by land, sea or air;
- organise patrols or offensive manoeuvres;
- occupy new positions;
- lay mines and prevent mine-clearing operations;
- interfere with military communications;
- carry out any kind of reconnaissance operations;
- carry out acts of sabotage and terrorism;
- acquire or receive lethal equipment;
- carry out acts of violence against the civilian population;
- restrict or prevent without justification the free movement of persons and property;
- carry out any other military activity which, in the opinion of the CCF and the United Nations, might jeopardise the cease-fire.

In performing their functions, the CCF and the United Nations shall enjoy complete freedom of movement throughout the territory of Mozambique;

c) On E-Day, the United Nations shall begin official verification of compliance with the undertaking described in paragraph (b), investigating any alleged violation of the cease-fire. Any duly substantiated violation shall be reported by the United Nations at the appropriate level;

d) During the period between the signing of the General Peace Agreement and E-Day, the two Parties agree to observe a complete cessation of hostilities and of the activities described in paragraph (b), in order to allow the United Nations to deploy its personnel in the territory to verify all aspects of the CAC as of E-Day.

6. Separation of forces
The Parties agree that:

a) The purpose of the separation of forces is to reduce the risk of incidents, to build trust and to allow the United Nations effectively to verify the commitments assumed by the Parties;

b) The separation of forces shall last 6 (six) days, from E-Day to E-Day + 5;

c) During this period, the FAM shall proceed to the barracks, bases, existing semi-permanent facilities and other locations listed in annex A;

d) During the same period, the Renamo forces shall proceed to the locations listed in annex B;

e) The locations listed in the above-mentioned annexes shall be those agreed to between the Parties and the United Nations no later than 7 (seven) days after the signing of the General Peace Agreement. The lists shall specify the name and site of the 29 assembly and billeting points for the FAM and the 20 such points for the Renamo forces;

f) Accordingly, by 2400 hours on E-Day + 5, the FAM and the Renamo forces must be in the locations listed in annexes A and B respectively;

g) All movements shall take place under the supervision and co-ordination of the United Nations. Neither Party may prevent or jeopardise, the movements of the other Party’s forces. The United Nations shall supervise all the locations listed in annexes A and B and shall in principle be present 24 hours a day in each of those locations as of E-Day;

h) During this period of 6 (six) days, no force or individual shall be able to leave assembly and billeting points except to seek medical care or other humanitarian reasons, and then only with the authorisation and under the supervision of the United Nations. In each location, the commander of the troops shall be responsible for maintaining order and discipline and for ensuring that the troops conduct themselves in accordance with the principles and the spirit of this Protocol.

7. Concentration of forces The Parties agree that:

a) The concentration of forces shall begin on E-Day + 6 and end on E-Day + 30;

b) During this period, the FAM shall concentrate in the normal peacetime barracks and military bases listed in annex C;

c) During the same period, the Renamo forces shall go to the assembly and billeting points listed in annex D;

d) All movements shall take place under the supervision and co-ordination of the United Nations and shall be subject to the same conditions as those established for the separation of forces;

e) All the main military facilities of the two Parties which cannot be moved to assembly and billeting points, such as military hospitals, logistical units and training facilities, shall be subject to verification in situ. These locations must also be specified no later than 7 (seven) days after the signing of the General Peace Agreement;

f) Each assembly and billeting point shall be run by a military commander appointed by the corresponding Party. The military commander is responsible for maintaining the order and discipline of troops, distributing food and ensuring liaison with the organs for the verification and supervision of the cease-fire. In the event of an incident or a cease-fire violation, the military commander must take immediate steps to avoid an escalation and put a stop to the incident or violation. Any incident or violation shall be reported to the senior level of the command structure and to the cease-fire verification and supervision organs;

g) Arrangements for the security of each assembly and billeting point shall be agreed between the corresponding commander and the CCF, with the knowledge of the United Nations. The military unit stationed in each location shall provide its own security. Each assembly and billeting point shall cover an area with a maximum radius of five kilometres. Individual weapons and the necessary ammunition shall
be distributed only to the security staff of assembly and billeting points;
h) Each location must have the capacity to accommodate at least 1,000 soldiers.

8. Demobilisation

Shall take place as stipulated in section VI of Protocol IV.

9. Formation of the FADM

Shall take place as stipulated in section I of Protocol IV.

10. Miscellaneous provisions.

a) The Parties agree to the following:

1. To supply the United Nations with complete inventories of their troop strength, arms, ammunition, mines and other explosives on E-Day-6, E-Day, E-Day + 6, E-Day + 30 and, thereafter, every 15 days;

2. To allow the United Nations to verify the aspects and data referred to in the preceding paragraph;

3. As of E-Day + 31, all collective and individual weapons, including weapons on board aircraft and ships, shall be stored in warehouses under United Nations control;

4. (a) As of E-Day + 6, troops shall be able to leave their respective assembly and billeting points only with the authorisation and under the supervision of the United Nations;

b) As of E-Day, the naval and air force components of the FAM shall refrain from carrying out any offensive operation. They may carry out only such non-hostile missions as are necessary for the discharge of their duties unrelated to the armed conflict. All air force flight plans must be communicated in advance to the United Nations. Aircraft may not, in any case, be armed and may not overfly assembly and billeting points,

c) The foreign forces currently present in the territory of Mozambique must also respect the agreed cease-fire as of E-Day. In accordance with section II of Protocol IV, on E-Day the Government of the Republic of Mozambique shall communicate to the United Nations and the CSC the plans for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Mozambican territory. These plans shall include the numbers and equipment of such troops, the withdrawal shall begin on E-Day +6 and end on E-Day +30. All movements must be co-ordinated and verified by the CCF;

d) The Parties agree that, as of E-Day, they shall end all hostile propaganda, both internal and external;

e) Border control as of E-Day shall be provided by the immigration services and the police.

II. Operational timetable for the cease-fire

E-Day:
Entry into force of the cease-fire and beginning of United Nations verification
Beginning of the cessation of the armed conflict (CAC)
Beginning of the separation of forces phase

E-Day +5:
End of the separation of forces phase

E-Day +6:
Beginning of the concentration of forces phase
Beginning of the withdrawal of foreign forces and contingents from the country

E-Day +30:
End of the concentration of forces phase
End of the withdrawal of foreign forces and contingents from the country

E-Day +180:
End of the demobilisation phase and of the CAC

III. Release of prisoners, except for those being held for ordinary crimes

1. All prisoners who are being held on E-Day, except for those held for ordinary crimes, shall be released by the Parties.

2. The International Committee of the Red Cross, together with the Parties shall agree on the arrangements for and the verification of the prisoner release process referred to in paragraph 1 above.
In witness whereof, the Parties have decided to sign this Protocol.

For the delegation of the Republic of Mozambique:
(Signed) Armando Emilio Guebuza

For the delegation of Renamo:
(Signed) Raul Manuel Domingos

The Mediators:
(Signed) Mario Raffaelli
(Signed) Jaime Gonçalves
(Signed) Andrea Riccardi
(Signed) Matteo Zuppi

Sant’ Edigio, Rome, 4 October 1992

Protocol VII

On 4 October 1992, the delegation of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique, headed by Armando Emilio Guebuza, Minister of Transport and Communications, and composed of Mariano de Araujo Matsinha, Minister without Portfolio, Aguiar Mazula, Minister of State Administration, Teodata Hunguana, Minister of Labour, Lieutenant-General Tobias Dai, Francisco Madeira, Diplomatic Adviser to the President of the Republic, Brigadier Alexo Malunga, Colonel Fideles De Sousa, Major Justino Nrepo and Major Eduardo Lauchande, and the delegation of Renamo, headed by Raul Manuel Domingos, Chief of the Organisation Department, and composed of Jose De Castro, Chief of the External Relations Department, Agostinho Semende Murriat, Chief of the Information Department, Jose Augusto Xavier, Director-General of the Internal Administration Department, Major General Herminio Morais, Colonel Fernando Canivete, Lieutenant Colonel Arone Jula and Lieutenant Antonio Domingos, meeting at Rome in the presence of the mediators, Mario Raffaelli, representative of the Italian Government and co-ordinator of the mediators, Jaime Gonçalves, Archbishop of Beira, Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi, of the Community of Sant’ Edigio, and observers from the United Nations and the Governments of the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom and Portugal, took up item 6 of the Agreed Agenda of 28 May 1991, entitled "Donors’ conference", and agreed as follows:

1. The Parties decide to request the Italian Government to convene a conference of donor countries and organisations to finance the electoral process, emergency programmes and programmes for the reintegration of displaced persons, refugees and demobilised soldiers.

2. The Parties agree to request that, of the funds provided by donor countries, an appropriate share should be placed at the disposal of political parties to finance their activities.

3. The Parties appeal for the donors’ conference to be convened no later than 30 days after E-Day. In addition to donor countries and organisations, the Government and Renamo shall also be invited to send representatives.

In witness whereof, the Parties have decided to sign this Protocol.

For the delegation of the Republic of Mozambique:
(Signed) Armando Emilio Guebuza

For the delegation of Renamo:
(Signed) Raul Manuel Domingos

The mediators:
(Signed) Mario Raffaelli
(Signed) Jaime Gonçalves
(Signed) Andrea Riccardi
(Signed) Matteo Zuppi

Sant’ Edigio, Rome, 4 October 1992
Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective

The Rome Process:
Other Texts

Joint Communiqué

From 8 to 10 July 1990, at the headquarters of the Community of Sant’ Edigio, Rome, a direct meeting took place between a delegation of the Government of the People’s Republic of Mozambique, headed by Armando Emilio Guebuza, Minister of Transport and Communications, and a delegation of Renamo, headed by Raul Manuel Domingos, Chief of the External Relations Department.

Mario Raffaelli, representative of the Government of the Italian Republic, Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi, both of the Community of Sant’ Edigio, and Jaime Gonçalves, Archbishop of Beira, attended the meeting as observers.

The two delegations, acknowledging themselves to be compatriots and members of the great Mozambican family, expressed satisfaction and pleasure at this direct, open and frank meeting, the first to take place between the two parties.

The two delegations expressed interest and willingness to do everything possible to conduct a constructive search for a lasting peace for their country and their people.

Taking into account the higher interests of the Mozambican nation, the two parties agreed that they must set aside what divides them and focus, as a matter of priority, on what unites them, in order to establish a common working basis so that, in a spirit of mutual understanding, they can engage in a dialogue in which they discuss their different points of view.

The two delegations affirmed their readiness to dedicate themselves fully, in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding, to the search for a working basis from which to end the war and create the necessary political, economic and social conditions for building a lasting peace and normalising the life of all Mozambican citizens.

At the close of the meeting, the two delegations decided to meet again in due course at Rome, in the presence of the same observers. They expressed satisfaction and gratitude for the spirit of friendship and the hospitality and support shown them by the Italian Government and by all those who helped make this meeting possible.

Done at Sant’ Edigio, Rome, on 10 July 1990.

For the delegation of the Government of the People’s Republic of Mozambique:
(Signed) Armando Emilio Guebuza

For the delegation of Renamo:
(Signed) Raul Manuel Domingos

Observers
(Signed)

Sant’ Egidio, Rome, 10 July 1990

Agreement on a Partial Ceasefire

Delegations of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique and Renamo, led respectively by Armando Emilio Guebuza, Minister of Transport and Communications, and Raul Manuel Domingos, Head of the Department of External Relations, met in Rome at the Sant’ Egidio Community headquarters in the presence of the mediators, Mario Raffaelli, representative of the Government of the Italian Republic, Jaime Gonçalves, Archbishop of Beira, and Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi of the Community Sant’ Egidio. Inspired by reciprocal commitment to and desire for the rapid attainment of a peaceful situation in Mozambique, they agreed on the need for immediate implementation of the understandings and conclusions reached in the discussion of point 1 of the agenda approved on 9 November 1990, “THE PRESENCE AND ROLE OF ZIMBABWEAN MILITARY FORCES IN THE PERIOD PRECEDING THE CEASE-FIRE PROCLAMATION,” in the following terms:

1. The Government of the Republic of Mozambique will agree with the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe modalities for concentrating the Zimbabwean troops along the areas known as “The Beira Corridor,” and “The Limpopo Corridor,” to a minimum distance of 3 km outside the furthest edges of each corridor. This limit may be altered by a proposal from the Joint Verification Commission referred to in point 3, in conformity with criteria which will guarantee greater security and efficiency in verification. The concentration of the Zimbabwean troops in the above-mentioned corridors will begin at the latest 15 days after the
signature of this Agreement and will be concluded by a deadline of 20 days after the time limit for beginning concentration.

1.1. The Government of the Republic of Mozambique will inform the negotiating table of the maximum number of Zimbabwean troops to remain in the corridors.

1.2. The Zimbabwean troops may not be involved in military operations of an offensive nature while concentration is under way.

2. To facilitate the peace process in Mozambique, Renamo will end all offensive military operations and attacks on the Beira and Limpopo corridors, along the areas agreed in term of point 1.

3. A Joint Verification Commission is created with the aim of invigilating the strict implementation of this Agreement. It comprises civilian and military representatives designated by the Government of the Republic of Mozambique and by Renamo, three for each party, whose names will be given to the mediators within seven days of the signature of this Agreement. The Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe may also join the Joint Verification Commission and have three representatives.

3.1. The mediators or their representatives will also be members of the Joint Verification Commission and will chair it. Eight countries agreed between the parties will be members.

3.2. The Joint Verification Commission will have its headquarters in Maputo. It will present reports to the negotiating table at regular intervals or whenever one of the parties so requests.

3.3. The Joint Verification Commission may create sub-commissions with the same composition, qualified to verify the implementation of this Agreement “in loco.”

3.4. The members of the Joint Verification Commission will have diplomatic immunity. The Government of the Republic of Mozambique and Renamo will guarantee the safety and free movement of the members of the Commission and its sub-commission, as well as those of its emissaries, in any area subject to the application of this Agreement.

3.5. The Joint Verification Commission will agree the security measures necessary for its members at the due moment. The Government of the Republic of Mozambique will provide installations for the headquarters of the Joint Verification Commission as well as the necessary logistic support for its operations.

