Report of the Comisión de Personalidades September 2001 We, the commissioners signed below, designated by the National Dialogue and Negotiation Table of the current peace process in progress from article 3 of the Los Pozos Accord signed by the President of the Republic, Andrés Pastrana Arango, and the commander of the FARC-EP, Manuel Marulanda Vélez, after an intense and consciencious period of work during which we have had the opportunity to analyse and evaluate the different factors that have lead to the armed conflict the country has experienced as of several decades, and whose social implications are unquestionable, the influence that this conflict has had and continues to have in Colombian society, the seriousness presented by the phenonomen of paramilitarism (created within the framework of the conflict), and completely aware of the obvious fact that the framework for negotiations in the midst of the continuation of war which has been used since the beginning of this peace process is now exhausted, fulfilling our remit we have formulated for the Table the following recommendations, after presenting some brief considerations which we deem necessary. Historical experience, both from Colombia and the rest of the world, demonstrates that the framework of negotiations during continued violence does not produce satisfactory results, at least in the short and medium term, with regard to the objective of establishing peace. This is because, amongst other things, it supposes maintaining the aspiration among the parties to the conflict of imposing themselves through the use of force on the other side, until they have defeated it militarily, with all that this implies in terms of the loss of human life, material destruction, economic costs and budgetary and moral ruin for millions of people. And we strongly believe that in the Colombian case for reasons in which it is not necessary to enter into detail on but that are obvious to any observer, it is not possible to consider such a possibility, at the risk of worsening even further and extending the conflict, with potential serious international economic, political and military implications, a situation that no Colombian who is a true patriot and lover of peace could wish for their country. Therefore, for these reasons we believe this framework for negotiations has no obvious possibilities of producing positive results for the search for peace, which is the greatest wish of everyone and the genuine objective that ought to motivate the parties in this process. On the contrary, what we argue with genuine concern is that in these last three years since the process started, under the framework of negotiations parallel to conflict, the conflict far from waning has intensified, and the paramilitaries have not ceased to escalate their illegal actions. As a consequence of this, everyday the number of massacres, innocent victims and the most revolting violations of International Humanitarian Law increase. It is obvious to us that the character of these negotiations must be fundamentally political and not military. This is why it appears to us a contradiction that the dialogues should take place during ongoing armed conflict. And that despite conversations continuing between the parties in Villa Nueva Colombia, undoubtedly driven by the best faith and patriotism, across the rest of the country military actions by all sides take place daily, with their inevitable consequences of more deaths and injured, not only amongst the protagonists but also the civilian population – primarily rural – as well as the destruction of goods and materials and therefore incalculable loss to the national economy. And to this we must add the worrying phenomenon of human displacement that today has reached very alarming levels, up to the point of placing Colombia as one of the countries with the highest numbers of internally displaced persons in the world. The political nature of the dialogues and negotiations, which has in fact been explicitly recognized by both sides, obviously dictates that it should be in a political and not military environment – in other words one of armed confrontation – in which these peace negotiations should progress. We have no doubt that this is the appropriate framework for the advancement of the negotiations and the achievement, within a reasonable period, of specific, practical and effective results, as the Colombian people and the international community so desire. We strongly believe that maintaining negotiations in a framework of war, will not only prolong the process indefinitely but will also make the accords we so desperately wish for more difficult each time. For the above reasons, we the commissioners, unanimously and in fulfilment of the mission invested in us by the Dialogue and Negotiating Table with the objective of proposing formulas in order to decrease the intensity of the conflict and end with the phenomenon of paramiliatrism, driven by the most genuine patriotic sentiments and as a positive contribution to the establishment of peace in Colombia, have formulated the following recommendations for the Negotiating Table: 1. That a bilateral ceasefire, initially for six (6) months but whose end can be postponed by agreement between the parties, be agreed upon between the government and the FARC-EP, This ceasefire implies that the parties, that is to say the national government and the FARC-EP, during this period subscribe to, as a minimum, the following commitments: A) There will be no military actions carried out by the Armed Forces and the Police against the FARC-EP in any location in the national territory. B) There will be no military actions carried out by the FARC-EP against the Armed Forces