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Topic 13 The relevance of popular consent and the contribution of civil society In the second extract below Thomas Abraham argues that “Perhaps the most striking part of the Northern Ireland Agreement has been the way the principle of consent has been woven into its every strand.” Not only did the Agreement have to be supported by a majority of the political parties but also it had to gain the support of the majority of the population in Northern Ireland and in the Irish State before it could be implemented. And it was agreed that now and in the future the constitutional position of Northern Ireland would be determined by the wishes of the people. This should reassure the public that they have some control over their destiny and even those who are unhappy about the current choice of the majority have the possibility of changing that choice by democratic means rather than by force. “We are all part of the problem or part of the solution.” This common maxim reminds us that if we do nothing we still have an impact for better or worse. It is therefore important that the community has a good understanding of the nature of issues so that they can make an informed choice and influence the political process in ways that truly reflect their interests. They may also be better able to respects the interests of others. How can an informed public debate about the issues be promoted? It has been noted that Northern Ireland has a remarkably vibrant community sector, but for many years that did not seem to be sufficient to have a positive impact on the resolution of the conflict. Other conditions were also necessary. Exercise 1 Extracts 5 and 6 below suggest that in the past there were strong views in the community about the situation but little debate about the options for the future. Why should this be? 1. If possible obtain a copy of the song “Whatever you say, say nothing” by Colum Sands and listen to it together. (5 minutes) 2. Is your own experience similar to the song in the sense that important issues are often avoided by social groups to which you belong? (5 minutes) 3. In general why do you think that important issues are often not discussed? Are there other reasons why the community has not play a more active role? (10 minutes) Exercise 2 1. As a group, list opportunities that exist for social groups to engage in discussion and debate? Where do people normally have discussions with others? (5 minutes) 2. Which of the opportunities that you identified could be used to initiate discussion of important political issues such as the Northern Ireland peace process. (5 minutes) 3. Suggest ways in which discussion might be stimulated. (10 minutes) 4. Try out some of your ideas in mini role-plays with one group member using one of your ideas and the rest of the group responding as they feel appropriate. Change round with different group members trying other ways to initiate the discussion. Exercise 3 Individually prepare a strategic plan the aim of which is to encourage greater public discussion and debate about political and constitutional options for Northern Ireland. The aim is not to promote any specific option for future development (30 minutes). In order to write the plan deal with the following points that could form the sub-headings in your plan:
Exercise 4 In the peace process most people only expressed their views at the referendum. However there are many other ways to make one’s views known and to influence politicians and others. 1. Brainstorm ways in which a group could make its views public and gain support for its ideas. (10 minutes) 2. Evaluate those, which you feel would be most effective? (10 minutes) 3. Consider the most appropriate time for expressing ones views in order to have the maximum impact. (10 minutes) Extracts There has been a remarkable consistency of policy between successive British governments on the key concept of consent — that Northern Ireland should determine its own destiny. Furthermore, the idea that a British government should become a “persuader” to edge unionists towards Irish Unity was never accepted. Perhaps the most striking part of the Northern Ireland Agreement has been the way the principle of consent has been woven into its every strand. The essence of the Agreement is that the future of the province can only be determined by the consent of its people. What is important is that this consent is not mechanically defined as agreement by the majority of the population, but instead as an agreement by the majority of people in both the Protestant and Catholic communities. In other words, Northern Ireland’s future can only be determined on the basis of a genuinely popular consensus that would cut across communal and sectarian divisions. The Northern Ireland agreement was arrived at through negotiations, endorsed by a popular referendum and backed by the international community. This is a pattern of conflict resolution that is worth emulating. The British and Irish governments made a commitment that, in the new British—Irish Agreement replacing the Anglo—Irish Agreement, they will, firstly “recognize the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland.” Secondly, they will ‘“recognize that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and without external impediment, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, accepting that this right must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland.” Thirdly, they will “acknowledge that while a substantial section of the people in Northern Ireland share the legitimate wish of a majority of the people of the island of Ireland for a united Ireland, the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, freely exercised and legitimate, is to maintain the Union.” The other parties to the talks endorsed that commitment. At the beginning of the Troubles both communities had only limited opportunities for developing a broader political understanding of the situation and street politics remained largely a reflection of traditional sectarian loyalties and identities. Most sectors of society, including the churches, were themselves divided about the most appropriate response to the conflict and in these circumstances intransigent voices are dominant. Perhaps it was inevitable that violence would muffle the voices of those who support accommodation. Intransigent voices speak a simpler and more forceful message that is easier to understand than the more intricate and less obvious arguments in favour of co-operation and dialogue. It has always been difficult for civil society in Northern Ireland to open up a broader middle ground where a settlement is more likely to be found. Corrymeela members were scattered throughout society and were encouraged to work in their own neighbourhoods and local associations to challenge the prevailing nature of politics. It was also one of the few civil society groups which tried to build links and enter into dialogue with political parties. The politicians for their part tended to dismiss activists in civil society as naive or unwilling to get involved in the messy compromises of real politics. Overall these initiatives had limited direct impact though it is probable that indirectly they contributed to the development of a climate where new ideas could be explored. Initiative ‘92 ‘s lasting contribution may have been its efforts to encourage community groups and individuals to think and discuss the options for the future. As a result the wider community began to have greater confidence in putting forward its views and engaging with the political process and politicians from which it had felt alienated for so long. Most support for peace rallies occurred just before the paramilitary ceasefires in 1994 and after the breakdown of the IRA ceasefire in 1996, but not during the negotiations when they might have provided encouragement for the politicians. It seems that those in favour of an end to violence were worried that public action might make the situation worse and only got involved when the situation looked very bad. Throughout ‘the Troubles’ opponents of accommodation have made their views known by assembling outside buildings where significant political meetings where taking place. Now those who supported political co-operation and accommodation also began to appear. Their presence reinforced the realization that there was support for inclusive politics. This message was perhaps most important for those opposed to the peace process. Once the Belfast Agreement had been achieved, it had to be ratified by a referendum, and this presented another opportunity for civil society to make its voice heard. The anti-agreement ‘No’ campaign was more vociferous and the pro-Agreement political parties were rather half-hearted in their campaigning. A civil society ‘Yes” Campaign was quickly organised with members of Initiative ‘92 at its core, and they attempted to create a popular campaign involving local celebrities. The will for a settlement did exist and had some influence over politicians.
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