Engaging armed groups: Revolutionary and agreed change: managing the contradictions

Paper circulated at the Conciliation Resources (CR) Accord Programme Joint Analysis Workshop on ‘Engaging armed groups in peace processes’, London, July 2004.

Abstract: The factors that help a revolutionary movement to sustain a military campaign are the very factors that make it difficult to shift to negotiations. These include its ideological orientation on the nature of conflict and its structures and decision making processes. Equally the considerations which determine a government's response to a militant challenge make it difficult for it to develop an alternative strategy when moving to negotiation. These are concerns about governance and the maintenance of political stability. This paper examines the nature and implications of this dichotomy, with reference to attempts to resolve conflicts, in particular the experience in Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland since August 1994. In conclusion, consideration will be given to ways to achieve a more effective basis for negotiation.

It is an unfortunate truism that not all conflicts that are ripe for settlement can achieve a satisfactory outcome. Too often the process of negotiation stalls and misunderstandings occur which destroy the expectations that resolution is possible. Or one or other side concludes that it will not be possible to achieve an outcome that they can accept. There are numerous reasons why the genuine desire to resolve the conflict cannot be translated into a settlement in all cases, and there have been extensive studies of the resolution process, both in cases which seem to lead to a mutually satisfactory outcomes and those where the situation has clearly not improved (e.g. Touval and Zartman, 1985, Burton and Dukes, 1990, Bercovitch and Rubin, 1992).

For those who find it helpful to think in terms of conflicts reaching a stage where they are ripe for settlement, an important task is the identification of those factors which determine what constitutes "ripeness" (Mitchell, 1996, Zartman, 1986). On this basis it should then be possible to identify those conflicts where the most significant progress can be made, or to find the means to create the conditions which make a mutually acceptable settlement possible. Even if a conflict has reached this stage, no one questions the importance of finding the right format and process for negotiations. There is plenty of scope for insensitivity, cultural misunderstandings and other forms of miscommunication to hamper the progress of negotiations but it is doubtful if problems here will be allowed to be a fundamental impediment when there is a genuine desire and commitment to find a settlement. Psychological factors can be a greater obstacle and attention has been given to the identification of those measures that will build confidence and establishing personal rapport between adversaries. Other psychological factors can be the commitment to traditional aspirations that are no longer relevant. There is also the political difficulty of finding a way to present unpalatable realities to supporters who are often more militant than the negotiators.

All of these factors assume the good faith of the parties, but it must be recognized that good faith is not always evident, and that even in the best of circumstances some parties will resort to political manoeuvring if they feel disadvantaged or on the other hand if they see the opportunity to press home an advantage. Consequently attention has also been given to how to create the circumstances which minimise the possibility of such behaviour and how to neutralise it when it occurs.

While these are all relevant factors which can be identified in many examples of conflict resolution efforts, less attention has been paid to the impact of different and contradictory conceptions of conflict which are held by opposing parties. These frameworks are sufficiently comprehensive, structured and self-sustaining to be referred to as ideologies of conflict, in that they constitute a specific orientation concerning the nature of conflict, assumptions about the characteristics of relations between people with competing interests and appropriate responses. This is more narrow than an overall world view or ideology which is used in analysing the socio-political situation and identifying the problems, issues and competing interests which give rise to conflicts, though clearly they interact. Parties with differing world views and different overall conceptual frameworks can negotiate a settlement if they have fairly similar views on appropriate ways to handle conflict. But it is possible for parties to hold similar world views, to have reached similar conclusions about what might constitute an acceptable settlement and to each have an interest in reaching a solution, and yet fail in negotiations because they hold contradictory assumptions on the way to handle conflict, as this leads to fundamentally different forms of discourse which can be incomprehensible to each other. In some cases, the failure to identify one's own and opponent's conflict ideologies and grasp the implications of those perspectives appears to have been fundamental reasons for failure or lack of progress.

These different ideologies have often grown up in the course of the conflict as an effective way to function in a power/coercive context, maintaining one's own position and pursuing one's goals. Consequently they become obstacles when the parties attempt to move from a power/coercive paradigm to a cooperative problem solving process aimed at mutual satisfaction. The existing ideology still provides the underlying perspective which influences each party's understanding of their opponent's actions and it determines and limits the possible behaviours which may be employed in the negotiation process.

It is often assumed that a shift from militant confrontation to negotiation follows a change in the parties' orientation from "a winning mentality to a conciliating mentality" (Zartman, 1985). The move to negotiation may be a genuine decision to discard the military option. But it is often for pragmatic reasons, and seldom demonstrates a shift on either side to more cooperative problem solving which is seeking a mutually acceptable settlement. The basic orientation remains and a process of competitive, and often hostile, bargaining is initiated, to gain maximum advantage and minimise the threat of damage. Approaching negotiations in this way is likely to confirm the existing conflict ideology and the impossibility of reaching an agreed settlement and to discourage rather than encourage the development of conciliatory mentalities on both sides. For example to use the rhetoric of a "peace strategy" or even a "peace process" suggests a rather mechanistic approach which is at variance with Zartman's conciliatory, cooperative mentality that allows genuinely joint problem solving. If it is accepted that such an orientation is required to reach a mutually acceptable solution, the question is then how to ensure that the experience of entering negotiation demonstrates that such an orientation is practical and more likely to achieve better results, without leaving either party vulnerable. If measures are taken to recognize the underlying assumptions, attitudes and impulses and their implications, and if steps are taken to try out and test alternative strategies, then a more productive negotiation strategy becomes possible, challenging the winning mentality on both sides and opening up alternative ideological frameworks for relationships between competing groups.

One area where this type of ideological difference is particularly salient is in conflicts between an established government with some measure of legitimacy and a militant organization that represents a marginalized group or a group which perceives itself as marginalized. In these circumstances the representatives of the perceived or actual marginalized group is attempting to challenge the government's authority and it is proposing ways to meet the group's needs which range from changes in government policy through some level of autonomy to the overthrow of the existing authorities, but in all cases it is seeking some fundamental change in the status quo. The government for its part is trying to maintain stability and handle the situation with the minimum of disruption to the existing system. The oppositional group in these circumstances will often develop a concept of itself as a revolutionary movement with a complementary ideology. Not all groups engaged in campaigns of violence are revolutionary of course. They may be counter-revolutionaries or nihilist terrorists. As such they do not sustain this kind of ideological underpinning for their action and may see themselves as guardians of the status quo. In the conflict in Northern Ireland the Irish Republican Army has features of a revolutionary movement, but the same is much less true of loyalist paramilitary groups. Therefore it was much easier for them to act flexibly after they called a ceasefire and the problems of that type of group are not the focus of this paper.

It is the contradiction between this revolutionary movement ideology and the status quo ideology of the government which is the source of many misunderstandings and breakdowns in attempts to establish negotiations, the more serious because the nature of the contradiction is not always recognized. It is often seen more in terms of the conflicting goals and aspirations rather than in these ideological terms. It is therefore important to clarify the nature of the discrepancy to ensure that it is recognized as a real factor in the process of opening up communication and entering negotiations, and can be taken into account and dealt with by all parties. We will consider three areas in which the differences in "conflict ideology" become manifest – a) the analysis of the conflictual relations and basic assumptions about the characteristics of opponents; b) development of strategic options and the perceptions of parties' actions and stances in the course of the search for a settlement, especially the operation of confidence building measures; and c) decision making processes - and discuss some of the implications of these contradictions for conflict resolution processes.

The difficulties in the move from militancy to negotiation between governments and revolutionary movements were evident in the efforts in 1994 to end the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka. In Sri Lankan in August 1994 the new People's Alliance Government was elected on a platform of peace through negotiation and over the next six months the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) tried to find a basis for negotiations. Immediately on taking office, the Government relaxed a number of features of its economic embargo of the northern area around Jaffna, which was controlled by the LTTE or Tamil Tigers. The LTTE in turn released ten policemen and, following exchanges of letters, a Government delegation visited Jaffna though fighting was still continuing. Following the election as president of Mrs Kumaratunga, the People's Alliance leader, the LTTE called a short ceasefire in November 1994 and a Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities was signed in early January 1995. Subsequent talks were inconclusive and marked by misunderstanding and recrimination, and these efforts finally ended with the LTTE's return to hostilities in April 1995.

