Bringing peace to Liberia

The difficulties encountered in the Liberian peace process emerge from the complex interplay of a plethora of factors. Some analyses (Sesay, 1996b) focus on the pivotal position of Charles Taylor. For a long time, Taylor's signing of ceasefire agreements and accords did not indicate a serious commitment to a political solution. His involvement in negotiations was generally secured only under intense military or diplomatic pressure and his adherence to peace agreements was conditional on their not obstructing his presidential aspirations. Taylor's refusal to recognise the IGNU frustrated the earliest peace efforts of 1990-91. It was also his decision to launch 'Operation Octopus', which brought about the collapse of the Yamoussoukro process and his all-out military confrontation with ECOMOG.

What we have in Liberia today is a classic case of the 'prisoner's dilemma', or shall we say 'thieves dilemma'. All armed groups are keenly aware that none has operated under any formal system of rules that is based on trust, honesty, principles, and respect for law and order. Indeed each leader has so much blood on his hands that none believes the others are capable of using power for the common good. Each is therefore likely to opt for the gun in the 'rational' belief that a first strike would give advantages or in the rather 'irrational' consolation that it is better to deny the prize to the enemy even if everybody dies in the process.'

- Yusuf Bangura, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), Geneva, April 1996

'In my latest conversations with President Soglo, .. I am finding that he has thrown up his hands over Liberia, deciding that Nigeria has taken over ECOMOG and that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is too divided to have a common policy for a peaceful resolution of the problem. Let them fight, he mutters often, until they are all exhausted.'

- leaked memorandum from the US Ambassador in Cotonou, Benin to the State Department, October 27 1992

On the other hand, despite two episodes of vigorous anti-NPFL 'peace enforcement', ECOWAS has repeatedly appeased and accommodated the warring factions. With an interest in ending the war quickly, it has particularly acceded to NPFL demands, providing for the expansion of ECOMOG, the involvement of UNOMIL and the replacement of IGNU with a transitional government increasingly dominated by the more powerful factions. Although all these concessions seem to have removed major obstacles to progress, they have not brought an end to the war in Liberia. This is due partly to failures of implementation. ECOMOG continues to be an under-staffed, under-resourced, Nigerian-dominated force, while UNOMIL has been severely under-strength for almost two years. However, and perhaps more importantly, bringing faction leaders into government has been fraught with difficulties. From the outset, the LNTG has been riven by violent squabbling within and between factions concerning the allocation of key posts in the Council of State, the cabinet and the parastatals.

The proliferation of warring factions has obstructed peace for at least three inter-related reasons. First, it has led to a wide diffusion of arms across the country and to an increase in the total number of combatants which has immensely complicated the process of disarmament. Second, it has compounded the commercial dimension of the war as Liberia's natural wealth has been carved up and contested by increasing numbers of covetous warlords and strongmen. Third, the proliferation of warring factions has complicated diplomatic negotiations as agreements have had to be inclusive of and acceptable to an increasing number of interests. The Yamoussoukro, Cotonou, and Akosombo accords all collapsed largely because new groups were either left out or refused to attend peace talks.

Violations of the Abuja accord in December 1995 and April 1996 can be traced ultimately to the marginalisation of Roosevelt Johnson and ULIMO-J within the LNTG. Johnson's appointment as Minister of Rural Development and the faction's control of a number of minor ministries, public corporations and state enterprises was regarded within ULIMO-J as wildly inadequate. Trouble began in December when ECOMOG troops were deployed to disarm ULIMO-J fighters around rich diamond mining sites in Bomi and Lofa Counties. In response, fighters loyal to Johnson went on the rampage around the city of Tubmanburg, killing and capturing several ECOMOG soldiers and civilians, and destroying property in the process (Africa Confidential, 16/2/96; The Economist, 20/1/96; West Africa, 22/1/96).

These troubles culminated in the intense fighting of April 1996, after a LNTG commission of inquiry into the December disturbances found Johnson guilty of wanting to derail the peace process. This led to Johnson's dismissal as leader of ULIMO-J and his consequent suspension by the Council of State from his cabinet post.

Following intra-factional skirmishes outside his home, a police force backed by NPFL and ULIMO-K fighters was despatched by the Council of State to arrest Johnson on charges of murder. In response, ULIMO-J supporters rioted, provoking the worst fighting and looting in Monrovia since 1992. Significantly, Johnson loyalists were joined in resistance to the NPFL and ULIMO-K by their Krahn kinsmen in both the AFL and LPC.

Regional politics has added a further dimension to the complexities of the peace process. For instance, progress was obstructed in 1991 when the Yamoussoukro agreements were interpreted in a number of anglophone states as an attempt by the late Ivorian President Felix Houphouet-Boigny to steal the peace-making spotlight from ECOMOG. These talks were generally welcomed by the NPFL, but snubbed by others, especially the Nigerians and some of their officers in ECOMOG. The role of intra-ECOWAS antagonism in undermining the earlier accords is explored in more detail above.

Since the institution of the 'Committee of nine' in October 1992, intra-ECOWAS agendas have harmonised substantially. However, regional power politics remained a factor even after Jerry Rawlings became ECOWAS Chairman in 1994. In a swift and rather surprising move, Rawlings developed some kind of friendship with Taylor, with whom he and senior Ghanaian officials held closed talks in various locations around West Africa. Although these talks injected fresh momentum into the peace process, there were reports of Nigerian unease. If successful, the Akosombo and Accra accords would have added to Rawlings' stature as an international statesman and served as an indictment of Nigerian diplomacy. Aware of the crucial need to obtain broad support for any peace deal in Liberia, Rawlings changed tack and sought conciliation with the Nigerians. He eventually helped Taylor mend fences with the Abacha regime, paving the way for the signing of the Abuja Accord. The Taylor/Abacha rapprochement also secured a measure of continuity in the peace process when the chairmanship of ECOWAS transferred to Nigeria in August 1996.

