Northern Ireland: Topic 8 - Managing the process of implementation

It is tempting to assume that reaching an Agreement is the hard part and implementing the Agreement should be straightforward. That does not seem to be the common practice in many disputes. This is particularly the case in many recent political conflicts as the agreements are often a framework which it is hoped will provide the conflicting parties with structures and arrangements to work out many aspects of their future relationship in the longer term. The Belfast Agreement is no exception and as a result the parties have continued to dispute with each other over the implementation. They want to ensure that it is implemented in ways that do not damage their interests. There have been a series of negotiations about implementation, most of which have not been very effective, and further lessons can be drawn from this about different approaches to negotiation.

The extracts below from McWilliams and Fearon describe the obstacles that arose in the implementation of the Agreement and a number of attempts to overcome them, while the final extracts suggest more successful approaches.

Exercise 1

Imagine that you are advising the British and Irish premiers on the most appropriate approaches that they should adopt.

1. On the basis of the experience described in the extracts, in a group make a list of dos and don’ts that the premiers or the secretary of state could use as guidance in their future efforts. (15 minutes)

2. Individually rank each list in order from the most critical practices to the less important. (5 minutes)

3. Share the lists with other group members and make an agreed ranking order. (15 minutes)

Exercise 2

1. Compare the descriptions of the meetings organised by the British and Irish governments in the earlier extracts below with the description of the Review and the meetings about the civic forum in the later extracts. (5 minutes)
2. In groups identify the main differences between the different approaches. (10 minutes)
3. Which differences were most significant for the effectiveness of the processes? (10 minutes)
4. Is it possible to identify a specific feature that characterises the nature of each type of process? (10 minutes)
5. On the basis of the discussion give a specific name to each type of process. (5 minutes)

Exercise 3

Most of those involved would probably support an open reflective process in which all parties have a chance to think through the issues and come to prudent and considered conclusions that they know will have the support of their constituencies. Yet the extracts show that often individuals and parties seemed to be looking for short-term advantage and hoped to be able to bring pressure to bear on others to compromise. Why should this happen so often?

1. On the basis of the extracts and your personal experience think of the pressures on the parties involved in the process. (5 minutes)

2. In groups share and agree what are the main pressures to reach an agreement quickly?

3. Are there other factors in the nature of the process and of politics that encourage the type of approaches described in the extracts? (10 minutes)

4. Look at the experience of the Review and the negotiations on the Civic Forum and see if the pressures and tendencies you identified in steps 2 and 3 seem to have had less impact. (10 minutes)

5. How could one minimize the effect of these pressures and tendencies in the political process? (10 minutes) The people who were negotiating around that table, even though they had been in a talks process for over two years and had been on the same side for the referendum campaign, did not know each other. During the process steered by Mitchell, there had been structured and facilitated listening, if not dialogue, between parties, but the process had never required them to form personal relationships. Trips abroad sponsored by international non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations had provided opportunities for interpersonal contact, but the potential, certainly between Sinn Féin and UUP members, was not realised on return to Northern Ireland. Given this context, the [first UUP/Sinn Féin] meeting appeared to be a relative success. After it was over though, Trimble travelled to Downing Street to lobby the Prime Minister. The pattern of dealing with the Prime Minister and sidelining the Secretary of State had been established in the discussions over the number of new departments. Having set the precedent on that occasion, the Prime Minister was to continue in the same vein over the next few months, so that he became the facilitator in bilateral discussions about acceptable arrangements to allow the implementation of the agreement with Sinn Féin, the SDLP and the UUP. On occasion, the Irish government would also be present in Downing Street.

Extracts

These meetings culminated on three occasions - in April, May and July 1999 - in intensive negotiations held in Hillsborough, Downing Street and Stormont involving the two premiers. At the same time, the Secretary of State and her Minister of State convened a parallel process in Belfast, holding round table meetings with all participants. These became problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, while the SDLP and Sinn Féin sent high level delegations (Hume and Adams appeared at least once), Trimble never appeared for the UUP. Trimble’s non-appearance and the personnel changes to the UUP delegations caused Sinn Féin to stop sending its top people. Secondly, the government, which chaired and participated in the meetings, was reluctant to have parties commit their positions to paper. Thirdly, the governments did not prepare an agenda. The round table meetings tended to be open sessions for restating opening positions on the subject and were undermined by a sense that the “real business” was being conducted at Downing Street with a much narrower range of participants.
Monica McWilliams and Kate Fearon (Women’s Coalition)

INTER–PARTY TENSIONS

The two ministers were required to produce a report detailing new administrative departments and cross-border implementation bodies. On the face of it, this was a relatively straightforward task and the consultation recreated the inclusive process of the previous negotiations. It was conducted bilaterally and round table meetings with all participants did not occur on a regular basis. An initial discussion paper detailing a number of options was produced in August, but as it continued into September and October the process of implementation only served to provide new opportunities to play out old battles. The dual roles of Trimble and Mallon - as Assembly ministers representing all the people of Northern Ireland and as leaders of their parties - meant that they were unable to focus on overall implementation alone when serving their constituents as well.
Monica McWilliams and Kate Fearon (Women’s Coalition)

In contrast, the process that decided the composition of the Civic Forum, which was to act as a consultative mechanism on social, economic and cultural issues, was conducted in a more businesslike manner. A working group was established, comprising one representative of each of the political parties, with senior civil servants forming the secretariat. Representatives on this group tended to be of junior rank, reflecting the lower political importance given to it by the bigger parties, and included more women (four out of seven regular attendees). An initial paper was produced by the secretariat and the representatives discussed and amended it at frequent meetings over a two-month period. This is not to say these negotiations were easier - they were not - but there was a commitment to discuss the issues until they were resolved and as many round table meetings as necessary were held.
Monica McWilliams and Kate Fearon (Women’s Coalition)

The value of the review was that it provided enough sustained contact between parties to enable them to respond positively to the opportunities for mutual understanding that its final phases provided. The improving relationship between the UUP and Sinn Féin was consolidated in week ten when Mitchell invited all the parties to London to spend some time informally at the residence of the US Ambassador to Britain.

The final phase of the Mitchell’s review was designed to create trust-building opportunities that could be reciprocated immediately. When the parties, especially Sinn Féin and the UUP, saw that taking small risks, like issuing helpful statements, fostered the build-up of trust they realized that, collectively for the first time, they could prepare the ground on which bigger decisions had to be taken. The series of incremental steps worked like closing a zip fastener, locking in each stage interdependently. Thus, when the time came to make bigger decisions about the establishment of an executive, the party leaderships were more convinced of each others’ honest intentions and more prepared to sell the deal to their respective constituencies. Once this process started, it rapidly developed momentum.
Monica McWilliams and Kate Fearon (Women’s Coalition)

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