Coordinating Committee for Conflict Resolution Training in Europe

Number 4, Summer 1996

CCCRTE


  From notes of the day

IFOR's David Grant provides some personal reflections on the day's discussions.

It's good to know what your motives are and what you are trying to do. Different means should be used at different stages. One of the polarities of particular interest is regarding pedagogy, "elicitive" or "prescriptive". Genuine elicitiveness is what Freire wrote about; fake elicitiveness, Socrates. Also, let's be clear that "prescriptive" is an appropriate pedagogy in certain circumstances, e.g., transference of technique.

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A problem for stakeholders: accountability is strong between the donor and the organizer of the training...but accountability is not strong between the participants and the donor. Therefore the real needs of the people for whom the trainings are given are sometimes not addressed because of the real needs of others (for instance, the need for funders to justify expenditures to their constituents, sometimes taxpayers).

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The idea came up of funding a "semi-participant" to provide in-depth, third-party-of-a-sort evaluation and/or monitoring of the trainers and the training. (Problems arise of vested interests, of non-shared perspectives, of non-participant observation, of "the laboratory" influence.)

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If an external evaluator of trainings is used, two aspects should be identified and separated: the course itself (did the trainers do what they set out to do?); the individual effects (immediately afterwards as well as much later).

This point was made relative to the value of making mistakes. For instance, a participant might remember, a year later, only a provocative "mistake" that leads to an opening. (This is important because, in using a pedagogy of "mutually seeking solutions to real problems", there must necessarily be errors along the way. I have seen trainers who "say" this is the way they work, but allow no "deviations" or "mess-ups", keeping everyone safe and secure and comfortable...but not engaging in the difficult work of facing problems and dangers in a mutually participative way.)

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How to evaluate "invisible" change that goes on inside individual people? This was brought up in regard to treatment of trauma. Psychotherapeutic approaches within the conflict resolution field may not be as specifically effective as bruited. They may be merely a form of "paying attention" (which, in and of itself, tends to "empower" people). The same might be said of all sorts of "trainings", "programs" and "therapies".

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How to evaluate the value of opponents or enemies simply being able to talk with each other, when before they couldn't?

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It is important to remember what levels are being addressed: interpersonal; organisational; societal. How do those levels affect each other? In our small group on "Framework", other levels were defined: the most polarized; the caught-in-the-middle; the military; etc. Consider these within the social fabric. Also to consider: In what stage is the conflict? Always ask: Who is doing what work already?

Some thoughts on the discussions

Who "legitimizes" NGOs to do this conflict resolution work?

In a conversation with the Oxfam representative, an article from Index on Censorship was recommended ("Intervention Unbound: African Encounters" by Alex de Waal, Issue 23). That article and others are about the dilemmas of working in situations of moral ambiguity (such as Rwanda), and the choices about military intervention vis-a-vis humanitarian relief. It was interesting to read of the International Red Cross' strict policies of engagement and discretion. I think she is correct when she told the group that a self-policing Code of Conduct or Code of Professional Practices should be worked towards...or it will be imposed.

Regarding that "hot topic" of codes, I appreciated the honest recognition that "this is a highly competitive field". I think it behooves the CCCRTE to come up with a suggested list of voluntary parameters for "basic rights and privileges of trainers and the organizations they work for", something that will say to potential partnering or contracting organizations: "If you employ someone from CCCRTE's member organizations, you can expect, and have a right to demand, these particular minimums."

Regarding the question "How to evaluate that which does not happen?" (...when an intervention has prevented a conflict and thus there is nothing to report...part of the problem of public relations.) ...It hadn't occurred to me so clearly that this condundrum explains, in part, why it is easier to get funds "after" a war than before one. Furthermore, I was interested in early warning systems as a solution (if they are reliable indicators of the future), to the problem of proving "that which does not happen". I appreciated others pointing out to me that, even with accurate early warning systems, there are also the problems of: the political will to respond to early warnings (again, it's more likely after the shooting starts than before); what are the preventative measures themselves (not well-known, not accepted, usually not to scale)?

"Jet Set Trainers" were criticized for skipping from place-to-place. On the other hand, "one-off" trainings were defended IF there was an organizational continuity and plan behind them. I think this is an important point because it seems to me that much of this work is "personality"-driven. There is a certain amount of charisma and "performer presence" that is needed by the individual trainers, almost "irrespective" of the content of the training! This goes back to the devil's advocate remark above about pychotherapeutic approaches being merely a form of "paying attention". It also relates to the comment that it is "fairly easy" to have the participants all "feeling good" and "positive" at the end of several days of training. So it is all the more important that there be an organizational overview and long-term objective. Otherwise we fall prey to atomizing the effects of what we are trying to do.

I was struck by the obviousness of "There should always be an analysis of the situation before responding to a request". Certainly this is true, but no one mentioned the most obvious influential parameter of any "situation": namely, finances. There is always a temptation to go where the money is. I have read criticisms of NGO's that were "saved" by the Rwandan tragedy. We are in a business that feeds off of adversity. Other professions in this category are journalism, medicine and law. I think we might do well to ponder the implications of this in light of "dilemmas of evaluation" and otherwise D.G.

 

 

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