Possibly the thorniest issue for peace efforts in Liberia has been the encampment, disarmament and demobilization of the estimated 60,000 combatants. The fearfully slow progress on disarmament is explained by a combination of factors. Firstly, mutual suspicion among faction leaders has not only destroyed agreements, but has also made unilateral disarmament impossible. Faction leaders have executed, or threatened to execute, war-weary fighters who have disarmed without permission, leading to deep scepticism concerning their professed commitment to peace. Despite years of trying, peace groups have not yet been able to construct effective inter-factional confidence-building measures.

Secondly, several years of fighting have created a gun culture that has become a source of livelihood for thousands of young men. In response to this, adequate economic resources are needed to create sustainable non-violent livelihoods which are attractive to fighters. The government in Monrovia, cut off from access to timber, minerals, rubber and iron ore, is ill-placed financially to fund such a programme. Susukuu has been useful in trying to solicit funds from the public and overseas for this purpose, but has not come near to what is required for comprehensive disarmament to occur.

Despite US contributions averaging US$10 million a year (and renewed pledges of an additional $30 million), there are also problems regarding ECOMOG funding for disarmament. A donor conference on Liberia held in New York in October 1995 pledged just over US$100 million towards disarmament, reconstruction and democratisation. However, for comprehensive disarmament to have taken place ECOMOG needed strengthening from 7,000 to 12,000 troops, an increase which alone required US$133 million. Furthermore, for effective monitoring of the nine designated safe havens and the 12 assembly points, UNOMIL also needed enlarging by 42 observers, requiring a further US$62 million (West Africa, 6/11/95). These estimates make the current pledges look grossly inadequate.

Prospects for the demilitarization of Liberian politics were further worsened by Taylor's words and actions in early 1996. By this time, he had recruited over 800 fighters to the armed, NPFL-controlled national police force, a move widely interpreted as a measure to circumvent the requirement to disarm. Arguing that total disarmament in his circumstances is unknown in world history, Taylor has even suggested that disarmament should take place after elections. However, in the wake of the April fighting, he has backtracked from this hardline stance, committing to immediate, if partial, disarmament in response to censure from civic groups, other faction leaders, ECOWAS and the broader international community.

The Liberian civil war, like those in Angola, Sudan, Somalia and Burundi, has shown that people are prepared to go on fighting until they completely dissipate themselves, are defeated militarily, or perceive the possibility of furthering their interests by other means. As a result of this, peace accords like Liberia's often become just another means of pillage for those involved, while excluded players seek to ensure that nothing meaningful comes of negotiations. We are yet to see whether those who accepted the political framework and principles of the Abuja Accord will eventually accept its authority, but the recent violence in Monrovia is clearly a cause for pessimism.

In the meantime, the nature of the war, the unprecedented military intervention it has provoked and the tardy nature of the peace process offer much food for thought both for the international community and for Liberians themselves.

There are a number of lessons to be drawn from the nature and consequences of the regional intervention. While ECOWAS governments have been remarkably persistent with their initiative, their efforts, notably ECOMOG peacekeeping, have not always been as professional as they could have been. This is partly due to insufficient and inadequate resources. In addition however, efforts have also been frustrated when the interests of individual countries have been allowed to over-ride their common purpose of returning peace to Liberia. For a enterprise of this nature to accomplish more in the future, it requires greater regional co-operation, and more professional, better resourced and experienced forces.

Much could also be learnt of the positive role indigenous civic organizations can play in times of crisis. In the case of Liberia, religious groups, academics, women's organizations, the media, interest groups and other local NGOs managed to maintain a semblance of ordered civil society amidst the chaos. Their input also strengthened the peace efforts of international actors, while providing a conduit for constructive criticism. The main lesson here is that indigenous NGOs should be encouraged and assisted to improve their organization, finances, and political standing to exert a greater positive influence on peace initiatives.

For Liberians, the horrifying spectacle of a wrecked nation and the thought of the challenges to be faced in the next century, have provoked an intense debate on the need to mould a new Liberia. This process of national reconstruction will entail eliminating the deadly weapons currently diffused throughout the country, rethinking the basis of political practice over the last century and a half, revamping old institutions including the state, and creating new and more viable ones. To be effective, however, any revolution of Liberian society has to be built on a thorough transformation of social attitudes. There is an urgent need to shed off the sycophancy and self-delusions that have infected the average Liberian psyche (Enoanyi, 1990).

As an excellent starting point, most Liberians are beginning to see that increased self-reliance is required to reduce the consequences of disappointment at the hands of trusted friends and traditional benefactors. The manner in which faction leaders and politicians have manipulated ethnic identities, traditional loyalties, and youth and rural resentments has also helped to make Liberians more wary of demagogues, of people who mobilize popular feelings and prejudices for their own selfish ends. To consolidate these lessons, sincere efforts have already been initiated by local organizations to increase awareness of the destructive effects of 'tribalism' and to start addressing the need for a transparent, competitive and inclusive political system headed by a competent, caring, dedicated and truly national leadership (Dixon, 1992; Moniba, 1992). Ultimately, the future of Africa's oldest republic lies in the hands of the traumatised survivors of this vicious war and of their supporters in the international community.