3.6. The Joint Verification Commission will be sworn in up to 15 days after the signing of this Agreement, and will begin its work immediately. It will control the implementation of this Agreement for a period of six months, renewable by common agreement between the parties when necessary.

3.7. The Joint Verification Commission will submit the fundamental criteria that are to govern its activities to the negotiating table for approval as soon as it has been sworn in.

3.8. The delegations of the Republic of Mozambique and Renamo request the Italian Government and other governments of the member countries of the Joint Verification Commission to make efforts at both bilateral and multilateral levels to guarantee the necessary financing and technical support of the Joint Verification Commission created by this Agreement.

4. The parties undertake to avoid any activities that could directly or indirectly violate the spirit or letter of this Agreement. In the case of noting any unusual event of a military nature that could compromise the implementation of this Agreement, at the request of one of the parties the mediators may take practical initiatives to identify and overcome the problem.

4.1. The Government of the Republic of Mozambique and Renamo, convinced that the signing and implementation of this Agreement will make a significant contribution to strengthening the climate of confidence necessary for dialogue, renew their commitment to continuing their analysis of the remaining points of the agenda aimed at establishing peace in Mozambique.

5. This Agreement comes into force on the date that it is signed.

For the delegation of GRM:
Armando Emilio Guebuza
Raul Manuel Domingos

For the delegation of Renamo:

The mediators:

Mario Raffaelli,
D. Jaime Gonçalves,
Andrea Riccardi,
D. Matteo Zuppi

Done at Sant’ Egidio, Rome, on 1 December 1990
**Declaration on the Guiding Principles for Humanitarian Assistance**

On 16 July 1992, the delegation of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique, headed by Armando Emilio Guebuza, Minister of Transport and Communications, and the delegation of Renamo, headed by Raul Manuel Domingos, Chief of the Organisation Department, in the presence of the mediators, of observers and of representatives of international organisations, agreed to adopt the following Declaration:

Considering that, for the population, the consequences of the armed conflict have been seriously aggravated by the worst drought in 50 years in the country and the region,

Determined to mobilise every resource to alleviate starvation and prevent deaths in Mozambique,

While pursuing efforts to reach a total peace agreement in Mozambique as soon as possible,

Reaffirming the principles for humanitarian assistance contained in resolution 46/182 of the United Nations General Assembly,

Reaffirming the understanding reached in December 1990 between the Government, Renamo and the International Committee of the Red Cross on the principles of free movement of populations and assistance for all Mozambicans wherever they might be,

I. The Government and Renamo solemnly agree and undertake to observe the following guiding principles for humanitarian assistance:

a) Assistance shall go to all affected Mozambicans, freely and without discrimination;

b) Freedom of movement and respect shall be guaranteed for persons and means which, under the flag of the United Nations or of ICRC, are engaged in humanitarian actions and are not accompanied by military escorts;

c) The freedom and neutrality of humanitarian assistance shall be recognised and respected;

d) Access shall be permitted to the entire affected population, using all means of transport;

e) The use of all means for the rapid, expeditious distribution of humanitarian assistance shall be permitted and facilitated;

f) Freedom of movement shall be guaranteed for all personnel who, under United Nations/ICRC auspices, are responsible for identifying populations in need, priority areas, means of transport and access routes and for supervising the distribution of assistance;

g) Persons shall be allowed freedom of movement to enable them to have full access to humanitarian assistance.

II. In order to provide relief in situations of extreme urgency, which already exist in the country, the parties agree to:

a) Immediately permit and facilitate air traffic to all points in the country, for transporting humanitarian assistance and whatever personnel is considered necessary and viable;

b) To the same end, to permit and facilitate the immediate use and rehabilitation, where necessary, of other access routes to affected populations, including routes coming from neighbouring countries, as agreed to by the parties and communicated by the committee referred to in paragraph V of this Declaration.

III. In addition, the Government and Renamo will continue their negotiations with a view to reaching, as soon as possible, an agreement on the opening of roads and the removal of all obstacles which might prevent the distribution of humanitarian assistance.

IV. The Government and Renamo undertake not to derive military advantages from humanitarian assistance operations carried out under this Declaration.

V. Both parties agree that the co-ordination and supervision of all humanitarian assistance operations carried out under this Declaration shall be the responsibility of a committee presided over by the United Nations. This committee shall be made up of the mediators, the observers to the Rome negotiations and ICRC. The mediators will also have the task of verifying respect for this declaration and for bringing any complaints or protests to the negotiating table.

The committee will report to the parties, in due course, on the operational details.

VI. Both parties agree to participate and co-operate with the international community in Mozambique in formulating action plans, with a view to implementing such plans in accordance with this Declaration. The committee will co-ordinate such activities. To that end, Renamo will appoint its representative in the framework of and in accordance with the procedures of the COMIVE, who shall have the status provided for therein.

VII. Both parties undertake to comply strictly with the terms of this Declaration and agree that any violation substantiated by the committee may be communicated to the international community.
VIII. This Declaration shall be disseminated as widely as possible in Mozambique.

For the delegation of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique:
(Signed) Armando Emilio Guebuza

For the delegation of Renamo:
(Signed) Raul Manuel Domingos

The mediators:
(Signed) Mario Raffaelli
(Signed) Jaime Gonçalves
(Signed) Andrea Riccardi
(Signed) Matteo Zuppi

Done at Sant’ Edigio, Rome, on 16 July 1992

Joint Declaration

We, Joaquim Alberto Chissano, President of the Republic of Mozambique, and Afonso Macacho Marcete Dhlakama, President of Renamo,

Meeting at Rome in the presence of His Excellency Mr. Robert Gabriel Mugabe, President of the Republic of Zimbabwe; His Excellency Mr. Emilio Colombo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Italy; the representative of His Excellency the President of the Republic of Botswana, Ms. Gaositwe Keagakwa Tibe Chiepe, Minister for Foreign Affairs; the mediators of the peace process, Mario Raffaelli, representative of the Italian Government and co-ordinator of the mediators, Jaime Gonçalves, Archbishop of Beira, Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi, of the Community of Sant’ Edigio,

Recognising that

The achievement of peace, democracy and national unity based on national reconciliation is the greatest aspiration and desire of the entire Mozambican people,

In pursuit of this goal, the peace process was launched at Rome between the Government of the Republic of Mozambique and Renamo, assisted by mediators from the Italian Government, the Community of Sant’ Edigio and the Catholic Church of Mozambique,

Important results have been achieved thus far, as exemplified and demonstrated by the signing of the partial cease-fire agreement of 1 December 1990 and the adoption of the following Protocols and agreements:

(ii) Protocol I “Basic principles”, signed on 18 October 1991;
(iii) Protocol II “Criteria and arrangements for the formation and recognition of political parties”, signed on 13 November 1991;
(v) Act of 2 July 1992 on improving the functioning of the COMIVE;

Supplementing these efforts in the search for peace, democracy and national unity based on reconciliation in Mozambique, a meeting was held at Gaborone, Botswana, on 4 July 1992 between His Excellency Mr. Robert Gabriel Mugabe, President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, and His Excellency Sir Ketumile Masire, President of the Republic of Botswana, on the one hand, and Mr. Afonso Macacho Marcelo Dhlakama, President of Renamo, on the other,

Following which the President of the Republic of Mozambique, MR. Joaquim Alberto Chissano, was briefed in detail by the President of Zimbabwe on 19 July 1992,

Whereas Mr. Afonso Macacho Marcete Dhlakama declared his readiness to sign an immediate ceasefire if certain guarantees were provided and arrangements were made for the security of both himself and members of Renamo, and if his party was given freedom to organise and campaign without interference or hindrance,

Considering his request for guarantees to enable Renamo to operate freely as a political party after the signing of the General Peace Agreement,

Convinced that the suffering of the Mozambican people as a result of the war, exacerbated by the consequences of the worst drought in living memory, demands that rapid steps be taken to end the war,

Recognising the need for the immediate restoration of peace in Mozambique,

Reaffirming the commitment of the Government of the Republic of Mozambique and of Renamo to end the hostilities in Mozambique,

Determined to do everything possible to end the disaster brought about by the combined consequences of war and drought in our country,

Appreciating the progress made in Rome peace negotiations between our respective delegations,

Considering the spirit of the Gaborone meeting of 4 July 1992,

Accordingly, commit ourselves to the following:

(i) To guarantee conditions permitting complete political freedom, in accordance with the internationally recognised principles of democracy;
(ii) To guarantee the personal safety of all Mozambican citizens and all members of political parties;

(iii) To accept the role of the international community, particularly the United Nations, in monitoring and guaranteeing the implementation of the General Peace Agreement, particularly the cease-fire and the electoral process;

(iv) Fully to respect the principles set forth in Protocol I, under which “the Government undertakes to refrain from taking any action that is contrary to the provisions of the Protocols to be concluded and from adopting laws or measures or applying existing laws which may be inconsistent with those Protocols” and “Renamo undertakes to refrain from armed combat and instead to conduct its political struggle in conformity with the laws in force, within the framework of existing State institutions and in accordance with the conditions and guarantees established in the General Peace Agreement”;

(v) To safeguard political rights, emphasising that the principles set forth in Protocol I are valid and also relate to the problem of constitutional guarantees raised by Renamo and dealt with in the document submitted to President Mugabe. To this end, the Government of the Republic of Mozambique shall submit to the Assembly of the Republic for adoption legal instruments incorporating the Protocols and guarantees, as well as the General Peace Agreement, in Mozambican law;

(vi) On the basis of the above principles and of our commitment made in this solemn Declaration, we, Joaquim Alberto Chissano, President of the Republic of Mozambique, and Afonso Macacho Marceta Dhlakama, President of Renamo, hereby authorise and instruct our respective delegations participating in the Rome peace process to conclude, by 1 October 1992 at the latest, the remaining Protocols provided for in the Agreed Agenda, thereby permitting the signing of the General Peace Agreement by that date.

The signing of the General Peace Agreement and its adoption by the Assembly of the Republic as provided for in paragraph (v) (on this page) of this Declaration shall result in the immediate entry into force of the cease-fire agreed to under the General Peace Agreement.

(Signed) Joaquim Alberto Chissano
President of the Republic of Mozambique

(Signed) Afonso Macacho Marceta Dhlakama
President of Renamo

(Signed) Robert Gabriel Mugabe
President of the Republic of Zimbabwe

Witnessed by:
(Signed) Gaositwe Keagakwa Tibe Chiepe
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Botswana

and by the mediators:
(Signed) Mario Raffaelli
(Signed) Jaime Gonçalves
(Signed) Andrea Riccardi
(Signed) Matteo Zuppi

Rome, 7 August 1992
Early disputes within Renamo were often related to the control of money and resources. One reason behind the killing of Secretary-General Orlando Cristina in mid-1983 was his secret diversion of Renamo funds for investment in a farm in Australia.

The strong interest demonstrated in the role of the church and various diplomatic initiatives in bringing about an end to Mozambique’s war has led to a number of other critical factors being underplayed. It is well known, for instance, that the severe drought which bit Southern Africa in the early 1990s dramatically raised the costs for both sides of continuing the war. Less well understood is the extent to which the peace process was paved with incentives — largely financial in nature — which made the final settlement possible.

‘Tiny’ Rowland, then chief executive of the UK-based multi-national, Lonrho, started making protection payments to Renamo during the early stages of the war to protect Lonrho’s agricultural and industrial investments. When this strategy failed, Rowland became personally engaged in the peace process and was instrumental in building up Renamo’s confidence to step out of the bush and negotiate. His support would not be enough, however, to ensure that Mozambique’s peace settlement held. Additional financial inducements were needed to secure Renamo’s continuing commitment to the peace agreement, and came mainly from the Italian government.

Protection Payments

Tiny Rowland first became involved with Mozambique in the early 1960s when he negotiated the building of an oil pipeline from the port of Beira to Southern Rhodesia for Lonrho. The pipeline was opened in December 1964 and for the next three decades was Lonrho’s primary asset in Mozambique. When the security of the pipeline was threatened in the early 1980s, in the context of the expanding war between the Mozambican government and the South African-backed Renamo insurgents, Lonrho entered into direct contact with Renamo to arrange a deal.

In June 1982, a Lonrho subsidiary signed a secret protection agreement with Renamo leaders covering the Beira oil pipeline. The agreement stipulated that payments of US $500,000 would be made to Renamo each month from June to August, to be continued indefinitely thereafter, unless either party gave one month’s notice to terminate the arrangement. These payments were made into foreign bank accounts controlled by a number of Renamo’s senior internal leadership. Later, additional agreements were reached covering Lonrho’s tea estates in northern Mozambique.
These latter payments continued up to the signing of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) in Rome in October 1992 and amounted to some US $5 million.

The protection agreements between Lonrho and Renamo were complicated by the fact that Renamo’s main backer in the 1980s, South Africa, considered the destruction of the Beira pipeline a priority. It was thus agreed that Renamo would carry out some symbolic attacks on the pipeline, although serious damage would be avoided. However, despite these agreements, Lonrho’s commercial activities continued to be disrupted by intermittent attacks. These may have been reminders that payments were due, and company officials were quick to blame most on renegade groups operating outside the command of their leaders.

In its quest for funds to drive its war effort, Renamo sought protection agreements with other commercial firms apart from Lonrho. In 1981, the rebels had approached the Cahora Bassa consortium in Paris about ceasing attacks on the power lines running from its large hydroelectric project in Tete province.

Negotiations for monthly protection payments were conducted by Jorge Jardim, a prominent Portuguese businessman with former interests in Mozambique, serving as intermediary. However, Renamo never received any funds and Jardim was subsequently refused any further contact with Dhlakama despite his efforts to arrange another deal. Much later, in mid-1991, Renamo again made a pledge to the consortium to refrain from attacking the Cahora Bassa power lines, this time in return for a non-lethal aid deal. However, this arrangement also failed to live up to Renamo’s expectations and eventually collapsed.

With the knowledge of the Mozambican government, Renamo also signed several protection agreements with the Malawian government. The first, in August 1989, resulted in a temporary cessation of Renamo attacks on the Nacala railway line. It also appears to have given the rebels transit facilities as well as permission to conduct cross-border trade in cashew nuts, ivory, hardwood, precious stones and dug-out canoes. Payments were made in Malawian currency so that Renamo could purchase consumer goods in Malawi.

