Policy briefing
Peace by piece: addressing Sudan’s conflicts
The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in January 2005 was heralded as the beginning of a new era of peace for Sudan. Although the parties to the CPA are to be credited for bringing an end to the north-south conflict, it is but one of a broader web of armed conflicts that are being addressed through three separate peace processes. Many parts of the country remain unstable and violent conflict has intensified in Darfur since the partial signing of a peace agreement in May 2006. It is unclear whether Sudan is actually progressing from civil war to peace.
Conciliation Resources’ (CR) Accord issue 18, Peace by piece: addressing Sudan’s conflicts, produced in conjunction with Concordis International, examines some of the causes of Sudan’s conflicts and its recent peacemaking experiences, and asks what remains to be done to build a comprehensive peace. With articles authored by government and SPLM/A representatives, civic actors and international experts the publication is available in English and Arabic.
This policy paper offers a summary of findings from the publication and shares some of the lessons learnt that can inform future steps towards peace in Sudan and elsewhere around the world.
Key findings
1.The structure and design of Sudan’s formal peace processes have reflected the main axes of conflict in the country. This approach has resulted in some significant breakthroughs; however the complex inter-relationships between these distinct conflicts need to be addressed more effectively in future peacemaking strategies if the important progress made is to be consolidated.
2.Sudan’s peace negotiations have been largely characterized by an elite power-bargaining approach, with many constituencies and regional concerns excluded. More inclusive, multi-levelled peacemaking and peacebuilding strategies are required to build broader consensus and ownership of the processes and agreements reached.
3.The peace agreements (the CPA, Darfur Peace Agreement and Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement) have not dealt comprehensively with the causes of conflict. Because decisions on contentious issues around land and natural resources have been avoided or deferred to post-agreement processes, implementation and continued negotiation are vital to prevent the agreements unravelling.
4.Considerable efforts were made by the mediators of the CPA to develop a process that fostered the parties’ ownership of the negotiations. As well as agreeing a text, they overcame seemingly intractable obstacles through a lengthy process of trust-building and joint problem-solving. Such commitment is vital in creating the political will and joint responsibility required for a sustainable peace agreement and provides important lessons for securing peace in Darfur.
5. Informal dialogue processes and grassroots peacebuilding have a key role to play in taking peace processes beyond the domain of a limited elite group and building a broad social consensus that can support a sustainable peace. Such initiatives need to be better integrated into future peace negotiations in Sudan.
1 & 2. Support the development of an inclusive peacebuilding strategy
A piecemeal approach to resolving Sudan’s different but interlocking conflicts has resulted in a number of different peace agreements and it is unclear that these can fit together as the jigsaw pieces of a comprehensive, sustainable peace. The result is an exclusive approach to dealing with armed conflicts in Sudan.
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is a significant step in the process of building sustainable peace in Sudan, with protocols that address issues of national and state-level governance and paved the way for a new Interim National Constitution (INC). However, it was a bilateral agreement between the two dominant military parties in the north-south war and other parties originally excluded have now had to adhere to its power-sharing and wealth-sharing framework and the limits it imposes. Moreover, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) talks were framed as if they were an internally unified north and south instead of competing groups with differing agendas. This alienated and emboldened others who felt marginalized and gave credence to the success of an armed struggle. Such sentiments are a significant cause of the war in Darfur.
The cost of exclusive peacemaking
The exclusion of a range of political voices and regional groups from the formal negotiations processes threatens the sustainability and durability of the agreements reached. These processes need to be complemented by and connected with initiatives that reach out to wider constituencies so that they too become stakeholders in any peace settlements. This would support the development of a pluralistic political arena capable of generating consensus and ownership over the peacebuilding process.
Experience elsewhere shows that peace agreements made between leaders are likely to fail without significant ‘buy-in’ from wider society.
Building an inclusive political environment
Sudan has not yet developed an effective political answer to issues of diversity and pluralism. The political system has tended to be based on power bargaining between factionalized elites, inside and outside the ruling party. This needs to be reformed so that all the country’s social and political forces – including women and members of marginalized groups – can participate in an inclusive peacebuilding and democratic governance system that holds political leaderships accountable and helps to uphold international commitments to rights and freedoms.
