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Limits and Possibilities for Civil Society Led Re-democratization:
The Fijian Constitutional Debates and Dilemma
by Satendra Prasad ,* 1996
Summary
This paper examines the many facets of Fiji’s current political and constitutional
crises. It argues that Fiji’s race-based political system has retarded
efforts to resolve these complex problems; arguing in favour of civil society
initiatives instead. The paper examines the experiences of the Citizens Constitutional
Forum in promoting a people-based process aimed at advancing the prospects for
a sustainable settlement to Fiji’s constitutional crisis. It also assesses
the prospects for and constraints upon such civil society initiatives in promoting
redemocratization and demilitarization in an ethnically divided society.
Introduction
Fiji’s political crises beginning with the military coups of 1987, the
subsequent rise of ethno-nationalism and the emergence of a highly racialised
and undemocratic constitution in 1990 provides a unique setting for the study
of the role of civil society in redemocratization in the contemporary era. Fiji's
political institutions rooted in a history of racial exclusivity inhibited the
development of ‘democratic-spaces’ required for a resolution of the
serious political and constitutional problems that Fiji faces; harming in turn
the autonomy of civic institutions, their democratic potential and Fiji economic
development prospects.
Given such failures and its long history of racial separateness, citizens groups
need to take up the challenge of re-democratization and demilitarization in
fresh and creative ways. This is not easy in a country torn by racial strife
and division. It is also difficult for many existing civic institutions and
associations to create the spaces in which a redemocratization agenda that is
at odds with the interests of the post-1987 state can be articulated. How can
civil society create conditions favourable for re-democratization in Fiji in
the face of such constraints?
This paper overviews one civic initiative. In examining the experience of the
Citizens Constitutional Forum (CCF), the constraints, limitations and potential
of civic initiatives are assessed. In particular, the paper examines the ways
in which civic groups can affect a progressive review of the highly divisive
and racialistic 1990 Constitution and enhance the sustainability of constitutional
settlements. It throws light on new approaches aimed at de-racialising electoral
politics in multiethnic formations and strengthening human rights and the rule
of law. Moreover, it examines ways of ensuring that civil society can more vigorously
defend encroachments upon the democratic processes in future not only through
constitutional provisions but through practical and non-constitutional measures.
Lessons from other parts of the world including South Africa were drawn upon
and assessed by the CCF in its consultations. Its many recommendations have
attracted the serious attention of power holders in Fiji and indeed by the wider
international community interested in aiding Fiji’s re-democratization.
However, its central contribution has been in providing a social, political
and constitutional agenda for consideration by civic institutions such as trade
unions, women's interest groups, churches and religious bodies among others
during this phase of the review of the controversial 1990 Constitution. By continuing
to play such a role, such an initiative may provide an alternative way of formulating
both a national political agenda and ensuring popular support for it.
Given Fiji's history of ethnic compartmentalization, reflected in a profoundly
"ethnicised" party political setup and associated communalization
of electoral and parliamentary politics, the prospects for such an initiative
and approach are phenomenal, and the constraints commensurate.
In arguing for a people-driven approach to political change, the paper concludes
that democratization and demilitarization can be sustainably anchored within
wider civil society when political institutions are constantly engaged and challenged
in a highly informed, rather than a polemical manner by civic institutions.
The CCF provides space for engagement between a diverse civil society and highly
differentiated and divided political institutions.
An overview of Fiji’s political and constitutional problems
Fiji is a multiethnic state, comprising of two dominant groups, indigenous Fijians
and Indo-Fijians with a smaller proportion of Chinese, Part-Europeans, and Pacific
Islanders among others. It was colonized by Britain in 1874 and gained its independence
in 1970. Colonial requirements for large scale and continuous supply of labour
resulted in the import of some 75,000 Indians from colonial India between 1879
and 1918 under the infamous indenture system. As a result of such a labour policy,
indigenous Fijians were largely confined to the traditional sectors of the colonial
economy, although a small proportion did enter the wage-employment sector in
mining and copra industries as well as through recruitment in the colonial military
and police services. Indo-Fijians were largely engaged by the sugar industry
initially as plantation and mill workers but later as smallholder tenant farmers.
This created a unique multiethnic society, in which by the time of independence,
Fiji’s population came to be roughly equally comprising indigenous Fijians
and Indo-Fijians. Moreover, the colonial political economy created an ethnically
segmented labour market, restricting the space for inter-ethnic interaction
and the emergence of multiethnic civic groups and institutions.
Decolonization began in earnest in early 1960's and was mainly pressed by the
National Federation Party (NFP); which had its origins in the economic struggles
by Indo-Fijian tenant sugar farmers who bore the brunt of colonial exploitation
mainly by the sugar monopoly, the Colonial Sugar Refinery (CSR). Largely in
response to the party-politicisation of Indo-Fijian tenant farmers and CSR workers,
the Alliance Party was set up as an elitist and mainly chiefly indigenous-Fijian
party-political counterweight. It later developed a multiethnic structure that
sought to bring together Indigenous Fijians, Indo-Fijians and other communities.
However, the dominance of the Alliance by Fijian chiefs whom the British had
groomed for high offices following independence remained persistent. Behind
it lay the unflinching support of Fijian traditional institutions such as the
Council of Chiefs, and European and Part-European business houses that had mushroomed
in the protective colonial era. The Alliance Party reflected a continuation
of a paternalistic solidarity between European capital and the Fijian chiefly
oligarchy through which the colonial state had secured and sustained its hegemony.
Capitalizing on this arrangement, and its largely superficial cross-ethnic appeal,
the Alliance Party won successive elections in 1972, 1977 and 1982 (with the
exception of early 1977 when a hung parliament and the failure of opposition
NFP to form government led to a fresh elections).
What evolved out of these elections and indeed the policies of the ruling party
were a deeply racialised system of party and electoral politics, where the Alliance
and hence government came to be closely associated with indigenous Fijians and
the NFP which formed the opposition came to be associated with what came to
be viewed as largely Indo-Fijian interests. An electoral system that entrenched
communalism at one level only reinforced this tendency and made a near mockery
of the provisions for cross-ethnic electoral mechanisms within an electoral
system dominated by ethnically compartmentalized voting structures.