After 1986, it seems that Rogers with Renamo were always discussed privately with President Chissano in advance, although other members of the Frelimo government were not informed.
Accord Page 68

In October 1990, Renamo and the Malawian government signed a more formal agreement covering the Nacala line. Andre Thomashausen of the University of South Africa flew to Blantyre to help Renamo draft the agreement. However, a spate of new Renamo attacks occurred along the Nacala corridor in January 1991. These were probably a reminder to the Malawian government that it was late in its payments and should pay what was agreed or face the consequences. Although denied at the time, talks between Renamo and the Malawian authorities took place to resolve the crisis. Another non-aggression agreement was signed at this time which would cover the Tete corridor running between Malawi and Zimbabwe after the withdrawal of Zimbabwean troops. The last Renamo attack on the Nacala corridor took place on 24 February 1991.

The secret protection payments made to Renamo during the 1980s and early 1990s brought temporary respite from the fighting in some areas, but very few instances of sustained security. Even the Beira pipeline and the Nacala corridor were occasionally attacked and well-trained military units from Zimbabwe and Malawi were soon assigned to protect these crucial transport infrastructures.

**Shifts in Commercial Strategy**

In the case of many of its Mozambican investments, Lonrho provided its own protection. In the Limpopo valley, triple stacks of concertina wire surrounded Lonrho’s Chokwe cotton farm which was also protected by a 1,400-strong militia, watchtowers and tanks. Despite the war, Chokwe’s 2,000 hectares achieved Africa’s highest cotton yields in 1989: 20,000 tonnes were produced. Lomaco, a Lonrho/government joint venture, was also extremely successful and at one point became the biggest producer of tomatoes in the southern hemisphere.

The price of these commercial successes, however, was high and growing. Security outlays alone were consuming about US $1 million a year, representing 30 per cent of Lonrho’s local operating costs. To protect its estates and convoys, a £6 million, three-year contract had also been signed in 1986 with a British private security firm, Defence Systems Limited. This agreement soon became too costly and was in any case failing to ensure total protection. Money was saved by replacing Defence System’s ex-SAS officers first with Lonrho’s own security, then with Gurkhas from Gurkha Security Guards, another British firm. Only lasting peace, however, could guarantee total security.

By 1989, the war was seriously undermining Lonrho’s investments in Mozambique, then worth some £53 million, and contributing to its annual global losses. A large attack occurred against a key Lonrho installation in early 1990, precipitating a major change in its commercial strategy. Some 200 rebels broke through a perimeter fence, driving a herd of cattle before them, and in a matter of minutes blew up US $500,000 worth of chemicals and irrigation pipes. Offices and trucks were also doused with petrol and burned. This attack strengthened the belief of Lonrho’s board that running militarised farms in a civil war was no longer feasible and that Rowland’s efforts to assist the peace process should be fully supported.
Shuttling Diplomats

Rowland had become personally engaged in the search for a solution to Mozambique’s war as early as 1984 when he used his Gulf stream jet to transport Maputo officials to ‘indirect’ Renamo-government talks in Pretoria. He became more fully involved in 1988 with the encouragement of both the Italian consul in Malawi and John Tembo, Minister without Portfolio and, at that time, heir-apparent to President Banda of Malawi. Both men were in frequent contact with Renamo inside Mozambique.

By 1989, the search for a peace settlement would take up increasing amounts of Rowland’s time and Lonrho’s resources. In August of that year, after hearing of Kenya’s involvement in the initial round of talks between Mozambican churchmen and Renamo, Rowland got in direct contact with President Moi. Moi subsequently ordered the permanent secretary of the Kenyan Foreign Ministry, Bethuel Abdu Kiplagat, to discuss with Renamo Rowland’s interest in helping to mediate. Rowland also sent his Maputo representative, Alves Gomes, to Lisbon to lobby there for his involvement in the peace process. On 22 September, Rowland himself travelled to Lisbon and met with Portuguese Prime Minister Cavaco Silva for two hours. This meeting took place on the eve of the Prime Minister’s visit to Maputo and was intended to gain support for Rowland’s mediation attempts.

In October, Kiplagat accompanied Rowland to Pretoria. In a meeting with Foreign Affairs Minister ‘Pik’ Botha and another ministry official, Rusty Evans, he suggested that, while Renamo could not achieve a military victory, it should still be treated seriously. In December, Rowland arranged for Botha and Evans to fly secretly to Nairobi to meet President Moi. Neither President Moi nor Rowland informed Kiplagat of this meeting, an indication of his weakening position in the peace process. Around this time, the US assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Herman Cohen, also informed President Moi of his support for Rowland’s initiative, though the Americans also continued to pursue their own initiatives for peace in Mozambique.

The December meeting in Nairobi prepared the way for the June 1990 visit of F.W. de Klerk to Kenya during which the new South African president discussed the Mozambique problem with President Moi. De Klerk also secretly met with Dhlakama on 8 June, urging Renamo to be serious in peace talks with Maputo.

That same month, with President Moi’s support, Rowland tried to bring about direct talks between the Mozambican government and Renamo in Blantyre, Malawi. On 9 June, Kiplagat was told to bring Dhlakama to State House, Nairobi on the following day. Once there, Dhlakama and Kiplagat found Rowland waiting for them, together with President Moi. Rowland told Dhlakama that there were delegates in Blantyre who wanted to discuss peace and offered to fly the rebel leader there to consult with them. Dhlakama refused. As a guarantee of safety, and to show there were no conditions attached, Rowland offered to take both Kiplagat and Raul Domingos, Renamo’s Secretary for Foreign Relations, along with Dhlakama. Dhlakama accepted and, with President Moi supporting the initiative, the four of them flew south also accompanied by Mark Too, Moi’s illegitimate son and Lonrho’s Kenya director at the time.

At Blantyre airport, John Tembo was awaiting their arrival. Dhlakama went through a separate channel at the airport and was driven off by Malawian officials. Rowland, Kiplagat and Too were escorted to a government guest-house where they fruitlessly awaited Dhlakama’s arrival for 11 hours, along with three Mozambican and three Zimbabwean ministers. Dhlakama had changed his mind about meeting the delegations, despite Malawian attempts to convince him otherwise. Rowland blamed Kiplagat for Dhlakama’s failure to appear, claiming he had told Dhlakama that the Zimbabweans were planning to assassinate him. This marked a further decline in relations between Rowland and Kiplagat.

At a meeting with Chissano in December 1991, Rowland took advantage of Zimbabwe’s desire to play a greater role in the peace process and obtained the go-ahead to bring
In December 1990, Rowland flew Dhlakama to Lusaka to meet Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda at the government guest-house. During their first meeting, Kaunda unsuccessfully urged Dhlakama to end the war and settle with Chissano in a face-to-face meeting. At a second consultation, Dhlakama gave Kaunda a list of his pre-conditions for direct talks to transmit to Chissano. Kaunda then agreed to Dhlakama’s request to stop referring to Renamo as ‘bandits’ in his speeches and to ask the state-controlled media to drop the label as a gesture of reconciliation. He then visited Chissano in early January 1991 to discuss the outcome of his talks with Dhlakama. Chissano told Kaunda that no face-to-face meeting could take place between himself and the rebel leader unless it resulted in a guaranteed ceasefire.

During 1991 Kaunda’s attention became increasingly focused on his own electoral campaign for Zambia’s October general elections. Despite his hope to continue his mediation attempts, he was also finding his efforts undermined by Zimbabwe’s determination to play a greater role. Zimbabwe, anxious to see its interests properly represented in the peace process, was increasingly concerned that Zambia and Kenya were developing too much influence in Mozambique at its expense.

On 14 May, Rowland flew Dhlakama, Dhlakama’s wife and Renamo’s soon-to-be Secretary-General Vicente Ululu to Britain using Kenyan passports. This was a renewed attempt to bring Dhlakama together with President Mugabe who was in London on a private visit. Although this meeting did not take place because of pressure from Chissano, who feared Mugabe and Dhlakama were getting too close, the rebel leader met with the British assistant under-secretary for Africa, Anthony Goodenough. Restrictions on Dhlakama and other senior Renamo figures entering Britain had been lifted earlier as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had been planning a secret Renamo-Zimbabwe summit in London, in the event, this meeting was superseded by Lonrho’s successful 10 January summit in Blantyre.

By mid-1992, the official Rome talks between Renamo and the Mozambique government had been underway for almost two years. With no signs that a settlement was imminent, pressure on the parties was growing, not least due to the severe drought affecting Southern Africa.

In an attempt to inject some urgency into the peace process, Rowland flew Dhlakama to Botswana for a 4 July summit with Mugabe, Botswanan premier Quett Masire and accompanied the two to State House for talks with Malawian and Zimbabwean ministers.

Dhlakama was more relaxed following this meeting. He then attended a second hour-long consultation with Presidents Banda and Mugabe, at the end of which agreement was reached on the aim of ending the war and securing the withdrawal of foreign troops from Mozambique. Rowland’s belief that such an encounter might accelerate the pace of the peace process proved correct. He also noted that not all of the senior Zimbabwean officials supported his mediation efforts. It appears that the warning that Dhlakama might be abducted had actually come from a minister in the Zimbabwean delegation.

Mugabe and Dhlakama together. In the same month, he also held two series of talks with Dhlakama, met with Mugabe in Harare and with ‘Pik’ Botha in Pretoria. In January 1992, President Chissano formally asked President Mugabe to meet Dhlakama to sound out the Renamo leader’s ideas on a possible summit. A Mugabe-Dhlakama meeting finally took place in Blantyre, Malawi, on 9 and 10 January 1992. Like the June 1990 meeting, this almost failed with Dhlakama pulling out of the talks at the last minute. Rowland was told by Renamo official Vicente Ululu, that ‘they had heard that the Zimbabweans will arrest Dhlakama.’ Rowland quickly contacted John Tembo to locate the rebel leader and then

Clinching the Deal

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The Impact of Drought

While the 1992 drought placed a great strain on both Renamo and the government, it was hitting the Mozambican population hardest. With increasing numbers of Mozambican refugees crossing the country’s borders in search of food and safety, Mozambique’s neighbours were also increasingly concerned. In addition, the extensive agricultural activities of Lonrho were severely affected by the drought, a problem compounded by the increasing difficulty of recruiting staff to work in a war zone. In short, the drought greatly strengthened determination throughout Southern Africa to end the conflict soon.

US Ambassador David Passage. This meeting witnessed a significant mood shift, increasing the likelihood of a face-to-face Chissano-Dhlakama summit. Dhlakama gave Mugabe a document containing the 17 articles from Mozambique’s 1989 draft constitution with which Renamo disagreed. Mugabe pledged that his government would assist Renamo in its transformation into a political party. As an immediate sign of good faith, an interview with Dhlakama was broadcast for the first time on Zimbabwean television.

At six in the evening of 3 August, the Lonrho corporate jet arrived in Rome from Nairobi bringing Dhlakama, Vicente Ululu and the rest of the Renamo delegation. Chissano and his delegation arrived the next day, as did Mugabe. The four mediators of the Rome talks met briefly with each party shortly after their arrival. Mugabe told them that Chissano had asked him to get involved with the peace process in January. Chissano, for his part, said he was in Rome because Mugabe had asked him to come.

Mugabe took charge of the talks on 4 August, leading the first summit session at Chissano’s hotel. From midnight until six in the morning, Chissano and Dhlakama, joined only by Mugabe and Rowland, started a slow but necessary dialogue. As tiredness set in, Chissano compromised and an agreement was finally reached on the constitution and on Dhlakama’s personal security. The next day, an official session took place at which Botswana’s Foreign Minister Gaositwe Chiepe was also in attendance. This meeting resulted in an historic handshake between Chissano and Dhlakama with a commitment to accelerate the pace of negotiations.

Immediately after the handshake, drafting sessions on the text of a joint declaration commenced. The deal that emerged was that a ceasefire would not come into force until after the parliamentary assembly in Maputo had ratified the commitments made as part of the Rome peace process. On 7 August, a declaration of intent to sign a ceasefire in early October was signed by both sides.

After the summit declaration was signed, Chissano went on to thank “all those who directly or indirectly contributed toward the holding of this historic meeting, notably our friend ‘Tiny’ Rowland, whose valuable work must not be forgotten; he facilitated contacts, gave advice, and helped find ways to ensure the meeting would be held.” Dhlakama expressed his own commitment to peace and democracy. He thanked all the mediators, as well as Presidents Moi and Chissano, and also said “We must not forget our private friends, notably Mr. ‘Tiny’ Rowland, who worked very hard for this.”

Despite the progress achieved at the summit, by September it had become apparent that the peace process in Rome was again foundering. Neither delegation appeared to have the mandate to deal with outstanding disagreements concerning military issues and the interim administration of Renamo-controlled zones. Sant’ Egidio held a prayer meeting in Brussels on 13 September, attended by Mugabe. The president then met twice with the mediators to discuss the impasse. After this encounter, Mugabe again called on Rowland to facilitate a second Chissano-Dhlakama summit, this time in Gaberone, Botswana on 18 September. Rowland flew Dhlakama from Nairobi to Gaberone on his corporate jet. Mugabe, having made the arrangements, stayed at home and encouraged President Masire to host the meeting.
Some Quantifiable Costs to Zimbabwe of South African-supported destabilisation 1980-89
(at average annual exchange rates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>$US million</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Additional freight costs</td>
<td>824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locomotive hire from South African Transport Services</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck losses/costs</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel losses/pipeline costs</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabotage (quantified)</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabotage (estimated)</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Refugee maintenance</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional defence costs</td>
<td>1,853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,844</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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This figure does not include lost investment and tourism, increased prices of goods in Zimbabwe, less competitive exports, additional police and security costs, missed opportunities for development, etc. Nevertheless, the figure still exceeds the country’s 1989 external debt.


On 19 September, Chissano and Dhlakama were installed in the penthouse suite of a Gaborone hotel. Rowland himself regarded this meeting as crucial, telling both men “you can have whatever you want to drink or eat, but you can’t come out till you have reached agreement.” He sat outside the door until 5:30 a.m. the following morning when the leaders finally emerged, claiming to have reviewed the issues referred to them by the mediators and to have reached a general understanding. At this point, the delegations in Rome were instructed to work out the final text of a peace agreement.

