| Committee for Conflict Transformation Support | CCTS
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Conflict Transformation: from Violence To Politics An account of the seminar, based on the record made by Peter Jarman and the contributions of other participants Introduction Eighteen people attended this seminar, which was organised by the Committee for Conflict Transformation Support (CCTS) and held at the Britannia Conference Centre, London, on June 15th 2000. The seminar laid the ground for a series of further CCTS seminars on Supporting Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. Its purpose was to review the many elements of what is needed to achieve constructive processes and outcomes in post-conflict situations, and to discuss some of the dilemmas. Inevitably, it was concerned with both practical and moral issues, and the tension which often exists between them: questions surrounding deeply held social and political values about justice, rights and responsibilities, and what constitutes a good society. Diana Francis opened the seminar with a substantial review of her paper (above). She commented that she had found it difficult and, at times, depressing to write since the issues were so complex, and it had involved trying to untangle how it was possible to act in a constructive and principled way in situations which were by nature far from ideal. At times she had found herself wondering whether anything in the way of conflict transformation could be made to work. Yet societies do recover in time, even after terrible wars, and positive action in support of recovery was essential. Plenary discussion (...not necessarily representing the consensus of the gathering) The peacebuilding process itself includes an element of force, as police and security forces, suitably armed and equipped, are necessary for the establishment of the rule of law. A blanket condemnation of all violence and weapons ignores this reality. Any intervention, whether military or civilian, needs to have an exit strategy. In practice, however, intervention often creates problems and dependencies that complicate the process of withdrawal and may delay it indefinitely. Western powers, for example, are still trying to extricate themselves from the Gulf following the intervention of 1991. The problem is likely to be even greater in Kosovo/a and Sierra Leone. NGOs, too, have to try to avoid raising unrealistic expectations of what they can contribute. Can a ceasefire come too soon by rescuing from defeat a party that really needs to be defeated - the rebel forces in Sierra Leone for example? The dilemma here is that the fighting needs to end for the process of re-establishing normal politics to begin. But if a ceasefire consolidates the position of a party determined to block that process, the problem might remain intractable. In order to bring about a ceasefire, peacebuilders may have to deal with de facto power holders who have been responsible for aggression and war crimes, thereby consolidating their advantage over victim communities and affronting the latter's basic need for justice. This can severely compromise the moral authority of the external intervenors. The credibility of the claim of outside states to be intervening on humanitarian grounds is compromised when they fail to take any action in parallel situations out of considerations of advantage or realpolitik. In Kosovo/a, the intervening states calculated they could probably emerge unscathed from the action. However, those same powers gingerly left Russia alone in a morally equivalent situation (in terms of human rights violations and the death and injury of civilians). Prudential considerations, such as the risk of sparking a wider war - perhaps even a world war - are a legitimate element in the moral debate. But that does not lessen the hypocrisy of the states concerned failing even to take a serious diplomatic stand against Russian policies in Chechnya. After the initial discussion, participants divided into four groups to consider particular sections of the discussion paper. They worked in the same groups before and after lunch, reporting back in the final session. The outcomes of their discussions are summarised below, under the paper's section headings, on the basis of Peter Jarman's record and individual reports submitted by other participants.
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