The post-colonial economic system readily engendered ethnic compartmentalization
and the subsequent racialization of party politics. Indo-Fijians continued to
dominate sugar farming and sugar industry workforces in the post-independence
era inspite of the fact that the Colonial Sugar Refinery had been nationalized
in 1973. Indigenous-Fijians continued to dominate gold mining and copra production
which were located in specific regions. As the Alliance constituted government
and the seat of parliament lay in Suva, Fijians numerically dominated Suva on
the backs of preferential employment policies in the public sector and the state
dominated commercial sectors, while the sugar towns in the West were dominated
by Indo-Fijians. Fijian employees dominated industries such as gold and fish
canning leading. Subsequently the spaces where ethnic groups interacted were
few and far between. Ethnic patronage also ensured that cross-ethnic interaction
in gradually integrating workplaces was discouraged.
Such a history of separateness restricted the capacity of civic institutions
such as trade unions to reverse a tide of authoritarianism that was gradually
evolving in the early 1980's when Fiji's economic growth slowed down and the
euphoria of independence had begun to wane. By the early 1980's, Fiji had become
very communalised and communalism was beginning to be popularly accepted almost
as a fact of life in multiethnic setting.
In response to a rapidly deteriorating communal climate, and the demise of corporatism
through which the party political potential of trade unions had been capped,
the urban industrial and public sector workforce led the momentum to establish
the Fiji Labour Party (FLP). The FLP was set up in 1985 as a multiracial political
party aimed at reversing the increasingly right-wing policies of the Alliance
government. Tagged to this goal was its commitment to carve a genuine multiracial
electoral niche through which it could establish its parliamentary strength.
Naturally, its support was somewhat narrowly concentrated in the multiracial
workforce in urban regions. Its popularity grew rapidly as unions and workers
began to feel the effects of austerity measures imposed by the Alliance Government
from the early 1980's.
In one of the most spectacular rise of new political parties anywhere, the FLP
in a coalition with the NFP was swept to power only two years later in April
1987. The trade union movement provided its core of leaders. A highly populist
government, it set about implementing its elaborate social policy platform fairly
rapidly and in its first two weeks in office had introduced free health care
services and enhanced the range of state support to pensioners and the elderly
and initiated progressive reforms in a number of other areas.
However, as this was the first electoral defeat of the Alliance Party since
independence, the Labour victory also threatened a senior bureaucracy that had
benefited from decades of patronage. It also brought to an end the Ministerial
careers of many prominent politicians. Such narrow self interests formed the
initial backdrop to a destabilization campaign which quietly grew in momentum
and had rapidly begun to be projected and couched in racialised terms as a challenge
to the 'paramountcy of indigenous Fijians' in their own land.
Fiji Labour Party’s decidedly anti-nuclear policy followed on the heels
of the New Zealand’s nuclear free declaration which deeply upset American
and Western military interests. Such developments generated considerable anxieties
in the international environment where reports of a “left-wing takeover”
had gained currency even prior to the elections.
In this context then, on 14 May, 1987 a third ranking officer in the military,
Lt.Col. Rabuka seized government members of the parliament and declared military
rule. While the military in Fiji had been largely dominated by ethnic-Fijians,
the coup failed to attract an overwhelming support within the military initially.
Such a support was only ensured through a systematic "cleansing" within
the military whereby those not in support of its political intervention were
marginalized or silenced.
This was followed by a systematic and vigorous effort to reconstruct a politics
of race, based on claims of paramountcy of indigenous rights, combined with
lethal doses of Christian nationalism, militarism, and traditionalism as basis
for a permanent indigenous Fijian government. What emerged subsequently was
a highly divided society, deeply scarred by the wounds of ethno-nationalism
and a severe economic morass requiring a full-blown structural adjustment programme.
It is in this broader economic and historical context that the debate on re-democratization
in Fiji needs to be conceptualized and understood.
At the heart of Fiji's post 1987 problems lies its military whose role until
that time was largely obscured by the parliamentary dominance of the Alliance
Party which drew bulk of its electoral from indigenous Fijians. At the same
time, prominent high chiefs had continued to play important national leadership
roles through the Alliance Party ever since independence; giving an image of
an indigenous-Fijian controlled government. Thus, the military coups were projected
as an effort to preserve such a system of government.
Historical and contemporary dimensions of militarization
Fiji's militarization can be properly understood when located in both its historical
and global contexts.
The indigenous Fijian nature of the military has its origins in the colonial
era. Indigenous Fijians were initially recruited into a “native constabulary”
to crush rebellion against colonial rule by “native tribes”. Indo-Fijian
opposition to discriminatory pay scales in the British forces during the second
world war resulted in their exclusion from the colonial forces. During this
period indigenous Fijians were recruited in large numbers largely through their
chiefs who held important positions within the colonial state bureaucracy. Moreover,
Fiji’s military involvement in anti-communist campaigns during the Malaysian
insurgency gave it an important ideological posturing. Finally, during the colonial
era, the military provided an important recruiting and training ground for both
chiefs and commoner indigenous Fijians who were to play important administrative
and leadership roles in the post-independence period. By the time of independence,
its loyalty to the colonial state and the elite structure that it engendered
had already been well established.
However, the large scale expansion of Fiji's military began only in 1977 with
the commencement of Fiji's participation in US led peace keeping missions in
the Sinai peninsular. This provided an opportunity for recruitment, improved
training and a practical international exposure for a military that since independence
had played a largely symbolic role. An overt recruitment campaign ensured that
Fiji's military came to be dominated by indigenous Fijians. Senior appointments,
moreover, were closely allied to Fiji's ruling political elite.
Heightened Soviet presence in the region in early 1980's provided the justification
for increased support to the military via the US rather than Fiji’s traditional
partners in the Commonwealth. Because it saw active duty abroad continuously
between 1977 and 1987, the military was shielded from other developments in
Fiji. Rotating overseas service under United Nations pay scales ensured that
officers were shielded from pressures of pay increases. It was this structure
that Rabuka mobilized to contain the multiracial and Labour-led challenge to
Alliance’s hegemony in 1987. An ethnicist and traditionalist military also
provided a fertile ground for a Christian, ethno-nationalist, conservative and
racialist ideology upon which the post coup regimes were to be legitimated.