Also at the end of August 1994, in Ireland the Irish Republican Army called a ceasefire which was the result of a period of consultations within the movement and secret discussions including contact with both the British and Irish Governments. In October 1995 the loyalist paramilitary organizations declared their own ceasefire effectively ending inter-community violence, though a level of violence continued within each community. In the following eighteen months various procedures were proposed to reach all party talks, including not only Sinn Féin, as the political representatives of Irish republicanism, and the British Government, but also representative of the unionist community, moderate Irish nationalism and the Irish government. However as the process faltered, again with mutual recriminations over the lack of progress, an agreed basis for Sinn Féin involvement continued to be problematic, until in February 1996 an IRA bomb in London marked the end of the ceasefire. However the IRA violence was kept at a low level and attempts continued to find a basis for negotiation. Inter-party talks were initiated in June 1996, following a round of elections but still excluding Sinn Féin because IRA had not renewed their ceasefire and it was not clear if Sinn Féin could satisfy the other parties that they were committed to "exclusively peaceful methods". Subsequently inclusive talks did resume, though the Democratic Unionist Party and some other unionists withdrew, and the negotiations culminated in the Belfast Agreement of 1998. Since then the implementation of that agreement has continued to provide evidence of the impact of the kind of problems discussed here. (Rowan, 1995, Mallie and McKitrick, 1996).

It is not intended to claim that either situation is a true example of the ideal type of conflict configuration that is the focus of this paper. But both of these attempts to establish a basis for negotiation between a government and a militant organization demonstrate some of the types of misunderstanding that can arise and therefore are used for illustrative purposes. It is advantageous that they are also well documented process and in the case of Sri Lanka, the LTTE leader and the Sri Lankan President communicated through published letters in which each gave their description and analysis of developments. In both examples there are other parties that have a significant influence on the situation, but in this discussion the focus is restricted to the specific conflict configuration between revolutionary movement and government.

A militant organization will invariably frame the conflict in structural terms. The conflict is embedded in fundamental inequalities and power relationships between the centre and disadvantaged groups. This analysis provides a justification for armed opposition and the rejection of gradualist methods because it suggests that there will be no possibility of any change without a radical realignment of power relationships and that will only come about through the use of force. In contrast, a government which is faced by such militant opposition will be most concerned with issues of governance and maintaining stability in the system. These contradictory perspectives reinforce each other. In the search for stability the government will almost inevitably find themselves using coercive measures because it may fear a complete collapse of its authority, not only with the militant group but with other sections of society including its own supporters who demand firm government. In return coercive action by the state reinforces in the thinking of the militant group that the problem is one of structural conflict by a repressive state.

In developing its structural analysis, the revolutionary movement will often adopt the concomitant assumption that social actors behave strictly rationally and functionally. Two somewhat contradictory conclusions follow from this. On the one hand, in respect to their own movement, they stress the danger of the human factor in subverting the movements clear goals, and they are very guarded in establishing relationships with opponents which can be seductive, leading to greater sympathy with their opponents' problems and encouraging compromise and concession which weakens their struggle. On the other hand in assessing their opponents they discount the possibility of human frailty or misunderstanding as part of the problem because of the predominance of systemic factors. However such an analysis requires an explanation of why the system of authority does not act consistently and overtly in pursuance of its perceived aim. Paradoxically they will often describe their opponents as unreliable and contrast that approach with what they see as their own principled stance. For example Gerry Adams, president of Sinn Féin has said "My one-sentence description of the British Establishment position is that they have no bottom line. They can be moved as far as the political influence or power that can be harnessed for a democratic solution; they will move as far as that can push them." (quoted in Rowan 1995, pp48-49)

The final sentence of this quotation points to the logical conclusion of this analysis that the authorities are only motivated by self-interest and therefore are only amenable to pressure which challenges those interests. This provides part of the justification for the use of force. They will often see a political strategy as counter-productive in that it appears to offer the authorities a means to contain and divert militant pressure, and blurs the clear strategy of pressure for radical change through direct challenge.

This perception reinforces another assumption that is made by revolutionary movements. Given that the authorities are considered to be unprincipled and motivated by self interest it is a natural conclusion that they will manipulate circumstances for their benefits and even the most apparently benign behaviour is part of a conspiracy or plot.

The authorities for their part have no more reason to accept the good faith of the militants who have made no secret of their basic distrust of the authorities and their willingness to use either a militant or political strategy, depending on which seems most likely to further their aims. They provide reports of the continuing operational activities of the revolutionary movement, recruiting and training members, and preparing operations. In these circumstances the political strategy is seen as a cynical ploy with no serious intent and a cessation of hostilities is simply an opportunity to regroup militarily and prepare for farther fighting.

While revolution movements' self perception is of a principled rational movement developing strategies appropriate to the fundamental contradictions in the state, and their perception of the authorities is of unprincipled self seeking vested interests using any pragmatic means to cling on to power, for the authorities these considerations play no part in their analysis. Being in positions of power, they have, not surprisingly a benign perception of their role in holding society together and maintaining stability, order and good government, often in the face of threats of anarchy and chaos by misguided or evil terrorists. This perception will be particularly strongly held in professed democracies even those where the protesting section of the community are marginalized from the democratic process. It follows that they have the more limited concerns of maintenance and management of the system. There first priority may well be law and order, rather than radical change and they take pride in being able to act pragmatically and make adjustments in the system to contain dissent. That for them is what politics is about.

They may sometimes make a misjudgement, raising questions about the degree of authority they are able to exercise rather than reinforcing it. They will normally wish to avoid situations where their authority is directly tested. For example they may elect to mount a campaign against the revolutionary movement or stand firm on a position which requires increasing effort to maintain. At this point they may not feel the issue is worth protracted confrontation and may realize that they cannot contain the situation or succeed in their strategy. They then find themselves in a situation in which the choice is to persist with their present strategy with the use increasing resources to no effect or they will want to concede. In either cases they appear weak and lacking in authority and if they concede they also appear to lack political will.

With each side satisfied with the validity of its own concerns and denying the validity of their opponents' preoccupations there is little room for mutual understanding of the issues and their interaction confirms rather than challenges the existing conflict ideologies giving no grounds for the need for a reassessment. For example, in the contact between the Sri Lanka Government and the LTTE during January and February 1995, there were differences over a number of issues which proved to be obstacles to the development of the talks process: the ban on fishing in North-eastern seas, the removal of an army camp, the embargo on transport of a list of goods to the North-east and free movement of armed LTTE cadres in Eastern Province. The LTTE demanded changes in government policy on these matters, while the Government was only prepared to consider them as part of a general talks process. In defending her position, President Kumaratunga wrote in a letter to the LTTE of 7 March:

'All of these demands could have serious military repercussions if granted outside the framework of an established and durable peace. In the case of all these requests, the government has made the maximum concessions without compromising national security.'

The fact that the President was so clear in making this reference to national security so clearly suggests that as far as she was concerned this was an eminently sensible and prudent consideration which would be understood by the LTTE, and in subsequent correspondence (e.g. 12 April) she continued to justify the government's stance on the basis that issues have "military repercussions". However in his reply of 9 March Mr Pirabhakaran said

'In previous communication, the LTTE had attributed the reluctance of the government to resolve the urgent and immediate issues to placating the military hierarchy and pointed out that this approach of giving primacy of the strategic interests of the military over and above the existential concerns of the civilian population would pose a serious threat to the peace process. The LTTE's apprehensions about the military design are confirmed by the President's latest letter when it said that granting the "demands" of the LTTE would have "serious military repercussions".'

One cannot discount a level of rhetoric and self justification in such correspondence, but it is also important to recognize the existence of different ideological frameworks which means that while the parties seem to be talking about the same issue, their interest in the issue and the way they understand it are so very different that there is no basis for discussion.

From the perspective of a revolutionary movement the period following a cessation of violence and the transition to formal negotiations is problematic in terms of the balance of power and influence and seems fraught with dangers as worrying as the physical dangers of military struggle.

During a military campaign the use of violence gives the movement a relevance which makes it difficult to ignore. It has a veto on any settlement unless it is defeated. Once the violence stops the revolutionary movement may have no other basis for recognition in terms of public support or legitimacy, though it's concerns and interests (such as justice for a minority section of the community) may be important in their own right. But without the use of force the movement is at risk of being marginalized and ignored, which may be the reason it adopted a violent strategy in the first place. It may find itself in competition with other groups who have campaigned through democratic channels on the same issues and this experience will have given them greater legitimacy, political experience and contacts which places them at an advantage in this phase compared to the revolutionary movement.

