Policy brief
Learning from the Indonesia-Aceh peace process
An overview of the Indonesia-Aceh peace process
Conflict context
The conflict over Aceh had many causes and dimensions. At one level, it reflected a self-determination struggle within Aceh. At another, it was caused by oppressive and exploitative policies of a specific regime that had treated other parts of the country in a similar way. Yet fulfilling the aspiration for independence would fundamentally challenge the status of Aceh within Indonesia. It also had implications for the wider state, which some feared could break apart from multiple secessionist movements. However if the conflict stemmed from bad policies that generated legitimate grievances, then the remedy might be better governance without changing the status of the territory - a solution favoured by Indonesian nationalists and made more possible by Indonesia's democratic transition.
The challenge was to develop a formula that could address both of these core dimensions of the conflict in ways that responded to the fears and needs of the main parties. The negotiated agreement that eventually emerged was based on a formula of self-governance for the territory within a unitary state, along with provisions to address specific contested issues and to deal with the consequences of conflict. This agreement was successful in ending the war and initiating a transition process. Yet there are signs of continuing political conflict over how to fulfil the promise of self-government, with uncertain implications for the future. Both the successes and challenges of the implementation period indicate how much the structure of the negotiation process and the contents of the agreements reached tend to shape the prospects for future transformation of the conflict.
Gaining momentum
I n a war that spanned three decades, there were no significant efforts to resolve the conflict through negotiations until the late 1990s. A new dynamic emerged with the radical changes in Indonesia following President Suharto's downfall in 1998, as well as East Timor's vote for independence in an UN-supervised referendum in 1999. While Acehnese aspirations for independence gained traction from the latter, new thinking about how to deal with conflicts stemming from state abuses and the democratic deficit took hold in Jakarta, as did fear of threats to Indonesia's territorial integrity.
In this context both the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the government of newly elected pro-dialogue President Abdurrahman Wahid welcomed the Geneva-based, non-governmental Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue's (HDC) offer to convene a humanitarian dialogue. This led quickly to an agreement establishing the Humanitarian Pause in May 2000 and the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement of December 2002. Efforts to expand on these agreements to forge a wider conflict resolution process collapsed amid ceasefire violations, with allegations that GAM used the ceasefire to strengthen its position and that the Indonesian government was 'talking peace while waging war'.
Seizing a ripe moment
While the government's offensive following the ceasefire's collapse was militarily successful, senior officials appear to have realized that an exclusively security-driven approach could not end the conflict. This was well understood by the soon-to-be President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono - a former General who could influence the military - and Vice President Yusuf Kalla, chair of the leading Golkar party. Meanwhile GAM was weakened militarily to the extent that some of its field commanders were ready to negotiate.
Elements on both sides appear to have recognized that attempts to achieve their goals unilaterally were unlikely to be successful. Furthermore, Acehnese NGOs had spearheaded societal debate on humanitarian issues and the value of pursuing goals through peaceful means, creating a climate more receptive to negotiations. When the December 2004 tsunami devastated coastal Aceh, it was the catalyst for a new push for peace that moved on currents emerging over the previous years. On entering the next talks process, both GAM and the government had more realistic expectations of what they might achieve and the basic shape of a settlement.
President Martti Ahtisaari
Negotiation processes
Although GAM saw international involvement as beneficial, Indonesian officials still stinging from the East Timor experience were cautious about 'over-internationalizing' the peace process by involving UN mediators. This contributed to the appeal of non-official intermediaries first through the HDC initiative and then through the private diplomacy of former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari and his Crisis Management Initiative (CMI). Ahtisaari fostered the Helsinki process and the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) ending the war.
Structuring talks
With no prior foundations for trust between the parties, the HDC process started from a temporary humanitarian ceasefire. They then tried to structure further talks on an open-ended, step-by-step approach that was not based on a joint understanding of the shape of a possible final political settlement. They had little choice but to rely heavily on shuttle diplomacy and indirect negotiations that allowed little space for developing trust between the negotiators and an appreciation of the other's perspectives, aspirations and 'bottom-line'.
The Helsinki process unfolded through five rounds of direct and informal talks from January 2005 mediated by Ahtissari, who worked hard to help establish both realism and trust. The ambition was to reach a comprehensive package agreement addressing both security and substantive issues. Key to success was the principle of deferring final agreement on the various provisions until everything could be agreed in a final package: 'nothing is agreed until everything is agreed'. Learning from previous experience, the MoU agreed in August 2005 included a robust monitoring mechanism with international oversight.
