Lome is dead! Long live Lome!

A talk given at Conciliation Resources on Wednesday 9th August 2000 by Dr. Dennis Bright, Commissioner, Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, Sierra Leone

The peace agreement signed in the Togolese capital of Lome on 7th July 1999 by His Excellency the President of Sierra Leone, Alhaji Dr Ahmad Tejan Kabba and the Revolutionary United Front ( RUF) leader Foday Sankoh, was expected to bring to an end eight long years of violence, death and destruction which characterized the Sierra Leone Civil War. The Lome Agreement required the participation, avowed interest and commitment of all parties and received the expressed goodwill of the West African sub-region and the International Community as a whole. Lome provided for the creation of a number of structures that would ensure its implementation but it also needed the cooperation of all the factions and especially that of their leaders.

After a delay of about three months due to the late arrival of the RUF leader, the implementation of Lome started with the removal of those legal obstacles that could have prevented the inclusion of RUF members in Government, their appointment to diplomatic and other official positions and their enjoyment of a blanket amnesty granted "in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives up to the time of the signing of the (...) Agreement."

However, in May of this year 2000, almost one year after the signing of the Lome Agreement, some unfortunate events such as the taking of UNAMSIL peace keepers as hostages and the murder of peace demonstrators by the RUF, triggered off another round of hostilities and brought the agreement itself under scrutiny, with observers wondering whether Lome was dead or alive.

My objective here is not to make an assessment of the problems of implementation of the agreement in question ; my ideas on that subject are contained in an article to be published soon by Conciliation Resources. You may also wish to refer to the report on an evaluation seminar on the Lome Agreement organised by the CCP from 5th to 7th July 2000. I prefer instead to make a few statements on the current situation in Sierra Leone that may hopefully provide an insight into the implications of the new scenario that has emerged as a result of the May incidents.

Let me hasten to say that the views I will express here belong to me and have been inspired by months of observation of and contact and discussions with the major parties in the conflict while performing my duties as Commissioner in the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP). After my statements on the current situation I will then proceed to share with you my thoughts on why Lome should not die or in other words why peace must remain high on our agenda. I will end by throwing light on some aspects of the work of the CCP and its plans for the immediate future.

Foday Saybana Sankoh, leader of the RUF, key signatory to the Lome Peace Agreement, Chairman of the Strategic Minerals Resources Commission (CMRRD) enjoying a status equivalent to that of a Vice President, was arrested about three months ago and is facing prosecution for criminal offences. The Government of Sierra Leone will have to take a decision based on a number of options as to whether to:

1. try him in Sierra Leone according to the laws of Sierra Leone
2. try him in another country because of concerns of security but still according to the laws of Sierra Leone
3. try him out of Sierra Leone for crimes against humanity in an International Court
4. revoke a pardon granted him in a previous treason trial so that he would face capital punishment under the laws of Sierra Leone (view of Prof. Jimmy Kandeh)

On this issue the Government once again finds itself constrained to make an extremely delicate and sensitive decision. Should it give in to the pressure of those victims of the war who are calling for Sankoh to be tried at home and to be made to pay with his life for all the deaths, atrocities and destruction caused by his RUF ? Or can it afford to apply the death sentence and face disapproval by the International Community which, in the present circumstances, is the one paying the piper ? Furthermore, twice in three years rebels have succeeded in breaking into the Pademba Road "maximum security " prisons and releasing all the prisoners. With such a record can the Government ensure security for all during the trials ? Even more significantly, there are signs that the Government may not have much confidence at the moment in its own judicial system. In this regard, there is an imminent trial of a very senior judge accused of accepting a bribe from an accused and influencing his judgment on the latter’s behalf in a recent case of fraud. It would appear therefore that the trial of Sankoh is like a hot potato that the Government would prefer to pass on.

Personally, I think killing Sankoh would be a coward’s option and certainly not a solution. I prefer a fair trial for crimes against humanity in a safe and secure environment because I consider that no opportunity for the Sierra Leone story to be told to the world should be missed. The relative impartiality assured by such an option shall clear the way for the hidden truths about this war to come out and shall also provide, for the benefit of human history, a glimpse of the depths of bestiality and absurdity to which our species can descend when the social contract is broken and bad governance leads to the emergence of despots and the collapse of the State.

Furthermore, the Government will have to decide on who to try and who not to try. Among the nearly one hundred "RUF people" arrested pending trial for treason as a result of the May incident there were cooks, drivers, nurses and secretaries working at Sankoh’s residence at a time when the organisation was recognized by the law of the land. A proper selection of the leaders to be tried will have to be made so that the whole situation does not decline into the ridiculous.

