Topic 11
Role of governments
In some ways the position of a government in a peace process seems paradoxical. On the one hand it has all the authority and resources, military and financial of the state behind it. On the other hand in the peace process it has limited opportunities to assert itself and the parties may be immune to threats or inducements if their basic concerns are not met. The Northern Ireland peace process is but one example of the dilemmas that face governments.
The extracts suggest that at times the governments worked through agreed procedures and at others relied on personal contacts. It also seems that at times the governments took a very proactive stance and tried to carry the local political parties along, while at others they seemed constrained. The final extract gives one explanation of why the governments may have preferred not to take the initiative.
In February the British Secretary of State took on another role when it seemed that the Assembly might collapse. He suspended the Assembly, accepted the resulting criticism and was prepared to be the scapegoat for the problems at that time. This avoided to some degree recriminations between the local parties about who was responsible for the problems.
Exercise 1
1. In a group identify the constraints on the British and Irish Governments, using the information in the extracts and your own judgement. Were they different for each government? Did they change over time? (15 minutes)
2. What means did they use to deal with the constraints? Were they effective? (10 minutes)
3. Can you identify other ways they might have been able to deal with them? (10 minutes)
Exercise 2
The two governments would acknowledge the value of an open reflective process in which all parties have a chance to think through the issues and come to prudent and considered conclusions that they know will have the support of their constituencies. Yet the extracts show that often the approach adopted was more insistent and individual parties were targeted to make compromises. It seems that sometimes individual leaders were persuaded to accept proposals that their party was not willing to accept. Why should this happen so often?
1. On the basis of the extracts and your personal experience think of the pressures on the governments in managing the process to reach a quick solution. (5 minutes)
2. In groups share and agree what are the main pressures to reach an agreement quickly?
3. Are there other factors in the nature of power which encourage the type of approaches described in the extracts? (10 minutes)
4. Look at the experience of the Review and the negotiations on the Civic Forum and see if these pressures and tendencies in the exercise of power seem to have had less impact. (10 minutes)
5. How could one minimise the effect of these pressures and tendencies in the exercise of power? (10 minutes)
Exercise 3
It is not surprising that individual politicians tried to gain the support of the Prime Minister or Taoiseach as powerful and influential people (See also the first extract in topic 8). The extracts below indicate that at times such lobbying put at risk the two governments’ intention to maintain a common strategy and appear fair and balanced between all the parties. How could this be avoided without causing offence?
1. Imagine the situation in the first extract in topic 8. What difficulties did the situation present for the Prime Minister? Consider how he might have handled the situation to avoid undermining the position of the Secretary of State or the participation of the other parties. (7 minutes)
2. Prepare a role-play of the situation. Divide into small groups of three participants in each, and in the groups allocate the roles of Prime Minister, David Trimble and observer. (5 minutes)
3. Act out the situation in the small groups, with David Trimble trying to enlist the Prime Minister’s support and the Prime Minister trying not to snub Trimble but also trying to avoid giving him any special treatment. (10 minutes) 3. In the small groups discuss the role-play and evaluate the approaches used by the Prime Minister and David Trimble. Which was more successful (5 minutes)
4. If desired, the small groups can repeat the role-play, with each group member having a different role, and afterwards compare the differences from the first role-play. (15 minutes)
5. Come together in the full group and agree what are the problems in the situation for the Prime Minister and how best they can be dealt with.
Exercise 4
The fourth extract shows the dilemma for the Premiers in trying to allow the local political parties to take responsibility for the implementation of the Agreement and setting up the new structures but at the same time wanting to ensure that they made progress. Individually write a briefing paper for the Prime Minister/Taoiseach suggesting ways of encouraging and helping the parties to make progress without taking over: i.e.: how to undertake “a relatively low-intensity, but sustained management role”. (25 minutes)
Extracts
Three governments, Britain, Ireland and the United States played key roles in the peace process. Britain and Ireland, as the two countries directly involved, played a variety of roles at different times, ranging from mediation to acting as a proxy for the different parties in Northern Ireland. But by far their most important contribution was to have laid a foundation for peace talks by declaring they were willing to abide by the wishes of the people of Northern Ireland. This created the space for the political parties in the province to decide their own future through negotiations.
