Topic 12
The value of an inclusive process
A number of the authors argue strongly for the value of involving all parties and indicate the arrangements that tried to ensure an inclusive process (see extracts below). See also the extracts in topic 4 (“establishing acceptable negotiation arrangements”) where some of the authors argue for restrictions on participation.
However it is evident from some of the extracts that at a number of key points the focus of the negotiations was restricted to a few key individuals. It is often said that in a negotiation process all the parties which have a veto over the outcome must be involved and in this case all the attention was given to those parties whose consent was needed to make the arrangements work. However, this can mean that other parties are excluded because they do not have a veto over the outcome because they have little power. Or they may not want to exercise a veto because they are already committed to a positive outcome and will support any reasonable proposals. But the extracts below show how their participation may be very helpful. Inclusiveness can moreover refer to the participation not only of the leadership and key individuals but also the wider party. There are also examples from the peace process when leaders accepted a proposal without the involvement of their party as a whole and then found they could not get the party’s support.
Exercise 1
1. Consider the extracts below and individually list the benefits of involving as many parties as possible in negotiations. (10 minutes)
2. Share the lists in the full group and make a common list. (5 minutes)
3. As a group make a list the possible objections to the participation of a large number of parties - perhaps related to the impact on the negotiation process or perhaps related to the perceived self interest of one or more of the larger and more powerful parties. (10 minutes)
4. Compare the two lists and decide the relative advantages of each approach. How do you think the problems caused by an inclusive approach could be overcome? (15 minutes)
Exercise 2
It is pointed out that in implementing the Belfast Agreement the benefits of including all parties was often over looked and there was “no internal or external encouragement to maintain an inclusive implementation process until the Mitchell Review.”
1. As a group think of ways in which parties locked in a disagreements could appreciate that it might be in their own interest to involve other parties. (10 minutes)
2. What external encouragement could be given to parties in dispute to involve other parties? (10 minutes)
3. Could effective structures and rules and procedures be created which would ensure that all parties are kept involved at all times? (10 minutes)
Exercise 3
1. As a group identify the parties that at times were ignored during the implementation of the Belfast Agreement. (5 minutes)
2. Which parties do you think were overlooked because their support could be relied upon and which parties were overlooked because their support was not necessary? Were both of these factors true for some parties? (10 minutes)
3. On the assumption that their participation is useful how could smaller parties increase their significance and influence to ensure that they are involved fully? (15 minutes)
Extracts
Problems did not derive from the number of parties involved and unproductive bilateral meetings show that having a smaller number of parties would not necessarily have improved communication. Indeed earlier talks involving four parties suffered from a similar syndrome.
The large number of parties in fact helped communications on several counts. The negotiations were more inclusive, with the widest span of democratic representation ever involved. This helped to differentiate the process from previous failed initiatives and underlined that “ownership of the process” was not just for the larger parties.
Mark Durkan (SDLP)
The process of implementation would require as much, if not more, concentrated energy as the process of negotiation that produced it. The question of their entitlement to participate in that process had been carefully constructed. To begin with, and in contrast to past attempts to cut a historic deal, the process had gone beyond the traditional elites for participants. Holding elections to determine entitlement to attend the talks had ensured a process that was grounded in inclusion. Not all participants had been keen to include other parties despite their democratic mandates, but it was not until all interests were represented around the table that things had begun to move.
Monica McWilliams and Kate Fearon (Women’s Coalition)
The importance of maintaining an inclusive process was overlooked. Very few round-table meetings were held, and the number of parties involved in the process of negotiating on this part of the Agreement was reduced to just the SDLP and the UUP. There has been no internal or external encouragement to maintain an inclusive implementation process until the Mitchell Review.
Monica McWilliams and Kate Fearon (Women’s Coalition)
An inclusive consultative process with an increased number of participants would have made the process more open and transparent and enabled participants to verify any statements made by the parties at the centre of the dispute. Broadening the scope of the discussions would have shifted the focus away from the hostile UUP/SDLP axis, softened the glare of the media spotlight and made it easier to agree details that may have been unpalatable to the main players.
Monica McWilliams and Kate Fearon (Women’s Coalition)
At Hillsborough in March initial discussions were conducted between the UUP, SDLP and Sinn Féin. Other pro-Agreement parties were not involved until the negotiations had been going on for almost a day. The two governments did not on that occasion recall the lesson from the writing of the Agreement that people are much more likely to support something they have had a hand in creating.
Monica McWilliams and Kate Fearon (Women’s Coalition)
The Hillsborough Declaration, which was drawn up after an all-night negotiating session, envisaged a way forward which would see some weapons put “beyond use” together with a timetable for running the díHondt procedure, and a collective act of reconciliation. But there was never a first, let alone a final round table discussion where all parties could gauge the feasibility of the deal. The governments met all parties individually and then went out to announce the deal to a waiting world media on 1 April. The deal, however, quickly fell apart, as the realization dawned that not all the consent that the governments claimed for it was actually there.
Monica McWilliams and Kate Fearon (Women’s Coalition)
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