Topic 1
Predisposing conditions for negotiations
In the 1980s, and even in the early 1990s, most commentators saw little sign that a way out of the Northern Ireland conflict might be found or even little evidence of a will to reach a stage where an agreed settlement might be possible. Each party claimed that they wanted an end to the conflict but at the same time doubted that a process of negotiation would be more beneficial to their interests than the existing stalemate, in spite of the damage that it was causing.
Yet by the mid-1990s, the process that led to the
Belfast Agreement was clearly underway. What were the factors that brought
it about? There were social, economic and political forces at work that changed
the situation. And also changes were taking place within the different communities
and parties with a stake in the conflict. All these elements were shifting
the protagonistsí assessments of the possibility of gaining their preferred
outcome to the conflict and their assessment of the prospects of reaching
a fair settlement by negotiation. At the same time, and indeed throughout
the Troubles, political parties, governments, paramilitary groups, third parties
and the wider community were monitoring these developments and trying to influence
the changing social political and economic landscape for their own benefit
or to enhance the possibility of a negotiated settlement. Martin Mansergh's
chapter chronicles the shifts that were taking place and the extracts below
summarize the factors that led the protagonists to the conclusion that, in
his words, the time was ìripe for dialogueî and a settlement was possible.
He identifies the factors that led constitutional nationalists to engage with
the republican movement and the factors that encouraged the paramilitary groups
to call a cease-fire. The shift in unionists came with the decision to enter
talks in which Sinn Féin were participating and the extracts from Barnes
and Kent and Abraham point to some of the issues which influenced them. The
extracts in topic 4 point out some of the factors that influenced the DUP
and other unionists to boycott the talks.
Exercise 1
1. Read the extracts below.
2. Individually make a list of factors that Mansergh thought were important
in encouraging the feeling that the time was ripe for dialogue. (10 minutes)
3. In small groups compare the lists. (10 minutes)
4. As a group can you agree which factors in the list were most important?
(15 minutes)
5. Are there other factors that you think sometimes encourage people in conflict
to decide that the time is ripe to reach a settlement? (10 minutes)
Exercise 2
Some of the conditions that predispose parties to look for a negotiated settlement could be described as opportunities or inducements in the sense that they encourage one or more protagonist to think that a negotiated settlement is possible. Others could be described as threats in the sense that they encourage the protagonists to think that the present strategies are likely to make their situation worse.
1. Using the list prepared in exercise 1, mark off
those factors that are opportunities and those that are threats. (5 minutes)
2. In small groups discuss how this distinction might be useful. (20 minutes)
For example:
- Are protagonists more likely to respond to opportunities
or threats?
- Are protagonists more likely to try to remove threats rather than take up
opportunities?
- If you wanted to try to influence a protagonist in a conflict to decide
that it was a good time to enter into negotiations, would it be better to
emphasis the inducements or the threats?
3. Test your conclusions in a small role-play. (20
minutes)
Divide the group into pairs. One member of the group will be Gerry Adams.
The other will be a third party trying to encourage the view that it is in
the republican movementís interest to negotiate. Pick one of the positive
inducements and try to present the arguments for it to Adams. Now switch roles
and in the second role-play the third party should pick one of the threats
to present as a reason why the Republican movement should want to engage in
negotiations.
4. Discuss in pairs the experience of the role-play. (5 minutes)
5. In the whole group share the conclusions reached in the role-play. (10
minutes)
Exercise 3
Many of the factors listed in exercise 1 came about through the efforts of individuals and organizations, or at least they contributed to an existing trend. When a conflict seems locked in stalemate it may be more useful to try to work on the surrounding conditions than the immediate issues with which the protagonists are preoccupied. Some of these conditions are easier to shift than others and some individuals and organizations are in a better position to act than others.
1. In small groups use the list prepared in exercise
1 and enter these factors in column 1 in the grid. (5 minutes)
2. In column 2 mark each factor as general or specific depending on whether
it is part of the general social and economic context or an internal concern
of one or more party. (5 minutes)
3. In column 3 rank the degree of difficulty in changing each factor, one
for the easiest, two for the next easiest and so on. (10 minutes)
4. In column 4 note the names of those protagonists in the conflict for whom
each factor would be significant. This might be a whole group or a specific
section within a group. For example the leadership of a political party might
be more influenced by a factor than the grass roots of the party. (10 minutes)
5. In column 5 write the names of those organizations and groups who in your
judgement were trying to change the way each factor impacted on the situation.
