CCTS
Review 32

by Andrew Rigby, Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies, Coventry University, UK

Introduction

We are all aware of the manner in which military force has come to be used for ‘humanitarian’ purposes in recent years, as a consequence of which aid and conflict transformation agencies working in post-settlement contexts have found themselves having to develop appropriate working relationships with their new partners – the military forces representing regional and international governmental organisations such as NATO and the UN. Indeed, the influential report Responsibility to Protect which seeks to present a rationale for armed humanitarian intervention based on traditional just war thinking concludes its observations regarding ‘human protection operations’ with the recommendation that ‘there must be maximum coordination between military and civilian authorities and organisations’[1]. Indeed, the implication of the report is that such coordination should begin prior to the actual intervention, and that peace-building should be integrated into the planning of the intervention. Thus we read,

If military intervention is to be contemplated, the need for a post-intervention strategy is also of paramount importance. Military intervention is one instrument in a broader spectrum of tools designed to prevent conflicts and humanitarian emergencies from arising, intensifying, spreading, persisting or recurring. The objective of such a strategy must be to help ensure that the conditions that prompted the military intervention do not repeat themselves or simply resurface. ... the consolidation of peace in the aftermath of conflict requires more than purely diplomatic and military action ... an integrated peace building effort is needed to address the various factors which have caused or are threatening a conflict.[2]

In this paper I offer a few reflections on the possible roles to be played by ‘third party’ military forcesin post-war peace-building processes. The hypothetical scenario that informs these observations is of a ‘third party’ military force intervening in an intra-state conflict situation in order to enforce a ceasefire and create the conditions necessary for peacebuilding processes.[3]

Deep values and the world-as-it-is

Before offering my observations on the potential role of the military in peace-building processes, I want to try and contextualise them with regard to my own stance vis-à-vis the military. I am an unreconstructed pacifist, using the term in its Anglo-American sense of someone who opposes all war. My commitment to pacifism is a core element in my identity. That said, as a peace studies academic with an interest in post-war reconstruction and reconciliation processes, I am required to deal with the world-as-it-is, and that world is one where the military continues to exist as an institution prepared to pursue its traditional function of inflicting physical violence and death on those defined as enemies by the state or other authority to whom the military owe allegiance. In recent years in the UK and elsewhere we have found that the military are laying claim to a broader role – sowing the seeds of sustainable peace in the aftermath of war. I remain deeply sceptical at some ‘gut level’ that what are essentially institutions for coercion and violence can have any role whatsoever in the promotion of peace. Be that as it may, at the more superficial level of the intellect I recognise that it is important to try and identify the lessons to be learned with regard to the involvement of military forces in ‘postconflict’ peacebuilding on the principle that if it is going to take place, we should seek to learn the lessons in order to generate guidelines for best practice.

Peacebuilding is a generic term referring to all those activities and initiatives that are intended to create the conditions necessary for a sustainable peace in the aftermath of violent and destructive conflict. The achievement of such a durable and self-regenerating peaceful condition is only possible where the citizens enjoy a degree of human security such that the possibility of a reversion to organised and large scale violence is minimised. In other words, sustainable peace at the societal level is dependent on the experience of heightened levels of individual (and hence communal) freedom from want and fear such that the post-war peace grows ever-deeper, from the surface level of a ceasefire to deeper forms of co-existence and mutuality between the different sectors of society.

Enhancing human security – the dimensions of a ‘good peace’

If we want to explore those factors that can contribute to the enhancement of human security as the necessary pre-condition for a durable peace, we need to identify the main components of what we might call a good peace – a sustainable peace process that deepens over time. Such a broad project is directly comparable to nation-building, and as such involves not only laying the foundations of new institutions but also entails efforts to promote attitudinal and cultural changes. Amongst such challenges we can identify the following.

