Bringing peace to Liberia - part 2 International responses Especially through the early months, the regional politics of the Liberian conflict helped shape the nature of external responses. For instance, Taylor's Libyan connections significantly damaged his profile in Washington while his Ivorian links increased his standing with the French. However, international responses must also be understood against the backdrop of the dramatic global events in and around 1989. The end of the Cold War occasioned a shift in the West's strategic interests and with it, a decline of interest in sub-Saharan Africa. marginalization of Africa in the so-called 'new world order' meant that Liberia's conflict can be said to have occurred at inauspicious times. The contemporaneous crisis in the Persian Gulf also helped determine that the external intervention which did occur was either too little or too late (Riley, 1993). United States' response Due to its unique history, pre-war Liberia had long enjoyed the friendship and beneficence of the United States. Because of this history, the presence of a large US military and intelligence network in the country, and its close links with Israel, Liberia attracted substantial US aid between 1980 and 1988, amounting to around $500 million. By the outbreak of the war however, the special bond between the US and Liberia had weakened substantially. This was partly due to US exasperation at Doe's authoritarianism, ineptitude and corruption, but mostly reflected the shifting strategic priorities of the incipient post-Cold War era. As the war erupted, it soon became clear that the US would not intervene to secure its former protegee. This came as both a surprise and an utter disappointment to most Liberians (Keppel, 1986). There have been allegations of various forms of covert US involvement in the Liberian conflict. US Rangers, along with Israelis, are reported to have actively engaged with Taylor's forces in the early stages of the war while later on, it has been suggested that the US shared military intelligence with the NPFL. However, both the Bush and Clinton administrations have officially taken the view that the conflict is largely an internal matter that requires an African solution. While individual statesmen, such as Jesse Jackson, Herman Cohen and former President Jimmy Carter have made sincere, if unsuccessful, attempts to mediate in the conflict, the most dramatic US response to date has been the rapid evacuation of its citizens and other expatriates from Monrovia. This occurred at the outbreak of war in the city in 1990, and again following the renewed fighting of April 1996. While the US has remained highly wary of direct involvement, it has been of assistance in other respects. It has contributed an average US$10 million a year to ECOMOG, and has pledged an additional $30 million in 1996. It has also disbursed around US$440 million in relief aid, largely through the UN and international NGOs, and has pledged an additional US$75 million for post-war reconstruction (West Africa, 6/11/95). In the wake of the April 1996 debacle, the Clinton administration has come under increasing pressure from the US-based Friends of Liberia (FOL), from the Black Caucus and other lobby groups to adopt a more proactive policy on Liberia. This co-incided with the setting up the US-led International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL), involving a range of donor countries concerned with bringing peace to Liberia, and with a slight raising of the US profile in ECOWAS negotiations. Role of the United Nations The United Nations, which appeared to have regained potency after the end of the Cold War, was constrained from embarking on direct intervention in Liberia largely due to the burgeoning demands of its existing peacekeeping operations. However, lack of resources does not fully account for the UN's initial inaction. The fact is that for more than a year from the start of the fighting, African countries frustrated every attempt of the UN Security Council to meet and discuss the crisis. Cote d'Ivoire was particularly resistant to discussions, while Zaire and Ethiopia were also obstructive, reluctant to allow a precedent for intervention that in time might be applicable to them (Wippman, 1993). The UN's first significant intervention came three years into the conflict, when the Security Council passed Resolution 788 in November 1992 following the NPFL's second major assault on Monrovia. This resolution supported the arms embargo imposed by ECOWAS on the warring factions and opened the way for what has since been a small but significant UN presence. During UN-assisted talks which culminated in the signing of the Cotonou Accord in July 1993, a technical team recommended the establishment of a UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). Since its deployment in late 1993, UNOMIL's mandate has been renewed several times, despite threats of withdrawal as late as 1996. Always headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), first Trevor Gordon-Somers and then Anthony Nyakyi, the principal objective of the mission has been to monitor and assist ECOMOG in the process of encampment, disarmament and demobilization. While it was originally mandated to employ around 400 observers, UNOMIL was at full strength for just nine months during 1994. Since 43 of its number were detained and