The Final Leg

On 28 September, Dhlakama wrote to the mediators indicating that there were several ‘very delicate’ matters that still needed to be resolved. The mediators issued a press release the following day, urging Dhlakama to come to Rome to sort out his final differences with Chissano. On his arrival in Rome late on 1 October, Dhlakama started to make other demands and appeared lonely and isolated. In an effort to bolster his spirits, Rowland dispatched his jet to Lisbon to collect Dhlakama’s wife and children. Rowland’s wife went shopping in Rome for toys for the children.

With Dhlakama, Chissano and Mugabe all in Rome on 1 October, both delegations began a line-by-line review of the mediators’ proposals. Dhlakama and Chissano would only meet face-to-face when all had been agreed. Throughout the next two days, the mediators moved from delegation to delegation trying to reach a compromise. The Renamo leader continued to appear insecure, however, and started demanding an end to Zimbabwe’s role in the final negotiations.

By the end of the next day, only Rowland seemed able to get through to the Renamo leader. With Presidents Mugabe and Masire showing increasing impatience and Mugabe starting to pack his bags, Rowland intervened, pleading that having got so close to an agreement, it was surely worth waiting a short while longer to conclude it. Shortly before midnight on 3 October, Dhlakama finally agreed to the texts of the accord. On the morning of 4 October, the final protocols were complete and the General Peace Agreement was signed.

Rowland entered the Mozambican peace process in 1989 employing bluff and a vague agenda to persuade regional leaders that their adversaries were prepared to reach a settlement. Before long, a seemingly unlimited supply of money and the use of Lonrho’s aircraft to transport Renamo had helped to build up confidence and accelerate the pace of the peace process. Without Rowland’s assistance, the Rome talks might well have dragged on at additional financial and humanitarian cost. It is to his credit that, at the end of the day,
Rowland was the only person Renamo leader Dhlakama trusted for advice. While Rowland’s initial involvement in the peace process undoubtedly stemmed from commercial self-interest, it appears that Rowland quickly became personally engaged in the search for a settlement. By 1992, the time and resources he was spending far exceeded anything he could hope to recoup commercially.

Cashing in on the Accord

As the peace process progressed, so did Renamo’s financial demands. In December 1991, the rebels were asking for US $3 million as a condition for their co-operation. In mid-1992, they requested US $7 million from Manuel Balhosa, a Portuguese businessman who had owned Maputo’s oil refinery during the colonial period, as well as another US $6 million from Lonrho. The rebels claimed they needed these funds to transform themselves into a political party.

The final Renamo pre-condition before the peace agreement was signed also involved a demand for a significant sum of money. The relationship between Dhlakama and Rowland cooled dramatically at this point, but agreement was eventually reached on a figure of US $6-8 million, with the exact amount dependent on continued Renamo adherence to the peace accords. Lonrho also helped out with Renamo’s demand for housing in 1993, putting the Cardoso Hotel in Maputo at Renamo’s disposal and providing a fleet of vehicles to transport its people. This top-class hotel was closed to the public for more than a year.

While commercial interests played a key role in funding Renamo’s political transformation, the Italian government also chipped in considerable sums of money to help build peace. As early as 1984 the Italian government had been in touch with Renamo to seek the release of Italian citizens kidnapped by the rebels. Protection payments against further attacks and abductions were made at this time. The Italian government later hosted both delegations throughout the 27 months of the Rome talks, providing extensive financial incentives and gifts to Renamo in particular in order to keep it engaged in the peace process.

Supervision and Surveillance

The role of the Italian government was not simply financial. Keen to ensure the success of the Rome talks, it closely monitored their progress. Its intelligence service kept tabs on the discussions at Sant’ Egidio in addition to conversations in hotel rooms, telephone calls and fax traffic. This placed the Italians in a good position to anticipate negotiating log-jams and to understand tactical manoeuvres by both the government and Renamo delegations.

Premier seats at the opening World Cup football match in June 1990 between Argentina and Cameroon were an initial incentive for both delegations to commit to talks. Italian ‘hospitality’ also included shopping trips to fashionable Rome stores where Renamo’s delegates were outfitted in designer suits and shoes. When Renamo rang up US $60,000 in telephone bills between January and July 1992 alone, the Italians met the costs. In 1992 the Italian government even paid the flight costs of Renamo’s London lobbyist, a film crew, and exiled Renamo supporters to attend the rebels’ ‘Second Congress’ in central Mozambique, despite the fact that it was mostly a public relations event.

By the time of the signing of the Rome accord, the Italian government had spent some US $20 million on the peace process. However, few ‘blank cheques’ had been given; there were always strings attached. As an Italian official noted, “With Renamo it was simple. We found out what they wanted, and then provided it with conditions attached. For example, Dhlakama wanted a satellite telephone. We purchased it, put it in a cupboard and showed it to him. We made it clear that he would get it in return for signing one of the protocols. He came back several times to have a look at it before deciding to sign.”

While Frelimo needed less urging to sign the final peace settlement, similar tactics were used with them to ensure a role for the Italians in the post-war reconstruction of Mozambique.

“There is no democracy without money”
- Raul Domingos, chief Renamo negotiator, 16 June 1992

“I had a bag full of cash for eventualities. Demands came at all hours. We needed to be flexible.”
- Italian Diplomat, August 1994

“Money certainly helped make peace”
- ‘Tiny’ Rowland, September 1997
The generous aid pledges made by the Italians also spoke of their intentions to secure Mozambique as a friendly economic gateway into the Southern African region as a whole in the face of economic competition from other European nations, including Portugal.

Italian financial support for Renamo became more formalised in December 1992 when the collapsing Italian government put its signature to a deal which would provide the rebels with US $15 million to assist its transformation into a political party. By March 1993, having not received the payments he had been promised, Dhlakama leaked details of the agreement to a group of European parliamentarians. However, little money ever materialised. In the postwar period, public and private requests for funds would remain a characteristic feature of Renamo’s external relations, much as they had been during the war.

Loose Ends

Mozambique’s war and peace process illustrates well how big business can influence the direction and level of violence for commercial gain and, where it makes good economic sense, bring it to a halt as well. This raises many questions about the degree to which the ‘commercial’ logic of peacemaking is compatible with the longer-term interests of social and political stability in war-torn societies. To what extent did the enormous protection payments made to the rebels during the war enable the insurgent group to sustain its activities? Did the financial payments made during the Mozambican peace process actually hasten the signing of a peace agreement, or might they also have delayed it?

The role played by financial payments in securing Mozambique’s peace settlement is in many ways key to understanding why Renamo’s leadership found it worthwhile to fight for so many years in the absence of a coherent social programme or ideology. While it is clear that financial incentives did play a positive role in bringing about an end to Mozambique’s war, there is also some indication that once Renamo realised the huge potential for generating funds Dhlakama adopted a strategy of stalling in order to maximise his financial gains. Should Renamo fail to achieve a substantive political role in Mozambique in the near future — which seems likely given Frelimo’s continuing dominance of the political system — this raises the question of how its co-operation will be paid for the next time round.
The 1992 Mozambican peace settlement brought to a close a 15-year war between the government and the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo). Three particular aspects of this conflict stand out: it was waged largely in rural areas, it revolved primarily around the control of civilian populations by both sides for tactical reasons, and it was extremely violent. Renamo, in particular, developed a reputation for the ritualistic use of violence aimed at instilling incapacitating fear in rural communities. These tactics served to severely disrupt the social fabric and to undermine the legitimacy of the government which was unable to protect large parts of the country.

Five years on from the signing of the Rome accord, peace continues to hold at the national level where the parliamentary system has become the primary arena of confrontation between Frelimo and Renamo. At the local level, however, particularly in rural areas, profound social unrest and intermittent violence pose a persistent threat to the fragile peace. These local-level tensions reflect both the deep social divisions spilling over from the long war and the desperate survival tactics of many Mozambicans attempting to rebuild their lives in the face of overwhelming poverty. Consolidating peace in Mozambique is thus dependent on extending its benefits to all levels of society, especially in the rural areas where the majority of the population still live.

One aspect of this broader challenge is the healing of psycho-social traumas associated with war and upheaval. ‘Trauma’ includes a wide range of afflictions that have affected soldiers, peasants, women and children caught up in the war in many different ways. ‘Healing’ goes beyond the alleviation of individual traumas and includes the mending of the social divisions which exist both within and between communities. War-affected populations in rural Mozambique continue to draw on a wide range of traditional rituals to help them deal with the traumas of war and to open the way to reconciliation. To the extent that outside approaches have a role to play in promoting post-war healing, they need to build upon local strategies without necessarily seeking to replace them.
Cultural understandings of health, trauma and healing are important because the way people express and interpret their afflictions are very locally-specific. In the Mozambican context, as in many other parts of Africa, health is traditionally defined as harmonious relationships between human beings and their natural surroundings, between them and their ancestors, and amongst themselves. Far from being narrowly defined realms, the social world (comprising the spirits and the living) and the physical world are united within a larger cosmology. If this harmonious state breaks down, this is seen to result from the malevolent intervention of valoi (witches and sorcerers) or a sanction by the ancestral spirits for incorrect social behaviour. Illness is therefore considered primarily a social rather than a physical phenomenon.

Moreover, the power of ‘spiritual’ entities remains paramount in both the causation of trauma and in community-based approaches to healing. It is by means of spiritual understandings that people can restore meaning and a sense of balance to their lives following traumatic experiences. ‘Appeasing the spirits’ is thus a mechanism for redressing the wrongs of the past and restoring well-being both within and between communities.

Such models of health and healing contradict traditionally Western approaches in which individuals and their social context, the body and the mind, are often perceived as separate, distinguishable entities. These approaches typically locate traumatic distress in the mind of the individual, and responses are devised on a one-on-one basis between ‘patients’/’clients’ and health professionals. Recovery is often achieved by helping the individual ‘come to terms’ with the traumatic experience, usually by externalising it in some way. If such approaches prove unfruitful or problematic, drug therapy — typically a treatment for ‘physical’ afflictions — can be administered to control or repress distressing symptoms.

In cultures where they are widely understood and accepted, western approaches enjoy some success. In the Mozambican context, their suitability can be questioned. This is partly because western approaches tend to be expensive, require specialist training, and are
limited in the numbers they can reach. On the other hand, therapies which do not account for the role of ancestral and malevolent spirits in the causation and healing of trauma may actually hamper family and community efforts to provide care. This is corroborated by recent studies of war-affected populations in Mozambique which show that talking about traumatic experiences does not necessarily help patients ‘come to terms’ with their distress. In such cases, the performance of complex traditional healing rituals can prove significantly more effective.

It would be wrong, however, to paint a picture of homogeneity among the diverse rural communities of Mozambique, or to claim that universal agreement exists on the efficacy of traditional healing rituals. It is likely that, for many people, healing involves a combination of medical and religious practices, as well as appeals to the spirits. As Zionist, Apostolic and other churches have extended their activities into Mozambique’s rural areas, their role in holding exorcisms, cleansing and other ceremonies has also become important.

Nevertheless, because traditional practices are strongly embedded in daily activities, they offer an important starting point for the healing process and a backdrop against which the strengths and limitations of other models can be evaluated. Three ritual healing processes are discussed below.

**Mphukwa Spirits**

During the war, both fighters and civilians had recourse to traditional healers, diviners and spirit mediums to protect them. In the post-war period, these links remain important because people fear the spirits of the dead will return to haunt and punish them. **Mphukwa** are the spirits of fighters and civilians killed during the war who did not receive the proper burial rites to settle them appropriately in the after-world. They are spirits of bitterness with the capacity to torment, provoke illness and even kill those who mistreated them when they were alive.

Revenge can even extend to people’s families who have to pay for the behaviour of their relatives. **Mphukwa** spirits may also be nasty to passers-by, especially those who cross their path.

Local people recall that during the Nguni wars in southern Mozambique in the 19th century, the spirits of Nguni and Ndau warriors killed far away from their homes afflicted local Tsonga families. Ndau spirits are reported to have been the most dangerous ones. In the tradition of the Ndau, every individual has to drink a liquid derived from the Mvondo plant just a few weeks after their birth. This is believed to make the individual stronger and, when he or she dies, to ensure that vengeance will be sought if the proper burial rituals have not been observed.

The war between the government and Renamo had a strong Ndau component as the support base of Renamo was largely within this group, especially in the early years. Moreover, since there has been significant inter-marriage between the Tsonga, the Nguni and the Ndau, the secret of **Mphukwa** is now widely known in south-central Mozambique. For these reasons, fears that **Mphukwa** spirits would emerge following the war were more widespread and pronounced than in the past.

Rituals to appease the **Mphukwa** are generally performed by the **Tinyanga**, local spirit mediums who know how to capture, exorcise or appease them. The rituals must be performed where the battles took place or where people died. Locals recount that in April 1993, the **Tinyanga** from the locality of Munguine in Manica province was asked to perform a ritual along the road linking Munguine to the village of Manhica. The **Mphukwa** spirit of a Renamo commander who had been killed there was afflicting passers-by and preventing them from using the road after dark. Local people reported that when they used the road, they often felt something beating them, heard voices telling them to go back, or became blind and could not see their way forward. The **Tinyanga** performed a ritual called **ku knfemba** to catch the spirit. The spirit identified himself and asked for money and **capulanas** (traditional garments), and to be accompanied to his home in Ndauland.
The local population contributed money to give to the spirit and to buy the capulanas. A week later, the spirit was caught again, tied with the pieces of fabric and buried with the money far away from the locality. The Tinyanga also placed some medicine in the fabric to prevent the spirit from returning. According to the local people, there have been no more problems along that road since the ritual was carried out.

**Cleansing and Purification**

In the post-war period, many families in rural areas have also performed a cleansing ritual to purify and protect their relatives from the atrocities they experienced during the war. Ritual cleansing, like ceremonies to bar the way to malevolent spirits, is tied to the notion of 'social pollution' which must be eliminated before the links to the past can be cut. The healing process consists of several symbolically-charged rituals aimed at restoring the identity of the individual and reintegrating him or her back into the community.