1. The existence of an effective ceasefire.
   Here a key role can be fulfilled by an intervening military force, establishing the minimalconditions of physical security necessary for longer-term peace-building initiatives to take root.
   
   
2. Functioning administrative system.
   It is vital that the means be developed for the delivery of basic amenities and a level of ‘law and order’ sufficient to enhance people’s sense of physical and psychological security.
   
   
3. Nonviolent conflict management.
   A major challenge is the creation of institutions of government at central and local levels that can manage conflict non-violently without recourse to large-scale violence.
   
   
4. The development of a working economy.
   There should be a particular focus on inclusivity and employment generation.
   
   
5. Promotion of a culture of inclusivity.
   The capacity to handle conflict non-violently will be enhanced to the degree that post-settlement initiatives are seen as inclusive and as such can engender the active support of significant peace constituencies who can maintain and mobilise popular sentiment in favour of the peace.
   
   
6. Dealing with the past.
   The emergence of new forms of co-existence such that former enemies begin to acknowledge each other as fellow-citizens (a new civic culture) can be encouraged by the utilisation of culturally appropriate means of helping people individually and collectively to become reconciled to their past loss and associated pain. The processes and the institutions by which this is pursued will invariably depend not only on the culture of the particular society but also on the power-relationships between the parties to the peace settlement..
   
   
7. Reconciliation initiatives.
   A sustainable peace/security will not come through institution-building and economic development alone. Too often it seems that third parties work with a model of ‘peace through prosperity’. Such an approach ignores the fact that ceasefires might bring an end to the fighting, they do not bring an end to the conflict. Therefore it is vital that in all spheres of life efforts are made to create the space necessary for dialogue to take place across the boundaries of divided communities, such that the seeds of new forms of co-existence can be sown.

The risks of military involvement in peacebuilding

I am aware that what has been presented above might seem like a seven-point plan for peace-building. Unfortunately the real world is not so simple, and at this stage I want to make a few cautionary observations directed towards those who think they can convert a military intervention aimed at a form of pacification (the top-down imposition of order by coercive means) into a constructive dimension of a longer-term and broader peace-building project to create a sustainable peace.

1. There is no standard template for peace-building, there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’. Each initiative needs to be crafted in the fullest awareness of the specificity of the context and of the dynamics of the conflict. What might have worked in Northern Ireland is not necessarily appropriate for the Balkans or elsewhere! Any agency contemplating intervention in a conflict zone must first of all perform a very thorough conflict analysis.
2. Any intervention, whether it be by military or non-military means and however ‘humanitarian’ in impulse it might be, must be informed by the awareness that outsiders cannot make peace for other people. Reconciliation can take place only when communities take responsibility for their relationships with each other. All outsiders can reasonably hope to achieve by their intervention is to contribute to the empowerment of indigenous peace constituencies.
3. Any agency intervening in a conflict zone, by military or non-military means, can hardly avoid becoming a party to the conflict. The belief that a military force can enter a conflict zone for peace-keeping purposes and remain as some kind of neutral referee is not supported by the available historical evidence.
4. The most critical factor affecting the speed and the manner by which an intervening force comes to be seen as partisan is their perceived degree of legitimacy. This in turn is influenced by a number of variables.
   a) The decision to intervene is taken according to due process and as a last resort, in accordance with the normal precepts of just war theory relating to jus ad bellum.
   b) There are no substantial grounds for suspecting any ulterior motive for the intervention beyond humanitarian concern and a belief in ‘the responsibility to protect’, as evidenced amongst other things by the degree of consistency regarding such decisions. (Why intervene in Kosovo and not in Palestine?)
   c) There is reliable evidence that the intervention is welcomed by the majority of the indigenous population.
   d) During the period of intervention the personnel behave in a manner that generates legitimacy, as evidenced primarily by a non-discriminatory respect for basic human rights and a system of holding to account those who abuse such rights.
5. To the extent that intervening forces are viewed as partisan and integral to the conflict, they undermine the legitimacy and the efficacy of those civilian humanitarian agencies that intervened ‘on the coat-tails’ of the military, such that they too can become ‘legitimate targets’ for violent sanctions.