For all their problems, if properly implemented the Cairo Agreement, Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) could allow other political groups to become part of a common national process, buttressing the CPA and the INC as central pillars of this process, helping to support forthcoming elections and overcome questions of political and regional identity.
3. Address the root causes
Sudan’s armed conflict has been characterized as a civil war of interlocking civil wars. Causes are deeply rooted in the country’s historical and political development. Colonial powers and successive governments have manipulated administrative structures to undermine local access to resources. The peace agreements have only scratched the surface of these causes. Unless historical grievances are addressed and the environment created for a just political system that accommodates the interests of all, further conflict is likely to follow.
Contentious issues
Land tenure has yet to be adequately addressed by any of Sudan’s peace agreements but it remains central to political questions of wealth and power in most parts of the country.
In order to reach agreement, the resolution of issues such as land tenure and the ownership of subterranean natural resources was, largely deferred, on the assumption that newly-established land commissions would be better able to operate in a post-agreement environment. However, there is little political will to deal with these issues or to clarify the relationship between traditional, modern and emergent judicial structures, and minimal progress has been made. Sustainable peace is likely to require a shift in the legal, judicial and political frameworks governing land administration. It will also need an inclusive resource management system that suits Sudan’s complex realities.
The ‘three areas’ - Abyei, Southern Kordofan and southern Blue Nile - are of critical importance for national stability and security. The effective nationalization of land in these areas fed into the north-south war and remains the most likely trigger for renewed violence given the strong potential for local conflict to escalate and draw in armies from the north and south. Implementation of the protocols is therefore a key test of the willingness of the parties to deal with the causes of the conflict. If the will to implement it exists, then the Protocol on Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile provides a model for relations with the centre for other parts of Sudan.
4. Foster ownership of negotiation processes
The process of negotiating peace is critical in creating political will, trust and shared responsibility for its success.
The style of negotiation adopted during the IGAD process focused strongly on military and economic relations between the parties, leading to sound ceasefire and demobilization arrangements. While bilateral negotiations potentially pay the price of their exclusiveness in a settlement that does not have wide endorsement on the ground, the IGAD negotiations were successful in cultivating the parties’ ownership of the process and encouraging trust between them. This was thanks to robust but patient mediation and helpful international community representation. For example, negotiating the CPA implementation details took longer than observers wanted, but the mediators recognized that implementation guidelines, often the ‘poor child’ of peace agreements, are important to building trust.
The negotiations leading to the DPA were modelled on the CPA process but without reference to the lessons learned by the IGAD mediators, the specifics of the conflict or the expectations of the parties and the international community. The DPA has failed to bring peace to Darfur, in part due to parties’ poor engagement with the negotiation process that resulted in an agreement with little local ownership. Text of an agreement is not a substitute for the self-motivated political will of the parties themselves.
International support
International actors played a key role in encouraging the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A to the negotiating table and in supporting the Naivasha process. But the emphasis on achieving a major peace agreement between the government and the SPLM/A led to a lack of effective early conflict prevention action in Darfur.
In turn, international pressure for a quick agreement in Abuja, at the expense of building a durable process capable of delivering peace, has not been helpful in supporting ownership of the DPA. Little trust exists between the parties and there is currently insufficient domestic will to resolve the conflict or international will to engage in an equivalent process to that which led to the CPA – not least because any agreement on Darfur must conform to the CPA’s existing framework. International partners could have made more of their role of building the parties’ capacity to negotiate credible and locally owned agreements.
Mediators need a good understanding of the interests of domestic, regional and international actors or risk losing their support for the process. For example, the international community’s poor understanding of the SLM/A led to uncertainty on how to manage internal SLM/A politics during the Darfur peace negotiations. In order to engage with armed groups it is crucial to understand them, yet current international policy responses are often based on poor analysis. A holistic understanding of the different armed groups is required for any progress to be made in halting the continuing violence in Darfur.
It remains to be seen whether the ESPA, negotiated with minimal international involvement beyond the mediation of the Eritrean government will be easier to implement or whether the lack of international backing will also mean an absence of incentives and implementation monitoring.