Once negotiations are initiated a measure of equality is established as the participation of the revolutionary movement is a sign that it has been given some relevance, if not legitimacy, in the eyes of other parties and the format of the negotiations will inevitable give a degree of influence to all parties. Therefore the hiatus of the pre-negotiation phase or transition from violence to talks is critical, especially for the revolutionary movement.

Its weakness at this point is often compounded by its lack of alternatives to negotiation. Its only other option may well be a return to violence from which it has just decided to move away, while the government can often contemplate with relative equanimity a long period of "truce". Both the government and the revolutionary movement have benefited from the end to the violence but in most situations there are additional benefits for the authorities. We have seen that one of their main concerns is stability which is clearly enhanced by the cessation of violence. The situation on the ground normally remains as it was at the time of the ceasefire and, though the revolutionary movement may retain control of some areas, overall a cease fire normally leaves the status quo intact or provides the government with the opportunity to rebuild its authority in disputed areas. The authorities find positive advantages in prolonging the transition period, not only because it weakens the militant groups, but it also makes a return to violence more difficult. In fact the point may be reached where a new stability has become so established that it will not be necessary for the government to negotiate a settlement directly with people that it sees as illegitimate terrorists. Only where the revolutionary movement is in control of substantial or economically significant areas will the wish to proceed to negotiations weigh more heavily with the authorities.

In such circumstances it is not surprising that for different reasons both sides act cautiously and defensively, but they often fail to appreciate the reasons for caution on the other side. They may recognize that their own hesitance and reluctance to take additional risks at this point is a reflection of their underlying ideology and concern about the level of risk already being taken, but they overlook the contradictory but equally powerful ideological concerns of their opponents and are very suspicious of their reluctance to show more flexibility. We can easily see how this experience can quickly reinforce their existing conflicting revolutionary and governance ideologies. If there is one lesson from the recent Sri Lankan and Northern Irish experience it is that it is important to move through this period as quickly as possible, preferably establishing a timetable for a move into formal negotiations as part of the ceasefire. While in many ways the recent Dayton Accord on the future of Bosnia/Hercegovina raises many questions, one instructive feature of the ceasefire arrangements was the commitment to enter into formal talks within a week of an agreed cessation of violence which took advantage of the wish to achieve a ceasefire and did not allow time for other obstacles to appear subsequently.

If their ideologies warn the parties of the dangers of the transition phase to negotiations, they are also aware that negotiations themselves are not without risks. From the government's point of view the revolutionary movement may appear to have been rewarded, and can build up credibility with other interests, so that they are better placed to continue a campaign to destabilize the government. Therefore they want some evidence that the revolutionary movement is prepared to recognize the rule of law as currently applied and the authority of the government.

The assumption is therefore that the revolutionary movement wants to move into a formal process of negotiation and in this way gain credibility, but the movement is also cautious about the implications of this step. Its analysis suggests that the authorities will want to co-opt dissidents and buy them off with limited concessions, without bringing their goal of a new society any nearer. Therefore they want to see evidence that the authorities and other parties are prepared to recognize their demands as legitimate. Alejandro Bendana of the Centro de Estudios Internacionales in Managua, and formally an official in the Sandinista government of Nicaragua, encapsulated the dilemma facing a revolutionary movement, or in his terms a democratic movement, in a paper written in 1991, shortly after the negotiated settlement of the Nicaraguan conflict had led to the defeat of the Sandinista government in elections:

' Throughout history, the opponents of democracy have often raised the issue of negotiations in order to defuse mounting struggles in their countries as well as international ones by holding out false hope of a just settlement which they have every intention of impeding.

No serious democratic movement can ever assume a position of rejecting a negotiated settlement of the conflict. Indeed, throughout modern history most armed struggles have ended in negotiations. The point is to be able to ascertain correctly when the objective conditions exist which would compel a serious and honest negotiation effort on the part of the opponent. And that it becomes evident in the process that the democratic forces are not negotiating out of weakness nor at the expense of historical aspirations.' (Bendana, 1991)

On this basis it is very difficult for a revolutionary movement to take the risk of adopting Zartman's conciliating mentality.

Both sides are also aware that negotiations can take on a momentum of their own. There may be the apparent safe guard that proposed outcomes have to be acceptable to those involved before they can be described as agreements, but it is not easy to move back to more hostile relations if some measure of progress is being made. In some multi-lateral talks decisions may be taken by a weighted majority, or sufficient consensus, and this allows one or more smaller party to be over-ruled but even in these circumstances, the failure to gain the support of key interests makes implementation of the settlement more difficult and creates a powerful pressure to reach general agreement once talks have started.

With these preconceptions and preoccupations, neither finds it easy to appreciate their opponents' difficulties in entering into dialogue and the risks that they take. The revolutionary movement's requirement that their concerns are recognized as legitimate is taken by their opponents to mean giving in to their demands. The government's requirement that the movement acknowledges the authority of the present government is seen to be surrender. Both sides are ambivalent. The authorities sees the opportunity to tie the revolutionary group into a political process and the existing political system but fears that the movement may be able to use the legitimacy gained against them while at the same time the revolutionary movement fears co-option but wants the legitimacy that is available. However most attention is given to the specific demands which are being made, rather than the underlying concerns which give rise to the demands and make it hard for the other side to respond.

The revolutionary and governance analyses of the nature of the conflict and the implications of processes of conflict resolution produce specific strategies for dealing with the situation, which we will now consider.

Given that a revolutionary movement is committed to a militant strategy as the only means to achieve change, and sees inherent dangers in a more cooperative approach, the move to a political strategy of negotiation is problematic. The adoption of political means may be recognized as necessary to achieve a settlement, but can appear inconsistent with the underlying analysis of irreconcilable conflict between groups with opposing structural interests and therefore it can be difficult to identify when a political strategy is appropriate.

The situation is clearest when a clear victory has been reached by one side or the other and the negotiations are simply to manage the victory or defeat. It is more problematic in those situations of "hurting stalemate" (Zartman, 1996) where each side can continue the struggle but with little possibility of outright success. The incentive to negotiate is increased if there seems to be a window of opportunity which would suggest a reasonable outcome is possible. There is a greater incentive to seek a negotiation process if it appears that the militant strategy is actually counter productive, perhaps by increasing resistance and pushing the movement's goals farther away.

Nevertheless a political strategy will only become attractive if it fits within the basic analysis that the authorities have no capacity or willingness to change the structural inequalities. From this perspective the movement may conclude that a political strategy may offer a way to bring pressure to bear on the Government's perceived self-interest, perhaps by building alliances with other movements and states. One expression of this thinking has been quoted already in the phrase of Bendana (1991) that "The point is to be able to ascertain correctly when the objective conditions exist which would compel a serious and honest negotiation effort on the part of the opponent." Such a strategy sits comfortably with the revolutionary ideology, but less well with a mutual problem solving process. One description of the process leading up to the IRA ceasefire in 1994 is that a convincing political strategy had to be put in place which was consistent with the basic analysis of the republican movement:

'At this [lower ] level within the organization, the feeling was that "war" was all Britain understood. According to security sources the difficulty through this lengthy period and the reason the ceasefire took so long in coming was this whole process of consultation and persuasion that indeed the "war" should be over. These sources made it clear that republicans had not suddenly come to believe that violence was morally wrong but that the debate within the movement had been won on the argument that "more could be gained along an unarmed path." In this process of internal scrutiny, republicans had come to the view that more progress could be made if they could win the backing of significant "political forces" for a peace process. Critical to all of this was Irish-American opinion and the positions taken up be the Dublin government and by John Hume.' (Rowan p85)

We have seen that from traditional perspectives the phase between military confrontation and formal negotiations is difficult in terms of the balance of power and influence. With this in mind parties will therefore act cautiously to protect their position and if possible improve it.

It was noted that the Government often has less incentive to take steps to move the process forward. Caution seems like the safe option but it is important not to overlook the lessons which are being drawn from any apparent lack of commitment which will have the effect of confirming the revolutionary movement's existing ideology. As the memory of the implications of a military strategy recede and the gains appear limited, farther recourse to violence may actually become a more attractive option. The analogy of trying to ride a bicycle slowly is often used to point up the risks of a "minimalist" approach. Riding a bicycle like the search for peace requires some momentum, and if we make a misjudgement and go too slowly we lose our balance.

