Policy Briefing

The limits of leadership: elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process

January 2006

Despite a decade of deadlock in the Armenian-Azerbaijani struggle for sovereignty over Nagorny Karabakh, this conflict remains unresolved and of enormous strategic importance, not least because of its proximity to oil and gas transport corridors from the Caspian basin to Europe and beyond. International mediation efforts have yet to succeed, leaving much to be learned about the structure of the peace process and the respective roles of elites and societies. The costs of stalemate can be measured in lost opportunities for democratization, economic development and the integration of the South Caucasus into the wider world.

This policy paper offers a digest of the findings from issue 17 in Conciliation Resources' (CR) Accord series, The limits of leadership: elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process. With articles authored by the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers, political and civic actors, as well as international experts, the publication is available in English and Russian (www.c-r.org/accord).

Key findings

1. The Nagorny Karabakh peace process illustrates the limitations of peace processes focusing solely at the level of political elites. A more comprehensive, inclusive and multi-levelled peacemaking strategy is required that binds a broader spectrum of stakeholders into the process.

2. Greater engagement with Nagorny Karabakh as a de facto but unrecognized entity is essential. Excluding it from the peace process has entrenched a more intransigent position.

3. There is an urgent need to strengthen the capacity within Armenian and Azerbaijani societies to promote a peacebuilding agenda that stimulates greater public discussion on how to address the conflict in ways supporting mutual understanding, rather than isolation.

4. Interventions need to respond to different dynamics emergent after a decade of stalemate, as distinct from the original causes of conflict. Negotiating agendas will be more effective if tailored to current realities as well as original causes.

5. Interventions exclusively focused on the region's economic potential will not support longer-term stability, which instead demands strategies for improving state-society relations.

1. The limitations of elite-focused peace processes

• Strengthen public buy-in to the peace process through complementing formal negotiations with additional arenas for dialogue in all societies.
• Support the involvement of marginalized populations with most at stake in a future settlement.

Broaden participation in the negotiation process

The Nagorny Karabakh peace process has focused almost exclusively on securing agreement between very narrow circles of political elites, while wider societies have been marginalized. This approach carries costs for the development of a pluralistic political arena capable of generating consensus and a sense of public ownership over the peacemaking and peacebuilding processes.

No peace without popular support

Formal peace negotiations need to be complemented by initiatives reaching out to the wider populations so that they too become stakeholders in any peace settlement reached. The leaders' positions at the negotiating table have sharply diverged from the hardline rhetoric they have used to frame the issues for domestic audiences. Experience elsewhere suggests that peace agreements made between leaders are likely to fail without significant 'buy-in' from wider society.

Another challenge is giving a voice to constituencies that have the most to gain or lose from any future settlement but find themselves marginalized from the peace process in its current structure: the Armenians of Nagorny Karabakh and Azerbaijanis displaced from Karabakh and the surrounding regions. Displaced Azerbaijani populations in particular have fewer opportunities than most to influence the peace process, leading to disenchantment and radicalization.

2. Understanding, then engaging de facto states

• Reframe the negotiations to enable appropriate engagement of Nagorny Karabakh in the formal talks
• Explore options for informal or semi-official contact between the Armenians of Nagorny Karabakh and Azerbaijanis.

Rethink prior strategies

De facto but unrecognized states remain key players in the politics of the South Caucasus. Their continued existence poses challenges to strategies for the region's economic and political development. I n excluding Nagorny Karabakh, the formal peace process has institutionalized the interests and fears of the states party to the conflict in ways that narrow the field of stakeholders in its final outcome.

There is a need to rethink the commonly used metaphor of 'frozen' to describe South Caucasian conflicts. While the Karabakh conflict continues to evolve and change, it is the peace process in its current structure that has 'frozen' a framework of state-to-state relationships preserving the asymmetries that are a source of conflict. This structure has both shielded Azerbaijan from necessary engagement with the de facto state in Nagorny Karabakh and advanced the latter's integration with Armenia. Preferences for state-to-state relationships have likewise offered no point of entry into the peace process for displaced Azerbaijani populations.

Understand de facto interlocutors

De facto states represent an institutionalized form of non-state actor, which offers numerous opportunities for engagement. They have clearly defined institutional structures, leaderships and, to varying extents, display degrees of pluralism and competition within their internal political orders. There are important benefits to be gained by encouraging pluralism within de facto states and engaging with internal political developments as a means of supporting prospects for constructive dialogue.

Legitimacy concerns

De jure states have understandable concerns that engagement with de facto states will be interpreted as conferring legitimacy on the latter and thereby strengthen their case for secession. However, there are many options for unofficial or semi-official forms of engagement, some of which could build on the resource of pre-war relationships between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. This is a finite resource, which will soon no longer be available to mutually isolated younger generations raised on propaganda.

Constructive engagement

Constructive engagement requires Azerbaijan to reframe its relationship with the Armenians of Karabakh. This would demand a rethink of current strategies of isolating, blockading and demonizing this population. In turn, it would require serious debate in Nagorny Karabakh and Armenia regarding the strategic costs and benefits of continued occupation or withdrawal from the occupied territories.

3. Developing civil society's role in peacebuilding.

• Offer support for marginalized groups to play a role in peacebuilding.
• Improve state-non-state cooperation in supporting peacebuilding initiatives.
• Support independent media initiatives to promote informed debate.

Participation

In many peace processes civil societies have played a central role in articulating societal aspirations, determining negotiating agendas on both substantive and procedural issues and in mediating between states and societies. Yet peacebuilding work has remained marginal to the remits embraced by civil societies in the region. In Armenia and Azerbaijan this is attributable to the prioritization of other issues, while in Karabakh civil society development is also curtailed by international isolation.

