CCTS
Newsletter 9

Necessary conditions for the resumption of civil politics

In her presentation, Diana recognised that none of the pre-conditions for true civil politics could be privileged above the others, though in terms of sequence some, such as a ceasefire that would hold, might necessarily require prior attention before anything else could begin to fall into place. But however impossible it might prove to be in fact and actual opportunity in particular cases, the ideal was to try to proceed on all fronts at once and at least try to keep all the necessary ingredients of the transition to politics actively in mind. Then, as the opportunity arose within the unique unfolding profile of each particular situation, they could be all be introduced and worked on.

Diana's presentation set the tone for a difficult but stimulating and rewarding discussion within our small group. We looked in particular at the problems of firstly achieving ceasefires, then getting them to stick and then advancing from stalemate to some sort of equitable order. One of the central points we tried to wrestle with was the apparent necessity of including de facto power holders who had committed the vilest atrocities within the initial dispensation of a ceasefire, simply in order to achieve stasis and a breathing space - to stop the killing. This carried the danger, however, of seriously consolidating the power of butchers, whilst leaving the victims or their remaining families dispossessed and ruined, and excluded - sometimes perpetually - from even the prospect of recognition or minimal restitution. Furthermore, it was likely to lead to ever more rounds of fighting if the signatories were not even mildly serious. From this point of view it might in some cases (such as Sierra Leone or Liberia) be better to choose not to intervene to force a ceasefire until such parties were defeated militarily (always assuming that was the way the tide was running!).

Elevating 'civil order' over the arrest and trial of war criminals, even where it might be prudentially required in the short term, could have disastrous consequences for the claimed 'authority', however broadly based, of an external intervention. This could, however, be mitigated in part by proceeding to arrest and try offenders after a lapse to allow minimal civil order to become established. Similarly, the authority of external intervention could also be compromised by purporting to employ human rights criteria to justify it, as in the 1999 NATO intervention in Yugoslavia/ Kosovo/a. The credibility of this was undermined by the inconsistency of not intervening, or even of protesting more than minimally in all like cases (for instance in Chechnya). Nevertheless, we acknowledged that there might be a moral reality and necessity in such prudential calculations, since unacceptable risk for the world at large is an entirely proper consideration in a decision not to intervene, however tragic.

The group felt that some of these anomalies could be lessened by paying more attention to the social and community chapters/clauses of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights - rather than the bias towards individual rights which tends to be favoured by the western powers who mostly claimed the authority (under UN auspices) to intervene.

This represents only two of the strands of a rich and interwoven conversation which was enlivened and highlighted by detailed examples of situations where these conundrums present themselves, particularly for NGOs who are often operating within the context of a scenario set by military intervention. Examples were taken from West Africa, Sri Lanka, the former Soviet Union and the Balkans.

Peter Jarman's record indicates some of the complexities raised by these examples, and the hard realities that have to be faced:

It was recognised that whilst there is a moral duty to establish a ceasefire as early as possible, to do so may not provide optimum conditions for creating a civil society. From this perspective, the ceasefire might come too early, as in Sierra Leone, or too late, as in Bosnia. Including, as parties to a peace treaty, groups like the rebels in Sierra Leone, who have cut off the limbs of adults and children, may simply multiply the difficulties of establishing a civil society - especially if such parties have no intention to abide by the ceasefire. The price paid for such a ceasefire may preclude effective intervention by NGOs to quicken moves towards democracy and a civil society. Some ceasefires last only a few days, as happened many times in Liberia. A ceasefire is, in any case, merely a transitional step on the way to re-establishing a civil society.

State actors may change their tactics following a visit by one of their leaders, as happened when the British Foreign Secretary visited Sierra Leone and realised that Liberia had to be dissuaded from providing weapons to the IUF rebels. Outside states may contribute the instability of a situation by supplying weapons to both sides in an effort to maintain a balanced tension.

There was a time before war broke out between the government and the rebels in Sierra Leone when the backers of both sides were willing to engage in dialogue and to eschew violence. However, there was then an almost total lack of the trust required for meaningful dialogue. Violence is symptomatic of an absence of trust and the task of peace-builders after a ceasefire is to bring people together in trust-building relationships.

Peacekeepers may be required for an indefinite period in the aftermath of a violent conflict, and this too raises problems. One of the sides, for example, such as the rebels in Sierra Leone, may calculate that the intervening states will not be prepared to make such a commitment and may bide their time until the peacekeepers are withdrawn and then renew their attacks. What decides the time when peacekeepers are pulled out? Exhaustion of people? Exhaustion of money? Attrition?

In Sri Lanka, the settlement of the protracted conflict might well come about through de-escalating the violence rather than through a ceasefire.

next  |  discussion paper

newsletter  |  ccts