Following the coups, Fiji's military developed new alliances. Firstly, France,
which was isolated in the region for it’s nuclear and colonial roles moved
in to provide crucial support to the military. This helped mute Fiji’s
opposition to French rule in the region and deeply hurt the international case
of struggling groups in Kanaky and French Polynesia. A two-China card was also
played briefly to extract favours from both sides. Links with Israel were further
strengthened as were those with Malaysia and South Korea. These countries shielded
Fiji from its isolation in the international community.
It is important to recognize that Fiji's coups were not a classic case of miliary
takeovers as the Military Government had effectively restored the ruling Alliance
Party to power by December 1987, when Lt. Colonel Rabuka returned to the barracks,
giving political control to the previous Prime Minister, Ratu Mara.
Fiji’s post coup military expansion not only saw an expansion of its indigenous
Fijian composition overall, but a far greater proportion of new recruits were
drawn from provinces where support for the coups was most intense. This included
Cakaudrove, the home province of Rabuka. Moreover, many military officers were
promoted to crucial public service jobs and recruited by the police forces ensuring
its broadened presence across the state bureaucracy.
Constitutional basis for ethno-nationalism
The challenge for the new post-coup regime was to find a constitutional legitimacy
for its rule particularly in the wake of massive international pressure, temporary
trade boycotts and the complete opposition withdrawal from the political process
internally.
In 1990, a new constitution was promulgated unilaterally by the "Interim
Administration". Several features are commented upon here. It completed
the racial compartmentalization of the parliamentary system by providing that
future elections were held only under separate ethnic constituencies; making
redundant the need for multiracial parties and multiracial electoral politics
more generally. It guaranteed a Fijian majority in the parliament and the senate
(upper house). It gave an unelected Council of Chiefs the right to appoint a
president with wide powers and to appoint a majority of members to the senate.
Moreover, it reserved the offices of prime minister, president, and senior most
positions in the public service for ethnic Fijians. It gave the military a special
constitutional window through which it could play a direct political role should
it so desire.
The 1990 constitution has been widely condemned as racialistic, undemocratic,
feudalistic and divisive. Two elections following its promulgation have only
worsened the levels of communalization. A severe economic downturn has also
aided the further militarization as the Fijian government finds it to be one
of the few avenues through which to provide employment for an important segment
of its support constituency.
Moreover, the constitution enables breaches of individual and collective human
rights. Such provisions have been used to curtail opposition to government,
cripple trade unions and also cap the democratic potential of civic institutions.
The current views of the main parties on the 1990 constitution and the case
for (or against) its review is contained in their submissions to the Constitutional
Review Committee (CRC) set up by the President in 1995. The CRC is expected
to make its report on a review of the 1990 constitution to the President by
September 1996. While the 1990 constitution is being reviewed on its own terms,
civic institutions such as the Citizens Constitutional Forum (CCF) have recognized
their historic role in enabling and helping create conditions favourable to
a progressive review of the 1990 constitution and have lent almost unconditional
support to this official process underway.
The current economic context
There is a strong association between continued authoritarianism, the political
marginalization of the Indo-Fijian community and the dismal economic performance
of Fiji since 1987. Firstly, Fiji’s racialised system of government has
created acute anxieties not only among Indo-Fijian investors who have held back
investments or simply moved their capital offshore, but also among increasingly
"footloose" foreign investors. Fiji's search for investors in Asia
has borne few fruits as low returns on investment are hardly offset by the generous
incentives offered under the tax-free system. While the massive 12 percent decline
in GDP in 1987 had been reversed by 1990, most of the gains made since independence
were eroded within a space of five years since. Only two employment growth sectors
have emerged since 1987. First are the export processing factories mainly targeted
at the garment and textile sectors where some 8,000 new jobs have been created
since 1988. Second has been the military which now faces acute pressures as
a result of budgetary cuts. Fiji's economic woes have been aggravated by the
scandalous experiences of the Government owned Fiji National Bank which has
accumulated bad debts in excess of $US180 million by the end of 1995.
In response to the economic downturn, Fiji was forced to adopt a stabilization
and structural adjustment policy package aimed at economic liberalization in
1988. The initial stabilization measures included a devaluation of the Fiji
dollar by 33 percent in 1987, a freeze on public sector investments and recruitment,
wage cuts and curtailment of the free collective bargaining rights of trade
unions.
A World Bank imposed structural adjustment programme (SAP) commits Fiji to privatization,
tax reforms, removal of subsidies, reduction in tariffs and withdrawal of licence
protection, severe cut backs in public sector expenditure in areas such as health,
education and social services, and labour market reforms. Labour market deregulation
and reforms were aimed at lowering prevailing wage levels and crippling trade
unions. Moreover, the structural adjustment programme (SAP) was imposed in a
context of authoritarianism when the parliament had ceased to function and when
the severe restrictions were in place upon the media, trade unions and non-governmental
pressure groups more generally.
The net impact of economic restructuring is severe and varied. Real wages declined
sharply by more than 20 percent in a space of four years only and unemployment
expanded rapidly. Formerly protected agricultural sectors such as rice and dairy,
which provided scarce cash incomes opportunities in some rural areas, and import
substitution manufacturing sectors were severely undermined as they were opened
to international competition. Such an economic morass has further contributed
to high levels of skilled and professional emigration from Fiji; creating in
turn significant gaps in the labour market.
World Bank and the UNDP studies have noted the deterioration in many indicators
of social development. A UNDP study also concluded that 23 percent of all households
fell under the poverty line in 1994. While the short term sharp downturns were
arrested mainly on account of recovery in sugar, tourism, and the tax-free Export
sector, Fiji's economy has largely remained static.
A generous system of incentives has attracted investors to set up mainly garment
factories in Fiji but both the incentives and preferential access to Australasian
and US markets for tax-free products run out in less than a decade. This has,
however, compensated 3000 manufacturing sector jobs lost due to deregulation.
Moreover, the livelihood of some 7 - 9,500 households are severely threatened
as a result of the gradual demise of rice and dairy industry. Incomes from the
mainstay, sugar have declined in real terms despite the generous markets in
Britain and real incomes remain frozen at near 1975 levels. While statistical
unemployment hovers around 6 percent, real unemployment and serious underemployment
is in excess of 25 percent. Youth unemployment is as high as 30 percent in key
urban areas. One in three families now live under the official poverty line.
