Committee for Conflict Transformation Support

CCTS
Newsletter 7



Going Home

A Day Workshop on the Problems of Return

by Kathleen Shepherd

...The voices of the refugees, whose lives are at the centre of the turmoil, are not readily heard.

Listen to the voices of people on all sides of the problem! In keeping with this first caveat for the work of conflict transformation, CCTS members did some intense listening on 16 January at Friends International House. We had gathered to explore the personal and political obstacles to the return of refugees and internally displaced people after violent conflict. Members who work within NGOs to transform conflicts in former Yugoslav republics and the Caucasus region, as well as in Africa and in Latin America, began the day of exchange by hearing the perspectives of two guest panellists who have administered repatriation programmes for UN agencies.

The guests were Larry Hollingsworth, who has worked with UNHCR in a number of refugee return programmes, and Philip Peirce, who has recently worked with UNDP in Central Bosnia. Their on-the-ground accounts of their work to return hundreds of thousands of wartime refugees to their former homes gave a picture of the imperatives governing these programmes. There is pressure from donors and host nations to return people home as soon as possible. There is an expectation that the allotted budget will be spent within a specific time period no matter how circumstances may change. There is an assumption that money is the engine of redevelopment. Under these conditions, the voices of the refugees, whose lives are at the center of the turmoil, are not readily heard.

In evaluating the success of UN repatriation programmes, the panellists emphasized good timing, careful preparation and sufficient money. Larry Hollingsworth showed how all three contributed to the successful return of Ethiopian refugees from Sudan by UNHCR. The timing for return was right because the war was clearly ended. Fifty eight thousand men from Mengistu's defeated army agreed to be disarmed by their Sudanese "hosts" and were airlifted by UNHCR to Addis Ababa. This was managed in just seven months. Good planning was evident in the thought given to the refugees' needs after their return to their capital city. The differing needs of urban and rural dwellers were considered, and the latter were provided with immediate transport to their villages along with a package of appropriate supplies to help them start making their living once more. The subsequent return and successful reintegration of 340,000 other refugees of the conflict was achieved at a total cost of $154 million.

By contrast, the return of Georgian IDPs to Abkhazia seemed to be weak on timing and planning. In spite of the reluctance of some of the refugees, and the warnings from various quarters that return was premature, 200 people were sent back, only to be intimidated and to retreat. In addition, money was insufficient. Larry's conclusion from this experience was, "You've got to know it's right. You have to have the courage to stop it if it's wrong."

In a third case, unforeseen difficulties for repatriation arose from plans to house refugees from Chechen with host families in Dagestan . During the war, the local economy was disrupted by the presence of relief food on the market. After the war, many refugees chose the advantages of Dagestan' s regular food supply, schools, and clinics, over return to their home area. Larry concluded that UNHCR' s policies in this case had the effect of discouraging their return home.

Philip Peirce's account of his work with UNDP to return displaced persons within Central Bosnia stressed the development of different plans for different areas, with sensitivity to the political differences. In terms of timing, there is tension between the people's need to feel secure and the risk that delay may lead to further entrenchment of community divisions. Philip described some regions as currently incapable of reintegration, and others in which an abundance of resources are now being invested. Philip administers a civil society grants program which funds projects in media, small business, and home repair, focusing resources in a limited geographic area in the hope of effecting measurable change. The available budget for redevelopment is huge -- six times more per capita than the Marshall plan -- and geared mainly to rebuilding infrastructure. But the tasks of assessment, planning, and building are difficult in the towns which have separate and recalcitrant Bosniac authorities, and by corrupt and separatist mayors who came to power in the fighting.

Having listened closely to these perspectives from UN agency experiences, CCTS members followed with questions focused on the refugees' experiences -- their real and perceived security, their ability to overcome the trauma of war and to rebuild their lives, their willingness to coexist alongside former enemies.

David Lord's question hovered over the discussion: "Do conflict resolution organisations have any actual impact?" The answers were not quick in coming, perhaps because of the different lenses used by UN and NGO workers. But some of the spaces in which conflict transformation is essential to the successful return of refugees emerged in discussion. First, there are neglected places. Certain war-torn regions such as Ossetia receive little international support because they have less strategic importance to donor nations. Second, psycho-social needs are neglected everywhere. Any existing social welfare structures of countries were destroyed by war when social sector workers fled or were killed. For example, in Bosnia 70 per cent of children have witnessed a traumatic event and many women have suffered rape, but no official provision exists to help with their psychological recovery. Cross-community reconciliation programmes are without funding. Third, preventive work is neglected. The seeds of future wars are in the unhealed wounds of past violence, but there is no wide awareness of this relationship, and major funds are spent neither on social welfare nor on the prevention of future conflicts.

From the discussion, facilitators Diana Francis and Alan Pleydell developed three areas of questions, dilemmas, and conundra for smaller groups to consider.

1) What is the "right" intervention, and how is it affected by problems of power, money and mandates? How can analysis and mapping help determine when and how it is "right" to repatriate refugees? How can we assess perceived threats to security as well as objective danger to the returnees?

2) What account must be taken of refugees' perceptions, hostility and trauma? How are they affected by media and propaganda? How are fears for security at the psychological level to be considered?

3) How is the right timing and situation for intervention determined in view of socio-political group relations, ethnicity, local power structures, and war crimes tribunals? How can refugees' security be ensured?

Participants divided themselves into three groups and spent the remainder of the morning and early afternoon airing and sharing their experiences around these themes. The day concluded with a final plenary in which each group shared its central observations with the others. Diana Francis pointed out that the people who are most affected-- the refugees themselves -- have the least say in the decisions about return. CCTS members made a continuous effort throughout the day to include the refugee voices they had heard during the course of their work.

Peter Jarman supported the value of listening to people on the local level, but reminded us of the need for a larger awareness which seeks to influence people and agencies at different levels. To this end, efforts to define what different NGOs are able to do and to coordinate their work would benefit refugees.

In keeping with that concern, the "short-termism" of donor agendas was criticised as destructive to a problem that demands a long-term perspective and long-term engagement.

The merits and dangers of war tribunals were raised in an effort to assess their potential for reconciliation versus exacerbation of the conflict. An effective permanent international tribunal geared not to specific conflicts was thought to command more respect and power to deter future violations.

Someone summed up the day's work: To be more questioning is wiser -- it increases the chance of doing some good. Implicit in this thought is the wisdom of listening as well, particularly to the refugee voices of those who are most affected.

 

 

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