and the Police in any location in the national territory. C) The above does not prevent the Armed Forces and the Police from continuing their actions against other groups and individuals that continue to act in an illegal manner, in accordance with the rules of the Constitution and the law. D) The State should reiterate its commitment to respect all of the universal norms that regulate internal armed conflicts, embodied in International Humanitarian Law (The Geneva Convention and additional protocols) and the FARC-EP equally must commit itself to respecting said norms. In particular both sides must abstain from the use of non-conventional weapons, such as anti-personnel mines, gas cylinders and cluster bombs, the recruitment and use of minors in their ranks, as well as attacks on and the capture of population centres. E) The FARC-EP must not undertake hostilities against individuals, such as the holding of persons, kidnapping, forced payment of cattle or any other livestock, attacks on the energy and petrol infrastructure of the country or transport infrastructure. F) The national government, in agreement with the FARC-EP, will investigate financial mechanisms in order to meet the subsistence needs of the insurgency combatants throughout the period of the ceasefire. G) The State must, in accordance with article 10 of the Accord of Los Pozos, commit itself to the substitution of illicit crops in small landholdings through a process of manual eradication, and both parties must commit themselves to the protection and recuperation of the environment and ecological system. 2. During the period of the bilateral ceasefire, the National Dialogue and Negotiating Table will examine and formulate agreements on specific issues that will constitute a defined agenda on projects for constitutional reform, based on the 12 points agreed upon by the parties in the Common Agenda of La Machaca, as well as issues that should later be subject to development as legislation by Congress or implementation by the Executive. All of the above without compromising the adoption of partial agreements during the ceasefire for immediate implementation. 3. During this period the meetings of the Negotiating Table should be increased to at least three full days per week, and, as well as public civil and military authorities, members, spokespersons, and representatives of the different classes or sectors of Colombian society should be invited to attend the deliberations and contribute their opinions and experiences in order to determine the specific issues included in the agenda, with the objective of achieving the advances that Colombian society hopes for. 4. The agenda of specific proposals for constitutional reform should be defined, based on the agreements reached at the Negotiating Table, referred to in point 3, for this to be debated and decided upon, in principle, by a Constituent Assembly whose convening the national government must commit itself to promote. This Assembly should be composed of representatives of the different political parties, political and union movements, sectors of production, independent sectors of civil society and the FARC-EP and the other insurgent groups that decide to commit themselves to this process. The process for the formation and composition of this Constituent Assembly, as well as the location where it is to be held, its agenda, period of duration and other aspects related to its function and logistics should be decided upon by the parties during the period of the bilateral ceasefire that we propose. 5. Without dismissing the above, the Negotiating Table should examine the possibility of opting for the alternatives of convening a Constituent Assembly or in its stead conveing a public referendum. We recommend that the government, in agreement with the Negotiating Table, analyse in light of the Constitution, the law and the political circumstances of the country, which of these two alternatives would be most convenient and free of obstacles for the implementation of the projects of constitutional reform that have been defined by the terms of point 3 of this document. 6. The parties must commit themselves, in a formal and solemn manner, to respect and obey the decisions adopted by the Constituent Assembly and/or through the referendum, and, in general, all those that arise from the different initiatives that constitutionally relate to the process of the reforms envisaged in these recommendations. 7. Once the agenda for projects of constitutional refom is agreed upon, these should undergo an intense process of dissemination and public awareness amongst the Colombian people, so that the public is sufficiently informed about these, both as part of the process for the debate of these projects, and, if need be, before these are put to a referendum at the appropriate time. 8. If it is to be held, the period of duration of the Constituent Assembly should be a maximum of six (6) months, and not more than three (3) months should elapse between its election and it taking place. 9. The convening of the Constituent Assembly or the holding of the referendum, if this is the case, must be understood as the culmination of the current process of dialogue and negotiation. 10. In the case of convening a Constituent Assembly the majority of the Assembly should be selected through the free and democratic election of its members, without excluding the adoption of special procedures for the selection of those to represent the insurgency. 11. The demilitarized zone should be maintained during the period of the bilateral ceasefire, and in general throughout the period of this democratic process of constitutional reform. 