terrorised by NPFL fighters in September of that year, it has operated at around quarter strength. Deployment outside Monrovia has been partial and sporadic. The organization of African Unity and Liberia The organization of African Unity (OAU) was alarmed by the scale of the humanitarian crisis in Liberia in 1990, but lacked both the will and capacity to intervene (Aning, 1994). Therefore, like the UN, it ignored charges from within West Africa that the ECOMOG intervention lacked legality, arguing that the principle of non-interference enshrined in its charter does not excuse indifference to such magnitudes of disaster. In time, the OAU nominated an 'Eminent Person' for Liberia to help in the search for peace. This representative, the former Zimbabwean President Reverend Canaan Banana, has played a significant role in the diplomatic efforts from the Cotonou Accord onwards. He also facilitated troop contributions to ECOMOG from two non-ECOWAS countries, Uganda and Tanzania. However, troops from these countries pulled out of Liberia in the summer of 1995, after just 18 months service, due to international reluctance to sustain their costs. On the whole, the role of the OAU in the peace process has been marginal, symbolic and limited to support for ECOWAS and UN initiatives. Humanitarian responses In the early months of the war, the security situation in Liberia largely prevented international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) from providing food and shelter to the displaced and starving. By late 1990 however, ECOMOG intervention had allowed for some international organizations, together with a sizeable number of Liberian NGOs, to engage in humanitarian relief assistance in Monrovia. By 1992, local and international NGOs had expanded beyond the capital and were operating in at least nine of Liberia's 13 counties, most of which were under the control of the NPFL. By 1995, the number of operational INGOs had increased from four to 18, while the humanitarian efforts of the UN involved no less than nine separate agencies. Following widespread looting and arson in April 1996, most aid workers withdrew from Liberia. Since then, foreign humanitarian agencies have operated a co-ordinated policy of performing only 'limited, life-saving' operations in protest at factional harassment. Humanitarian activities have included the building of shelters and latrines, the digging of wells and the provision of food and clothing to indigent Liberians both within the country and in the region's refugee settlements. Such activities have played a great role in protecting lives, stabilizing explosive situations, giving succour to traumatised populations, and facilitating post-war reconstruction. However, they have also had a number of negative consequences. They have helped institutionalize dependency, caused notable ecological damage, and have sometimes provided resources and legitimacy to armed factions. Humanitarian agencies have also been criticized for engaging only in relief activity, rather than rehabilitation and development. ECOMOG and peacekeeping As the international community failed to take rapid and meaningful steps to contain the carnage in Liberia, responsibility for direct intervention fell on the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In May 1990, ECOWAS convened a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) which soon assumed the primary role in the peace process. By the end of August, the SMC had established and deployed ECOMOG and organized a national conference which duly elected the civilian Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) headed by the academic-politician, Amos Sawyer. Originally, ECOMOG was intended to monitor a ceasefire which had yet to be signed by the NPFL at the time of deployment. However, they soon adopted a peace enforcement posture after the execution of Doe in September 1990, repelling the NPFL and securing Monrovia for the IGNU accession. Although ECOWAS protocols on non-aggression and mutual defence seemed to provide the legal basis for ECOMOG intervention in Liberia, it was nonetheless an unprecedented initiative. ECOMOG was the first example in the world of a 'regional' peacekeeping force sent in to oversee the resolution of an internal armed conflict. Rationale for intervention The arrival of ECOMOG in Liberia is partly explained by ECOWAS' stated concern at the scale of the humanitarian disaster and the possibility of fighting spilling over Liberia's borders diffusing weapons and instability throughout West Africa. However, regional political dynamics are also revealing in understanding the rationale behind the ECOMOG initiative. The West African states that formed the original ECOMOG were all governed by leaders that came to power through military coups d'etat, headed single-party governments, or demonstrated a tendency to hold on to power perpetually. They were President Dawda Jawara of The Gambia, Ghana's Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, General Lansana Conte of Guinea, Nigeria's General Ibrahim Babangida and Major-General Joseph Momoh of Sierra Leone. As a civilian-led movement, the NPFL had mobilised adequate human resources and military materiel to effectively topple a government. This aroused fears of a regional domino effect which spurred the 'unholy alliance' of reactionary rulers (Sesay, 1995) to resist the forces of