The authorities may well be aware that the movement has lost the old basis of its significance and attempt to press home an advantage accentuating the lack of authority and legitimacy of the revolutionary movement and will not wish to help them in this transition period. The knowledge that this leverage will be somewhat nullified once negotiations begin are an incentive for the authorities and other parties to use this period to gain maximum advantage, actual or symbolic, which they feel will strengthen their hands once talks start. The revolutionary movement, equally sensitive to this possibility, will resist any move which will appear to be a concession, which in fact means refusing to respond to any conditions laid down by other parties. In actual fact many of these issues are unlikely to make a fundamental change in the balance between the parties if and when negotiations start, but the mutual sense that they are important creates a spiral whereby they acquire increasing significance.

In these circumstances specific details which might in other circumstances be minor can become points of principle. As we shall see later, issues which could be brushed aside while hostilities were continuing become obstacles to progress towards formal negotiation. While they are symbolic of the underlying relationships between the parties, specific issues are disputed on a pragmatic basis, manoeuvring for advantage, and at this level failure to resolve them causes frustration and increases mutual distrust, and reinforces the conspiracy theory which is often prevalent in the movement. A report of a discussion with Martin McGuinness, one of the key members of Sinn Féin in bringing about the IRA ceasefire is enlightening in this regard:

' At the time of the publication of the Downing Street Declaration the British prime minister had made clear that republicans could enter the democratic political process within three months of an end to the violence, and in that interview with Martin McGuinness I asked him for his view on this. "I think there are many people out in the republican community who believe that what the British government is actually after is a defeat of republican resistance. Many people believe that the British government are trying to break the republican community once and for all." (Rowan: page 81-82)'

Similarly, Veluppillai Pirabhakaran, the LTTE leader, on 18 April 1995 in a letter to the Sri Lankan government noted that "the LTTE was convinced beyond doubt that the government was making every effort to strengthen and consolidate the military capability of the armed forces under the guise of the current cessation of hostilities."

We have seen that each party is concerned that they will be pulled into negotiations on an unacceptable basis, and their most fundamental requirement at this stage is therefore evidence of tangible recognition and accommodation of their basic concerns. Wallensteen (1988, p125-6 and also at pp133-140) has touched on these issues in a somewhat different way, noting the importance and difficulty of establishing recognition in the context of asymmetry in status and legitimacy of the parties. Bendana (1991) points out that:

'Serious negotiations presume a recognition of the legitimate interests of your opponents, indeed of the legitimacy of your opponent; which explains why the US systematically refused to seriously negotiate with Nicaragua. Indeed it made no sense for the Reagan Administration to do so because it was bent on destroying the revolutionary option in Central America by military force.'

It is extremely difficult to establish that the situation has in fact changed, that existing assumptions may no longer be valid and there is a basis for negotiation, because the conflict ideologies are often held so strongly that it is always possible to explain all events in a way which supports them. Without reassurance on the stance of their opponents, parties are unwilling to become involved in discussion of wider issues, about which they are uncertain anyway. Pirabhakaran, the LTTE leader, demonstrated such concerns in his letter of 9 March:

'If the government continues to adopt this hard-line attitude on issues that need urgent resolution and could be resolved without difficulty, the LTTE had grounds to suspect whether the government would be able to resolve the most complex and difficult issue, the national conflict.'

As the concerns of each side are different and each seeks to protect their own interest, the process can become a vicious circle in which it is extremely difficult to satisfy their contradictory requirements at once, and as that difficulty becomes more evident each party becomes more determined that its interests should be met. Each side will want to ensure that they retain control of the process and the weaker party will be particularly concerned to proceed step by step and will want to be satisfied at each stage before moving on to the next. The stronger party is likely to be willing to leave the situation vague arguing that it can be sorted out at a later stage. This leads to arguments about setting preconditions for talks which is really an attempt by each side to gain moral superiority and does not take account of the genuine fears out of which the search for reassurance emerges. This forms the context for the search for a basis on which negotiations can take place.

The form that these disputes will take varies in line with the actual local circumstances, the interests of the parties and the balance of advantage held by each side, so that one party may be keen to move directly to formal negotiations while others require reassurances which become seen as preconditions for talks. After its ceasefire Sinn Féin was keen to move to all party talks and the British and, to a lesser extent, the Irish Government wanted a series of steps including an unequivocal rejection of violence and the decommissioning of arms. Giving up arms was never an issue in Sri Lanka following the cessation of hostilities and the Government was the party which was keen to move to political talks while the LTTE was very reluctant, refusing to allow the ceasefire monitoring committees to operate and insisting that steps should be taken to return the situation of the Tamil people to normal before beginning talks on a political settlement.

The underlying issue in both situations as elsewhere was the search for reassurance that the other side had moved away from a "winning mentality", which ironically demonstrated that both sides were in fact still operating with that orientation.

In such circumstances each party will have to balance contradictory considerations. In so far as the authorities' interest is in finding ways to contain the threat to law and order and ensure stability, they will typically want a cessation of hostilities, surrender of weapons or arrangements to bring revolutionary forces under state control before they normalize the situation by scaling down military operations or releasing prisons or entering into negotiations about substantive issues. In so far as the authorities want to know that the revolutionary movement has shifted in its conflict ideology towards negotiation, action on these issues is also important as an indicator of that change. But in so far as the authorities wants to commit the revolutionary movement to the political process they will be keen to move to talks quickly which creates a tension with the other requirements. Added to these considerations is the concern not to enhance the revolutionary movements legitimacy. From this perspective, the authorities will try to avoid giving the revolutionary movement recognition or "rewarding" it for its past violence, which they fear would undermine the basis of stable government and is a disincentive to those groups which have campaigned through democratic channels for the same causes. They will try to maintain that its significance should rest on its current activities and support. We have seen earlier that the authorities' orientation gives priority to containing dissent and that the way to achieve this is to make adjustments and act pragmatically. However they will have limits beyond which they will not go, but its flexibility makes it difficult to be clear that this is the case and they can often have the appearance of responding to pressure and can give the message that violence or the threat of violence can work. In the Sri Lankan example at each stage the government made new proposals which it hoped might satisfy the LTTE. When on 9 March the LTTE gave a deadline for the resumption of hostilities, the government stressed that it refused to treat this as an ultimatum, but nonetheless it also made new proposals on some of the LTTE's concerns in order to expedite the commencement of talks. The IRA bombing in London on 9 February 1996 was followed by a flurry of meetings at governmental level and while again the governments were at pains to stress that they were not responding to violence they nevertheless produced new proposals for the mechanism for entry to talks.

The revolutionary movement will be concerned about being recognized as legitimacy and direct enter into talks can be a means to that end. Other signs of recognition will be the signing of a formal cessation of hostilities and meetings between their leaders and leaders of the government. The revolutionary movement will also want talks for their own sake if they will help to achieve a settlement. However it's priorities at this stage are more clearly defined than the authorities who we have seen are trying to balance a number of considerations. Given its revolutionary orientation the priority is recognition and it is seen as extremely dangerous to enter talks without that recognition. We noted already the LTTE reluctance to move to negotiations on a political settlement, yet felt it had to state its commitment to such talks:

'The LTTE's insistence on the urgency of resolving the day to day problems of the people should not be misconstrued as attempts to by-pass discussions on fundamental political issues underlying the ethnic conflict. The LTTE has never refused to discuss political issues. The underlying cause for the current impasse in the peace process has nothing to do with the resumption of political dialogue, but rather the reluctance of the government to deal with the immediate and urgent issues on grounds of "military repercussions."'

Equally the revolutionary movement is unwilling to make concessions to expedite talks, such as decommissioning its weapons because these demands indicate to them that they are not being treated as legitimate and the presumption follows that their opponents do not intended to work for an inclusive settlement through the negotiations. The movement may feel that it made many sacrifices during the campaign of violence and this is its basis for recognition as it moves into a new era of political involvement. A clear assertion of this position was given by the LTTE in a letter of 28 March, 1995:

'The government's description of its action in initiating the peace talks without demanding the laying down of arms, declaring the cessation of hostilities, visits of government's peace delegations to Jaffna, etc. as concessions granted to the LTTE was a wrong assumption. They should be viewed as necessary conditions to undertake the peace initiative. The perception of the LTTE as an armed group was predicated on a mistaken conception. The LTTE was a national liberation movement articulating the wishes and aspirations of the Tamil nation.'