There is also the problem of identifying a new leadership within the RUF since it seems as though a consensus has been reached by all parties to exclude Foday Sankoh from further negotiations on the grounds of lack of credibility. There needs to be an interlocutor from the RUF and one should not make the mistake of assuming this organisation dead because of the demise of Sankoh. Behind the crowd of disoriented, violent and dangerous young combatants in the bush lurks a whole community of supporters at home and abroad, many of whom prefer anonymity, flung together by a variety of motivations and using the RUF as an opportunity to achieve their various objectives. The problem is that for most of its life the RUF has been dominated not by its political membership but rather and necessarily by a military wing (headed by Sankoh himself) which is not so versed in the finer things of democracy and political discourse. It is not difficult to understand why the dominant military men and women in the organisation could not at harvest time surrender the centre stage to their political supporters who, apart from a few exceptions, had always preferred not to be openly identified with the terror machine that the RUF had become. This problem was obvious in the discomfiture of the group when nominations had to be made to ministerial and other positions and they brought in young and not-so-lettered fighting men whose elevation turned out in some cases to be an embarrassment to the nominees themselves. Therefore, finding a new and credible leadership that will command the respect and represent the interests of combatants as well as the other RUF members may not be a simple matter but it is absolutely vital to the continuation of the peace process.

One major development that crowned the events of May was the return from grass to grace or to some form of public acceptability of AFRC/ SLA soldiers who had been much in disrepute since the 1997 junta days and more especially because of the role some of them played in the January 1999 invasion of Freetown. Hailed now for their effort in chasing the RUF from Sankoh’s residence in Freetown, these former junta soldiers were rushed to the battlefield ,this time to fight against their junta RUF allies on the side of the same Government they had ousted in 1997. The question now is : does this twist of fate signify the natural end of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) ? The answer is not so simple as was illustrated by the defiant and spirited reaction at a CCP seminar held last month of some members of the AFRC, all civilians, who in 1997 worked or associated with the junta in one way or the other and are now demanding recognition and inclusion in any peace deal to be brokered. The AFRC, if it should be brought into future negotiations in its own right, must be seen as being composed of not only soldiers but also civilians, some of them disgruntled for one reason or the other. This brings me to the question of the West Side Jungle boys who I understand have been forced by UNAMSIL to change their address recently.

Much has been said about this extremely colourful but dangerous group. Close contact with them has revealed that there are less soldiers and more civilians among them, the latter (named "Junta II")comprising many elements with a criminal past. In fact quite a few of them were serving terms for crimes when they were released by the rebels who stormed Pademba Road prisons in January 1999. These West Side boys therefore comprise people with very little to lose and much to be afraid of within communities where not so long ago they were committing some of the worst atrocities ever recorded in human history. Even though most of them will claim that their leader is Johnny Paul Koroma, the true loyalty of these combatants must be found elsewhere, in those commanders with whom they have had a long and uninterrupted bush experience at a time when Koroma was being held hostage by the RUF in Kailahun. These commanders who carry very interesting and revealing aliases such as Brigadier 555, Gullit and Bomblast ! are in fact among those who in 1997 actually seized power, freed Koroma from prison, made him their leader and went on to take the title of "Honourables". This act of valour, as it is seen in their circles, makes them wield tremendous power over their boys who consider it unfair that their "honourables", unlike Johnny Paul Koroma, have not been given a piece of the Lome cake. The solution of the West Side problem will therefore depend on the capacity of Government to dislodge them from their bases, undermine the control over them of the Honourables and separate the soldiers from the civilians.

At the heart of the Lome Peace Agreement was the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (DDR). In reality, it was intended among other things to attract combatants from all factions to designated disarmament and demobilisation centres where they would voluntarily disarm and receive necessary counselling and reorientation before receiving reintegration packages. The whole programme has been condemned for not laying emphasis on the reintegration aspect which should provide sufficiently attractive packages and therefore good reasons for the fighters to leave the bush and opt for peace. Other problems with the DDR that have been indicated elsewhere include the failed "money for guns" initiative, its highly centralized structure and logistics extravaganza, and the exclusion from the whole process of potentially useful partners such as Chiefs and the local faction commanders. Today, some of the camps have been destroyed and the whole DDR programme is being reviewed but there are certain implications inherent in the resumption of hostilities. For instance, in the absence of a ceasefire, what would the DDR be calling for : disarmament or surrender ? Will the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) or local militiamen be disarmed as well at a time when they are supposed to be providing support to the advancing Government forces ? These questions need to be answered before any revised DDR programme can be meaningfully implemented.