Concluding observations

1. The need to distinguish between combat and policing
The basic aim of any intervening military force is to create the necessary conditions of physical security such that reconstruction and reconciliation processes can take place. However, there are two dimensions to this role, and they do not rest easily alongside each other. On the one hand there is the use of coercive force to protect threatened populations and enforce a ceasefire. Then there is the
policing function of establishing and maintaining a degree of public order (and the avoidance of civil chaos) such that some variant of normal social life can begin to grow. These two roles – the warfighting and the policing – require different approaches and different mentalities. Whereas overwhelming force might be necessary in combat, it can be counter-productive in policing – sending the tanks in to disperse a mob is not the way to maintain law and order in the long-term. Moreover, it is unrealistic to expect combat troops who have risked life and limb on the battlefield to take on a post-ceasefire policing function, to shift from being instruments of deadly violence to being protectors of public order within the community. Combat troops are not accustomed to treating those they encounter with dignity. Yet we know that unless locals are treated with respect, then the intervening force will lose legitimacy. We also know that you cannot police without the support of local communities. Without that support the only way to maintain a kind of order is by coercive domination, which leads to further erosion of legitimacy and a corresponding corrosion of themorality of the troops themselves who increasingly take on the role of occupiers.

2. The efficacy of an unarmed interventionary force has been under-estimated.
In discussing these issues with one of my students from Sudan, he reported on the experience of African Union troops in the Darfur region, equipped with small-arms, in front of whom people were still being killed. Given that a ceasefire can hold only so long as the parties remain committed to it, could not an unarmed interventionary ‘force’ be just as effective as an armed one in monitoring a ceasefire?

3. Responsibility of military to educate politicians and publics
Given the questionable contribution that any military intervention can make to the peace-building processes necessary for the achievement of a sustainable peace, beyond establishing the base conditions of physical security for such processes to proceed, the military have a responsibility to educate politicians and publics about the limitations and the dangers of military intervention – there
can be no military solution to a political problem.

4. The need to think in the long-term
If and when intervention does take place, the military should prioritise from the very start the need to work for their own redundancy in relation to the intervention. If they fail to think in the long-term, seeking to manage each crisis in public order as it occurs, failing to train and hand over responsibility to indigenous civilians, they risk becoming an occupying pacification force, ‘freezing’ the situation at
a stage which remains unsustainable without their continued presence, thereby becoming an obstacle to deeper peace-building processes.

5. The dangers of a culture of militarism
Any military intervention contributes to a ‘culture of militarism’, a belief that reliance on military force and violence is a legitimate means of pursuing interests. This is one of the paradoxes at the heart of military involvement in peacebuilding. As such it is perhaps important to be reminded that the threats to human security stem not so much from conflict but from the violence involved in the pursuance of conflict. The fact that some of us, on occasions, recognise the ‘responsibility to protect’ threatened populations, and recognise that military force can have a role to play in such a project, should not mask the more fundamental imperative to develop nonviolent means of transforming destructive conflicts along constructive channels in all walks of life and at whatever level they occur.

6. Peace-building is not a job for the military
In one of my postgraduate classes I reviewed some of the points made in this presentation. One of the students, a West African military officer, after looking at the listing of the elements of a ‘good peace’ declared, ‘Other than enforcing and monitoring a ceasefire – the rest ... that is not a job for the military!’

Notes:

[1] ICISS, The responsibility to protect, Ottowa: International Development Research Centre, 2001, p.67. [Back to text]

[2] Responsibility to protect, p.39. [Back to text]

[3] In presenting these reflections I am focusing on those military interventions that enjoy a credible degree of legitimacy. I am not referring to cases like the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq, which was and remains illegitimate. [Back to text]

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