International support

International actors play a key role in supporting civil society capacity to engage in peacebuilding, but these efforts needs to be comprehensive and inclusive of all stakeholders. Disparities in civil society development mean disparities in peacebuilding capacity. It is crucial to reach out to marginalized communities, especially displaced Azerbaijani populations, and to broach taboo themes. There is also urgent need for greater cooperation between international state and non-state actors in civil society and development work; this is a shortfall acknowledged in the work of the UK government funded Consortium Initiative, though significant scope for further work remains.

Practitioners and policymakers need to have realistic expectations of civil societies' peacebuilding potential. Representatives of civil societies in Armenia and Azerbaijan, while sharing a commitment to dialogue, hold radically different visions of justice and the future of Nagorny Karabakh. Reconciling competing visions of justice - and indeed coupling the concepts of 'justice' and 'peace' - within a shared framework of a commitment to non-violence represents an important additional challenge.

Role of the media

Across the region the media remain largely harnessed to incumbent regimes. State-run media form a key pillar in the dissemination of simplified versions of the conflict and the institutionalization of taboos on discussion of possible compromises. Greater interest in and support of non-state media outlets in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Karabakh is required to secure the necessary autonomy for the media to promote sufficient public awareness of the issues at stake and instigate meaningful debates on the peace process.

4. Differentiating original and subsequent causes

• Counter the militarization of political culture.
• Factor in the impact and interests of informal trade on a possible settlement of the conflict.
• Hold political leaderships to their international commitments to rights and freedoms.

'No war, no peace'

Practitioners and policymakers need to be aware of the self-sustaining causes of the current stalemate (commonly referred to as the 'no war, no peace' context), which are qualitatively different from the sources of the original conflict. To an extent this situation derives from external influences, however, there are dynamics in these societies that need to be understood and acted upon if peace initiatives are to succeed.

These dynamics include:

The militarization of political culture

Militarization contracts the space available for civil politics and imposes a culture of political homogenization that undermines democracy. In promoting militant rhetoric, leaders leave themselves little room for discussion of the compromises that any peace settlement must involve. The resulting taboos then form an important resource to regimes wishing to preserve their monopoly on the peace process.

Development of informal authorities and illicit trade

Despite the formal blockades, unregulated trade continues between Armenia and Azerbaijan; new networks of local service and goods providers are generated outside formal institutional channels, contributing to a governance problem. Addressing the relative weight and interests of these 'illegitimate' networks compared to the 'legitimate' business community must be a necessary corollary of any broader peace agreement.

External interests

Geopolitical interests have significantly influenced vectors of economic and political development in ways that entrench fault lines deriving from the conflict and feed into the stalemate. This is evident, for instance, in the geopolitical agenda represented by the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, solidifying an alliance between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey that isolates Armenia and Karabakh. Similar dynamics fuel competing routes for rail and road links, questioning the internal coherence of the region. Enthusiasm for regionalism within the South Caucasus may vary - yet the choice to pursue or reject regionalist agendas should come from within the region and not proceed from the interests of outside powers.

Challenging stereotypes

There is an urgent need to challenge the stereotypes on which the mythologies of the conflict are based. Policymakers must be fully aware of these and of the importance of international frames of reference (such as the 'war on terror') feeding into them. Policymakers may also be more stringent in utilizing leverage deriving from Azerbaijan's and Armenia's international commitments to fundamental rights and freedoms in combating the impact of negative stereotyping of the 'other'.

5. Resource management and peacebuilding

• Support the equitable internal investment of Azerbaijan's oil resources.
• Encourage conflict sensitive economic cooperation between local business communities and among larger regional players.
• Prioritize support for accountable and broad-based governance over 'stability at any price'.

Oil and development

The strategic significance of the South Caucasus lies mainly in the development of Caspian oil reserves, many of which fall under Azerbaijan's jurisdiction. A key issue is whether Azerbaijan's oil resource can be utilized in ways compatible with peace or to support its military build up. Azerbaijan faces a stark choice: the development of a skewed and corrupt oil economy, risking widespread social discontent among those not cocooned by the oil industry, or the development of a more balanced economy. In the second scenario, a more equitable distribution of revenues could make peace more compelling and open the path to Azerbaijan's transformation into a hub for regional development.

Business and peacebuilding

Peacebuilding NGOs have an important role to play in supporting outward looking business communities to engage with one another across conflict divides. Economic cooperation and development in the longer term will benefit from regional approaches taking in the regions' de jure and de facto states, as well as Russia, Turkey and Iran. Excluding antagonists from economic development initiatives may serve tactical goals, but in the long-term will incur costs for all parties.

Geopolitics or state-society relations?

Geopolitical interests have been predominant in foreign policy orientations towards the South Caucasus in recent years. 'Stability at any price' appears to be an important corollary of this approach. Unfortunately it is domestic societies that must pay that price. Elsewhere in the world propping up regimes with questionable legitimacy but control over strategic resources has been proven a short-sighted policy. Rather, it is the reform of state-society relations and the appearance of broad-based governments with robust mandates that offers the greatest chance of a stable, prosperous and peaceful South Caucasus. These concerns are all the more pressing given that the region is rapidly developing into a European periphery and may in the future border the eastern boundaries of the European Union. Practitioners and policymakers should prioritize the internal coherence of South Caucasian states over their roles as conduits for resources. To do otherwise would indeed be a false economy.

CR is an NGO with over ten years' experience in international conflict transformation work. It is a participant in the Consortium Initiative group of NGOs working on the Nagorny Karabakh conflict and has been working in the Caucasus for nine years.

For further information or for a copy of The limits of leadership: elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process, please contact Jonathan Cohen or Sarah Wheeler at:

Conciliation Resources
173 Upper Street
London N1 1RG
UK
Tel: +44 (0)20 7359 7728
Email: accord@c-r.org

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