Topic 10
Role of individuals in bringing about change
Throughout the peace process individuals have been believed to play key roles. Some were private individuals with no official status or influence, others were individuals appointed to play key roles such as the independent chairs of the negotiation process and others were in important official positions. It is interesting to consider if individuals played a crucial role or if the process had its own dynamic, independent of the influence of any individual. For example both the United Kingdom and Ireland experienced changes of premiers during the course of the peace process and it is suggested in the extractsbelow that each premier made his or her own impact on the process. It is also instructive to consider what factors made the contribution of individuals significant, especially those with no obvious source of influence over the process.
Exercise 1
Do individuals make a difference? Consider the extracts below. What would have happened if the premiers had not been replaced at key moments? What would have happened if the independent third parties were not involved? Set up a debate to explore the question.
1. Divide participants into two parts, one arguing the importance of individuals, the other arguing that the dynamic of the process is more important. (5 minutes)
2. Each group prepares its arguments, and also considers the weakness in the alternative position. (15 minutes)
3. Hold a debate. (20 minutes)
4. In the whole group, discuss the debate and consider which arguments seem most valid. (15 minutes) A third perspective might be to consider that individuals are needed to fulfil certain roles but no specific individual is indispensable and someone else might have provided the necessary impetus to the process.
Exercise 2
What gives an unofficial person influence?
1. Consider why an offer of help from an unofficial intermediary might be more attractive than the contribution of a government to someone in a conflict. (10 minutes)
2. Think of the situation in which a third party is offering his or her assistance as a third party to help with the problem of decommissioning paramilitary weapons.
3. Devise a role-play of a meeting between the potential third party and members of the unionist leadership. Allocate one person to be the third person and one or more group members to take the role of the unionist leadership. The third party might decide to be an academic, member of the clergy, member of a voluntary organization or simply a concerned individual. (5 minutes)
4. Play out the situation of the third party explaining why they might be able to play an effective role while the unionist leadership expresses their doubts about “the involvement of lay people”. (10 minutes)
5. Discuss the role-play and in particular assess the arguments for using a third party intermediary. (10 minutes)
6. Repeat the role-play changing the situation so that on one occasion the meeting is between the potential third party and the British government and on another between the potential third party and the leadership of the republican movement. (15 minutes)
7. Discuss how far the third party was acceptable and valued by one group more than others. Why was this? (10 minutes)
Exercise 3
The individuals mentioned in the extracts below can be grouped into three categories: elected representatives in formal positions of authority, private individuals and independent individuals invited to carry out a specific role (e.g. the independent chairs). What are the advantages and disadvantages of each?
1. In a group list the strengths, weakness, opportunities and threats which are related to someone in each of the three categories, based on your reading of the extracts and your own personal judgement. (15 minutes)
2. Compare the lists that you have prepared and decide who is best placed:
- to gain the trust of the parties;
- to ensure the co-operation of the parties;
- to obtain movement from the parties;
- to ensure that parties keep to their commitments. (15 minutes)
3. You may have decided that individuals in different categories are more appropriate at different stages in the negotiation process. Is it possible to suggest an overall scheme for involving the appropriate people at the right time? Overall is one category of people in a better position to play a useful role than the others? (15 minutes)
Exercise 4
What are the characteristics of a good third party?
1. Consider the extracts below and as a group list the qualities that the individuals mentioned brought to the peace process. (10 minutes)
2. Which of these qualities were helpful? (10 minutes)
3. Not all those described were acting as third parties. From the list drawn up identify those qualities which the group considers to be most appropriate for someone in a third party role. (10 minutes)
Extracts
In November 1987 Father Alex Reid, a Catholic priest who for many years had been involved in conflict mediation in Belfast, wrote a discussion paper setting out the principles of self-determination and consent on which could be based the dialogue and negotiation necessary for a political settlement, including circumstances in which the British government would depart from Ireland.
Martin Mansergh (Fianna Fáil)
Hope that more propitious conditions might arise for a breakthrough was not abandoned. Father Reid maintained regular contact between the Irish government, the SDLP and Sinn Féin. Other initiatives were taken by non-official groups to try to stimulate new thinking. On a number of occasions key figures in parties across the political spectrum were invited to participate in seminars to explore ways of moving the political process forward. For example, Eberhard Spiecher, a German lawyer, brought together representatives of the Alliance Party, DUP, SDLP, and UUP, with Father Reid acting as someone who could provide an insight into Sinn Féin, at a private meeting in Duisburg.
