UNTAC’s ‘top-down’ approach insensitivity or pragmatism?
Alexandra Tennant (November 1998)
Six months after the signing of the Paris agreements, UNTAC arrived in Cambodia to an environment of extreme tension and hostility. Given the deep and persisting antagonism amongst the Cambodian factions, UNTAC faced a formidable task in consolidating the precarious peace by facilitating the transition to a non-violent political system which would outlive its stay. Since UNTAC’s mandate did not permit the use of force by its peacekeeping troops, it was entirely dependent on the goodwill and cooperation of the Cambodian people, which were rapidly undermined by its ‘top-down’ approach.
High-impact operation
In keeping with its mandate, and following the pattern of previous UN missions, a high-impact, short-term operation was put in place. At its peak, UNTAC consisted of over 22,000 military and civilian personnel, drawn from over 100 countries, and cost the international community in excess of US $2 billion. However, in a fragile society that had endured many years of violent conflict, as well as a decade of international isolation, little thought had been given to the possible impact of such a large-scale operation. Indeed, the effect on Cambodia's economy was significant, contributing to distorted patterns of economic growth that further intensified vulnerability for many Cambodians already living near the poverty line, and stifling local initiatives and capacities.
UNTAC’s approach to the complex tasks assigned to it was based essentially on the transfer of expertise, via its numerous international personnel. Little recognition was given to the achievements of Cambodian people in rebuilding their own lives after the ‘zero years’ of the Pol Pot regime. Local skills and knowledge were instead marginalized as UNTAC, rather than encouraging the participation of local communities as partners to the peace process, treated the Cambodian people as targets of the peacebuilding operation — ‘victims’ rescued from a disaster of their own making.
It has been argued that Cambodia’s climate of mistrust and hostility forced UNTAC to adopt this ‘top-down’ approach since, to involve Khmer personnel in anything other than a basic role would have undermined the neutrality of the operation, and further destabilized Cambodian politics. The antipathy with which UNTAC was viewed by the Cambodian People’s Party and the Khmer Rouge in particular — the two most powerful factions with the most to lose from successful implementation of the Paris agreements — was an additional obstacle, as was its short-term mandate which militated against participatory peacebuilding.
Cultural insensitivity
UNTAC’s ‘top-down’ approach may also be explained as symptomatic of the UN’s bureaucratic culture which failed to recognize local resources or customs or the benefits of participatory development. Certainly, UNTAC as a whole showed very little interest in developing an understanding of the national culture with which it was engaging. Despite a number of fact-finding missions prior to its arrival, information and training on Cambodian culture available to staff remained vague in the planning stages and indeed, throughout the whole operation. It became apparent that the UN placed little importance on designing a culturally-appropriate peacebuilding model, or promoting culturally-sensitive behaviour by its personnel.
This was most evident in the widely reported antics of a number of UNTAC’s peacekeepers. Outside commentators observed that ‘as stories of outrageous acts by individual ill-disciplined soldiers piled up and were told and retold, UNTAC was seen with horror as a horde of drinking, whoring, half-naked drivers who ran over people and couldn’t care less’. In retrospect, Yasushi Akashi, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative to Cambodia, admitted that the effectiveness of the operation had been limited by a lack of cultural awareness: “...in the future we should have more strict, clearer criteria and standards of recruitment. If possible, we should have more training before we send peacekeeping forces and civilians to make them more sensitive and more attuned to the local and national cultures, manners and languages”.
Participation as imperative
While such measures would be welcomed, it is imperative that the UN goes further in rethinking its whole approach to its peacekeeping operations. Where local cooperation is essential to the success of the operation, a politically-attuned, participatory approach can no longer be perceived as an optional extra, but must be recognized as purely pragmatic in building sustainable peace.