One in two of Fiji’s 23,000 sugar farmers produces less than 150 tons of
cane, which combined with their subsistence products gives a rural cash income
that is equivalent to the rural poverty line. There has been more than 300 percent
increase in recipients of family assistance allowance between 1989 and 1994.
Unless these serious problems are contained, any constitutional settlement can
be undermined. Conversely, unless constitutional settlements are reached on
issues that have divided the nation, it may be difficult for any government
to marshall the national resources and will to generate a phase of accelerated
economic growth.
By the end of 1995, Fiji's leaders had belatedly come to recognize that regardless
of the economic policy regime, economic growth depended first and foremost upon
political stability which required a reasonable resolution of the constitutional
crisis. The World Bank also gave such a notice in its 1995 assessment of the
Fijian economy.
Indo-Fijians continue to feel alienated and marginalized and look for opportunities
overseas. It is estimated that more than 70,000 Fiji citizens emigrated between
1987 and the end of 1995; the vast majority being Indo-Fijians. This level of
emigration has denied the country investment and commitment from its more qualified,
professional and skilled citizens who are more mobile in the global labour market.
Investment remains depressingly low, hovering between 5 to 7 percent of GDP
over the period 1991 and 1995: this generally being the surest indicator of
Fiji’s economic ill-health. Given such low levels of investment overall
and even lower levels of public sector investment (averaging around 3 percent)
had resulted in a sharp deterioration in the level and quality of public services.
In 1995, more than 14,000 young people entered the labour market where less
than 1000 (mainly manufacturing sector) jobs were available at best. One job
for every fourteen labour market entrants is a panacea for social instability,
particularly given that unemployment among young persons in urban areas is already
as high as 40 percent.
These factors stress the urgency of resolving Fiji's political crisis because
it continues to seriously retard its social and economic potential. So long
as the national political agenda continues to be shaped by ethnically based
political parties pursing narrow electoral advantage, the possibilities for
this will remain limited.
The Citizen's Constitutional Forum (CCF) has made a modest effort to move in
this direction. Its advances the view a new constitution must enable Fiji to
deal with these difficult economic issues because social unrest can undermine
even the best crafted political compromises. It is to this initiative that attention
is now turned.
Civil society and redemocratization
The Citizen's Constitutional Forum's (CCF's) work challenges much of the conventional
thinking on the role of civil society in democratization not only in Fiji but
more generally. It is often assumed that civic institutions act as a natural
counterweight to the powers of the state and have vested interests in democratic
developments because that is how their autonomy is secured. In the same manner
it is assumed that civic society will almost naturally evolve as a force for
democratization when democracy is threatened or undermined.
From the start of the formal process of the review of the 1990 Constitution
in late 1993, the CCF has sought to set the parameters of the national constitutional
discussion and suggest signposts for public discussions on the review of the
constitution and engage civic institutions in that process.
Fiji's history of racial separateness has not only communalized its political
institutions but also its civic institutions. The problems that arise out of
such a history were acutely aggravated by the military coups of 1987. That is
why the sum total of Fiji's problems is more than simply a return to democratic
government through a democratic constitution. In such a complex situation active
steps are required to reverse a tide of communalism which requires the mobilization
of the civic rather than the state sector institutions.
However, civic institutions have generally tended to reflect the same divisions
that have come to characterize the political system. So, for example, there
were trade union leaders even at the height of the coups who were wholly supportive
of the coups and their professed aims. There were groups within civil society
that in a patterned manner fell on one or the other main sides in the aftermath
of the coups.
At the same time it is far too simplistic to say that there are only two sides.
To straightjacket all shades of opinion into two blocs are to deny that differentiations
exist in Fiji as indeed in all other societies. Besides the overwhelming identification
with race, people have numerous other basis for their political and social associations.
These include gender, rural versus urban differences, landowner and tenant interests
among others. Even within the indigenous Fijian and Indo-Fijian categories there
are diverse groups. For example the Indo-Fijian category comprises Hindu, Muslim,
Christian religious associations as well as Sikh, North, South Indian, Gujarati
and other linguistic/cultural groupings. At the other end, the Fijian community
comprises a number of linguistic and traditional groups with widespread social
and cultural differentiations. By locking them all into two main ethno-political
ideologies, incalcuble harm is done to nature of democracy.
The quality of parliamentary debates in recent times amply demonstrates the
consequences of Fiji's racial preoccupation. In such debates important national
policy considerations are reduced to some form or the other of racial bargaining.
This distorts the capability of national institutions to deal with what clearly
are national, rather than ethnic/racial issues.
In this regard the CCF has helped create an alternative and people-based space
where Fiji's diverse civic institutions can participate in discussions about
problems that its faced and explore ways of dealing with them. Such a space
also facilitates a modest level of direct interaction between civic institutions
and the race-based party political system so that the diversity of opinions
and interests are given expression. Consequently, the CCF helps subvert the
predominant politics of race to the larger national interests. More important,
however, such a space also provides citizens with an opportunity to discuss
political issues without the overbearing influence of race-centred and based
political parties enabling consequently a slight erosion of the monopoly of
political parties over the political and constitutional discourse.
Being an open forum rather than a structured organization has enabled it to
continue to project a national agenda and a national point of view in relation
to critical constitutional and political issues. In ethnically torn societies
forums that are open to all communities and where informed debate and discussion
can take place on even the most sacred of political issues are exceptions rather
than the norm. Clearly, the CCF has had no parallel since Fiji’s independence.
The CCF is best conceived as a people-based space that exists in the face of
a history of racial separateness. It also provides a vehicle for building consensuses
progressively without subjecting individuals to defending what are widely regarded
as entrenched ethnic positions. In this regard, it has a unique place in Fiji's
modern history.
The crucial issue of land illustrates how national issues become subverted to
ethnic bargaining. In political forums, land is projected almost entirely as
an indigenous Fijian landowner and Indo-Fijian tenant issue. This results in
a racialised construction of the land discourse and the institutional structures
for dealing with complex land lease and rental issues are inevitably tied to
accepted notions of state power.