12. The FARC-EP must lay down their arms once it has agreed to the process and this has been initiated on the understanding that the election of the Constituent Assembly, or the holding of the referendum if this option is chosen, marks – as stated in point 9 of this document – the culmination of the process of dialogue and negotiation. 13. In the same manner, once peace has been agreed upon the Armed Forces must adjust themselves to the parameters specified by the constitutional order which will establish their obligation to fulfil their primordial purpose which, in terms of article 217 of the Political Letter in force, is “the defence of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and constitutional order”. 14. The Negotiating Table should determine by consensus a mechanism in order guarantee and verify the absolute fulfilment of the commitments agreed to by the parties for the period of the ceasefire, and, in general, for the duration of the process of the political resolution of the conflict as proposed in these recommendations. We suggested, for example, that representatives of high authority from amongst the countries of the Group of Friends of the Process be designated in the capacity of observers to serve as guarantors for the fulfilment of these commitments before the national and international community: a representative of the United Nations could figure amongst these observers. The above does not exclude that the Negotiating Table agree that the guarantors or some of them should be national individuals of unquestionable credibility. 15. If with the approach of the end of the six-month period of the ceasefire the agreements presented in the above points have not yet been defined, the parties should prolong the ceasefire for the period considered necessary in order to do so. 16. The ELN should be invited to form part of this process and accept, with the same guarantees and commitments stipulated here, the ceasefire that we are proposing to the Dialogue and Negotiation Table. 17. The political movement to be formed by the FARC-EP as the logical consequence of this process must be privileged to all the guarantees and rights, and assume all the responsibilities, that this therefore implies. 18. In light of the threat of the breakdown of the ceasefire because of the failure by any of the parties to fulfil the commitments, as indicated in point 1 of this proposal, the Dialogue and Negotiation Table must immediately be convened in the presence of the national and/or international guarantors and the high-level civil servants that are deemed appropriate, with the objective of finding a swift solution to the problem. 19. Regarding the phenomenon of paramilitarism we have formulated the following recommendations: A) Throughout all of this process the national government, through the Armed Forces and the security organs, must continue pursuing the current policies used to combat paramilitarism in all of its diverse forms. B) In accordance with the relevant laws and without compromising these, the government must accelerate efforts aimed at subjecting to justice those who have been implicated in paramilitary activities. C) The parties must implement the recommendations formulated by the United Nations, and presented in the 57 Commission on Human Rights, and the organization of American States, regarding the Colombian conflict and the issue of paramilitarism in particular. D) A governmental agency should be designated to be responsible for coordinating the initiatives against paramilitarism, without interfering with those initiatives corresponding to other public bodies. E) Any person, civilian or military, that is implicated in acts of collaboration, complicity and, if it is the case, turning a blind eye to paramilitary crimes must be subjected to conventional justice, in accordance with the legal precedence of the Constitutional Court, F) The process of expulsion of all individuals within the Armed Forces and Police that have been involved in any form of paramilitary activity or where there are genuine indications of them having done so, must continue in order to remove the impunity of these practices, not withstanding that these persons also be subjected to the corresponding judicial and disciplinary proceedings. G) All the instutions of the State must support the Human Rights Unit of the Attorney General’s Office in the capture and trial of the instigators and members of paramilitary groups and other groups of private justice. H) All the current laws and judicial norms related to the issue of paramilitarism should be compiled into a single body of law. I) The programmes of protection and security for human rights activists, leaders of political parties and movements, judges, trade unionists, agrarian, youth, and popular organizations, journalists and other potential targets of paramilitary actions and other private justice groups must be strengthened. J) The controls responsible for the prevention of the entry to Colombia, by any means, of any type of foreign agents that act as promoters, advisers, teachers or trainers to paramilitary groups or any other form of private justice groups must be strengthened with international cooperation. K) A large national conference should be organized in which the phenomenon of paramilitarism can be publicly debated, with the broad participation of spokespersons of different political parties and movements, producers associations, social and popular sectors, the Church, NGOs and citizens that have been affected, in one way or another, by this phenomenon. L) Furthermore, we believe that if they are genuine in their reiterated declarations that their illegal actions are in response to the insurgent groups, in particular the FARC-EP, then in light of the ceasefire the paramilitary groups ought to cease to perpetrate criminal acts, at least while the ceasefire holds. And that if the so-desired peace is achieved through the path of understanding and political negotiation and through mechanisms such as those we recommend, as all of we Colombians of good will hope, the phenomenon of paramilitarism will inevitably disappear definitively from our country. 