Thomas Abraham (“The Hindu”)
There has been a remarkable consistency of policy between successive British governments on the key concept of consent — that Northern Ireland should determine its own destiny. Furthermore, the idea that a British government should become a “persuader” to edge unionists towards Irish Unity was never accepted.
Harry Barnes (Labour Party) and Gary Kent
At the end of the talks George Mitchell made it clear that, as with Strand Three, the Strand Two section of his paper was being prepared by the two governments.
Worry about Mitchell’s likely approach was replaced by profound concern and resentment when, on 30 March, Downing Street faxed its draft for Strand One to Hume and Trimble but to no one else. Anger was expressed in the strongest possible terms. There was no question as far as the SDLP was concerned of negotiating with a fax machine. The objection was not just the manner of delivery of such a paper. Its content reflected very little of the party’s thinking. The sense that this was no way to manage serious negotiations was strengthened by the fact that Mitchell knew nothing of such drafts until told of them by the SDLP. When a subsequent Downing Street draft was sent on 2 April, a corrected or revised version followed within a couple of hours; and even Paul Murphy, the British Minister of State at the negotiations, and his officials were unaware of this when the SDLP went to discuss concerns with him.
Mark Durkan (SDLP)
The premiers took a distinctly hands-off approach to managing the overall implementation, even shifting their key personnel who had built up real expertise and relationships with the influential players on the Northern Ireland political scene. Their rationale was understandable: the Agreement was supposed to herald the demise of direct rule, and the British government was sensitive to how new locally elected politicians might react to a heavy handed government in London insisting on running the Agreement. But this stance has cost the process dearly. Even a relatively low-intensity, but sustained management role could have greatly aided the implementation process.
Monica McWilliams and Kate Fearon (Women’s Coalition)
At crisis points when the local politicians proved unable to execute their responsibilities fully. On these occasions the pattern has been one of short bursts of highest level engagement bringing with it the pressure to succeed quickly and produce results. In engaging at this level, the premiers have diminished their joint credibility and, arguably, become a destabilizing resource instead of a driving force.
Monica McWilliams and Kate Fearon (Women’s Coalition)
The narrow nature of these discussions dragged on until December 1998, when the Prime Minister and Taoiseach stepped in and, reportedly, facilitated a deal between the UUP and the SDLP. When they left, however, the deal proved illusory and the next few days were spent in recrimination and blame. This, compounded with non-implementation, led to accusations of bad faith and further engendered mistrust.
Monica McWilliams and Kate Fearon (Women’s Coalition)
The pattern of dealing with the Prime Minister and sidelining the Secretary of State had been established in the discussions over the number of new departments. Having set the precedent on that occasion, the Prime Minister was to continue in the same vein over the next few months, so that he became the facilitator in bilateral discussions about acceptable arrangements to allow the implementation of the agreement with Sinn Féin, the SDLP and the UUP. On occasion, the Irish government would also be present in Downing Street… The round table meetings tended to be open sessions for restating opening positions on the subject and were undermined by a sense that the “real business” was being conducted at Downing Street with a much narrower range of participants.
Monica McWilliams and Kate Fearon (Women’s Coalition)
The shuttle back and forth to Downing Street and the round table meetings at Stormont continued sporadically, but the axis of communication was between the governments and individual parties, not between the parties themselves. Between parties there was no real engagement. With little progress having been made as the deadline loomed, Blair and Ahern travelled to Hillsborough Castle, the Secretary of State’s residence in Northern Ireland, to embark on yet more fire-fighting. The pressure cooker atmosphere had worked well in the context of the talks with the setting of a deadline paying off for Mitchell, and the two premiers felt it would serve them equally well. But they mismanaged the process. Mitchell had been working within an ongoing process for many months, but the two premiers had not - the round table talks at Stormont were illusory in this regard… Additional pressure was created by the fact that both premiers, by becoming so directly involved, were putting their reputations on the line. They needed a result no matter what and could not return to their parliaments empty handed.
Monica McWilliams and Kate Fearon (Women’s Coalition)
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