In spite of such a representation, more than 30 percent of agricultural tenancies
are held by indigenous Fijians. These leases are also subject to the same rental
assessment formulas and leasehold limits as those by Indo-Fijians. Like their
Indo-Fijian counterparts, many indigenous Fijian tenants also complain about
land rental hikes. At the other end, there are almost 2500 Indo-Fijian sugar
farmers who are tenants on freehold holdings and often under lease arrangements
that are far worse than those under native lands. In these lands, both the landlords
and the tenants are mainly of Indo-Fijian origin. Through its control of state
owned lands, the state is also one of the largest landlords. Agricultural lands
owned by the state are leased under the terms of the same Act, the Agricultural
Landlords and Tenants Agreement (ALTA). Again, the lease of state lands is not
subject to the kinds of ethnic consideration that is so apparent with an indigenous
Fijian landowner and Indo-Fijian tenant situation. Despite such differentiation,
much of the post-independence preoccupation as far as land matters go has been
with the protection and entrenchment of the rights and interests of Fijian landowners
on the one hand and the rights of Indo-Fijian tenants on native lands on the
other. Because both of these inevitably require political bargaining, the politics
of race is reinforced subsequently.
What the CCF provides in contrast to this is a forum where even the most deep
seated problems can be set in their proper national perspective and approaches
developed to deal with matters such as land from that point of view.
In these respects, by shifting the public discussion away from their racial
pedestal, a basis for convergence on some issues can be established and given
for consideration by both the political system, dominated largely by ethnic-based
political parties and civil society much more generally. Because the CCF’s
views and submissions have emerged out of genuine and informed consultations
open to all stakeholders, their validity has not come under much criticism.
While the weight of history lies heavy on the official review process, any review
will falter unless, the focus is shifted decisively away from race. By continuing
to lock constitutional debates into a form of bargaining for race-based privileges,
such a break cannot occur. Accommodations that are negotiated by peak leaders
of racial groupings cannot provide sustainable settlements for two reasons.
Firstly, whenever peak leadership is changed or challenged such accommodations
will stand open to contestation. Secondly, differentiation in opinions within
ethnic groupings have become marked and the influence of ethnic-leaders has
definitely waned.
The CCF approach seeks to anchor constitutional change directly amongst the
people rather than solely amongst political parties and peak political leaders.
This can happen if constitutional discussions largely take place in the public
fora. So that civil society is not disadvantaged when dealing with complex constitutional
and political issues such as alternative electoral systems, civic forums like
the CCF needs to enhance the capability of civic institutions and ordinary citizens
to deal with them through education campaigns. Quite appropriately, this is
a priority high on the CCF agenda.
A civic framework for constitutional discussions
CCF’s first consultation in December 1993 was aimed at establishing an
agenda of national issues. This occurred in the context of the impending approval
by parliament of the Terms of Reference for a review of the 1990 constitution.
This consultation brought together people from government, opposition parties,
church leaders, academics and senior public servants. Clearly, ever since the
military coups, this was the first effort at not only securing a meeting of
such a diverse group of unlike minded persons, but also using that diversity
to reach consensuses on what were the key problems for Fiji from a national
perspective. Ever since the coups, and indeed long prior to that, Fiji’s
problems were largely presented as the balance between political privilege for
Fijians and economic privilege for Indo-Fijians as was the case with land illustrated
above. Heartened by this consultation, an embryonic CCF was to launch a series
of consultations in a similar framework once the review process proper had commenced.
Its first consultation noted that many of Fiji’s problems cut across ethnic
communities more or less equally. An ethnic presentation of these were shown
to have inhibited its ability to even identify the real nature of some of problems.
Moreover the ethnic sketch severely distorted the ways in which ordinary citizens
understood and saw their own country; as largely made up of ethnic enclaves
with different ethnic categories having their own range of unique and specific
problems.
Debate in that first consultation sketched an agenda of national issues that
were to form the basis for CCF consultations between 1995 and 1996. The greater
challenge lay, however in establishing “sufficient consensus” about
the more specific issues that emerged from that agenda. In its approach two
achievements were observed. Firstly, perhaps for the first time in Fiji’s
recent history an effort was made to understand Fiji’s problems from a
proper national perspective. Second, was the recognition that when one adopted
such a point of departure, the whole constitutional and political problems were
immediately presentable in a radically different and fresh manner which in turn
gave the CCF an opportunity to play an enabling role in maintaining an informed
constitutional discourse in the public fora. Obviously, as Fiji’s constitutional
debates become subject to quiet parliamentary committee ‘horsetrading’,
such a role will progressively take a backseat, being displaced in turn by a
more aggressive public education and awareness role. As that stage of the constitution
review is about to be reached in early 1997, the CCF is quite aware of this
dilemma and its implications for its own future role.
Signposting the constitutional discourse
In one of its earlier consultations, the CCF suggested that Fiji’s Westminster-based
political system sponsored a ‘winner takes its all’ system of politics
which raised the stakes for control of political office and patronage quite
sharply. When such a system was superimposed upon an already racialised party
political system, the “winner takes it all” mentality began to prescribe
the behaviour of political parties and their ethnic support groups both within
and outside the political system. Consequentially political parties get locked
into a mode where they secured their parliamentary strength by creating hegemonic
ethnic voting blocks, generating a seemingly never ending cycle of communalism;
subverting the essence democracy subsequently. Such a system readily leads to
political brinkmanship and when the military is monopolized by one ethnic group,
political domination by any one ethnic-based party can come to be taken for
granted.
Such a system was seen to be distorting the policy making functions of the parliamentary
system and also interfered with the implementation of policies. It reduced parliamentary
debates on social, economic and other policies to the level of racial bargaining.
By distorting the conduct of government, the Westminster System was viewed as
inhibiting the national potential and harming social and economic progress.
Ethnic politics breeds ethnic patronage and when power passes to other groups,
then the privileges that accrue through such association are seen to be lost.
So the feeling of loss is real, taking a distinct ethnic expression. In multiethnic
societies already characterized by a high degree of racial/ethnic distrust,
the challenge lay in transcending the limitations of such a system without compromising
the democratic nature of the parliamentary system.
The democratization agenda, argued the CCF (1993, 1995) can be advanced by moving
away from a “winner takes all” system that facilitated political brinkmanship.