change embodied in the NPFL. They did this forcefully, immediately collaborating with the AFL and the INPFL to prevent Taylor from taking Monrovia. The initial deployment of ECOMOG also brought into focus the sharp rivalries between the region's anglophone and francophone countries. President Tolbert (1971-80) had established strong links between the Liberian state and the francophone axis dominated by Cote d'Ivoire. By executing Tolbert and members of his family and inner circle, Doe broke these ties spectacularly, and subsequently forged a close alliance with Babangida's Nigeria. With Ivorian and Burkinabe backing, the NPFL incursion threatened to shift the balance of power back in favour of the francophones. Considering this, ECOMOG can be seen partly as an Nigerian/anglophone attempt to defend its regional profile. The SMC was certainly dominated by the anglophones and ECOMOG, opposed by Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, reflected this. From the outset, the force has been guided largely by the Nigerians, who have provided around 70% of its human, financial (estimated at $4 billion since 1990) and military resources. Togo and Mali, both members of the SMC, initially refused to send troops to Liberia, and the only francophone country involved at this stage was Guinea, which bore the brunt of Liberia's refugee problem. Later in the conflict, Senegal, Mali, Tanzania and Uganda did deploy troops after successive internationally-sanctioned bids to dilute Nigerian dominance. However, only the Malians have maintained a sustained presence. The Senegalese quickly pulled out when six of their soldiers were killed by the NPFL. ECOMOG composition for anti-NPFL 'peace enforcement' (1992-93) and 'impartial' peacekeeping activities either side of the July 1993 Cotonou Accord
Peacekeeping 'success' It is generally believed that the success of military peacekeeping relies on an attitude of impartiality, on trained and experienced multinational troops and on a commitment to use force only in self-defence. Also essential are adequate and reliable sources of finance, a clear and practicable mandate and the continued support of the UN Security Council, the only body that can effectively authorize such an intervention. The consent of all, and an invitation from at least one of the warring parties is also desirable. At the time of deployment, it is questionable whether ECOMOG conformed with any of these principles. Firstly, its peacekeeping mandate was clearly problematic in August 1990 when there was no comprehensive ceasefire to monitor. Second, it is unclear whether ECOMOG deployment was invited by any of the warring groups, although it is certain that the AFL and INPFL later welcomed the initiative. Third, intervention was undertaken despite some awareness of the huge financial outlays to be incurred by the participating countries and the hostile domestic reaction these were bound to provoke (Sesay, 1996a). Fourthly, ECOWAS lacked a standing force that was trained and experienced in peacekeeping and, unlike the UN, could not appeal to member states who did have such capacity. Fifth, although later resolutions did support ECOMOG, the initial deployment of the force had no Security Council approval. Moreover, in view of the composition of ECOMOG and the variety of regional and political interests at play, its ability to remain neutral was hotly debated from the outset. Immediately after its deployment, ECOMOG efforts to secure Monrovia involved collaboration with warring factions against the NPFL. Things came to a head in October 1992 when Nigerian Alpha jets strafed NPFL positions around the capital, and bombed the rebels out of Buchanan right back to their headquarters in Gbarnga. Reports from this time also confirm that ECOMOG supplied ULIMO with weapons, other forms of military materiel and financial resources in return for intelligence on the Liberian terrain and NPFL movements. Events such as these spurred US ex-President Jimmy Carter to remark in 1993 that ECOMOG had ceased to be neutral and had become a combatant in the conflict. Such comments quickly became a propaganda tool for Taylor who had been calling for a neutral UN force to replace ECOMOG. Taylor's protestations were accommodated to some degree in the Cotonou Accord which provided for the expansion of ECOMOG and the establishment of UNOMIL in December 1993. To its great credit, ECOMOG has generally managed to provide a semblance of order in Monrovia. At least until April 1996, the capital consistently accommodated a functioning 'civil society', including independent media, church and human rights groups. Moreover, as intra-ECOWAS agendas have converged, as the international community has been drawn into the peace process and as diplomacy has sought to accommodate the major factions, the force has assumed a broad authority which was absent at its deployment. However, despite its considerable military and peacekeeping successes, ECOMOG's professionalism and neutrality have consistently been questioned. The force also remains seriously under-resourced, notwithstanding substantial new pledges of international support. 'Quite frankly, I think the issue of Liberia could have been taken care of a much longer time ago, if we had enjoyed a little bit more assistance from the UN as well as the western community.'
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