CCTS
Newsletter 9

Necessary conditions for the resumption of civil politics

Ceasefire leading to political settlement
Perhaps the most obvious precondition for a return to the political, as opposed to military, management of conflict is the achievement of a ceasefire and the start of a process leading to some kind settlement. The difficulties and complexities of reaching that point are not the subject of this paper. However, I shall discuss some of the elements which will need to characterise agreements made.

Inclusiveness
Ideally, the ceasefire and subsequent settlement will have been negotiated and agreed by all major players, with the backing of their constituencies. If the terms for ending hostilities are imposed through the outright victory of one side, or dictated by one side because of its overwhelming superiority in terms of power; or if they are imposed by an outside power, according to its own interests and judgements, the commitment of those who consider themselves to be adversely affected by the settlement, to living in accordance with its terms, is likely to be limited. In international conflicts, victors and vanquished have to live together only in the broadest sense; in internal conflicts they have to do it literally, and it is important that not only all the main military protagonists but as high a proportion as possible of the population at large, and of different groups within it, should support the settlement which has been agreed. Chief Butholezi and his Zulu supporters could have wrecked the chances of peace in South Africa. The shift in UK government policy, from excluding 'the men of violence' from talks, to including them in the still perilous peace process, was a crucial step in the direction of ending the rumbling war in the north of Ireland. In the negotiations between the PLO and the Israeli Government, the doing of a deal which failed to meet the aspirations of the majority of Palestinians, as well as the non-delivery of even those concessions made by the Israeli government, led to growing resistance to the agreement and the growth of support for Hamas.

Best/ least bad alternative; incentives
In this last case, many Palestinians commented, when the deal was first done, that it was hard to settle for so little after so much suffering. Even those who signed must have felt this, but decided it was the best they could do and better than the continuation of a war they could not win. Their power in relation to the state of Israel was insufficient for them to do better. The impoverishment and psychological scarring caused by war are never likely to find compensation, since they represent total loss, which is the cost of war itself. The original causes of the conflict are often overtaken in magnitude by its effects and it is hard, if not impossible, for any settlement to make adequate amends for the harm done, whether physical or emotional.
In order for political leaders to reach agreements, there need to be incentives for them to do so: pressure, or at least acquiescence, from an adequate proportion of their constituency, and some kind of prospect for their own future which is good enough (or as little bad) as to make peace more attractive than the continuation of war - whether in terms of their own power or security, or in terms of their more altruistic aspirations. This is often difficult to achieve without unduly rewarding selfish violence, or relying for the reestablishment of politics on clearly despotic and unreliable people.

Constituencies and pressures
The development of a strong peace constituency will not only support the settlement of a conflict, but make the successful implementation of any settlement much more likely. For instance, the support for the political settlement of the conflict in South Africa has so far carried the new government through what is inevitably an extremely difficult period.
One difficulty in ensuring that there is adequate support for a proposed settlement is that negotiations often require the political space provided by secrecy, and that this runs counter (at least temporarily) to the need for leaders to inform their constituencies and be accountable to them. Although this is a problem, one can think of possible ways in which it can be addressed. A more daunting difficulty is that the will of a very large peace constituency may be ignored by warlords, or whoever commands the fighting. It may be in many ways undesirable, but it is nonetheless true, that often the pressure to reach a settlement comes from powerful outsiders. Then it is to be hoped, at least, that they are motivated by a degree of real care for all the people of the region and understand their needs and views; but it remains hard to progress from the dynamics of war, perpetuated in the imposition of 'peace' by force majeur, to the dynamics of democratic and inclusive politics.

Addressing causes of violence
Sometimes the original causes of a war seem to have at least as much to do with demagoguery and personal ambition on the part of politicians (as in the former Yugoslavia) as with any underlying injustice; but the fighting has been so bloody and bitter that it has irrevocably altered relationships within an entire region. In other situations, the original causes of war remain fundamental, and it is vital that they should be addressed in any settlement. So the question of land distribution remains a matter of injustice and a cause of conflict in Zimbabwe - albeit used for his own purposes by President Mugabe; and in South Africa gross inequalities of wealth remain a cause of tension and violence.

Addressing the status of refugees and internally displaced people
One aspect of violent conflict which is clearly a result rather than a cause of it (though related to causes), is the large scale displacement of people from their homes. Any political agreement to end violent conflict will need to address their status and rights. In conflicts focussed on ethnic identity, the return of refugees is likely to be difficult, not only for security reasons, as in Kosovo/a, but because it may tip the demographic balance against those who remain. For instance, in Abkhazia, the return of Georgian refugees would make the Abkhaz a small minority again, in what they consider as their own country. (The Abkhaz refuse to address the refugee question until the constitutional issue has been settled. The Georgian government will not negotiate about the constitution until the refugee question has been addressed.)

Security and enforcement
The first fruits of a settlement should be the ending of large-scale violence and an immediate increase in physical and psychological security on all sides. Without these, it is impossible for real progress to be made on other fronts. For such an increase in security to be accomplished, it will be necessary for decisions made at the top to be implemented on the ground, which in turn implies a strong political will and effective procedures to ensure follow-through and monitoring. Fighters will need to be disarmed, demobilised and psychologically, socially and economically reintegrated into society. Civilian police will need to be (re)trained and their performance carefully monitored. These requirements are easily named. The current situation in Kosovo/a illustrates the difficulties of bringing them into reality, even (or perhaps especially) where a large enforcement agency is present. In a war, fighters are seen and see themselves as society's primary actors. Once it is over, they have no real status, no practical role and often no emotional stake in the peace. In Zimbabwe, the unmet needs of war veterans remain a source of both political conflict and violence.
Outside monitors, peace-keepers or peace-enforcers may have a role to play in preventing a return to violence and in helping build confidence and increasing the security of groups who are, or perceive themselves to be, particularly vulnerable; but it is hard for them to impose peace against the will of forces inside the country, both the mass of the population or those who control armies. The situation in Sierra Leone deteriorates as I write; and in Kosovo/a the international determination, so amply backed by troops, to see a multiethnic democracy in place, is no match for the understandable desire of many Albanians to be rid of their former oppressors and exact vengeance or settle scores where possible.
Our experience of working at the NGO level in situations of great violence will have been, on the whole, an experience of helplessness and frustration - of seeing all our partners' and our efforts repeatedly blown out of the water.

Questions:
How inclusive does a settlement have to be, or who, if anyone, needs to be excluded, if it is to be politically sustainable and morally defensible? Who does and should decide? How far is it necessary, or possible, to reward violence in the shaping of a settlement (and in 'justice' processes which follow)? Do our local partners and we have any role at this stage? What is the proper role of outside forces, military or civilian, UN or other, in providing security for the implementation of a settlement?

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