In its search for recognition that it is being taken seriously, the movement may fall back on the previous basis of its significance, its capacity to wage a campaign of violence. The possibility of a return to violence is always a consideration in its opponents' minds and it is true that violence or the threat of violence can often move things forward, as we have seen. But it can also create resistance. The reason that the authorities are hesitant to deal with them is because they want to be reassured that they are not a threat to stability, and accentuating that threat can widen the gap. It can be especially difficult for those leading the political strategy. In the case of Sinn Féin it was difficult to make the case that the slow rate of progress might encourage militants to return to violence, because such comments were taken as threats and undermined Sinn Féin's right to be treated as a credible political party. In the end the IRA did return to violence which actually in some ways freed Sinn Féin from this dilemma of trying to articulate the attitudes of the military movement.

A farther consideration in all parties minds is that flexibility will be construed as weakness and encourage farther pressure from the other side.

In these circumstances it is not surprising that each side has great difficulty in meeting the requirements of their opponents . The authorities want the revolutionary movement to conform and the failure or reluctance to do so confirms that it continues to challenge the state. The revolutionary movement needs recognition to justify its democratic strategy to its own supporters and the hesitancy in providing recognition, or the qualifications placed on it, give the message to the movement that it has gained nothing by its cessation of violence. What are preconditions for one side should be part of the substance of negotiations for the other. The revolutionary movement will feel that it is being asked to give up its aspirations and comply with a settlement before it is confident that there is a real intention to work for an inclusive that settlement which is considered to be tantamount to surrender. Their opponents will argue that they are being asked to negotiate with the threat of a return to violence hanging over their head if they do not comply with the wishes of the revolutionary movement.

These are real fears but they only touch the surface of the underlying dimensions of these issues which are seldom articulated, even by the parties themselves, so that it is not evident that they represent the fundamental ideological contradictions between the parties on the nature of conflictual relations. A number of consequences follow. The failure to deal with these issues confirms the opposing conflict ideologies of both parties that the conflict cannot be resolved by negotiations. At the same time paradoxically neither party is able or willing to appreciate, at least publicly, that they are challenging a fundamental tenet of their opponent's belief system so that it is almost impossible for any accommodation to be made. And they appear unaware of the risk that failure to avoid an impasse in these interim issues makes the return to violent confrontation more probable, or as we have seen they conclude such a development is preferable to any action which gives ground in an ideological stalemate.

The process becomes mired in discussions about the modalities of talks without a clear recognition of the reasons that the issues have contrasting importance for each side.

Given the conflicting world views of each side, it is almost impossible to build trust. In these circumstances confidence building measures and signals can be very important and Mitchell (1990) has identified some of the characteristics of signals which can help to build trust. They will be unsolicited, voluntary and altruistic, offering some advantage to opponents without any direct benefit in return and they will often be a marked change from previous behaviour or positions. But they are often given and received in the light of the underlying revolutionary and governance orientations and assumptions and as such are misunderstood and often unhelpful. They are no longer unsolicited gestures of good will. For the revolutionary movement they demand gestures from the authorities which are tests of good faith while the demands made on them are understood as seeking concessions intended to put them in a position of disadvantage. The authorities too see the gestures demanded from them as intended to put them at a disadvantage giving credibility and legitimacy to unrepresentative terrorist movements and weakening their capacity to maintain law and order. Neither side appreciates the difficulty in making gestures which from their point of view seem simple and uncontentious.

We can see these different assumptions when we look at the question of release of prisoners. For the revolutionary movement such a gesture is important for the prisoners concerned allowing them to return to something like normal life. But it is also important in indicating that their movement is not composed of common criminals and that they are recognized as being motivated by higher ideals. They see the gesture as demanding little of the authorities but a form of recognition of their struggle. On the other side the authorities are motivated by quite different considerations. They are weighing up the risks of freeing potential activists and setting boundaries for a managed process of release without increasing expectations and stimulating opposition within other sections of the community.

Being pragmatic the authorities tend to see gestures as incentives and inducements - a form of reward for good behaviour. They can use gestures to bargain for concessions from their opponents. They may hold back on making a gesture because they judge that it may be useful at a later stage when unforeseen sticking points arise and hope it can be used then to smooth out problems. Because of their pragmatism the authorities see such an approach as normal politics. With their self perception as principled the revolutionary movement are insulted in being treated in this way and feel that if something can be justified as intrinsically right and helpful it should be done without equivocation. The LTTE saw the Sri Lankan government's approach in this way in their communication of 9 March: "the government is determined to perpetuate the military and economic coercion on the Tamils as bargaining cards to seek political gains at the negotiation table." As it is, many gestures which are offered in the context of reciprocal gestures or at difficult moments are seen as grudging and manipulative and their value is lost.

Recriminations often arise over issues which are seen as new demands. A good example is the dispute over the requirement of IRA decommissioning before Sinn Féin can enter all-party negotiations. The republican movement argue that the IRA called a ceasefire on the basis that there was a direct route to all party talks but after the ceasefire they were then told that other conditions were raised such as decommissioning. The IRA would not have called the ceasefire if that condition had been made in advance. The British government has claimed for its part that it was always expected that there would be decommissioning. In Sri Lanka, LTTE demands for the dismantling of the Poonya army camp became an obstacle to decommissioning. The government was able to point to the clause in the Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities that "both parties to maintain their respective positions on the ground", while the LTTE argued that "the resolution to these issues was of crucial importance for the stabilization of peace and promotion of peace negotiations." These are only two examples of such disagreements which impede the negotiations and we have already argued that their real significance is that they are part of the testing process on each side. They may not be helpful but they may not necessarily be signs of bad faith which implies a breech of faith. However it can be fruitless to argue about whether they are new conditions or not. They may represent old assumptions which were being made by only one party. Because of the disjunction between the ideologies and discourse of the parties, each side will have believed that the other shares their assumptions while in reality they may not even be aware of the kind of assumptions that their opponents are making, never mind share them. To move from this sterile argument it is more important to apply criteria for meaningful gestures such as those identified by Mitchell and assess whether the disputed condition would meet these requirements in any case.

In parallel with the efforts to establish and maintain a negotiation process, other activities will be continuing which involve some form of interaction between the opposing groups and are therefore one way in which the parties assess the intentions of their opponents. We can call these collateral activities. This interaction can arise for example in relation to monitoring the ceasefire, general policing of the civilian population, contact between the civilian communities and the management of prisoners. Violence from all sources can be a form of collateral activity though it may seem rather distasteful to use such a term which is instrumental and lacks a moral connotation. The reality is that the parties will often use moral terms in public references to violence in order to challenge those responsible, but in fact they take a very pragmatic view and in virtually every example of conflict resolution, violence has intensified as communication between the parties has been developing.

The way that the parties handle these situations often does not promote confidence building as they act out of their existing ideologies. So "firm" policing will be applied and will be received as "intimidation" or "victimisation". Protests which are "public expression of opinions" will also continue and be perceived by the authorities as "challenges to law and order". So there is plenty of scope for misunderstanding. A good example was a protest by republicans to a visit by the British Prime Minister. The republicans wanted to show their dissatisfaction with the lack of progress on the negotiations and the local police authorities reached an agreement fir a peaceful protest, which if it had been possible might have actually helped to demonstrate that disagreement could be managed in non-violent ways. It was not without its risks. However as the time past and the prime minister was about to arrive the dangers of escalation began to carry most weight with some people. The policing became more urgent, the protesters became more annoyed and the situation did escalate until a running riot ensued and the prime minister cancelled the engagement. In fact it was in no parties interest for this to happen, least of all Sinn Féin who were accused of orchestrating the whole thing. Ironically Mitchell McLaughlin, one of their leaders, would have met John Major, the prime minister at the event and it was in Sinn Féin's interest at that time that the meeting should have taken place. These types of incidents may not only happen by chance but they may be an expression of the wish of the community or civilian population to test out what is happening. They may feel that they are loosing ground at the negotiation level and they want to see if they can assert themselves on the ground. Parades and opposition to them are controversial issues in some areas at all times, but they become a particularly emotive issue and it is more difficult to find an acceptable way of satisfying the interests of all sides when one or both sections of the community are uncertain and the ability of one side to hold a parade or the other side to stop it can become an important test of the way the overall situation is going. Unfortunately whatever the outcome, the overall impression of the confrontation is likely to reinforce rather assuage everyone's worst fears.