Much speculation is going on about whether or not, given the present circumstances, the next Presidential and Parliamentary elections provided for in the Constitution will be held at the prescribed date : i.e February 2001. This is a very tricky deadline because even though the provisions of the Constitution must be respected, it is hard to imagine how truly democratic elections can be held with so many refugees and displaced persons away from home and guns still firing in some parts of the country. However, whenever politicians have towed the line of postponement of the elections they have been regarded with a great deal of suspicion in some quarters as wanting to prolong their stay in office. It is believed that Parliamentarians in this Parliament who benefited from the Proportional Representation System do not now want to face the daunting prospect of campaigning directly to electors within the Constituency system. In fact, one view that is presently being bandied about and that seems to be gaining some ground much to the irritation of some Government officials and Parliamentarians is that there is need for a crisis interim Government of National Unity to be appointed at the expiration of the mandate of the present Government. Those who support this view see it as the only way in which the country can shelve pointless partisan differences and really focus on reconstruction (or renaissance?) using the best human resources available. Attractive though this idea may be the question here is: which legitimate authority can appoint such a Government and on the basis of which criteria? How can such a Government which is not rooted in the Constitution lay any claims to democracy? These problems of legitimacy, selection process and the democratic character of the proposed interim Government need to be resolved before any serious consideration can be given to this option.

You may want to ask that with all these problems I have just highlighted how can we still be talking about Lome. In this regard, it is significant that in the consultations held among civil society groups and others at the CCP seminar on the Agreement a consensus was reached that "the Agreement was valid and that it presented a good framework for the pursuit of peace, although some of its provisions needed a review particularly those relating to the RUF’s political status, Foday Sankoh’s leadership of the RUF and his chairmanship of the Strategic Minerals Resources Commission." Another important feature of this seminar was the insistence by all the various groups represented that, provided it disbanded its armed wing, the RUF should be given all encouragement to operate as a political party.

It is therefore evident that the people of Sierra Leone would go a long way as they have always done to obtain true and lasting peace. This can only happen within the sort of framework that Lome provides. The immense scope of this agreement is unfortunately too often narrowed down into a kind of Government / RUF dispute which when settled will bring peace to the homes of Sierra Leoneans. Lome is far more than that. Its beneficiaries are not only ex-combatants but also victims of war, in fact, the whole population of the country, because it encompasses disarmament and demobilisation issues as well as and most significantly post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation matters. It seems to me as if we have concentrated on the nitty-gritty details of human rights, disarmament and immediate security at the expense of clear and attractive reconstruction and rehabilitation packages that would guarantee some level of post-war security for Sierra Leoneans in general. Let me take the liberty of making what may be regarded by some of you as a shocking statement : a nation-wide and rural-based scheme comprising mass job creation opportunities such as homes reconstruction by building brigades, hospital and school furniture production, rural roads construction and rehabilitation, animal husbandry, boats construction and water transport, is more likely to attract the interest of ordinary Sierra Leoneans now than even the trial of Foday Sankoh. When simple development initiatives are ignited in various parts of the country in this way it sends signals to those stuck in the bush that a peaceful Sierra Leone has something to offer them too, and creates a favourable condition for true demobilisation and reintegration. It is in this light that I see the focus of a new and revitalized DDR programme.

Perhaps, in our future actions we may need to give more consideration to certain articles of the Lome Agreement that have been receiving more or less second or third-class treatment to date : ex. Art. 21 Release of Prisoners and Abductees ; Art. 22 Refugees and Displaced persons ; Art. 23 Guarantee of the Security of Displaced persons and Refugees ; Art. 28 Post-war Rehabilitation and Reconstruction ; Art. 29 Special Fund for War Victims ; Art 31 Education and Health.

By these few comments, I am suggesting that although the present circumstances make it impossible to follow Lome to the letter, at least the spirit must not be killed. Even with the exit of Sankoh there remains a document that embodies the hope of millions if respected and which in essence addresses major issues that are at the bottom of the conflict in Sierra Leone.

After nine years in hell I believe Sierra Leoneans now understand that peace has no substitute and that, trapped within this war that has assumed the absurd character and breakneck progress of a runaway train, they need to stop the madness. For the benefit of those friends who have been and are still helping us to get out of this mess, let me emphasize that for many reasons there is a need for sustained support and encouragement to be given to organizations or agencies such as the CCP that are trying to keep the peace option open.

One must not forget that the reason why the conflict has become difficult to handle over the years is because it has grown in complexity and become something of a family war. For instance, there is a kinship say between the RUF rebel and the Kamajor militiaman that is reflected not only in their brutal methods of operation but also in their common background of general social and economic deprivation. It is has even been reported that in some areas Kamajor and RUF have been mining for diamonds peacefully together.