Nine-year-old Paulo Macovo was kidnapped by Renamo soldiers during an attack on his village and spent eight months at the Renamo military base at Chinhanguanine. Just weeks before he was due to start military training, Paulo managed to escape from the base. When he finally arrived home, he was taken to the ndomba (the house of spirits) to be presented to the ancestors of the Macovo family. His grandfather addressed the spirits, thanking them for protecting Paulo and returning him alive. A few days later, Paulo went through a ceremonial purification. His father, Boaventura, described it:

“We took him into the bush about two kilometres from our house. There we built a small hut covered with dry grass into which we put him, still dressed in the dirty clothes he was wearing when he escaped from the Renamo camp. Inside the hut he was undressed. We then set fire to the hut and Paulo was helped out by an adult relative. The hut, the clothes and everything else that he had brought with him from the camp were burned in the fire. Paulo then had to inhale the smoke from some herbal remedies and was bathed with water treated with medicine to cleanse his body internally and externally. Finally, we made him drink some medicine, ku thlavela, to give him strength and protect him.”
Paulo’s case illustrates two related points about customary trauma healing. First, it shows that trauma is perceived as a collective affliction affecting not only individuals, but also their relatives, both living and dead. Correspondingly, purification rituals also involve the entire spiritual community. Secondly, Paulo’s case indicates that customary healing involves making a clean cut with past traumas. While modern psychotherapeutic practices emphasise verbalising the affliction until a way to deal with it can be found, the Macovo family felt that dwelling too much on the past opens the way for malevolent forces to return and afflict them. The objective of their cleansing ceremony is not to ignore past trauma, but to acknowledge it symbolically before firmly locking it away and facing the future.

Venerating the Spirits

When Mozambican fighters and displaced people returned to their homes following the war, the first rituals to be performed were often the timhamba. These rituals, also known as Ku pahla or mhamba, venerate the ancestral spirits buried on the family land or symbolised by the gandzelo (the sacred tree). In a post-war context, they are intended to restore severed ancestral links and to obtain spiritual guidance and protection to face the challenges of social reconstruction. Timhamba are acts of communication and communion with the dead. They represent a process of collective healing and the re-establishment of balance between the living and the spirit world.

In Mozambique, some fighters and displaced people returned to their homes following the war to check on conditions and prepare for the return of their families. Even during short stays, however, they performed rituals to honour the dead. Xitoquisana, who left his home in Mukodwene in 1987 after being tortured by Renamo soldiers, first returned in January 1993:

“I went to see the place and gave it a good clean. Next June I will return again, but this time to make mhamba. I will go with my family and I will take everything for the ceremony: goats, chicken, maize meal, etc. We are going to present ourselves to our ancestors and thank them for their protection because most of us managed to survive the war. We will move back home for good probably at the end of the year as we want to make sure that the war is really over.”

Damiao Matsinhe, from the locality of Manjacaze, is a demobilised government soldier who took his entire family away to live with him, including his mother, brothers and sisters, following an escalation of Renamo attacks in the area. He said they would not rush back home as he wanted to see what would happen after the elections:

“I have heard about what happened in Angola, so I would rather wait here. Nevertheless, we will go home for visits and prepare the fields. The elders in the family are organising a mhamba for next month.”

Timhamba rituals usually take place at dawn at the gandzelo tree or in the family cemetery where an animal is sacrificed. In times of peace and prosperity, the most common sacrificial beast is an ox but, with the poverty caused by the war, a goat or even a chicken may be used. The person presiding over the ritual, who is generally the senior family member, speaks to the ancestors. He invokes the names of all deceased relatives, informs them about the state of the family and thanks them for their protection and guidance. He also asks the spirits to continue looking after the family. After he has spoken, other family members are also allowed to express their feelings to the ancestors. The sacrificial animal is then shared between the living and the dead, representing the reciprocal nature of their relationship. At the end of the meal, drums are played and everyone sings and dances. It is a festive occasion for the entire family. Timhamba rituals are also very common in more urban environments, especially where modern institutions cannot deal with all the psychological traumas caused by years of war and upheaval. Many non-rural people forget to venerate the ancestral spirits when everything in their lives goes well and fail to perform mhamba for years at a time. In moments of crisis, however, they often seek solace in traditional practices.
Customary Practices in the Balance

The prevalence of customary healing rituals attests to the capacity of many Mozambicans to harness local cultural and institutional resourcefulness to address their problems. These people are not assuming that the government or other outsiders will meet their needs, but are using the means available to them to heal the social wounds of war and to restore stability in their communities.

While these local processes of healing need to be recognised and accommodated, it is also important to acknowledge their limits. The extreme disruptions of the past three decades in Mozambique in terms of economic hardship, social change and displacement have been important factors shaping and inhibiting healing processes. In communities where people were killed by their neighbours, where families were divided for long periods of time, where people can no longer muster the resources necessary to carry out ceremonies properly, and where the reputation of traditional leaders was compromised during the war, the effectiveness of customary remedies has come into question.

It is also evident that the horrors experienced by many Mozambicans cannot simply be erased from the collective memory as customary practices sometimes require. If drawing a line under the past fosters denial and impunity, there is also the risk of facilitating further human rights abuses. The establishment of a variety of interest groups to safeguard democratic principles in Mozambique and ensure that no dominant group seeks to vindictively ‘settle accounts’ from the past is perhaps the best guarantee that this will not occur. In the meantime, the practical and moral case for accommodating customary modes of healing and reconciliation, especially at the local level, is very strong.

Epilogue: ‘Purification’ versus ‘Reconciliation’ amongst Ex-Combatants

João Paulo Borges Coelho

A comparison of the events following Mozambique’s anti-colonial war in 1974 and its civil war in 1992 provides a thought-provoking case-study of the trade-offs between ‘remembering’ and ‘forgetting’, and between justice and reconciliation.

In the early 1970s, at the height of the wars it was waging against nationalist movements in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau, Portugal lacked sufficient numbers of combatants to defend its colonial rule. As a consequence, it increasingly began to rely on the conscription of Africans to fight against the nationalist forces. This strategy was also encouraged by military counter-insurgency doctrines that aimed to increase indigenous involvement in order to transform the anti-colonial wars into local ones. Thousands of Mozambicans were integrated into the colonial army, often in units created along ethnic lines. By the end of the war in 1974, a situation was created in which Mozambicans were, in effect, fighting their own countrymen.

Following independence and the withdrawal of the Portuguese colonial army, the Frelimo nationalist guerrillas moved out of the ‘liberated zones’ under their control and seized the rest of the country. They saw themselves as winners of a long liberation war and were highly suspicious of other Mozambicans, particularly those in the cities, which were then unknown to the liberation movement. As Frelimo established a new administration to replace the colonial system, it made a
A broad appeal to its countrymen to staff it. The best guarantee of a position in the new political and military dispensation, however, was to have been part of the nationalist struggle.

A principle of ‘purification’ was adopted whereby Frelimo sought to establish a ‘pure army’ and ‘pure society’, untainted by the colonial past. This led to the direct marginalisation of thousands of Mozambicans who had been involved with the colonial regime. While some of these people were offered the chance to reintegrate into post-independence society, this was on condition that they publicly reveal their records as former colonial agents. This was ostensibly to ‘wipe clean’ their past and render them less vulnerable to blackmail or pressure of any kind. However, the effect of coming clean was often humiliation. ‘Collaborators’ were persecuted for their past and saw their careers and attempts to rebuild their lives blocked. As a result, many fled the country, with some subsequently offering their services when Renamo was formed by the Rhodesians in 1977.

These were the origins of a new armed conflict which would once again pit Mozambicans against each other. While this civil war was at least as brutal as its anti-colonial precedent, its outcome was different in that the 1992 peace accord avoided a ‘winner-takes-all’ scenario. The United Nations force which oversaw its implementation was sufficiently flexible and firm in its mandate to ensure that neither Frelimo nor Renamo gained an advantage which might prompt a resumption in fighting. A fortunate combination of local circumstances also ensured that the principle of ‘purification’ adopted by Frelimo following the colonial war would be replaced by a more conciliatory stance towards Renamo. With ‘reconciliation’, space was created for the coexistence of all political forces. This included new political parties, a variety of civil and religious groups as well as a more independent media, all of which publicly supported the new message of peace.

The manner in which demobilisation of the two armed forces and the formation of a new national army occurred also reinforced the dynamic of reconciliation. All government and Renamo soldiers went through the same phases of assembly, disarmament, registration and demobilisation. Unlike their government counterparts, Renamo combatants were ineligible for army pensions and lacked experience of urban life. Nonetheless, ex-combatants from both sides shared the hardships of reintegrating into civilian life, a challenge which reinforced reconciliation at all levels.

The new national army, the Mozambican Defence Force (FADM), also became a stabilising institution in post-war Mozambique. The Rome Accord explicitly called for equal representation of government and rebel forces in the FADM, from the leadership down to the rank-and-file. Joint training courses have engendered a sense of belonging to the same team. The equal benefits which both sides now receive in the FADM further serves to blur the differences between the former enemies. Evidence that the new army is shaping up as a genuinely national institution is given by a former Renamo supreme commander and now deputy chief-of-staff of the FADM, Mateus Ngonhamo, who said that his political affiliations are now subservient to his loyalty to the national army.

It would be wrong to deny that during the peace process the two parties at times reneged on their commitments, both to cover their backs in the case of ‘enemy’ duplicity and to retain certain military advantages from the past. However, with growing war weariness, this issue has become less and less important. In Mozambique today, the people remember the horrors of war and social stability is highly valued.
Chronology

of War and Peace in Mozambique

Nationalist Struggle

1962 The Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) is founded in the Tanzanian capital Dar-es-Salaam with Dr. Eduardo Mondlane as its first president.

1964 Frelimo launches an armed struggle in northern Mozambique to achieve independence from Portugal.

1969 Mondlane is assassinated by a parcel bomb in Dar-es-Salaam. Suspicion falls on Frelimo dissidents and the Portuguese Secret Service.

1970 After an internal power struggle, Samora Machel is elected the next Frelimo president.

1972 Guerrillas of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (Zanla) begin operations against the minority government of Rhodesia from bases in Frelimo-controlled areas of Mozambique.

1974 A military coup d’etat in Portugal brings to power officers who favour independence for the country’s African colonies. A transitional government in Mozambique is formed with Joaquim Chissano serving as prime minister to prepare the country for independence.

Regional Realignment

1975 Mozambique declares its independence, with Samora Machel sworn in as President and Chissano named Minister of Foreign Affairs. The government sets into motion the first of its ambitious reforms which involve nationalisation, ‘villagisation’ and policies to reduce the influence of the church and the political opposition.

1976 Mozambique closes its border with Rhodesia in support of Zanla and UN sanctions against the minority regime. The obscure Africa Livre movement, with some support in Malawi, begins attacks on government establishments in northern Mozambique.

1977 Frelimo declares itself a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party and turns towards the Soviet Union for support. The Mozambique National Resistance (MNR, later Renamo) is established by the Rhodesian government and commences activities inside Mozambique to destabilise the Frelimo government and attack Zanla guerrillas.

1978 Guerrillas loyal to the African National Congress (ANC) step up their attacks on apartheid South Africa from bases in southern Mozambique. With the rise to power of military figures in the South African government, foreign policy...
shifts towards destabilising the Southern African ‘Front Line States’ (FLS) to force them into the South African economic sphere and punish them for supporting the ANC.

1979 Renamo’s first leader, Andre Matsangaissa, is killed by government soldiers in a clash in Gorongosa, Sofala province. Following a violent succession struggle, Afonso Dhlakama becomes the new Renamo leader. The Lancaster House agreement brings an end to the civil war in Rhodesia.

1980 Control of Renamo is transferred to the South African military which begins to build up the rebel movement. The new majority-led government in Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) signs a security co-operation agreement with Mozambique to defend its trade routes to the Indian Ocean and to destroy Renamo. First meeting of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) is held in Maputo.

The War intensifies

1981 After a year of relative calm, a revitalised Renamo starts infiltrating from South Africa and, over time, becomes active in nine out of ten Mozambican provinces. The rebels target symbols of government services, including clinics and schools. The South African Defence Force (SADF) also launches raids into Mozambique, attacking economic infrastructures and ANC bases. Africa Livre is absorbed into Renamo.

1982 The war and growing drought threaten widespread famine in Mozambique’s southern and central provinces, displacing large numbers of people. The war escalates in Gaza, Inhambane and Zambézia provinces, paralysing the transport corridors linking Malawi and Zimbabwe to the sea. Zimbabwe sends 1,000 troops to protect the Beira corridor. Subsidiaries of the UK-based multi-national, Lonrho, sign secret agreements with Renamo leaders to protect their assets.

1983 Frelimo launches ‘Operation Production’, forcibly relocating tens of thousands of urban unemployed to rural areas. Despite its Marxist credentials, Mozambique is refused membership of Comecon, the economic co-operation body of the Soviet bloc. With the threat of famine growing in the south, the government, under pressure from the US, begins peace negotiations with South Africa. Orlando Cristina, Renamo’s first secretary-general, is murdered at a Renamo base in South Africa. After a bitter power struggle, he is replaced by Evo Fernandes, a Goanese with strong Portuguese as well as South African connections.

1984 Tens of thousands of Mozambicans are estimated dead due to famine. Mozambique and South Africa sign the ‘Nkomati Non-Aggression Pact’, committing each to ensure that their territory is not used as a base for attacks against the other. Talks between the government and Renamo break down and the rebel group escalates its activities in Mozambique. The Mozambican Christian Council (CCM) sets up its Peace and Reconciliation Commission and begins to explore constructive avenues for dialogue.

1985 Faced with a decline in external support, Renamo changes its strategies and adopts more predatory activities against civilians. Zimbabwe increases its forces in Mozambique to 10,000. Initial efforts by the CCM to secure government backing for low-key dialogue with Renamo fail. While South Africa publicly disassociates itself from Renamo, evidence emerges of continuing support from conservative and military elements within the government.