These confrontations can arise spontaneously as an expression of the feelings of those in the area, but it fits well with the revolutionary ideology to highlight and manage such issues to demonstrate their fundamental view of the nature of conflict and the repressive nature of the state. It may not be their intention to allow these confrontations to escalate and they may successfully contain them, but nonetheless the risk is always present. Their participation in such events is often understood differently by their opponents and taken as a sign of their lack of interest in serious negotiations while for them the authorities show their lack of interest by their reaction to the protest.

Revolutionary movements develop specific decision making processes which reflect their underlying their ideology. These decision making processes were first constructed as effective means to maintain their clandestine military campaign and have themselves helped to form the ideology. The governance ideology does not incorporate such precise decision making structures tending as we have seen to value flexibility and pragmatism. This section will therefore focus mainly on the revolutionary movement.

We have noted that a revolutionary movement is suspicious of the human factor which introduces emotion into the analysis and blurs the issues. They therefore rely on a process of rational debate, though of course emotional and other factors may creep in with being explicitly considered and taken into account. The result is a conclusion which is held with a great deal of certainty and conviction and an analysis which is often very absolutist and unequivocal, not allowing for ambiguity or shades of subtlety. It is assumed that opponents' decision-making processes are similarly rational and there is therefore no ambiguity in their position: they are either interested in a negotiated solution or they are not and if they want a settlement they should be taking all necessary steps to bring that about.

In this context violence is not a moral or emotional issue whatever one's private feelings about destruction and loss of life. To some extent this view is shared by both revolutionary and governance ideologies. Moral arguments will be used, but within the broader view of the conflict, violence is a tactic which may be considered necessary or inevitable. This allows personal anger and emotion to be suppressed and efforts continue to reach a resolution of the conflict. Most attention may be given to understanding the significance of the timing of violent incidents. It is noteworthy that there is often a heightening of violence at times when there is contact between the opposing sides. At this point violence is a reassurance that no concessions have been made and the parties will not be deflected from the wider search for a settlement, if they have reached a point where they feel that is necessary. At the same time, they can misjudge the emotional impact of specific acts of violence on their opponents making rational analysis and dialogue more difficult.

The members of the revolutionary movement feel very comfortable with such an analysis which works well during periods of violence. The goals are clear and there appears to be no doubt about who is right and who is wrong. As the conflict enters into a more political phase these certainties become much less clear and many members of the movement will feel uncomfortable with this situation uncertain about what principles are at risk and where a firm stand should be made. Consequently there will be a significant pressure to return to the old certainties and the military strategy, which in itself challenges the internal cohesion of the movement.

Faced with a hostile and usually numerically and military superior opposition, it has been important to maintain a united front. This requires internal discipline which is usually based on strong loyalty and commitment to the cause but if necessary can be maintained by force. This applies not only to members of the organization but also to the community at large, where the ethos of the movement may be attenuated and reliance on force may be more necessary.

The inculcation of loyalty has the effect of suppressing the critical capacity of members. Some movements pride themselves on their capacity for internal debate and criticism and that may be genuine, but the loyalty to the cause means that it often stops short of serious debate about fundamental principles, such as the conflict ideology itself. The leadership can face the problem of wishing to move away from some commitments which are no longer considered to be functional but the rank and file membership are still consider it to be a fundamental principle of the movement and are unwilling to give it up.

The movement will also want to maintain solidarity within its wider constituency and so there will be a struggle for influence within the community at large. In some situations there are clear demarcation lines with each side exercising complete authority over an area, but in a fluid situation where the authorities and the revolutionary movement are both attempting to operate within a geographical area, each side will try to marginalize the other. For example in republican areas of Northern Ireland, the republican movement has encouraged the community to reject the state authorities and provide its own systems of welfare and internal stability. In this way the exercise of summary justice and punishment becomes an issue (McCartney, 1995). The revolutionary movement will encourage the community to rely on it and will want to demonstrate that it can manage all the problems in the community, even though many of them are intractable and require more resources and, perhaps, a more sophisticated response than the movement or local community self help is able to provide (Morrissey and McCorry, 1983).

To maintain consistency it is also important to ensure that lines of authority are clear and respected. Revolutionary organizations do not normally open their decision-making processes to inspection, and one must be cautious about making categorical statements. The one common feature is a strong central authority which directs and enforces policy, but its form and nature varies. Pirabhakaran for example appears to exercise individual absolute authority with a devoted rank and file. In the Irish republican movement there is a corporate leadership, the IRA Army Council and the Sinn Féin Ard Choraile, which has supreme authority for the direction of policy but in both cases there are procedures for consultation with and influence by the rank and file. A third approach is a decentralized system where operational units have direct responsibility for their own actions, which is necessary for a clandestine organization in a hostile environment. However it is usually restricted to specific operational matters and as such can function within a system which is centralized overall.

The structures are in part a response to the movement's ideological perception of the conflict relationships, but the structures also function in such a way as to reinforce the ideology. They maintain commitment and resilience during the war, and avoid the danger of uncertainty creeping in, but they therefore are designed to make change difficult. While it would appear that Pirabhakaran could change LTTE policy and tactics on a whim if he was so minded, his absolute authority means that it is difficult for second level leadership or the movement as a whole to exercise any influence in those decisions. We have seen that the Irish republican movement allows for consultation with members but this is a long and slow process and we have also noted already that the leadership can have difficulty in gaining support for changes which from its perspective is deemed necessary. A revolutionary movement has a recurring fear that the leadership might lose their commitment and compromise on the movement's fundamental principles which are strongly held by the rank and file especially during negotiation with the state, because the leadership can be seduced by its proximity to power or it is more aware of the political realities of the movement's situation and its potential for achieving its goals. The structures can ensure that change cannot happen too easily, but at times change may be necessary.

Related to the other characteristics, the movement will try to minimise the impact of outside influences on its decision making. This is of course a consequence of the need for secrecy but it also encourages awareness that outside influences can be dangerous in undermining the clear goals of the movement It can be extremely interested in learning of other experiences and analyses closely the thinking of its opponents. But it is very suspicious of direct interaction with people who do not share its ideology, both in the general sense and in the more restricted sense used here.

A revolutionary movement is wary of many of the ideas behind current approaches to conflict resolution, which emphasise the importance of human contact and interaction to open up mutual understanding between opponents, appreciation of the opponents point of view and the search for a win-win solution which meets the interests of all parties. The revolutionary ideology is embedded in the view that some things are non-negotiable, the process of conflict resolution are only a means to weaken that resolve and any compromise are in reality concessions to the status quo. And the biggest danger is that the members of their leadership most directly involved may not recognize that this is happening because they have lowered their critical rational faculties. The dilemma is that at some point the movement will have to enter into negotiations unless it can overthrow totally the present system

In the light of the last paragraph, it is not surprising that there is a great distrust of third parties. After all their role is to help to facilitate a settlement and that may well mean encourage a softening of the present line and compromise. A farther consideration is that an external state will share the government's concern about stability and in consequence the relationships between the revolutionary movement and the external party may increasingly become polarized. In the course of time a dynamic develops in which the external state brings pressure, and ultimately force, to bear on the revolutionary group to accept the authority of the government. This was the lesson which the LTTE learnt from Indian involvement in Sri Lanka during the second half of the 1980s.

We have seen that it is very important for a revolutionary movement to maintain their control of the process so that the it does not develop a dynamic which they cannot resist and find themselves in situations which make increasing demands of them, and where they feel at a disadvantage. Accepting the involvement of a third party concedes some control of the process to them and some third parties give such primacy to a settlement over the needs of the parties that they will try to use persuasion and even coercion, perhaps for the best of motives but not necessarily in line with the perceived interests of the revolutionary movement.