Using a different colour write the names of others that would have been in
a position to make some change. (15 minutes)
6. As a group look at each of the groups and individuals in column 5 and consider
what advantages they had which mean that their efforts could be effective.
(20 minutes)
Exercise 4
It is not clear from the extracts why some unionists decided to join the Stormont talks.
1. Read the extracts by Dodds in topic
4 and the extracts below by Barnes and Kent and Abraham. (10 minutes)
2. Individually think about why some unionists decided to enter the talks.
(5 minutes)
3. Imagine you are involved in a discussion of the subject between a group
of unionists, perhaps at a branch meeting of the party. Divide into two groups,
those in favour of entering talks and those wishing to stay out. In addition
appoint two people as observers. (5 minutes)
5. In separate groups prepare the arguments that would be important for your
group. (10 minutes)
5. Come together as a whole group and discuss the issue of entering talks,
each group trying to convince the other of its position. (15 minutes)
6. At the end of the discussion the observers should report back to the whole
group, listing the arguments which were used and assessing how effective they
were. (5 minutes)
7. Discuss how the discussion felt and how easy it was to keep to the assigned
position either for or against entering talks. (10 minutes)
Extracts
The peace process came into being through a combination of factors: the war-weariness associated with prolonged political and military stalemate; the courage displayed by governments and constitutional parties in dealing with the politicians close to paramilitary forces; the examples of breakthroughs and peace processes elsewhere in the world; the creation of a political alternative by a democratic nationalist consensus; the economic need for peace and stability; the active partnership between the British and Irish governments, even if there were often strains in the relationship; and the unprecedented high priority commitment given by a US President to peace in Ireland, including a willingness to act as ultimate guarantor. The overwhelming public desire for peace in both Northern Ireland and the Republic was perhaps the most critical factor of all. It had been consistently displayed over a long period and reflected a great deal of valuable and unsung work for peace by countless individuals and organizations.
By the late 1980s, despite much political and diplomatic
effort, the prospect remained one of prolonged political and military stalemate.
In protest against the republican movementís repugnant campaign of violence,
constitutional nationalist politicians had ignored their political demands
and refused to have any contact with 'representatives of terrorism'. But they
had failed to reach a cross-community political settlement that would marginalize
the paramilitary organizations and create the political consensus that might
make it easier to force an end to their violence. On the other hand, violence
was not yielding significant political advance for republicans....
Martin Mansergh (Fianna Fáil)
After Enniskillen, many people felt that the time
might be ripe for dialogue to bring violence to an end. First of all, there
was a moral duty to try and prevent any more Enniskillens, and secondly there
was a sense that the futility of a continuing campaign of violence was becoming
obvious to all.
Martin Mansergh (Fianna Fáil)
In 1991 Peter Brooke at last achieved his ambition
of starting political talks between the constitutional parties on the totality
of relationships. While outwardly contemptuous, republicans had always to
be aware of the possibility that at some point these talks might just succeed.
The paramilitary organizations would be placed under huge pressure if they
had contributed nothing to an agreed political settlement endorsed by the
people in referendums in both Northern Ireland and the Republic, as proposed
by John Hume. With no military breakthrough, despite the IRA's possession
of a sophisticated arsenal imported from Libya in 1985-86, and with the increasing
effectiveness of the loyalist paramilitaries, the situation was ripe for a
renewed push for peace.
Martin Mansergh (Fianna Fáil)
It is not only armed groups who have to abandon long
held strategies in the interests of peace. Democratic parties have often to
make painful compromises as well, as illustrated by the experience of the
Ulster Unionists, the principal party of the Protestant, unionist community.
The experience of the Ulster Unionists as they 'travelled that extra mile
to reach an agreement', as one of the contributors to this volume puts it,
holds valuable lessons.
Thomas Abraham (ìThe Hinduî)
On the day that Sinn Féin joined the all-party talks, Trimbleís most vociferous opponents within the unionist camp - the DUP and Robert McCartneyís UK Unionist Party (UKUP) - walked away from the negotiations. Trimble symbolically walked in with the UDP and PUP leaders. Both events effectively gave Trimble political cover to increasingly engage with republicans.
As what had become multi-party talks proceeded, UUP
negotiators moved from proximity talks with Sinn Féin to direct bilateral
negotiations. These unionists found it easier to join talks which involved
Sinn Féin because technically they were remaining in talks which had
been going on for many months rather than entering new talks with Sinn Féin.
Harry Barnes (Labour Party) and Gary Kent
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