1986 Under pressure from the Front Line States, Malawi expels Renamo forces operating from its territory. The influx of rebels into Mozambique’s northern provinces causes an upsurge in violence forcing tens of thousands of refugees into Malawi. The Frelimo government signs new agreements with Tanzania and Zimbabwe leading to increased
military deployment from both countries inside Mozambique. While continuing to enjoy significant levels of Soviet aid, government forces also receive British military training in Zimbabwe. On his return from a FLS summit, President Machel is killed in a mysterious plane crash over South Africa. Joaquim Chissano, who replaces him, remains committed, at least publicly, to a military solution to the war.

1987 The United Nations raises US $330 million of emergency assistance for Mozambique, now ranked the world’s poorest country. Large massacres in Inhambane and Gaza provinces are attributed to Renamo. A joint Renamo/South African offensive in Zambezia province brings the country to the brink of collapse, but is repelled by the Mozambican army with Zimbabwean and Tanzanian support. Chissano publicly denounces church calls for dialogue with Renamo but secretly explores the possibility of church leaders establishing contact with the rebels. In the face of military stalemate and looming economic catastrophe, Mozambique launches a harsh ‘structural adjustment’ programme under the guidance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The Search for a Settlement

1988 January-March The CCM and the Catholic Archbishop of Maputo meet Renamo’s US wing in an attempt to initiate dialogue, but find it out of touch with developments on the ground.

April
A US State Department report implicates Renamo in the death of 100,000 Mozambicans. Evo Fernandes, Renamo’s secretary-general, is murdered in Lisbon by the Mozambican secret service. Bethuel Kiplagat, an envoy of Kenya’s President Moi, consults with Chissano on possible Kenyan involvement in the peace process.

May
The government refuses to give Renamo political recognition but resumes talks with South Africa on common security and economic issues. CCM and Catholic Church leaders seek dialogue with Renamo through the Kenyan authorities. Mozambican churchmen, including Jaime Gonçalves, Catholic Archbishop of Beira, meet Dhlakama without Chissano’s consent at his Gorongosa headquarters.

June-August
With a major Mozambican/Zambian/ South African offensive underway in Zambezia, the churchmen report to Chissano that only negotiations with the internal wing of Renamo are likely to bear fruit. Frelimo announces the return of all church property nationalised in the 1970s.

September-October
In Mozambique, Pope John Paul II echoes Gonçalves’ call for reconciliation but Chissano remains publicly hostile to face-to-face talks with Renamo. South African President P.W. Botha formally repeats his government’s pledge to abide by the Nkomati accord; economic and military cooperation between Mozambique and South Africa is stepped up.

November
The churches’ peace initiative becomes public and Chissano mandates the Peace and Reconciliation Commission, headed by Anglican Bishop of Lebombo Dinis Sengulane, to talk to Renamo leaders about accepting amnesty.

December
Moi sends Kiplagat to meet Dhlakama in Gorongosa. Soon after, the CCM travel to Nairobi to formally request a meeting with Dhlakama. Tanzania withdraws the majority of its troops from Mozambique.

1989 January-February
In the presence of Kenyan facilitators, CCM and Catholic churchmen meet Renamo representatives sent to Nairobi by Dhlakama. Informal meetings also take place in Harare between Renamo and the Zimbabwean authorities. As the Nairobi initiative gains momentum, proposals from South Africa’s Foreign Minister ‘Pik’ Botha for formal peace talks involving South Africa, Mozambique, the US and the USSR are shelved.
March-May
With the number of people in need of emergency famine relief rising to an estimated seven million, Renamo announces a unilateral ceasefire in some areas to allow access to relief agencies. In Zimbabwe, opposition grows to the deployment of troops in Mozambique.

June
Renamo convenes its first ‘Party Congress’ in Mozambique as it begins the slow task of transforming itself from a rebel army into a political party.

July
At its Fifth Party Congress, Frelimo drops its Marxist-Leninist designation and widens its programme of political and economic reform. It issues a document containing ‘12 Principles for Dialogue’ which are pre-conditions for direct talks with Renamo. Presidents Mugabe and Moi become joint facilitators at the Nairobi talks between Dhlakama’s delegation and the churchmen. On the eve of his departure for Nairobi, Dhlakama is nearly killed in a joint attack on Gorongosa by Mozambican and Zimbabwean troops.

August
After deferring for five months, Dhlakama leads a Renamo delegation to Nairobi. The rebels deny responsibility for human rights atrocities and respond to the government’s 12 principles for peace with their own ‘16 Point Declaration’. With these talks and a second round failing to make headway, Lonrho chief executive ‘Tiny’ Rowland meets Kiplagat to promote his own initiative for direct dialogue between Renamo and Frelimo. In South Africa, the inauguration of President FW. de Klerk undercuts the role of the military in supporting Renamo and the rebel group is further isolated.

September-November
Rowland gains Portuguese backing for his role in the peace process and transports Kiplagat to South Africa for talks with foreign minister ‘Pik’ Botha. Exploiting links with Archbishop Gonçalves and the Italian government, the Sant’ Egidio lay community starts to promote direct talks in Rome between Renamo and the government.

December
‘Pik’ Botha is flown in a Lonrho jet to meet with Moi in Nairobi. Separately, representatives of the Mozambican government and Renamo also hold talks with the Kenyan government. In Nairobi, US State Department officials present Dhlakama with a new seven-point peace proposal. Though initially rejected, it later re-emerges as the basis of a new proposal for direct talks presented to Dhlakama and Chissano in a secret letter from Moi and Mugabe.

1990 January-February
Chissano circulates the draft of a new constitution for public review in anticipation of free elections in 1991. A Portuguese mission to Malawi fails to secure a Chissano-Dhlakama summit in Lisbon. In South Africa, the ANC is legalised and its leader, Nelson Mandela, is released from prison.

March
Kiplagat accompanies Dhlakama to Malawi for discussions with President Hastings Banda. Dhlakama then travels to Rome for talks with members of Sant’ Egidio and officials of the Italian Foreign Ministry. Sant’ Egidio assures Dhlakama of parity of status in any dialogue it might facilitate, while the Italian government expresses its willingness to finance peace talks held on its soil. Chissano meets US President George Bush in Washington and affirms his readiness to talk directly with Renamo.

April-June
Chissano again rejects Lisbon as a venue for direct talks, while Renamo continues to favour Nairobi. Dhlakama and Kiplagat are flown to Blantyre, Malawi, in a Lonrho jet on 11 June for talks with a Mozambican delegation. These discussions fail to materialise, however, due to Dhlakama’s reservations about security and the neutrality of the Malawian authorities.

July
The first direct meeting since Nkomati between delegations of the Mozambican government and Renamo takes place in Rome. Archbishop Gonçalves acts as an
observer to these talks, together with two representatives of Sant’ Egidio and an Italian socialist parliamentarian. The two sides adopt a joint communiqué expressing their common interest in ending the war.

**August-October**
A second round of direct talks founders in the face of Renamo insistence that Kenya mediate future negotiations. The parties eventually agree to upgrade the four existing ‘observers’ to the status of official mediators. The US offers Sant’ Egidio technical support for the negotiations. Renamo promises Malawi it will cease attacks on the Nacala transport corridor.

**November**
The Mozambican legislature approves the new constitution which lays the basis for a multiparty political system, universal suffrage, an independent judiciary, freedom of the press, the right to strike and a market economy. As a third round of talks gets under way in Rome, US assistant secretary of state for African affairs Herman Cohen presses Dhlakama to engage more meaning fully.

**December**
An agreement is signed establishing a partial ceasefire in Mozambique and granting the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) permission to undertake humanitarian operations throughout the country. An international Joint Verification Commission (JVC) is set up in Maputo to monitor the agreement. Progress at round four of the Rome talks is hindered due to Renamo complaints that the government is advancing ‘unilaterally’ with political reforms. Zambia’s President Kaunda presses Dhlakama to meet Chissano face-to-face. Dhlakama refuses, but gives Kaunda a list of his preconditions for such talks.

**1991 January-April**
After it is accused of ceasefire violations, Renamo calls into question the neutrality of the JVC. The rebels also refuse ICRC access to the Tete corridor. The fifth round of the Rome talks ends in deadlock. Dhlakama calls for all Zimbabwean troops to withdraw from Mozambique and threatens to break the ceasefire decisively. Renewed attacks in the Nacala corridor lead to the resumption of talks between Renamo and the Malawian government.

**May-July**
Round six of negotiations commences. The mediators draft a protocol of basic principles for future talks after an agenda is agreed which defers to Renamo pressure to address military issues after central political questions have been resolved. The ICRC presses for the establishment of ‘safe havens’ for humanitarian operations in Renamo-held territory.

**August-September**
The seventh round of talks is suspended after the government claims the mediators’ protocol might violate Mozambican national sovereignty. The Renamo delegation returns to Gorongosa expressing disillusion with the peace process. A meeting is called in Malawi between two of the mediators, Malawian officials and Dhlakama. Renamo drops its insistence on a post-ceasefire transitional government, but proposes that key government ministries are brought under UN control until elections. The UN rejects this proposal.

**October-November**
Mozambican churchmen appeal for an immediate ceasefire, blaming both sides for prolonging the conflict. Round eight of the Rome talks produces two protocols establishing mutual political recognition, a role for the UN in monitoring compliance with the peace agreement, the sole authority of the government to oversee organisation of the elections, and the right of Renamo to begin party political activities with the signing of a General Peace Agreement (GPA).

**December**
Renamo holds its second party congress in Gorongosa, funded by the Italian government. In the face of extreme drought, the morale and command structures of the Mozambican army collapse in many areas. At the ninth round of the Rome talks, the mediators present a draft proposal for an electoral law protocol. Meanwhile, US officials instigate informal discussions between the parties on military issues, but fail to secure an end-of-year truce.
1992

January-May

The third protocol of the GPA is signed in Rome. With US encouragement, Dhlakama agrees to defer discussion of the new constitution until after military issues have been addressed. Dhlakama continues to resist US pressure for a truce to ease relief distribution, fearing the Mozambican army will exploit this militarily. ‘Tiny’ Rowland facilitates a meeting between Dhlakama and Mugabe in Malawi but a second attempt to bring the two together in London is frustrated. The CCM presses Dhlakama and Chissano to ‘summitise’ the Rome talks.

June

In round eleven of the Rome talks, France, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States and the United Nations are granted observer status. Renamo is assured that constitutional issues will be addressed before negotiation of a final ceasefire, but continues to complain that the JVC is biased in favour of the government.

July

Under pressure from the ICRC, Renamo and the government sign an agreement permitting the use of all Mozambican roads and air space for humanitarian operations. A committee is established to oversee implementation of this agreement, but is delayed because the Renamo member fails to take his seat. Talks in Botswana, facilitated by Rowland and President Masire, lead to a rapprochement between Mugabe and Dhlakama. The latter expresses a willingness for a summit with Chissano and Mugabe promises to assist Renamo’s political transformation.

August

Chissano and Dhlakama meet for the first time in Rome, initially in the presence of Mugabe and Rowland, but later with the official mediators and observers. Dhlakama receives personal assurances of security and continued support for Renamo from Mugabe. Subsequently, he and Chissano sign a joint declaration committing themselves to the spirit of established protocols and ensuring that agreed constitutional guarantees will be adopted as law before a final peace agreement is signed.

The twelfth and final round of negotiations reaches stalemate over the size of the new army and the status of the State Information and Security Service (SISE), which Renamo wants abolished. The mediators dispatch letters to Chissano and Dhlakama, signed by their representatives in Rome, requesting urgent action.

September

‘Tiny’ Rowland, with Mugabe’s support, engineers a second Chissano-Dhlakama summit in Botswana at which a breakthrough is reached on outstanding political issues. Chissano requests UN financial support for reintegrating refugees, demobilising soldiers, forming the new army and organising elections.

October

With Dhlakama, Chissano and Mugabe in Rome, the delegations carry out a line-by-line review of all the agreed protocols. The General Peace Agreement (GPA) is then signed on 4 October. The UN is invited to monitor and verify implementation and, after ceasefire violations are reported, deploys two teams of military observers to Nampula and Beira.

November-December

The Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) is established, including both government and Renamo delegates and charged with overall responsibility for overseeing implementation of the GPA. Dhlakama agrees to the continued presence of Zimbabwean troops along the Beira corridor pending the arrival of UN forces. A donors meeting in Rome pledge nearly US $400 million of humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to support the peace process. Renamo seeks additional funds from the Italian government. The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) is formally established with a broad mandate, which includes organising elections, initially scheduled for October 1993.
**Re-establishing Political Stability**

**1993** As ONUMOZ units are gradually deployed to verify the ceasefire, Zimbabwean and Malawian troops are fully withdrawn from Mozambique. Renamo leaders press for more financial assistance and political concessions, stalling the peace process for three months. At Italy’s request, a UN trust fund is set up to finance Renamo’s transformation. International pledges for reconstruction assistance reach US $520 million. In the face of tensions between Renamo and Frelimo and a slow deployment of ONUMOZ, elections are postponed until October 1994. The cantonment of combatants prior to demobilisation commences in strategic assembly areas. The Mozambican churches continue to play a key role in brokering local ceasefires and defusing community tensions.

**1994** Despite difficult conditions and riots, demobilisation of both sides’ combatants is finally completed and a new army is formed. An estimated 81 per cent of eligible voters are registered for elections. A last-minute threat by Dhlakama to boycott the polls is reversed after pressure from the UN, the CSC, Mugabe and South Africa’s newly-elected President, Nelson Mandela. The elections take place on 27-29 October. Frelimo wins a slim majority in the Assembly, while Chissano is re-elected President. An all-Frelimo cabinet is appointed, still dominated by southerners, but with higher technical qualifications than previous administrations and an improved balance of age, ethnicity and gender. The mandate of ONUMOZ expires in December.

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**Postscript 1997**

Five years after the ending of the war, and three years after elections, many ex-fighters continue to nurse grievances due to the few economic opportunities open to them and the lack of recognition of their contribution to the war and the suffering they endured. This said, the process of reintegration has been relatively successful and most fighters do not pose an immediate threat to their local communities.

With the next national elections only two years away, and the immense stakes this represents, relations between Frelimo and Renamo still swing back and forth between cooperation and confrontation. Soon after the elections, the government rejected Renamo’s wish to appoint provincial governors where it had won majorities. In late 1997, disillusionment among the former rebels was further compounded by the postponement of local elections, now due in mid-1998. Some former Renamo zones remain practically off-limits to the government and ‘dual’ local authorities have persisted in some areas, where Renamo administrators appointed under the Rome accords unofficially retain their functions. Despite its status as the official opposition, Renamo is still faced with extensive debts and its organisation, especially at local level, remains in tatters.