Consequently, revolutionary movements have often refused to accept a third party. In the 1995 process in Sri Lanka the government proposed a third party, but this suggestion was refused on a number of grounds. They argued that it was not necessary, that the person was a friend of the President, which was hotly disputed by the government, and that he did not have the authority of being representative of his own government. This last point indicates one of the factors which may encourage the use of third parties: that their participation gives some legitimacy because of their status. The willingness to use a third party may also be an indication of the relative strength of the movement relative to its opponents and a third party may be seen as a way to redress an imbalance. Following the breakdown of the cessation of the hostilities and the subsequent military campaign to retake Jaffna, by 1996 the LTTE was calling for the involvement of a third party such as an international body.

The republican movement in Ireland has not been involved in such public disputes over the involvement of third parties because it has never become an issue. Sinn Féin does have a policy that it will only communicate directly with the British government and will not agree to the involvement of a third party. How that works out in practice may vary and at times messages have been conveyed through other people. Sinn Féin has also been willing to work with third parties in its contacts with other nationalists and one such person was present during meetings but took no direct part. It was said that his presence was seen as a symbol of the possibility of inclusive dialogue and in this way set the tone for more cooperative exchanges (Rowan, 1995 and Mallie and McKittrick, 1996).

In considering the relationship of parties to the conflict there are often parties which do not fit into the role either of protagonists or third parties (McCartney, 1990, Lederach, 1992). In the context of conflict ideologies there are parties which are able to understand the conflict ideologies of one of more parties and they have the potential to play an important role in explaining and interpreting, though they will want to avoid becoming the spokespeople or apologists for one or other party. In the situation in Northern Ireland the loyalists occupied an interesting position. We have suggested that they did not hold a revolutionary ideology. But they do understand many features of it, coming themselves from roots in clandestine paramilitary organizations. At the same time they are also rooted in Unionism and so they have an insight into two diametrically opposed interests. The Irish government holds a particularly significant role in this regard. As a government they share a commitment to maintaining effective governance but they also appreciate the preoccupations and concerns of the republican movement because of the common historical context from which they came. The republican movement felt this was more true of the Fianna Fail party when it was in power than with the present Fine Gael party. Fine Gael of course grew out of the supporters of those who signed the Anglo-Irish Treaty which was itself an example of a shift from a revolutionary ideology of conflict and which was rejected by the rest of Sinn Féin.

It is important to recognize the special role that these parties can play. We have noted earlier that Sinn Féin in common with other movement has tried to build up alliances with other interests as they enter into a negotiation process, while at the same time trying to use them as third parties. It may not be possible to sustain this dual expectation and we will note below that the limits to the common perceptions of the parties became evident once it was tested.

Whatever the process of decision making actually is, each side has a perception of how the other side functions which may be inaccurate and a product of their own assumptions about their opponents. As such it may be very unhelpful in understanding the situation and identifying appropriate ways of responding.

One phenomena which has been commonly observed in conflict is the tendency for each side to be very aware of their own divisions but to assume that their opponents are very united and monolithic. In effect all sides contain variations in emphasis to a greater or lesser extent. It is therefore assumed that their are no constraints on them and they could do whatever they want. No consideration is given to the possibility that they may operate under constraints from their membership or their wider constituency or the general political situation. Therefore if they do not do something which would be perceived as helpful, the conclusion is that they do not want to do it and therefore want to continue the conflict.

The conflict is also personalized in the figure of the identified leader or leaders and it is assumed that those persons have total control and are therefore totally responsible for any decisions and actions by the group. Revolutionary movements in particular are not willing to explain their structures and while they may deny that the leader has absolute control they will not explain clearly what actually happens. Therefore their denials are ignored. In some cases there is a leader who does exercise absolute authority and Pirabhakaran may be such a person. Even though decision making may be more open in the government, the leader ship will still be assumed to exercise total control.

Opponents will look for contradictions between the leaders' behaviour and statements and the activities of the movement and will use those discrepancies to challenge the leaders' good faith and put them at a disadvantage.

In reality most parties are a balance of different perspectives competing for influence. Shifts in movements seldom come from a change of attitude on the part of individuals but rather that the balance of arguments at any one time favour the analysis of one or other group within the movement. Perhaps the most significant influence on the credibility of any set of arguments is the inferences drawn from external events, and therefore to attempt to isolate the leader is actually to make it more difficult for them to influence the internal debate and reinforces the argument that it is impossible to negotiate with opponents. The leader may in fact still be committed to the search for a settlement, but the actions of the other side are making it difficult to make a convincing case within the group.

A good example is the shift in Irish republican thinking before and after their ceasefire in August 1994. The analysis of one group within the movement was that the conflict could not be resolved militarily and therefore they needed to reach a settlement which might allow their aims to be pursued more effectively by political means. To carry that strategy in the movement required a good deal of internal debate and they sought ways to encourage other parties including other nationalists and the British and Irish governments to adopt stances which would support their arguments. As a result the movement supported a ceasefire though many of those who had been against such a move were doubtful. But their opposition was weakened by the stances adopted by other parties.

Once the ceasefire was in place, additional steps were required from the republicans such as renunciation of violence and the decommissioning of weapons. Pressure was put on the republican leadership to make unequivocal statements on behalf of their movement and to explain the apparent contradictions of their position. Rather than helping to consolidate the move to political rather than military means, the stances now evident an d the discomfiture of the leaders helped to bolster the sceptics in the movement in their argument that political negotiation was not possible and ultimately they were able to carry the movement to end the ceasefire. If the government had understood better the internal dynamics of decision making in the movement they might have been able to use a more helpful strategy, though of course the strategy which had been adopted was itself a reflection of the pressures under which the government was operating.

It is also assumed that each side can control their own constituency where in fact this relationship is also dialectical. We have already seen that there is a constant tension in maintaining solidarity and the public is never as loyal to a party's position as its members. The public on all sides is generally in favour of peace, but not at any price. Therefore it may sometimes appear to be more in favour of peace than the party it supports because it is not aware of the risks while at other times it can be more hawkish because it may be less aware of the difficulty of sustaining a military campaign or it does not appreciate the risks in negotiations. A revolutionary movement may find it more difficult to handle this relationship than other parties because it has maintained a low profile during the military campaign and has less developed mechanisms for political interaction with its actual and potential supporters. This was the case with the republican movement in the 1970s, but in the 1980s it built up Sinn Féin as a credible political machine which can interact with its constituency and this has paid dividends for the movement in maintaining awareness among its supporters of its positions during the ceasefire period.

The ideologies of conflict which we have described indicate how difficult it is to develop a form of dialogue which will build confidence and help to move to more inclusive approaches to negotiation. However it is not a fatalistic view which suggests that parties are permanently locked into conflict and cannot reach a resolution of the conflict, though that may be the conclusion they will draw from failed attempts to open up negotiations. In some cases this shift has occurred as in South Africa after CODESA 1, and in others it has occurred but subsequent events may have confirmed the traditional conflict ideologies in the minds of at least some parties, the Oslo Channel and the Washington Accord between the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation organization being a case in point.

At the very least, awareness of the dynamics of the interaction of different conflict ideologies, as described in this paper, help to explain the reluctance which inhibits progress. As well as understanding the reluctance of opponents, it may help each side to recognize its own reluctance and the impact that makes on the situation. It may be difficult to change this pattern but it may be possible to accept that all parties have a responsibility for the impasses which occur rather than assuming that one is the victim of the intransigence of the opponents. This awareness, especially if it is mutual, may be sufficient to stimulate new thinking on ways round the obstacles. It shows that the impasse may be more to do with attitudes and assumptions rather than an unwillingness to settle, or doubts about the possibility of an acceptable solution. Such problems may of course exist, but they are not necessary to create an impasse which contradictions arising from the opposing conflict ideologies are sufficient in themselves to bring progress to a halt. Zartman (1986) talked about the ongoing search for a resolution of a conflict as a process of examining and rejecting solutions. An understanding of the effect of these ideological assumptions indicates that sometimes it is assumed that a solution has been rejected when it has never even been given consideration. It may indicate that a new approach to negotiation is required.

This type of analysis also highlights those occasions when the parties seem to be talking about the same issue, but in fact are working from basic premises which are so different that they are actually talking about completely different things. So each side may appear to be talking about decommissioning when in fact one side is concerned about being accepted as legitimate and the other is actually concerned about ensuring the primacy of political processes over military action. At this level the dispute may be more easily resolved: in this case the need for a political process that all parties can accept as genuine and inclusive.