M. Nur Djuli and Nurdin Abdul Rahman, GAM negotiators
Opportunity costs?
The Helsinki talks were structured as a two-party negotiation process, reflecting a framing of the conflict that saw GAM and the Indonesian government of the day as the main protagonists. They also restricted public communication on the substance of the negotiations, maintaining what one government negotiator called the 'zip-mouth policy.' These factors contributed to the efficiency and success of the negotiation. Yet, as elsewhere, it had the disadvantage of marginalizing other stakeholders, whose interests and concerns are poorly reflected in the MoU. The agreement essentially addressed only the minimum threshold of issues needed to end the war. It also meant there was little scope for bringing along other constituencies in the process and encouraging them to buy-in to the outcomes.
The MoU did not please everyone. While GAM was a popular movement with a significant constituency, there were Aceh-based anti-separatist groups who opposed the agreement and now number among the advocates of splitting Aceh further into new territorial units. The government made considerable efforts to ensure the military's adherence to their policy and to win over opponents without informing them of the specific compromises until after the agreement was signed. The legislature subsequently clawed back many of the governance reform provisions in the MoU. It treated them as guidelines rather than commitments, possibly because it was not one of the negotiating parties. This raises questions about the MoU's vulnerability if different political forces come to power in the 2009 elections. Finally, the specific needs of numerous social groups were not represented or addressed. Despite international norms on women, peace and security, both the process and the agreement were gender-blind - with considerable impact on post-settlement arrangements.
Suraiya Kamaruzzaman
Reframing and compromise
The substantive provisions of the agreement rested on a trade-off between GAM's demands for independence and the government's resistance to special dispensations for Aceh that might contradict existing laws governing the relationship between the centre and the regions. Both GAM and the government showed political courage in finding a way to address each other's concerns.
On entering negotiations, GAM recognized it would need to put new proposals on the table. Its big shift was to move from demands for independence to self-government. 'Autonomy' was deeply discredited and would have been rejected by GAM supporters; 'self-government' was a new framing that enabled agreement, despite being conceptually comparable; GAM leaders were also willing to agree principles without securing their own position through the direct allocation of posts.
Indonesia's political establishment was concerned that the government's efforts to contain separatism strengthened territorial integrity and national cohesiveness, rather than weaken or destroy it. Government negotiators had to be convinced that an agreement with GAM would further these goals. While some of the measures had been envisioned in the 2001 autonomy law (such as the 70/30 per cent spit of oil and gas revenues in Aceh's favour), a major new concession was to allow local political parties to contest elections.
Vice President Jusuf Kalla
Implementation
The first years of implementing the MoU reflect a broad picture of success in fostering security and demilitarization, along side ongoing renegotiation of governance and justice arrangements. This partly stems from the status of the MoU itself, which was an agreement of government rather than an agreement of state (such as a constitutional reform). Many of the substantive provisions needed to be ratified into law before taking effect, while many of the operational provisions could be implemented swiftly through the decisions of government and GAM leaders. Furthermore, many of the provisions were formulated imprecisely in the MoU and consequently open to opposing interpretations, leading to misunderstanding and tension.
External monitoring
While the Helsinki process was the product of private diplomacy, Ahtisaari drew on his close connections with the EU and influential governments to secure their technical, financial and political support for the process and agreement, which he skillfully assured before the final text was signed. Key to the parties' confidence in the agreement was the provision for an innovative joint European Union / Association of South East Asian Nations Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), with Ahtisaari involved in arbitrating serious disputes. The unarmed civilian mission's initial focus was on security issues. The parallel processes of GAM decommissioning and the military's redeployment were completed with remarkable efficiency, as was release of GAM prisoners through the amnesty process. The AMM's role in monitoring the political transition was more controversial; while it pressured the government to pass needed legislation, it did not interfere in the substance. While the government appreciated the AMM's 'neutrality', GAM and others argued it allowed the new Law on the Governing of Aceh to deviate significantly from the MoU. Some also questioned whether AMM should have operated until every MoU provision was fulfilled.
Unfinished business
There have also been a variety of practical and programmatic challenges. Atypically, Aceh has benefited from abundant reconstruction resources. Yet they have been unequally distributed between tsunami- and conflict-affected communities, leading to frustrated expectations and resentment. Despite the vast needs of both, the former have benefited far more than the latter due to many international programmes 'tied' to helping tsunami victims. Inequalities in reintegration assistance, as well as the allocation of reconstruction contracts, lead to perception of winners and losers that generate tension. Human rights have received scant consideration and transitional justice institutions have proved elusive. Little attention has been directed to addressing the specific needs of girls and women. Weak capacity in the Indonesian and unreformed Aceh government administration has been another factor constraining the ability to formulate effective policies, protect rights and deliver services. Few agencies have focused on the transition from emergency aid to domestically-led development, or to building government and civic capacity and fostering accountability.