Foreign aid constitutes around 60 per cent of the Mozambican national budget. While the country remains a darling of the donor community, the ethics and efficacy of the economic adjustment policies spearheaded by the IMF have been widely questioned. Questions also remain concerning how the country will manage if aid dries up.
Key Actors

in the War and Peace Process

Main Antagonists

Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo)

Founded in 1962, from an alliance of three regionally based anti-colonial movements, Frelimo came to power in 1974-75 following a ten-year liberation war against the Portuguese. Through its early years, the movement suffered infighting over a complex mix of ethnic, ideological and political issues, but came to be dominated by a southern, urban-based elite with a strong, non-racial, nationalist ideology. After the assassination of its first President, Eduardo Mondlane, in 1969, Samora Machel took over. Frelimo converted from a broad-based ‘front’ to a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party in 1977 and adopted ambitious economic and social programmes. In later years, its centralist tendencies and inability to effectively implement development policies due to the war with Renamo weakened Frelimo’s credibility with many Mozambicans. In 1986, Machel died in a plane crash and was replaced by long-serving foreign minister, Joaquim Chissano. Three years later, the party dropped its Marxist-Leninist designation and, in 1990, engineered a liberal constitution allowing for a multiparty political system. That same year, negotiations commenced with Renamo which led to the 1992 General Peace Agreement. Frelimo won 52 per cent of national assembly seats in the parliamentary elections of 1994, dominating in Maputo, the south and their original heartland in the north-east. The party maintained power, though with a substantial Renamo opposition.

Mozambique Armed Forces (FAM)

FAM (originally FPLM) was the armed wing of the Frelimo party through the 1970s and 1980s. The FAM was a conscription-based army, relying occasionally on forced recruitment, which during the 1980s

FAM troops on the march after destroying a Renamo base in Gaza Province, July 1992
Key Actors

Mozambique National Resistance (MNR, later Renamo)

Renamo was formed in 1976 by the Rhodesian government to fight and to collect intelligence on Zimbabwean nationalist guerrillas operating from Mozambique. With Zimbabwean independence in 1980, Renamo was taken over by South Africa and used to destabilise Mozambique. Internally, Renamo has been dominated by Ndau speakers from the east-central provinces and included Frelimo dissidents, as well as soldiers who had fought with the Portuguese during the colonial war. Following the death of its first leader, Andre Matsangaissa in 1979, Afonso Dhlakama (below left) took over. At its military peak from the mid to late 1980s, Renamo claimed well over 20,000 combatants and was operational country-wide. Its major offensives followed the expulsion of personnel from South Africa and Malawi in 1984 and 1987. A common Renamo tactic was to destroy and disrupt socio-economic infrastructure to highlight and exacerbate the government’s failure to protect and provide for its citizens. When support from South Africa began to wane in the mid-1980s, Renamo resorted to more violent tactics targeted at civilians in order to sustain its formidable reputation and resource its activities. In some areas, the movement was militarily well organised and equipped. In others, it was poorly provisioned and thoroughly ill-disciplined. Renamo’s leadership generally lacked a coherent political ideology. Its support base is mostly among the rural poor and, in the 1994 elections, it won a majority of parliamentary seats in five northern and central provinces. Over 20,000 Renamo combatants were demobilised in 1993-94

Renamo child soldiers in central Mozambique pose for a photograph taken by their hostage William Blakey in 1985
Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective

and an additional 4,000 were integrated into the FADM. Although severely in debt and politically inexperienced, fresh leadership, a presence in Maputo and continued support in the provinces suggest Renamo has some future in Mozambican politics.

Rhodesia

The Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) of the minority Rhodesian government formed the MNR in 1976 to counter the growing threat posed by Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (Zanla) guerrillas operating out of Mozambique. In 1980, following the Lancaster House agreements which brought majority rule to Rhodesia, the CIO transferred control of the MNR/Renamo to the South African military establishment.

South Africa

The South African military was directly involved with Renamo in operations to undermine the Frelimo government as early as 1978. This action intensified in the early 1980s when South Africa took control over Renamo, revitalising the movement and directing it in support of its own objectives of regional destabilisation. In 1984, the South African authorities signed the Nkomati accord with the Mozambican government and mediated direct talks between leading representatives of Frelimo and Renamo. These talks quickly collapsed, however, and it soon transpired that the South Africans had reneged on Nkomati, continuing to support the rebels covertly. From 1988, and especially after the accession of President F. W. de Klerk in 1989, relations warmed between the two governments, leading to agreements on common military and economic interests. As the shift to majority rule gained pace, Foreign Minister ‘Pik’ Botha (below) became closely identified with ‘Tiny’ Rowland’s initiatives to support the peace process. Immediately prior to the 1994 Mozambican elections, South Africa’s newly inaugurated president, Nelson Mandela, is believed to have played a key role in persuading Renamo to reverse an eve-of-poll boycott declaration.

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**Distribution of Seats in Mozambique’s National Assembly**

*(1994 elections)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frelimo</th>
<th>Renamo</th>
<th>Democratic Union</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Northern Provinces</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Delgado</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nampula</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niassa</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tete</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambézia</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central Provinces</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Manica</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sofala</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southern Provinces</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>Gaza</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhambane</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maputo City</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maputo Province</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>129</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Key Actors

Zimbabwe

Following the accession to power of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in 1980, Zimbabwe became Mozambique’s closest ally in its war against Renamo and its backers. With its economy dependent on access to the sea through Mozambique, Zimbabwe had committed upwards of 20,000 troops by the mid-1980s to contain Renamo and to protect transportation infrastructure in the so-called ‘Beira corridor’. When it no longer looked as if a military solution to the war was viable, the Zimbabwean government increased communication with Renamo and President Robert Mugabe became involved at different times in facilitating and mediating talks between the Mozambican government and the rebels. In the latter stages of negotiations and prior to elections, Mugabe’s personal pledges of security and support were essential to retaining the engagement of the Renamo leadership. The last Zimbabwean troops were withdrawn from Mozambique in 1993.

Intervening States

Botswana

As one of the anti-apartheid Front Line States, Botswana provided political support for peace initiatives in Mozambique throughout the 1980s. In the latter stages of the Rome peace process in July and September 1992, two crucial summits were held in its capital, Gaborone, facilitated by ‘Tiny’ Rowland of Lonrho and President Maître, which led to a breakthrough on sensitive political issues.

France

France provided the Mozambican government with military aid during the 1980s. Representatives of the French government were invited in mid-1992 to be observers for the remainder of the Rome talks and, two years later, to be part of the international commissions monitoring implementation of the General Peace Agreement. Following the formation of the new army, France has also provided substantial military training.

Germany

The former East Germany provided assistance to Frelimo during its struggle against the colonial government and in the period following Mozambican independence, particularly in the establishment of the National Service for Public Security (SNASP). In West Germany, in later years, Renamo enjoyed support from individuals in academic and right-wing political circles and from elements of the state intelligence service. A Renamo office was established in Heidelberg in 1983 which retained South African-financed communications links with Renamo bases in the northern Transvaal right up to 1989. Heidelberg was also the site of a Renamo congress in late 1988 at which Dhlakama sought to bring the rebels’ fractious external wing into line with his leadership. The unified German state also had representation on the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission overseeing implementation of the General Peace Agreement.

Italy

The Italian government backed the efforts of the Sant’Egidio lay community to mediate between the Frelimo government and Renamo. In March 1990, Italian foreign ministry officials met Dhlakama in Rome and pledged to host and meet the costs of any peace talks held in Italy. Mario Rafaelli, a northern socialist parliamentarian with long-standing links with Frelimo, represented the government, first as an observer, and later as an official mediator. With the assistance of observers from Portugal, the US and the UK, the Italian military drew up original drafts of the military and ceasefire protocols of the General Peace Agreement. Italy’s most significant contribution to the peace process, however, was a contribution of around US $35 million from 1990-94 to help finance Renamo’s continuing commitment to the peace process and its transformation into a political party. The Italians were also instrumental in the establishment, in 1993, of a UN trust fund for similar ends.
Kenya

Kenya has long hosted Mozambican dissidents and was the site of a Renamo office from 1984, after which it also provided travel documents to Renamo officials. Though the exact nature of its support for Renamo remains unclear, it has been suggested that, towards the end of the war, Kenya provided significant military training and channelled arms to the rebels. From a delegation of Mozambican churchmen was received several times in Nairobi and offered assistance for meetings with Renamo representatives. The ‘Nairobi talks’ commenced in early 1989 and continued, with President Moi as a mediator, until their collapse in August. Through this period, foreign ministry official Bethuel Abdu Kiplagat established a close rapport with Dhlakama and was party to ‘Tiny’ Rowland’s attempts to facilitate direct dialogue between Renamo and the Mozambican government. In December President Moi co-authored a proposal which increased the momentum for talks, but Nairobi was rejected as a venue in favour of Rome. Kenyan influence waned significantly in the latter stages of the Rome talks despite Renamo attempts to win for Moi a mediating role.

Malawi

Strategically defending its perceived political and economic interests, Malawi under President Banda maintained cordial relations with both Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa. As such, it was an important base for anti-Frelimo forces in the 1970s. Malawi also provided bases for Renamo in the early 1980s and later channelled assistance to the rebels from various evangelical mission societies based in South Africa and the West. Recognising the costs borne by his country as a result of the war, and under great pressure from the Front Line States, Banda finally expelled Renamo from Malawian soil in 1986. After this time, Malawian officials continued to negotiate with the rebels to secure export routes across Mozambique, although troops were also deployed for this purpose between 1987 and 1993. Malawi hosted many discussions aimed at establishing direct talks between Renamo and the Mozambican government and, later, to free log-jams in the Rome negotiations. At the height of the war, Malawi hosted up to one million Mozambican refugees.

Portugal

As the ex-colonial power in Mozambique, Portugal became a key base for groups opposed to the Frelimo government, and Renamo has maintained an office in Lisbon since its foundation. Mindful of their economic interests in Mozambique, the Portuguese government and business community also maintained communication channels with the rebels, as well as negotiating with the South African and Mozambican governments to protect their investments. After promoting its case with Lonrho and Renamo, Portugal was rejected as the site for direct peace talks in 1990. The government continued to press for a central role in the process, however, sometimes to the annoyance of the Italians. In mid-1992, Portugal was appointed an official observer at the Rome talks. Since then, it has played a role in monitoring implementation of the peace agreement and has provided military training for the FADM.

Tanzania

Frelimo has long enjoyed loyal support from the Tanzanian government. During the liberation war, party headquarters were in Dar-es-Salaam, and many of its military operations were launched from Tanzanian rear bases. From 1985, the Mozambican army was provided with training facilities on Tanzanian soil. Between 1983-88, Tanzania committed as many as 7,000 troops to Mozambique to protect its own borders from Renamo incursions and bolster the military operations of its ally. Tanzania also hosted some 60,000 Mozambican refugees during the war.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)

From 1976, the Frelimo government signed several trade and co-operation treaties with the Soviet Union. Despite the warming of relations with the West in the mid-1980s, Mozambique continued to receive substantial levels of Soviet military, economic and
humanitarian assistance as late as 1989. By this time, it was estimated that Mozambique’s debt to the USSR totalled in the region of US $2.4 billion. In the final months before its collapse, the Soviet Union was invited by the government to join the Joint Verification Committee (JVC) monitoring the partial ceasefire of December 1990.

**United Kingdom**

Due to the supportive role it played in the Lancaster House negotiations leading to Zimbabwean independence, Mozambique enjoyed surprisingly cordial relations with the UK government in the 1980s. Partly to deflect criticism of its refusal to impose sanctions against apartheid South Africa, the UK despatched significant levels of aid and military assistance to Mozambique, particularly between 1984-87. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is also believed to have played a role dissuading the Reagan administration in the US from supporting Renamo. At the request of the Mozambique government, the UK was afforded formal observer status in the final stages of the Rome peace talks. It has since provided development assistance to Mozambique as well as military training for the FADM.

**United States**

Despite a powerful pro-Renamo lobby in Washington, the US government sought to coax rather than force Mozambique from its ‘Marxist’ inclinations. From the early 1980s, it provided substantial humanitarian aid and some military assistance to the Mozambican government. The US sought to play a central role in the peace process in Mozambique, pressuring President Machel to sign the Nkomati accord in 1984, and later providing background technical support as well as political pressure during the Rome talks. The US played a key role in devising the military sections of the GPA and was appointed an official observer of the Rome talks in mid-1992.

**Zambia**

From 1987, Zambia suffered regular incursions from Renamo units which harassed and terrorised civilians to obtain provisions. In response, the Zambian authorities launched counter-raids against the rebels and, in 1989, reached a joint security agreement with Mozambique. In late 1990, President Kaunda held talks, facilitated by ‘Tiny’ Rowland, with Renamo’s Dhlakama and received his preconditions for face-to-face talks with President Chissano. In early 1991, Kaunda failed in his attempts to persuade Chissano to meet these conditions.

**Non-Governmental Institutions (National)**

**Catholic Church**

The Catholic Church represents the largest supra-ethnic organisation in Mozambican civil society. Though present in the country since the 1600s, it only established dioceses in Mozambique in 1940. The first African bishops were appointed in 1974 and today, there are around two million Mozambican Catholics. Relative to other Christian denominations, the Catholic Church is weakest in Maputo and the south. Tarnished by its colonial ‘civilising’ mission and often conservative, it experienced significant adversity in its relations with the state between 1975 and 1982, despite the fact that many priests had supported independence. Following a warming of relations with the government, Church leaders began to make public calls for a negotiated end to the war as early as 1983. By 1988, they were facilitating contacts between the government and Renamo. Having gained the confidence of rebel leaders through personal visits to their headquarters, the Catholic Archbishop of Beira, Jaime Gonçalves, played a key role in this and was later appointed an official observer, then mediator, at the Rome talks. Since the signing of the Rome accord, the Church has supported community initiatives for reconstruction and reconciliation in Mozambique.
Mozambican Christian Council (CCM)

The CCM was founded in 1948 to promote unity and co-operation among Mozambican churches. Representing Anglican, Baptist, Reformed, Methodist and independent church traditions, the CCM became involved in calls for dialogue between the warring parties from 1984 when it established a Peace and Reconciliation Commission. Capitalising on relatively cordial links with the government, the council gained approval for its overtures to Renamo. It was a leading force behind the Nairobi talks which provided the first significant interaction between Frelimo and Renamo representatives. In 1990-92, the CCM persistently drew attention to the slow progress of the Rome process, pressed for an immediate ceasefire and for direct dialogue between President Chissano and Afonso Dhlakama. Churches affiliated with the CCM played a key role in brokering local ceasefires as well as defusing community tensions and promoting grassroots development in the post-war era.