It is assumed that opponents see the situation in the same way as one's own side but simply have different interests. This analysis indicates the importance of understanding opponents on their own terms and, more importantly, their perception of the context in which they are operating. It does not follow that one must agree or accept the legitimacy of an opponent's perspective, but it is important to appreciate the implications of their understanding for their reactions and behaviour and ultimately for relations between the parties.

It might be assumed that the logical conclusion is to encourage parties to reject their current assumptions about managing conflict, and perhaps provide them with evidence which would support such a move. However this may not be possible, even though the change which is contemplated is restricted to orientation to relations with opponents and not in basic aspirations or interests. Nevertheless the change which is being contemplated is sufficiently fundamental to be a form of paradigm shift, to borrow concept of Thomas Kuhn' (1962). He argued that such a shift must be non-rational because in general the old and new paradigms are "incommensurable" in that they are such different kinds of frameworks that their merits cannot be compared in a purely logical way.

It is a step into the dark. If one is dealing with a system of ideas about the world, that step may be risky in terms of one's intellectual and personal standing and self construct if the new ideology should prove unsustainable. It does not normally involve physical risk to oneself or one's community as is the situation which we are discussing. Therefore the consequences of moving to a more cooperative ideology for handing conflict are much more serious for a party and leaves it much more vulnerable to opponents if the reorientation is not mutual and reciprocal.

It is easier for an individual to make this type of shift than an organization but they are then likely to find themselves marginal to their organization. This emphasises the limitations on the role of the leadership and the importance of dealing with the organization as a whole rather than trying to focus on leaders. All systems avoid change and only accept the need for change when existing positions become untenable, but there are additional factors at work here. The ideologies which are being considered here, and especially the revolutionary movement ideology has as its purpose the maintenance of current thinking and to restrict the available options. It focuses on key points at the expense of apparently more marginal issues. It has features built into it which exclude influences which might stimulate change. A cooperative ideology of conflict management will value behaviours and attitudes such as contact with opponents, emotional and intuitive responses, flexibility, openness, but it is evident from the earlier discussion that these are features which are distrusted and discounted by a revolutionary ideology in particular, and so it will avoid this type of initiative.

It is evident that these initiatives can be counter-productive. For example the Irish Forum for Peace and Reconciliation was an opportunity for different parties to meet and discuss relevant issues. Unionist parties did not attend but there was sustained contacted between Sinn Féin and other Irish political parties. However in some ways it may have raised more questions than were resolved. The other parties wanted Sinn Féin to accept a document on violence but Sinn Féin felt unable to do so. As a result Sinn Féin felt pressurized and misunderstood and realized the limits to the support that they might expect from other parties and the degree to which they would support the concerns of the British Government. The other parties did find it hard to understand Sinn Féin's difficulties and concluded that they were not really interested in finding a formula to allow progress. As a result the gap between the parties widened rather than narrowed, as they were pushed back on and reaffirmed their existing positions.

In the light of the argument in this paper, there are a number of ways in which the existing ideologies are applied in a limited way and if they were to be fully and consistently realized it would require a fuller debate which may eventually make it appropriate and possible to transcend the current frameworks. For example it suggests that there is often a need to think more systematically on the possible consequences of current policies and especially their effect on others. There may be too great a tendency to assume that because the analysis is coherent that it must be applied regardless of changing circumstances, and that current strategy is the obvious and only expression of that strategy. However an appraisal of all options in the light of the overall concerns may raise questions about current thinking and indicate alternative approaches.

In most organizations it is assumed that this process of critical evaluation does take place. However basic assumptions are not challenged and the debate takes place on the basis that a number of factors are taken for granted. The dangers of group think are very real for a closed system, so that the members of the group reinforce each other's views including errors and misjudgements. This is where an outside perspective may be very useful but we have noted the suspicion of such interventions. External views can be controlled in a variety of ways, though this may make them less effective. For example they can be separated from decision-making, as when Sinn Féin conducted its peace commission prior to the cease fire in 1994. It welcomed critical voices at public hearings, though only a limited number responded, and then undertook private internal consultations when, presumably those opinions were taken into account along side other considerations.

If it is decided not to permit an outside perspective, it is possible to identify individuals within the movement to act as critical voices or devil's advocates so that they are free to criticize all assumptions including they most fundamental.

The current discussion also warns against over-reliance on rationality, which leaves out other motivators of attitudes and actions. As we have seen in some of the examples given earlier, parties were able to offer finely crafted explanations of their position, but they were often distrusted because they seemed to mask self-interest, power struggles or emotional commitments or because the other party's own perceptions made it difficult to hear what was being said. In many cases this miscommunication can only be dealt with through confidence building which is not based solely on words but includes more risky human interaction or voluntary action. In the same way tests seem to be a technical matter which one side lays down for their opponent to meet. Again the very fact that a test is being set creates a power contest in which neither side is willing to concede to the other, even though the actual demand may not in itself significant.

It may be more appropriate to think not of tests which are requested from the other side or even of signals of willingness to negotiate in the sense that the person making the gesture is trying to build confidence in the opponent. It may be more helpful for the parties to think of their gestures as risk taking. Because it makes the group more vulnerable and because the group has not reached the stage where it trusts in a process of inclusive cooperative conflict resolution, it would be prudent to establish in parallel a system of risk management, and this aspect is in fact the key to this process.

The specific actions that a group might decide to make will in fact be the same as those categorized as tests or signals, but the discourse is in fact on a very different basis, which can be much more helpful. The action is now seen as a risk which is taken voluntarily as was the case with the effective signals which Mitchell described. Its main purpose is not to communicate with the other side but is given because it is seem as essential to help the process. The cease fires of the LTTE, Sinn Féin and the loyalist paramilitaries can be viewed in this light. They were certainly not intended to be seen as a sign of a weakening of resolve by any of these groups.

From the perspective of risk management, the assessment of risk will begin before the action is taken. The group would first analysis the nature of the risk it was running, consider the possible responses which would he made by its opponents, both those which would take advantage of their increased vulnerability and those which would be reciprocal and in fact minimise the risk which has been taken. It might be possible to sound out what would be the response to taking the risk, and what might flow from it. It seems evident that such soundings took place before the three ceasefires in our examples, though it is now a matter of dispute what understanding was reached. Of course part of the assessment will consider the validity of any assumptions being made. It will also be necessary to assess alternative future scenarios depending on the opponents' response.

If it is decided that the risk should be taken, the group should then monitor what impact it has. If it does have a positive impact, even if there is no response from opponents this builds confidence in the side making taking the risk. It has demonstrated that risks can be taken and opens up future possibilities. Of course their may be a negative response. In the examples given from the revolutionary groups point of view it appeared that they were put under more pressure to make concessions. In those circumstances it became a contest of meeting tests laid down by the opponents and lost the quality of risk taking. Ultimately the tests could not be met without appearing to lose credibility and the potential of the situation ebbed away. In the discourse of risks that issue is much less significant.

Once one side has taken a risk, opponents are now in a situation where they must consider their response and they can also view this as a form of risk management. This will involve a similar review of their options and the likely impact of them and an assessment of the risks involved and how to minimise them. They may well find that to make a positive response which does not attempt to exploit the increased vulnerability of their opponents is in fact the least risky option for themselves. Of course they may well feel under other pressures which may make them more cautious and less willing to take farther risks to encourage progress. At this stage the action of their opponents is not likely to build their confidence as they can interpret it in different ways. In our examples the concern to bolster stability encouraged the governments try to use the opportunity of the ceasefires to entrench their positions. They were of course also influenced by other considerations, including the pressure from their own supporters and in the case of the British Government they were concerned about the possible actions of the Unionist parties and their supporters. Nonetheless the governments did make responses.

If the second party takes a risk on the basis already described, that not only allows them to test out the situation for themselves, but it now begins to have a confidence building effect of the first party who has seen their risk reciprocated. That increases the possibility of farther actions which build confidence in the possibility of a cooperative process and allows the parties to shift in their own time from revolutionary and governance ideologies to a conflict resolution ideology.

The delicacy of many of these process described in this section and the potential for misunderstanding and restricted analysis of options, points to the useful role which third parties can play, though again the suspicion of the potential control of the third party must be emphasised. Nonetheless a process of risk management can also be implemented in working with a third party, and ideally the person or organization chosen will already have some understanding of the orientation of the parties not only on the issues but on their assumptions about how to handle conflict relationships.

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