This, it argued meant a decisive and bold shift of the political discourse away
from where it was pitched at this moment. Multiethnic formations such as Fiji
needed a parliamentary system that was characterized by an inbuilt tendency
towards inclusiveness, so that no single group was left out of the process of
governance. One way to proceed in this direction was to set at the outset an
agenda of what the real national issues were and what actions were needed to
redress them. In doing so, it also set very clearly the limitations of a race-based
parliamentary system in dealing with important national issues. At the policy
level, this implied a move towards a system of power sharing, rolling back the
race based electoral system, providing incentives and rewards to multiethnic
political parties and penalizing the communalistic tendencies in the political
system in the same breath. Many of these policy issues were seen to be too radical
for Fiji at the current juncture bringing into relief their sustainability should
they be implemented. However, by outlining what such policies sought to achieve
in the longer term, the CCF brought to the political centre-stage debates about
systems of power-sharing and proportional representation as the basis for elections
very specifically. In this manner, the CCF helped signpost the parameters of
constitutional discourse both in the public fora and within the parliamentary
system.
In racially divided formations, it is also important to develop creative mechanisms
through which national institutions such as political parties can be shielded
from ethnic merchants, that is, people who sell communalism, ethno-nationalism
and other tendencies that can potentially rupture the tenuous threads upon which
constitutional consensus rest. Because democratic institutions and processes
are both embryonic and fragile, any review of the constitution needs to carefully
think about such safeguards. By moving the constitutional discourse away from
direct policy areas, to include issues such as the above, the CCF has also demonstrated
its commitment to a longer haul framework for redemocratization. In this respect,
it holds that a review of the 1990 constitution is but only one important step
in that direction. Some more detailed examples of core CCF principles illustrate
its longer term commitment.
With respect to elections, the CCF proposed that Fiji needed an electoral system
that was fair, less divisive and that freed up people to exercise choices in
whichever way they desired. They need not be locked to vote racially only. In
delicately balanced societies, small shifts in public opinion should not lead
to major political changes. This, it thought made a compelling case for a system
of proportional representation, multi-member constituencies at another level
and a vigorously independent and professional electoral administration machinery.
Such dramatic reforms would also require massive public education by a body
that was seen to be neutral, rather than aligned to the government or to political
parties. Moreover, the capacity of people to adapt to a new system should not
be underestimated, particularly given that Fiji’s voters had adapted quite
well to a very complex voting system prior to 1987.
To move away from a ‘winner takes it all’ system would require an
inbuilt system of power sharing at the executive level. In the short term, a
formula for power sharing between political parties would need to be anchored
to specific constitutional provisions. Such a system would reduce the stake
for control of government and help moderate elections induced ethnic strife.
However, now forms of accountability would be required for good governance and
for accountability to compensate for the loss of a strong parliamentary opposition.
A “committee systems for executive power”under a system of power-sharing
might provide appropriate institutional mechanisms for implementation of policy
and an inbuilt accountability measure at the same time. Along with this, specific
measures needed to be put into place to encourage multiracialism in the electoral
process without distorting the democratic process at the same time. Safeguards
also needed to be anchored and strengthened within the constitution for the
rule of law, protection for human rights. Excellent models that now exist in
the international community (South Africa, New Zealand, Canada among others)
could be basis for change in these areas in Fiji. At the same time citizens
needed to be educated about their rights and given opportunities to seek redress
when they felt aggrieved as a result of state actions. This could mean the strengthening
of the office of the ombudsperson, establishment of a human and civil rights
section within that office, entrenching provisions in the higher courts for
specific constitutional references among others.
One of the stumbling blocs for constitutional reform is the accommodation of
rights and interests that are identified as ethnic interests. These need to
be studied and assessed carefully before constitutional safeguards were provided
for them and which did not erode the purchase attached to “the will of
the people” in any democratic system at the same time. Thus to protect
what were recognized and accepted across the board as fundamental community
rights, elected representatives of the different communities could have a second
vote where different types of majorities were specified depending on the importance
attached to the specific “ethnic concern”. At the same time, constitutional
protections for specific ethnic interests ought not fossilise communities in
their current stage of social and economic development. They must also be left
free to evolve and adapt and not too constrained by protective devices.
Legislative action was also needed to ensure that what were accepted as ethnic
institutions were accountable and exercised their influence in a manner that
did not disadvantage sections within the communities that they represented.
Disadvantages and inequalities that are concentrated within any one ethnic category
in multiethnic societies are a source of anxiety as they readily become the
basis for ethno-political mobilization. In Fiji’s case, the CCF demonstrated
that many of these actually cut across ethnic categories and affected all communities.
Some disadvantages were more community specific, however. These included the
unacceptably low levels of participation of Fijians in commerce and landlessness
among Indo-Fijians. Such disadvantages needed to be redressed as they can harm
social stability and they clearly required affirmative interventions by the
state. Affirmative interventions, however, needed to be well researched, transparent,
time specific, publicly accountable, means tested and targeted. Even Fiji’s
resource constraints required this to be the case. More importantly, there was
a need to ensure that affirmative interventions were protected from political
patronage. Transparency and public accountability are the best ways of securing
these from political manipulation.
Limits of the Constitution Review Commission (CRC) and the parliamentary approach
Many observers have invested too much faith in the Constitution Review Commission
and it is thus important to understand the limitations of the formal institutional
approach both in the context of the contemporary institutional framework and
in relation to Fiji’s recent history, particularly the experience of developing
the independence constitution between 1965 and 1969.
The CRC, chaired by the former Governor General of New Zealand, Sir Paul Reeves
was commissioned to solicit public opinions and make recommendations for the
review of the 1990 constitution based on a terms of reference agreed to by the
two main parties; the SVT and the NFP. Its work comes to an end when its report
is submitted to the President by the end of September 1996. Its report will
no doubt command a profound moral authority which the ruling elite cannot ignore.
This report will then be referred to the Prime Minister and via him to the Parliament.
A parliamentary subcommittee comprising ten representatives each from the Fijian
and other groups in parliament will then be charged with working out a consensus
for consideration by the whole parliament. It in effect means that the CRC report
will form the basis for a race-based political bargaining; albeit by elected
representatives of the different racial communities. There are no further requirements
for public consultation during this phase, nor indeed is their any prior role
set for the CRC itself.
Assuming that there is progress on this front, the report will form the basis
for a new constitution and will be drafted as either amendment/s to the existing
constitution or as a Bill for a new constitution altogether for adoption by
parliament. Under the terms of the 1990 constitution, the legislature is comprised
of 37 indigenous Fijians, 27 Indo-Fijians and 5 members from other communities.