20. The State must, as a long term policy and with the committed cooperation of the international community, redouble its efforts in the fight against the affliction of narco-trafficking, that apart from the incalculable damage it has caused to Colombia and to humanity in general through the serious deterioration of the social fabric and the irreparable damaged inflicted on the environment and our ecosystem that can genuinely be classified as ecocide, it has also unquestionably contributed to the extension of violence, corruption, common delinquency as well as our internal conflict. For these reasons, it is necessary that the international community, in particular the most developed countries, assume alongside Colombia and the other producer and exporter countries of narcotics the commitment to combat and punish those who stimulate this production, through the provision of chemical ingredients and other elements, as well as the importers and distributors of the drugs and other businessmen of narco-trafficking in their respective countries, and the international money laundering organiziations, as well as intensifying by all means available the educational campaigns against drug use amongst diverse social groups. 21. In conjunction with the above point, the international community, particularly the most developed countries, should be asked to commit their support to programmes or projects for illicit crop substitution and eradication through means or systems that do not pose ecological harm nor a lethal threat to human health. 22. The fulfilment of the phases envisioned in these recommendations, namely the six month ceasefire and its potential prolongation, the convening of the National Constituent Assembly and the potential popular referendum of the constitutional reforms, should not imply the interruption or suspension of the electoral process, as directed by the terms of the current Constitution, due to take place next year, and the FARC-EP must promise not to interfere with this through armed actions of any sort. 23. As it can alarmingly be seen, this conflict has degenerated to the point where it is below the minimum limits of humanity, resulting in unthinkable acts of cruelty, therefore the State and the FARC-EP in the same manner must commit themselves before the country and the international community to continue respecting the minimum humanitarian Principles, and that these Principles will not remain simply as rhetoric. This commitment implies, amongst other things, the redoubling the efforts so that in the future, neither during nor after the ceasefire period, there will be no more forced disappearances, nor illegal deprivations of a person’s freedom, be they civilians, combatants, or military personnel, nor any more displacements of the civilian population from their places of residence and employment through the use of intimidation or violence. 24. The national government, with the financial support of the international community and the assitance of all the academic and educational sectors, should from this moment on inititate an intensive public awareness campaign in order for Colombians of all social levels and conditions to learn to live in peace, tolerance and respect for the rights of others, and in order to rescue the virtues that have been lost in recent times amongst vast sectors of our population and amongst different social stratas, like honesty and the dedication to work and study. 25. In the implementation of what is established in article 22 of the National Constitution, peace should automatically be considered as a policy of the State, committed to providing continuity and firmness to the stability that we hope to achieve with this process, understanding peace not simply as the silencing of the guns, but as the non-violent resolution of the internal conflicts and the search for and implementation of social justice and tolerance amongst Colombians. 26. In order to support the ceasefire and peace process, the State should commit itself to considering the demands of the trade unions and popular sectors concerning the resolution of their concerns about their difficult conditions of existence, aggravated by unemployment, labour informality, price increases in public services and, in general, the misery in which large sectors of the Colombian population find themselves. 27. The recommendations that are formulated here should be considered by the Negotiating Table as a single whole, seeing as the recommendations different parts are connected, follow a single thread and therefore in fact represent a single proposal. 28. The Negotiating Table should make public these recommendations with the objective of sounding out national public opinion sorrounding the same issues, taking into account that this process must involve the totality of the Colombian people. By doing this it would be possible to avoid public opinion falling into the realm of distortion and speculations, which only generates confusion and uncertainty. In the patriotic hope that the above recommendations will be accepted by the Negotiating Table in its objective of achieving a complete and lasting peace, we dearly behold ourselves to the members of the Dialogue and Negotiation Table, fellow patriots and friends, CARLOS LOZANO GUILLÉN
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