Topic 3
Building confidence
Confidence building refers to attempts by a party to a conflict to indicate to its opponents that it is genuinely committed to finding an agreed solution to the conflict.
In considering the need to challenge existing assumptions (Topic 2) it appears that the protagonists in the Northern Ireland conflict believed that their opponents had no interest in reaching a collaborative settlement. As in most conflicts the parties suspected that their opponents were being devious and underhand even when they tried to make conciliatory statements or behave in a conciliatory manner. Therefore it is difficult to find ways to demonstrate the commitment that may exist. Attempts to send such messages to opponents are sometimes known as "signalling".
Often in the Northern Ireland peace process demands were made for one or other party to take certain actions to build confidence - decommissioning would be one example. However this approach seldom works. Most groups resist having to respond to demands, so often the demand is not met. Even when it is, it seldom has the desired impact because it is easy to doubt the motivation behind the action or statement. Maybe it was only done to satisfy the demand. Christopher Mitchell has studied the use of signals and has identified some features of a signal that help it to give confidence. He concludes that it will be more effective if, for example:
- it is unsolicited;
- it is done out of free will;
- it has no immediate benefit, such as a reciprocal gesture or concession;
- it in some way weakens your own position;
- it is not easy to reverse afterwards.
The first five extracts below give examples of some of the possible ways in which confidence was built or could have been strengthened before and during the Stormont negotiations. The use of agreed public statements that set down the positions of the parties was a striking tactic in the process. The paramilitary ceasefires also had the potential to build confidence. The later extracts shows how easily the limited confidence that exists is easily eroded. Compare this with the reference to Tony Blair's speech in the Dodds extract. Attempts to apply pressure can have a negative effect.
Exercise 1
1. Read the extracts below. (5 minutes)
2. List the actions and statements that are mentioned in the extract as possible ways to build confidence. (10 minutes)
3. Assess them against Mitchell's suggested criteria for an effective signal. Mark each one in relation to each of Mitchellís criteria. (20 minutes)
4. On the basis of Mitchell's criteria, select the proposed signal that was most likely to be effective. (5 minutes)
Exercise 2
What do parties want that gives them confidence in the potential for co-operative negotiations? The extract below refers to the statement that was made by the UK Secretary of State for Northern Ireland that the UK government had no selfish, economic or strategic interest in Northern Ireland and the circumstances in which the statement was made. Mansergh shows that this was designed to demonstrate to the republican movement that the government is prepared to be flexible about negotiations and their outcome and does not set down any preconditions.
1. Through group discussion consider what else the republican movement might have wanted the government to do or say which would have helped to give that impression. (30 minutes)
2. Assess how easy it would have been for the government to do each of the acts that the group has listed. (15 minutes)
Exercise 3
Mansergh shows how the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland was encouraged by the Irish government and the SDLP to make the statement that the UK government had no selfish, economic or strategic interest in Northern Ireland. Do you think that it was easy for the Secretary of State to make that statement? What considerations would have gone through his mind? Imagine the discussions that went on in his private office about whether the statement should be made and if so how it would be presented. Act out the situation as a role-play if you wish. (30 minutes)
Extracts
From clarification to ceasefire‚ in order to further encourage the IRA to move to a ceasefire a number of confidence-building gestures were made, notably the lifting of broadcasting restrictions in the Republic and the admission of Adams to the United States on a short visa.
Martin Mansergh (Fianna Fáil)
After the election in May 1997 Blair cleared the table of the wreckage of past negotiations and deprived the republican movement of excuses for violence. He accepted an independent investigation into Bloody Sunday, when fourteen unarmed civilians were shot dead by British soldiers in January 1972. Within a fortnight Blair visited Northern Ireland to deliver a keynote speech which signalled that the Union was safe - probably for generations. This also helped sustain the loyalist ceasefire that had held since October 1994 despite the IRA's return to violence.
Harry Barnes (Labour Party) and Gary Kent
The experience gained in breaking down the policy of treating prisoners as criminals following the 1981 Hunger Strike had instilled confidence in the movementís leadership. Another source of confidence was that the IRA was leaving the field intact on its own terms: unbroken and unbowed. This was of immense psychological importance to an organization that had suffered military defeat in previous campaigns.
Séan Mag Uidhir (Republican)
With ideas crystallizing around the concept of a joint declaration by Taoiseach and Prime Minister, John Hume presented Taoiseach Charles Haughey in October 1991 with the sketch of a draft declaration - an idea supported by Gerry Adams, the President of Sinn Féin......... These ideas were developed by the Irish government and the exchange of papers continued under the new Taoiseach Albert Reynolds.
Martin Mansergh (Fianna Fáil)
In March 1994, after a long pause, IRA violence resumed but work continued on a framework document between the two governments to provide a foundation for resumed political talks.
Martin Mansergh (Fianna Fáil)
The Downing Street Declaration of December 1993 was a set of foundation principles that the governments believed would safeguard the vital interests of both sides of the community in Northern Ireland. The Framework Documents of February 1995 were intended to be the basis upon which agreement would be built but were universally rejected by unionism which could not allow its negotiating base to be limited or defined by the terms of any agreement reached behind its back without either consultation or consent.
Nigel Dodds (Democratic Unionist Party)
Republicans were rapidly coming to the conclusion that the political process at that time offered no potential to end the conflict ó with a weak Tory government in London and Bruton at the helm in Dublin. The British stalling tactics and what was seen as duplicity were beginning to erode the unity of the republican movement and this factor too weighed heavily on the decision to resume the armed campaign. There was an air of inevitability within Republican ranks that there would be yet another round of warfare.
Séan Mag Uidhir (Republican)
The talks between Martin McGuinness and British officials had become both insulting and damaging, as the British government refused to get involved some seven months after the cessation. Sinn Féin's strategy was sending out the wrong signals to the republican base.
The next nail in the cessationís coffin was the British governmentís reversal of previous decisions to ban Orange parades along the Ormeau Road in Belfast and Garvaghy Road in Portadown. Nationalists all over the North saw the triumphalism of Ian Paisley and David Trimble in Portadown as a humiliation. It rekindled a feeling that despite twenty-five years of conflict nationalists still didnít count in the eyes of a British government faced with loyalist violence and Orange pressure.
Séan Mag Uidhir (Republican)
However, the position was complicated on the British governmentís side by its narrow parliamentary majority and consequent growing dependence on the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) for its maintenance in office until 1997. Far from being influenced towards more direct engagement with the republican movement by bombs that caused considerable damage in the City of London in the spring of 1993, the government concluded an informal political alliance with the Ulster Unionists in the summer of 1993.
Martin Mansergh (Fianna Fáil)
Anti-Agreement unionists have claimed that there has been a loss of confidence in the Agreement among unionists since April 1998, though this is only partly reflected in opinion poll data. There has been an actual loss of confidence by pro-Agreement unionist representatives who have to deal with the vociferous anti-Agreement unionists. Each attempt to break through the issue of the establishment of an executive has resulted in further loss of faith in the Agreement by the UUP members in the Assembly. It is true to say that some issues were not addressed explicitly at the time the Agreement was negotiated. But it was hoped that the process of implementation would provide all parties with the opportunity to become part of a shared project and enable trust to be built up sufficiently so as either to make the issue of decommissioning less important or to make it easier to for both parties to move. But for that to happen and for the Agreement to be implemented fully greater sustained overall management, not fire-fighting, was required.
Monica McWilliams and Kate Fearon (Womenís Coalition)
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