With the exception of the 5 from other communities, all members of the legislature
are elected solely by members of their own ethnic groups. Thus there is little
parliamentary incentive for a move away from an ethnic system of elections particularly
on the part of Fijian members for whom the guaranteed control of government
will become less certain as a result of any less race-based electoral system.
Furthermore, if there is an agreement at this level, a new constitution bill
will be referred to the Senate (Upper House) where there are 21 Fijians and
9 others nominated either by the Council of Chiefs (BLV) or the President. In
the Senate, the Council of Chiefs (BLV) nominees command a special veto over
matters associated with indigenous Fijian rights and interests. Clearly, because
any democratic reform of the 1990 Constitution will inevitably result in some
erosion of the blatant parliamentary domination of indigenous Fijians in both
the Houses, the Council of Chiefs nominees in the Senate can be an obstacle
to progressive constitutional reforms. Indeed the 1990 constitution requires
the BLV nominees to act as the ultimate custodian and guarantor of Fijian interests
and grants its representatives a fool proof veto in the upper house. Its nominees
are widely seen as playing the role of the “goal keepers” in case
the indigenous Fijian SVT-based Government were to agree or were unable to stop
undesirable reforms.
Thus after the Report is released, it will confront a structured hierarchy of
power brokers who can hold back or even veto the proposed reforms should they
so desire quite readily. That is how tenuous the official process is in reality.
Reform will ultimately depend on the goodwill of indigenous Fijian members and
senators at each stage. Unless there is a substantial change of attitude within
civil society, it is unlikely that institutions created by the 1990 Constitution
can be sufficiently pressed to agree to the progressive reforms that are required.
One remarkable absence has also to be noted about the official review process.
There are no procedures or requirements for consultation with civic organizations
that have some direct stake in the constitution review process or the people
more generally after the report of the CRC is submitted to the President and
eventually the Parliament. Racially elected MP’s are assumed to have the
mandate and authority to debate and agree on a future constitutional settlement
for all of Fiji.
Based on historical precedents, the CCF has taken the view that for any settlement
to be sustainable, people must be carried along with the proposed changes in
a genuinely informed manner. This is not something that either the political
parties or the Constitution Review Commission has taken seriously. However,
and more importantly, one of the reasons that the coups of 1987 was readily
justified to a large segment of the indigenous population was that the 1970
constitution was largely negotiated between peak ethnic leaders with little
or no consultation with their constituencies. For that reason also, when a review
of the electoral system in 1974 suggested a move to a less racially based electoral
system, ordinary citizens were largely apathetic to the shelving of that report.
Based on such experiences, it is important that constitutional settlements take
place through vigorous public rather than private discussion. That would be
the most likely way in which settlements could be protected from non-democratic
encroachments in future.
A view that the two main communities are leader-driven, and therefore their
leaders know what is best for their communities denies expression to the diversity
of opinions and political beliefs that members of any one ethnic community.
Such diversities can engender creative solutions that are not so possible within
a political framework so singularly driven by ethnic concerns.
In proposing a citizen driven process of constitutional reform, the CCF has
sought to influence the way in which a new constitution comes into being so
that power holders and brokers at each level of the political set-up are pressured
to deal with the opinions and interests that people hold directly. At a secondary
level, therefore, the CCF has invested heavily in creating an environment in
which people and groups can make informed choices.
Constraints upon civic initiatives at promoting redemocratization
As a nebulous body with a core secretariat, the CCF’s one important contribution
has been to provide a forum where civic institutions that fall on different
sides of the political equation largely as consequence of Fiji’s history,
and, political groups are able to interact and carry out discussions in an informed
manner.
At the same time, the such an organization is strengthened by remaining on the
nebulous, rather than a rigid institutional side. This enables the CCF to deflect
criticisms about the personal associations of individuals who are part of the
CCF initiative. Moreover, its institutionally disorganized nature also confers
flexibility in specific situations.
Clearly, civic and political groups in Fiji otherwise mainly interact in an
adversarial mode. This is also true about many religious organizations. The
absence of such inclusive forums where individuals can share the concerns and
anxieties of others has contributed to an atmosphere of suspicion and hatred.
Even the most conciliatory signals by any one group are interpreted suspiciously.
Consequently efforts at promoting re-democratization are easily derailed.
In this respect the CFF has only just begun to play the role required of it.
A review of the 1990 constitution will eventually have to pass the hurdle of
an ethnically set-up parliament. Thus any dilution of the parliamentary domination
of one group will meet stiff resistance from its affected ethnic constituencies.
Secondly, efforts to promote race neutral electoral systems will meet resistance
within existing political groups as most political parties clearly have evolved
as ethnic institutions. Because of these, the momentum and pressure for constitutional
and political reform will have to be built up directly in the communities -
a task that the CCF has dedicated itself to.
This means creating channels for directly communicating with communities and
holding consultations over political questions in the public fora. Again, this
might seem an obvious thing to do but it does mean competing with all political
parties for access to the communities and in fact, quite directly, undermining
the influence of political parties who have held monopoly over political questions
ever since Fiji’s independence. In a way, then, such an effort is directed
at empowering communities to make political choices in an informed manner that
in turn can help change either their party political preferences or result in
community pressure upon political parties.
A coordinated civic initiative
NGOs are by their very nature too preoccupied with immediate day-to-day concerns.
At the same time, their political attitudes are dispersed and even those that
broadly fit into the democratic mould rarely share common views. Thus many NGO
officials who personally support the work of the CCF fear rallying their own NGO
support behind the CCF because of its potential for division within their membership.
The challenge is to thus provide a forum where NGO’s can participate without
having to commit themselves, or without being pressured to adopt potentially
divisive public positions. In this context, the CCF can act as an umbrella organization
through whose support NGO’s may formulate their own ideas about the constitution
and democratization more generally. Many NGO’s have slowly come to rally
behind the CCF approach.
In a minimalist manner, CCF’s progressive consensus for a constitutional
settlement is embodied in the Peoples’ Constitutional Charter. Drawing
its inspiration from South Africa’s Freedom Charter and Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia,
this Charter has been a rallying point for civic institutions and ordinary citizens
behind a demand for a nation that is less divided, and more at ease with its
diverse peoples and ethnic communities. In a manner, the Charter presents a
very simple vision for a united Fiji - an appeal that is not lost on the political
leaders of the day.