Planning for reconstruction
International recognition of the need for a holistic post-conflict peacebuilding approach meant that the planning process for Sudan’s reconstruction needs was unusually thorough. The process, led by the GoS and SPLM/A with the support of the World Bank and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), ran in parallel with the Naivasha talks and resulted in the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) report, a comprehensive framework for development and poverty reduction. However, poor coordination, unclear responsibilities and ill-defined roles mean that progress has been slow and the implementation record is poor. The parties’ apparent ‘ownership’ of the JAM and expenditure under the Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) that the JAM introduced seems to be waning.
Better coordination between NGOs, inter-governmental organizations, government ministries and MDTF secretariats is required, along with the increased engagement of local civil society. There was a shared commitment to reconstruction, a thorough preparation phase and good understanding of the local context, but insufficient consultation at local and state government levels.
Unfortunately, the lessons from the ‘north-south’ JAM appear to have been overlooked during the equivalent Darfur analysis. The Darfur JAM could be improved with greater understanding of local needs, the expectations of the rural and urban communities and the root causes of the conflict.
5. Build peace beyond the elites
Peacebuilding initiatives are required at every level of society for effective transformation from armed violence to just and sustainable peace.
The role of track two actors
Developing relationships is the ‘glue’ of sustainable peace processes and track two processes (unofficial dialogue initiatives involving people close to the leaders of the different parties) play a critical role in developing effective relationships and building trust. They can look beyond the immediate need for a ceasefire and explore creative solutions that address the root causes of the conflict and wider societal dynamics. They can play a crucial role in maintaining the links between negotiating parties and their constituencies ensuring the broader picture is kept in view and providing a safe space for consideration of constructive options.
Channels of communication between track two initiatives and the formal talks in Sudan have generally been limited, largely because of the concerns of the official parties and mediators. But it is essential for mediators to recognize this broader picture and for negotiators to stay in contact with their constituencies so that they can take account of the aspirations and fears represented there.
Developing civil society’s role in peacebuilding
Once a powerful force – at least in the north – independent Sudanese civil society organizations have been weakened in recent decades and struggle to be seen as more than organizations that treat the symptoms of Sudan’s conflicts, rather than address their causes through effective peacebuilding.
NGOs in particular have struggled to overcome competition and engage in more cooperative and effective alliances and networks, partly due to over-dependence on foreign funding and a lack of specialization. Externally, NGOs need a more supportive environment within which to operate, free from the growing legal constraints on their work. Internally, work is needed on their own good practice – ethical codes and commitment to the values of democracy, transparency and accountability – which would foster their credibility in Sudan as well as helping international donors to identify genuine and independent partners.
Grassroots peace processes
Sustained and sensitive support for bottom-up initiatives in pursuit of stability and justice should be central to Sudan’s recovery process. Initiatives such as the ‘people-to-people’ processes and the Sudan Peace Fund have contributed to resolving local conflicts and provide valuable lessons for addressing similar dynamics in other societies. Grassroots peacebuilding can have a profound effect on governance, promoting improved interaction and collaboration with civil society and governing authorities. Any peace achieved at the political level remains extremely unsafe if not linked to peace at the local level.
Inclusion of women
Sudanese women have been deeply involved in Sudan’s conflicts and in resolving them at a community level, but have been ignored by, or at best co-opted into, the formal peace processes. Whilst disappointing women’s representatives, the peace agreements have at least established new opportunities for women’s political participation. Negotiation processes and governing systems need to enable women to participate fully and effectively at decision-making levels and have their perspectives taken seriously.
Refugees and returnees
Dissemination of accurate and timely information to refugees about the implementation of the peace agreements has not been a priority for any of the major actors and there are still entrenched views within refugee communities of ‘the other’ that have not changed significantly since the signing of the CPA. Support to refugees, returnees and vulnerable groups needs to be provided fairly and transparently.
Conclusion
Peace involves a complex web of complementary processes at all levels of society and a broader approach is required to resolve Sudan’s conflicts. All the main Sudanese parties must engage seriously in – and international actors must support – inclusive and coordinated peacebuilding initiatives if peace is to become a reality.