Martin Mansergh (Fianna Fáil)
In November 1990, the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher resigned following an internal challenge within her party over her government’s European policy. From a republican point of view she had been extremely antagonistic and was held responsible for the deaths of ten republican hunger strikers, including Bobby Sands, in 1981. Because of her triumphalist attitudes and the possibility that she would have proclaimed any ceasefire to be a republican defeat, it had always been difficult to envisage a ceasefire while she was in office. Her replacement by the milder, more pragmatic John Major brought a change in atmosphere that made such a ceasefire more possible.
Martin Mansergh (Fianna Fáil)
Albert Reynolds, however, was absolutely determined to pursue the initiative and refused to take no for an answer. He was prepared if necessary to reformulate the paper as a purely Irish initiative and confront the British government’s reluctance to move on it. ‘Who is afraid of peace?’ was his clarion call. At the same time, it was clear that if the proposal were to be adopted by the British government it would require modification and amplification.
Martin Mansergh (Fianna Fáil)
Whereas Charles Haughey had had a cautious attitude to the initiative, the importance and controversial nature of which he recognized, Albert Reynolds came to office imbued with the idea that peace was a moral imperative. He often described his intentions to an unsuspecting public by saying that he was seeking ‘a formula for peace’. He aroused the non-committal interest of Prime Minister John Major.
Martin Mansergh (Fianna Fáil)
However, if there was one event which killed off the potential of the 1994 cessation to culminate in a peace settlement it was the resignation of Albert Reynolds in November 1995 over an unrelated political scandal. The writing was on the wall from that point. Reynolds was a key figure and had taken political gambles in the run-up to the cessation to bring republicans on board. That is not to say that the breakdown was unavoidable with a bit of imagination or willingness from the Major government to participate actively in the process.
The new Taioseach, John Bruton, could be described at that time as republicans’ worst nightmare. The Fine Gael leader had been a consistent critic of Reynold’s support for the Hume-Adams initiative until the cessation was actually announced. He was considered overly sympathetic to unionists.
Séan Mag Uidhir
Those final two weeks had seen the sort of constant and concentrated negotiation that was crucial. The role of the two prime ministers had been decisive in terms of negotiation and brokerage but the role of the parties should not be underestimated.
Mark Durkan (SDLP)
The end of the ceasefire might have come sooner than February 1996 but for the feel-good factor generated by the visit of US President Bill Clinton to the North in November 1995. The visit captured the mood of huge public support for the peace process, and the world’s most powerful leader demonstrated a strong commitment to the achievement of peace in Ireland. The Sinn Féin leadership had worked hard to secure US involvement in the process, and the IRA was not about to commit political suicide by resuming its armed campaign before the Clinton visit.
Séan Mag Uidhir (Republican)
Over time, the independent chairs, by demonstrating a willingness to provide space without favour to each participant, gained the respect of most participants, and their authority as managers of the process became accepted. This then, was the framework upon which the talks process had been constructed - and was dismantled once the Agreement had been accepted.
Monica McWilliams and Kate Fearon (Women’s Coalition)
The patience and sensitivity of the independent chairs– not just George Mitchell but Harri Holkeri and John de Chastelain too – helped to facilitate all of this. Mitchell’s sense of purpose was matched by his sense of patient caution. He had all along talked of himself as “Humpty Dumpty - I can only jump once”. His instinct for the right time was acute, as demonstrated by his decision to call the Plenary session at fifteen minute’s notice on that Good Friday evening.
Mark Durkan (SDLP)
Individuals and civil society groups have tried throughout the Troubles to make a contribution to the search for a settlement by offering their good offices in the form of unofficial private diplomacy. They carried messages, facilitated meetings and helped political groups to evaluate their strategies and goals. Clergy and religious groups were well placed to fulfil this role and were able to maintain contact with key politicians without raising suspicions while continuing with their normal pastoral duties. Some clergy brought with them the institutional authority of their church. Other individuals, including academics and community workers, also played a part. Sometimes individuals had a contact which could be developed or a particular problem or confrontation arose in their area and they were able to respond. Occasionally an approach might be made to someone to act as an intermediary. These efforts were not public but they often had a significant local impact in defusing tension situations and these small achievements may have encouraged a gradual change in thinking about how to deal with the overall situation. These “good offices” roles were ultimately most useful in opening up communications when in the 1990s the parties themselves began to work towards negotiations.
Clem McCartney
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