Furthermore there is hardly a family left in Sierra Leone whose membership does not include perpetrators as well as victims of the war. It is against this background that the widespread secret civilian collaboration with the rebels can be understood. Wives, girlfriends, brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles and friends of RUF or AFRC combatants find it difficult or even impossible to disown their rebellious relations, a fact which is easy to understand within the African context where blood is certainly thicker than water. A clear illustration of this fact is that after the May incidents, some RUF officials took refuge and may still be "in custody" at the residences of relatives who hold very high positions in Government and the army.

The rebellion has also provided room for all types of dissatisfaction and grievances. It has absorbed the energies of a neglected and extremely violent youth population which during its long period of enforced idleness had been taking regular doses of Rambo, Schwarzenneger and Jackie Chan. The war has been the theatre for the resolution by violent means of clan, village or chiefdom conflicts. It has also been the commercial centre par excellence for trading by faction members ( including very senior ones ) in smuggled diamonds, looted properties, drugs, guns and "inside information". In short, the war is now a mess and only peace can save us.

Therefore, let Lome live so that peace and democracy can prevail. You will have noticed that in conformity with the Lome Agreement my understanding of peace goes beyond the signing of cease-fire or other agreements to encompass the setting up of solid and secure socio-economic structures in post-war Sierra Leone as a factor of security. It is also essential for sustaining democracy. I believe that if Sierra Leone is receiving so much support and assistance today from the International Community it is not because of any particular person, group or Government but because of the extraordinary courage and resilience of its people who in 1996 dared the flying bullets and stood up in long queues to vote for democracy against military dictatorship. It is in honour of a people who in a very historical experience of mass civil disobedience suffered hunger, death and humiliation for nine long months when they withheld their labour in 1997 from the AFRC junta. It is out of respect for the nineteen bodies that lay in the coffins at the National Stadium following the massacre of peace demonstrators on the 8th of May 2000. However, for democracy to be sustained certain basic socio-economic conditions must be assured. A jobless and hungry people do not vote on issues, they sell votes to the craftiest villain who bids the highest. This has happened before and here we are today.

If peace must prevail therefore , there is a role that the CCP can play to bring about true and lasting peace. But at this point let me clarify a few things about the CCP. Its mandate, guaranteed under Article VI of the Lome Peace Agreement and ratified by Parliament, is " to implement a post-conflict programme that ensures reconciliation and the welfare of all parties to the conflict ". It is also responsible for " supervising and monitoring the implementation of and compliance with the provisions of the Agreement relative to the promotion of national reconciliation and the consolidation of peace." It is also our responsibility to " ensure that all structures (such as Commissions) provided for in the Agreement are operational and given the necessary resources for realizing their respective mandates."

By its mandate and composition ( i.e. including members of the RUF, AFRC, Government, Parliament and Civil Society) the CCP cannot be a Government instrument or be manipulated by any one of the conflicting parties. On the other hand, even though it is called upon by virtue of its mandate to do exercises in peace building and sensitization it should not be considered to be an N.G.O. It was created by two parties locked in conflict as one of those structures in which they invested confidence and trust to guide them towards a solution that would address all their concerns. The CCP knows when its life will end ; at the end of the next elections.

In the light of the foregoing, the CCP has now committed itself to a programme that will involve support to the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) in terms of sensitization of combatants, National Reconciliation that should take on board family, relatives, close friends and collaborators of the rebels as well as of the victims, Protection and guarantee for the security of victims, Sensitization and proposals on how to address fundamental issues and root causes of this conflict such as marginalization of youths, unresolved local conflicts, oppressive system of justice at local level, impunity at the top level. The CCP shall permanently keep the attention of all the parties rivetted on the micro-problems whose potential for destruction is too often under-estimated but which very often provide fuel for the circulation of the bigger conflict all over the country.

In conclusion, let me say that Sierra Leone is one of the most beautiful countries in the world and it has a potential to bounce back to life that can only be realized if the conflict is assessed and understood without bias. Let us have the courage not only to condemn atrocities say of the RUF but also to criticize incorrect decisions or positions even when they are made or taken by the legitimate Government. An objective view of the situation reveals that in the final analysis peace is the only way out. Peace does not mean here the signing of a document or disarmament in camps alone but the courage to address the deeper issues that enabled this war to spread in the first place. Those in the bush can only really want to come out if they see their colleagues in the city engaged in stimulating and rewarding pursuits. It is in this soil of concrete, stimulating and clearly rewarding sub-projects that a more pro-active DDR must bury its roots. The people of Sierra Leone must be commended. Their experience in the past nine years has been a descent into the inferno that still has not shaken their courage to go on. They are simply waiting for all parties and sympathizers to give them that peace and stability they need to show who they really are. This is why I say that Lome is not really dead.

Thank you all for listening to me.

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