Naparama Movement

The Naparama — meaning ‘irresistable force’ — was a community defence movement which came to prominence in Zambézia province around 1990. Drawing inspiration from Manuel Antonio, a 28 year-old spiritual healer, it successfully freed many captives from Renamo bush camps and established several ‘neutral zones’ before the war was formally ended. The Naparama and similar movements relied on magic potions and other forms of ‘spiritual protection’ to render themselves ‘invincible’. The spiritual power of the Naparama instilled fear in many Renamo fighters, causing them to flee or lay down their arms, often without violence.

Non-Governmental Institutions (International)

All Africa Council of Churches (AACC)/World Council of Churches (WCC)

The WCC and AACC supported the early attempts of Mozambican churchmen to establish links with Renamo representatives in the US and Kenya. Collaborating with the CCM, the Nairobi Peace Initiative and others, the ecumenical bodies continue to analyse and draw lessons from the experiences of Mozambique, providing information and counsel through their wide range of international partners.

African National Congress (ANC)

The ANC, the South African liberation movement, held military bases in Mozambique until the signing of the 1984 Nkomati accord between the Mozambican and South African governments. With its legalisation in 1990, and the release from prison of its leader, Nelson Mandela, the ANC increased its pressure on the South African government to halt its backing for Renamo. This pressure was key in consolidating South African support for the Mozambican peace process.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

The ICRC frequently clashed with the Mozambican government during the 1980s over access to Renamo-held areas. In December 1990, the committee secured permission from the government and Renamo to operate freely throughout the country. Because this agreement was only fitfully respected, the ICRC was instrumental in securing a Declaration on the Guiding Principles of Humanitarian Operations, signed in July 1992 as part of the General Peace Agreement. Unhindered access to many areas remained problematic, however, long after the peace agreement was signed. While the role of the ICRC and other international NGOs was key in alleviating hunger in Mozambique, their aid was routinely manipulated for non-humanitarian ends by both sides in the war.
**Lonrho**

The UK-based multinational corporation, Lonrho, struck secret deals with Renamo as early as 1982 to protect the Beira oil pipeline and its other commercial interests in Mozambique. Starting with the ill-fated Nkomati accord of 1984, chief executive ‘Tiny’ Rowland (above left) played a significant role in the peace process, using his private jet to shuttle mediators and representatives of the warring parties between African capitals. His personal efforts to engineer dialogue between the government and Renamo were key in accelerating the peace process and in making possible the 1992 settlement. The most significant Lonrho contribution to peace, however, was probably the millions of dollars channelled to Renamo’s leaders to buy their compliance with the terms of the GPA.

**Sant’ Egidio Community**

Founded in the late 1960s to express the social concerns of Catholic students, the Rome-based Sant’ Egidio community has links with Mozambique dating from the 1970s. In 1982-83, it hosted a range of informal discussions fastening improved relations between the Frelimo government and the Catholic Church. Sant’ Egidio was also involved in negotiations for the release of missionaries kidnapped by Renamo in 1985 and in the arrangements surrounding the Pope’s 1988 visit to Mozambique. In 1990, the community offered to host direct talks between the Mozambican government and Renamo. Due to its strong links with leftist Italian politicians, the Italian government and Catholic churchmen trusted by Renamo, its offer was accepted. Sant’ Egidio went on to host all 12 rounds of the Rome talks, with two of its senior members acting first as observers and then as official mediators. Many were critical of Sant’ Egidio’s rigorously non-judgmental approach and the long-standing failure of its talks to bring about a credible ceasefire. In the final analysis, however, the community provided a genuinely ‘neutral’ environment which was essential for the parties to settle some significant differences and to reach a political accommodation.

**The Vatican**

Relations between the Vatican and the Frelimo government were strained in the late 1970s after the nationalisation of church property, the expulsion of missionaries and the persistent harassment of churchmen in Mozambique. Rapprochement came in 1982-83 and conciliatory talks were held in Rome between President Machel and Pope John Paul II. By 1988, most church property had been reinstated and the Pope made a highly successful visit to Mozambique, strengthening the momentum for dialogue and reconciliation between the government and Renamo. In late 1991, the president of Renamo was received at the Vatican. An audience with the Pope was deferred, however, until after the signing of the General Peace Agreement, when the pontiff hosted a symbolic reconciliation function for all prominent figures in the Rome talks.
**Inter-Governmental Organisations**

**The Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC)**

Headed by UN Special Representative Aldo Ajello and comprising representatives of the Mozambican government, Renamo, Portugal, Italy, France, the UK, the US and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the CSC was established at the end of 1992. It was the highest of a series of commissions set up to monitor the ceasefire, establish the new armed forces, reintegrate demobilised soldiers into Mozambican society and verify the withdrawal from Mozambique of all foreign troops. Responsible for managing the delicate politics of implementing the Rome accords, the CSC twice set back demobilisation and election schedules.

**International Monetary Fund/World Bank**

Desperate to draw foreign investment and to attract funds to relaunch its economy, Mozambique joined both the IMF and the World Bank in 1984. It received its first World Bank loan in 1985 and, two years later, launched an IMF economic recovery programme involving devaluation of the Mozambican metical, extensive privatisation, and counter-inflationary measures. In 1989, some US $820 million were received for economic rehabilitation as part of a ‘structural adjustment’ package agreed with both the bank and the fund. While the Mozambican economy is dependent on such support, deflationary policies, implemented at a time of protracted economic crisis, have had huge social costs and have angered many Mozambicans, outside commentators and other donors.

**Joint Verification Commission (JVC)**

The JVC was set up in December 1990 to monitor a partial ceasefire between the government and Renamo covering the key transport routes across Mozambique. Of the eight countries serving on the commission, Renamo selected Kenya, Portugal, the US and Zambia, while the government chose Congo, France, the UK and the USSR. The JVC attributed the majority of subsequent violations to Renamo, but came under fire from the rebels for a perceived lack of neutrality.

**United Nations**

The United Nations became formally involved in the Rome talks in 1992 when Renamo requested its participation as an observer. It was instrumental in the elaboration of the technical documents relating to the General Peace Agreement and, through ONUMOZ (United Nations Operation in Mozambique), played a key role in its implementation. ONUMOZ was established on 16 December 1992 by the United Nations Security Council with a mandate to verify and monitor the implementation of the General Peace Agreement and to organise elections. Headed by UN Special Representative Aldo Ajello (above), a former Italian parliamentarian and UN Development Programme (UNDP) official, ONUMOZ was a multi-faceted operation involving peace-keeping, the demobilisation of government and rebel armies, the provision of humanitarian relief, electoral support and the return of millions of refugees. Originally envisaged as a one-year operation, the mandate of ONUMOZ was twice renewed due to logistical, political and other problems which required extensive negotiation between Renamo, the government and the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC). At its height, ONUMOZ employed more than 6,000 civilian and military personnel. Its last remaining military officers left Mozambique in March 1995.
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Contributors

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Dom Jaime Gonçalves has been the Catholic Archbishop of Beira since 1984. In 1989, he became involved in parallel diplomacy to persuade the Renamo rebel movement to negotiate with the Mozambican government. When the peace talks between the government and Renamo began in Rome in July 1990 at the Sant’Egidio community, he became one of the four mediators facilitating the negotiations.

Fernando Gonçalves is a Mozambican journalist working in Harare, Zimbabwe. He was until recently the Senior Editor of the magazine *Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly* and has now moved to be Managing Editor of the *Southern African Economist*. Prior to moving to Harare in 1993, Gonçalves was an editor at the Mozambique News Agency (AIM) in Maputo.

Dylan Hendrickson is an independent researcher with a particular interest in how peace settlements can better address the societal conditions sustaining violence. He worked in Cambodia from 1991-93 during the negotiation and implementation of its peace agreement. Since completing an MPhil at the Institute of Development Studies in Sussex in 1995, he has carried out consultancies for the British Government, the United Nations and various NGOs. He has published on a variety of topics relating to international responses to armed conflict.

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**Pier Maria Mazzola** is a member of the Comboni missionaries. He served in Mozambique's Nampula province during much of the war and returned to Italy in 1992. He is the joint author of *La Fatica Di Sperare: Lettre dal Mozambico In Guerra*, a book about the war and the Comboni efforts to mediate between government and Renamo officials in Nampula province. In 1997, Father Mazzola became editor of *Nigrizia*, Italy's primary magazine on Africa.

**Lt. Col. Martin Rupiya** is a former officer in the Zimbabwean National Army and has operational experience in Mozambique. He is currently Director of the Centre for Defence Studies at the University of Zimbabwe, where he previously completed his PhD on military and security issues in southern Rhodesia during the Federation period. He has written on regional security matters and is author of the forthcoming book *Deadly Legacy: Landmines in Zimbabwe* (SAPES). He is currently a Visiting Research Fellow at the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, UK.

**Dinis Salomao Sengulane** is a Mozambican and is the Anglican bishop of Lebombo. Sengulane is an important member of the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM) and played a key role in the 1989 church talks with Renamo in Kenya. He has been a strong advocate for peace and reconciliation through the ‘Preparing the People for Peace’ programme of the Mozambican Anglican church. He is author of *Vitoria sem Vencidos (Bispo dos Lebombo)*, a book about the CCM’s role in the peace process.

**Alex Vines**, while on sabbatical as a MacArthur NGO Fellow at the Department of War Studies, King's College, University of London, contributed to and co-edited this issue of *Accord*. He is a research associate for Human Rights Watch/Africa and has worked on Mozambique for a number of years. His books include, *Renamo: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique* and he has published a number of reports and journal articles on Mozambique. He is also a Research Associate at Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford University and served as an United Nations international observer during Mozambique's 1994 multiparty elections.
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To achieve that objective CR works with project partners to provide:

- collaborative consultation, analysis, design and implementation of conflict transformation strategies;
- support for seminars, workshops and other for a aimed at clarifying issues in particular conflicts, at building confidence and capacities, and at generating a range of political, economic and social options for constructive change and peaceful settlement;
- conflict transformation training;
- production of educational and training materials;
- in-depth analyses of peace processes;
- media in conflict training programmes;
- organisational development support for organisations addressing conflict issues.

Programme areas

Conciliation Resources’ three principal programme areas are West Africa, Fiji, and the production of Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives, with issues on Liberia, Guatemala, Mozambique, Sri Lanka and Cambodia published or in production.

West Africa

CR has been active in West Africa since 1995. Activities have included:

- skills training for members of the Gambia Press Union and the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists in electoral coverage;
- support for development of the National Catholic Development Office/Caritas Programme for reconciliation and trauma healing in Sierra Leone;
- conflict analysis with national and international NGOs in Sierra Leone;
- support for the Liberian Women Initiative voter education campaign;
- negotiation and mediation training with religious, labour and women’s organisations and individual peace activists in Sierra Leone;
- community peacebuilding activities in Sierra Leone;
- regional information-gathering and analysis.

Fiji

CR’s programme partner in Fiji, the Citizen’s Constitutional Forum (CCF), has played a lead role in promoting dialogue and discussion aimed at reform of Fiji’s race-based constitution broadly acceptable to all sectors of Fijian society. CCF/CR initiatives since 1994 have focused on community and national political education related to democratisation and conflict prevention.

Activities have included:

- an ongoing series of consultative workshops in rural areas;
- national consultations on constitutional and political reform;
- articles and cartoon strips in the media;
- workshops with journalists;
- the dissemination of teaching and discussion materials on constitutional reform.

Other areas

CR has worked with the Peace Committee for Somaliland and undertaken consultancies for various organisations including UNESCO, CARE UK, Oxfam-UK, the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations and the King Baudouin Foundation.

CR is a member of the Committee for Conflict Transformation Support and produces the Committee’s Newsletter.

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Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives

The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective

Five years on from the Rome accords, Mozambique remains politically stable despite formidable levels of poverty and social dislocation. The issue returns to key aspects of the Mozambican peace process. It shows how the initiatives driving the parties towards a negotiated settlement were diverse and complex, and that the importance of each varied greatly through time. It also illustrates how the ending of the Cold War, the transition to majority rule in South Africa and other unexpected developments added vital momentum to the Mozambican transition. In emphasising dynamism, unpredictability and the broader historical context, the issue highlights the difficulties of ‘crafting’ political settlements to armed conflict. At the same time, it underlines that key forces favouring peace exist at all levels of society which can and should be harnessed.

Resource material – such as Accord – is of great help for those of us working in this field.

Bethuel Abdu Kiplagat, Sudan Working Group, All African Council of Churches

The Accord Series

Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives is published by Conciliation Resources (CR), a London-based NGO concerned with supporting community peace building in Africa, the South Pacific and around the world. It provides detailed narrative and analysis on specific war and peace processes, combining readability with practical relevance. Accord readers work in governments, non-governmental and inter-governmental organisations, in the field of conflict resolution, human rights, relief and development. Its appeal should extend, however, to anyone with a general interest in its themes including academic researchers, armed opposition groups and journalists. This issue of Accord was part-financed by the UK Department for International Development and the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs. Articles from this issue will also be published, in Portuguese, in the Arquivo series published by the Arquivo Histórico in Maputo.

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Liberia, Guatemala, Sri Lanka, Cambodia

Issues for release in 1999

Philippines/Mindanao, Georgia/Abkhazia, Northern Ireland

Price: £12.50 or $25 (see inside for order details)

The full text of all published Accord can be found on our website: www.c-r.org