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Topic 9 Armed groups and the transition to conventional politics A recurring issue in the Northern Ireland peace process has been the future of paramilitary groups, and this has often been a concern in other peace process. The immediate focus has been the question of decommissioning their weapons or putting them beyond use. Other issues such as amnesty for other paramilitary actions have not been directly tackled and punishment is possible though unlikely under the Belfast Agreement. The release of paramilitary members from prison has been implemented as part of the Agreement. However, the paramilitary groups have not been willing to decommission and other parties have been unwilling that paramilitary groups and those associated with them should gain any benefits from the process if the weapons issue has not been resolved. This has meant a series of stalemates that have been overcome by formula which have promised future decommissioning. However in the end it became increasingly difficult to find such formula when decommissioning has not resulted from previous arrangements. In consequence decommissioning and political progress became inextricably linked and in a way the paramilitary groups, though small in numbers have the ability to exercise a veto on political progress. This is probably not a scenario that the politicians desired. Ideally the decommissioning issue and the future of the armed groups could be dealt with as a separate strand from the development and implementation of new political arrangements. The extracts below outline the arguments for early decommissioning, while the last extract is a reminder of the difficulty of achieving it. Exercise 1 Consider the arguments for and against early decommissioning. Set up a debate on the issue. 1. Divide participants into two parts, one to argue the case for decommissioning, the other arguing for its postponement. (5 minutes) 2. Each group prepares its case, using the actual positions shown in the extracts, and also considering the weakness in the alternative position. (15 minutes) 3. Hold a debate. (20 minutes) 4. In the whole group, discuss the debate and consider which arguments seem most valid. (15 minutes) Exercise 2 Consider the internal debate in the republican community about decommissioning. 1. As a group, identify the important considerations that have made it difficult to decommission. (10 minutes) 2. Which of these arguments are symbolic and which are concerns of substance (i.e. would weaken the position of the republican movement in future negotiations and the political process). (10 minutes) 3. If the leadership of the republican movement thought that decommissioning was advisable, how might they convince their doubting members that this was the right way forward? (10 minutes) 4. Role-play a meeting between the republican leadership and doubtful members at which the leadership tries to convince the members that decommissioning is the way forward. (10 minutes) Exercise 3 Consider the internal debate in the unionist community about decommissioning. 1. As a group, identify the important considerations that have made it difficult to accept the postponement of decommissioning. (10 minutes) 2. Which of these arguments are symbolic and which are concerns of substance (i.e. would weaken the position of unionist in the political process). (10 minutes) 3. If the unionist leadership thought that the postponement of decommissioning was necessary, how might they convince their doubting members that this was the right way forward? (10 minutes) 4. Role-play a meeting between the unionist leadership and doubtful members at which the leadership tries to convince the members that the postponement of decommissioning is the way forward. (10 minutes) Exercise 4 Is it possible to satisfy unionists in some other way that decommissioning is being dealt with? Might it be possible to establish a demilitarisation body to deal with all the issues of the transition from a situation of armed confrontation? Can the absence of violence and commitment to non-violent political methods be strengthened to act as the guarantee for the political process? 1. Prepare a briefing paper for the Secretary of State on ways in which it might be possible to separate the decommissioning issue from the political process. (30 minutes) 2. In a group, share the proposals in the briefing paper and discuss how effective might be the steps proposed. (10 minutes) Extracts The DUP has never accepted that negotiations can be fair if around the table there is a party that has at its back a paramilitary terrorist organization with access to a massive stockpile of armaments. Negotiations on that basis are conducted with a gun metaphorically pointed at the heads of the other parties who come armed only with their electoral mandates. The issue of decommissioning has never been properly dealt with at any stage leading up to the talks or since. It has been fudged and pushed down the line at every juncture of the negotiating process. Initially the requirement of the British government was that a substantial amount of illegal guns and explosives had to be handed in before Sinn Féin could enter talks. This was changed to a requirement for a token beginning to decommissioning by the Secretary of State Sir Patrick Mayhew, in a speech in Washington on 7 March 1997. The setting up of an International Decommissioning Body under George Mitchell to examine the issue was announced in an Anglo-Irish communiqué of 28 November 1995, but it resulted in yet further concessions to the republican movement. All sections of the Northern Ireland community must feel at ease with each other. The psychological barriers of distrust and lack of confidence must be broken down. There is no place in a functioning democracy for equivocation on violence or the threat of violence. The right to be in government carries with it a responsibility: the responsibility to demonstrate absolute commitment to peace, democracy and therefore stability. It goes beyond accepted international norms for a political section of any movement to participate in the government of a region when its paramilitary section has done no more than declare a ceasefire: the threat of a return to violence by the IRA is still undiminished. The UUP had demanded that IRA decommissioning of weapons take place before Sinn Féin representatives could assume their seats in government, though no such demand was in the Agreement. Indeed, Sinn Féin representatives stated that if it had been they could not have delivered any weapons or the referendum “yes” vote.
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