Prospects for a democratic and demilitarized Fiji
While a pessimistic outcome appears more likely in the short term as no country
where military has intervened so sharply has returned to an even keel in such
a short space of time, the longer term prospects for democracy are bright, nevertheless.
In the post-cold war period, there has been improved global attention to issues
of governance and demilitarization even by institutions such as the World Bank.
At the same time, it is accepted that communalism has mainly been a one way
alley converting political brinkmanship into outright confrontation quite periodically
and hurting Fiji’s social and economic development potential.
With the passing of the cold war, the need for geopolitical loyalties have waned.
Moreover, with the ending of French Nuclear tests its checkbook diplomacy is
expected to wane. Furthermore, international bailouts for such small economies
will become increasingly difficult if Fiji’s economy remains on its current
course as a result largely of self inflicted wounds.
Clearly, the military will remain a big stumbling bloc to progress of the constitutional
front. Because it now has a vested economic interest to oppose democratization
(fear of loss of jobs and resources etc.), and because as an organization it
is not used to public accountability, it can veto progressive change using the
controversial Section 162 of the 1990 Constitution as its window. For this reason
the question of demilitarization has to be located in its broader setting. Firstly,
Fiji’s military requirements have to be mapped consensually and transparently.
Any reduction in the size of the military must be seen also in the context of
an active labour market policy where through re-skilling, military officials
may be re-employed in economically rewarding careers. Finally, Fiji’s long
term stability requires that the military is publicly accountable to democratic
institutions and that its composition reflects the demographic make up of the
population. Its international links must also always remain transparent and
subject to parliamentary scrutiny periodically.
The CCF has tried to move a fundamentally “winner takes it all adversarial
system” into a “win-win” system that is more consensual, less
adversarial, more participatory and inclusive. When such options are developed
more concretely, then civil society and political parties are bound to give
the options a better reception. For a long time, Fiji simply did not have any
home grown alternatives. The CCF has modestly enabled some to evolve.
Protecting the democratic space
Overall, people-driven initiatives such as that of the CCF can help create democratic
spaces. The potential for a sustainable constitutional and political settlement
will be enhanced if such spaces retain and indeed broaden their autonomy. Pressures
upon such spaces will intensify not only by a government that stands to lose
many of its privileges as a result of progressive constitutional reform, but
also by the media. Television, and segments of radio and print media have been
strongly supportive of Fiji’s post-1990 status quo. Consequently, the possibilities
for a successful turnaround in Fiji will be considerably improved if powerful
institutions of global civil society were to identify with and support the precarious
spaces for democratic action being created where their support internally cannot
be taken for granted.
Civic initiatives at this moment of Fiji’s history
There is still a long journey ahead for Fiji. Sadly in this era when important
functions of nation states particularly with respect to economic management
are being eroded by the tide of globalization, Fiji still faces that difficult
hurdle of creating a unified national-entity. Clearly, many will continue to
resist the winds of democratization and change, particularly a class of beneficiaries
whose privileges will be eroded by progressive change. Ultimately, political
change will be accelerated if ordinary citizens feel that they stand to benefit
from the process of change and ethnic communities find comfort in the fact that
change will not undermine what are felt to be core ethnic interests.
Because of the creative and fresh approach brought to Fiji’s fragmented
political landscape, the constitutional discourse has entered the public fora
in a manner that is slightly more visible than at any other time in Fiji’s
recent history. By activating the citizens arena, in contrast to the formal
political system, the CCF has helped signpost some of the parameters of the
constitutional discourse. How successful this has been in firstly brining about
a citizens’ led process of change, and eventually the sustainability of
constitutional settlements has to be left to for judgment by future historians.
Two final claims, however, are appended in support of the civic initiative discussed
above. What happens to multiracial societies when they no longer see any utility
for such multi-ethnic forums? Secondly, what other forums can Fiji call upon
at this stage of its development?
References
School of Social and Economic Development and International Alert, 1993. Report
on a Consultation on Fiji’s National Agenda. SSED and International Alert,
Suva.
School of Social and Economic Development and International Alert, 1994. Report
on Consultation on Fiji’s Constitution Review. SSED and International Alert,
Suva.
Citizens Constitutional Forum, 1995. Electoral System and Power Sharing: Report
of a Consultation on Fiji’s Constitution. CCF with Conciliation Resources,
Suva.
Citizens Constitutional Forum, 1995. Protecting Fijian Interests and Building
a Democratic Fiji: A Consultation on Fiji’s Constitution Review. CCF with
Conciliation Resources, Suva.
Citizens Constitutional Forum, 1995. One Nation Diverse Peoples - Building a
Just and Democratic Fiji, a submission to the Constitution Review Commission.
Suva: September.
Fiji Constitution Review Commission, 1996. “Towards A United Future: Report
of the Constitution Review Commission. Suva.
Hanley, J. 1996. “Speech to a combined meeting of the Pacific Islands Society
of the United Kingdom and Ireland, the Commonwealth Trust, and the British Friends
of Vanuatu”, Royal Overseas League, London. 24 January.
Kamrava, M and Mora, F. 1996. “Civil Society and Political Democratization
in comparative Perspective: Lessons from Latin America and the Middle East”,
paper presented to the Conference on the Emergence of Civil Society, Centre
for Studies in Democratization, University of Warwick. February 16-17, 1996.
Prasad, S. 1996. “Frameworking a sustainable constitutional settlement
in Fiji”, paper presented to Peace Research Institute, Meiji Gakuin University,
Tokyo (18 March).
Premdas, R. 1995. Ethnic Conflict and Development: The Case of Fiji. Aldershot:
Avebury.
World Bank, 1995. “Fiji: Restoring Growth in a Changing Global Environment”,
Washington: World Bank.
Satendra Prasad
Department of Sociology
University of Warwick,
Coventry, CV4 7AL
15 August 1996
* Lecturer, Department of Sociology, University of the South Pacific, Suva,
Fiji - currently on study leave at the Department of Sociology, University of
Warwick, England. And Member of the Secretariat of Citizens Constitutional Forum
(Fiji)
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