Despite these and other challenges, a remarkable transition to a more peaceful and equitable future is well underway. This remains an important test case for democratic transition in Indonesia and beyond, and yet it indicates the crucial need to sustain focus if the promise of a just peace is to be secured. Indeed, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.
Key policy conclusions
Prepare for negotiations (even when the prospects seem remote)
It is helpful to prepare for the option of negotiations even in the context of seemingly intractable war; new circumstances can rapidly change conflict dynamics and create opportunities for peacemaking that may otherwise be missed if parties are unprepared and no initiatives are in motion.
The value of civil society diplomacy and peacemaking
The Aceh process highlights the distinctive peacemaking roles that can be played by a range of private and local and international civil society actors including mediating formal negotiations, facilitating engagement, and mobilizing support for the process. They can also work in creative ways with state and inter-governmentally mandated mechanisms. A non-official mediator, such as a prominent individual or civil society institution, may be a viable option when one or more of the parties are reluctant to 'over-internationalize' a process. This process highlights challenges and constraints but also suggests that civil society peacemaking is coming of age.
Trade-offs between efficiency and inclusiveness
The structure of negotiations can lead to trade-offs on the depth and breadth of negotiated change. Tightly focused, confidential negotiations involving only the leaders of the belligerent parties can be an efficient way to deliver an agreement to successfully end a war, providing there is sufficient popular support. A more inclusive process with a more comprehensive agenda may be slower and more complex, yet it potentially enables a diverse range of stakeholders - including women - to agree on a wider range of issues that may create the basis of new political, economic and societal arrangements for the long-term.
Reframing contentious concepts can enable breakthroughs
Reframing key terms and concepts can open new possibilities for reaching agreement. Shifting from the contentious positions of 'independence' versus 'autonomy' to the comparatively neutral idea of 'self-government' was a breakthrough that enabled negotiators to sketch out the terms of an agreement that each side could perceive as addressing their needs.
Negotiation procedures matter
As it did in the Northern Ireland process, the 'nothing is agreed until everything is agreed' formula freed negotiators to trade across a range of issues without committing themselves before assessing the overall package agreement. An earlier step-by-step approach deferred decisions on the most difficult issues without inhibiting negotiators from exploring potential trade-offs and innovative solutions.
Imprecise drafting of peace agreements risks contested interpretations
While imprecise drafting can enable the constructive ambiguities that facilitate negotiations by drawing a linguistic veil over political concessions, it can also lead to contested interpretations at the implementation stage. Parties in a stronger position to impose their interpretation are more likely to benefit from this tactic.
Moving from agreements of government to agreements of state
It is inherently challenging to move from signing a political agreement to enacting a legally enforceable instrument. In cases where peace negotiations are not linked with constitutional reform or another legislative process, it can be valuable to ensure the agreement includes firm guidelines and mechanisms for making this transition from agreements of government to agreements of state.
Making the transition from an armed movement to political party
The decision to negotiate an end to armed conflict poses challenges to armed movements, who have to shift from a military structure to becoming one player amongst many in the contest for political power. To enable this transition, they often need to be assured of having a real role in the new political system. Yet instead of guaranteeing their position through a power-sharing formula, GAM candidates successfully contested open elections for key posts in the Aceh provincial government. This demonstrated their confidence in their popular base and strengthened their legitimacy as a political group. The challenges experienced to date highlight the need for capacity building in the transition period to help form capable political parties that are the basis for democratic politics in the future.
Negotiating and implementing transitional justice
To satisfactorily address the twin challenges of ending war and promoting justice, those involved in peace negotiations need to grapple with developing clear and robust guiding principles and processes on how transitional justice issues will be addressed. Vague provisions in the agreement for promoting justice may be especially vulnerable to being neglected in implementation.
Humanitarian relief and peace process support
The experience of tsunami relief indicates how large-scale humanitarian assistance operations in conflict contexts impact on the dynamics of the conflict and on an ongoing or potential peace process. They should be designed in ways that help to support the prospects of peace, with sufficient flexibility and capacities to respond to radically new developments. In a post-agreement context, efforts to meet the 'early recovery gap' need to seen as part of the 'peace dividend'. They should incorporate strategies to address key systemic challenges, such as strengthening government and civic capacities and supporting the implementation of agreements.
