by Dr Deborah Goodwin, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst
Expectations concerning the role of our armed forces have grown in the last couple of decades, with an increasing reliance on the ability of the soldier to act in a war-fighting capacity, peace support, a humanitarian role and, occasionally, in major human crises. These roles may not occur in discrete and individual operating environments but even within a single deployment, where the need to shift roles can necessitate procedural and behavioural changes within hours, or even minutes. This paper seeks to explore the dilemmas of the demands being placed on troops in modern mutable operations other than war, how they are expected to behave and act, and how they are being prepared for these multiple tasks.
Complex peacekeeping
Military operations other than war [OOTW] involve working in peace-making environments, post conflict, or even within a hot conflict where peace enforcement or suchlike is being attempted. Chapter VI of the UN Charter allows for the intervention of United Nations forces in the pacific resolution of both inter- and intra- state conflicts; recent deployments have demanded a more aggressive form of peacekeeping in order to be effective or even sustainable. The deployment of an UN peacekeeping force to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2003, a force of over 5000 personnel and led by the French military in the early stages, was necessarily different in the manner in which the working mandate was constructed.
Whilst the UN Security Council resolutions stressed the requirements to monitor ceasefire agreements, to work with parties to obtain the release of prisoners of war, to facilitate humanitarian assistance, and to liaise with all factions (all of which require effective negotiation skills to be successful) the military was also given a prerogative to shoot to kill if necessary.[1] Circumstances proved that attempting peacekeeping in an on-going civil war necessitates the option of full-blown aggression on the part of the peacekeeper, if appropriate. Another example of this approach was the UN mandate for Liberia issued in August 2003.[2] A lack of ultimate force as an option for the military peacekeeper in an obviously hostile environment could result in loss of life at most, frustration at least (as was witnessed in the unsatisfactory mandate given to UNPROFOR troops in the Balkans, 1992/93). However, a prevalent military force option in any negotiation situation can lead to scant regard for lengthy discussion or the use of de-escalation tactics, or even a lack of confidence in negotiation as an effective conflict resolution tactic in the eyes of the military.[3] When a Mission Mandate gives a greater licence to respond aggressively there may be a tendency to escalate tensions rather than a procedural necessity to sustain other forms of dispute resolution as a matter of primacy. Also in such circumstances peacekeepers tend to lose their neutrality status (a core of the early UN perception of peacekeeping), abandon the ‘non use of force’ tenet, and often are deployed without the prior consent of all parties in theatre. This is indicative of a dramatic shift in traditional peacekeeping intervention premises, and results in the need for a different response in the peacekeeper deployed in an aggressive role. So, even within peacekeeping operations per se there has increasingly developed a multiplicity of response depending on the Mission mandate, the nature of the conflict, and the operating procedures for the deployed force. The individual peacekeeper is required to conduct aggressive responses on some operations, and on others the more traditional forms of peacekeeping with an emphasis on conciliation and nation building.
As the Brahimi report states:
…When the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence with the ability and determination to defeat them…no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force if complex peacekeeping, in particular, is to succeed.[4]
Ideally, military forces deployed in such circumstances would have the mandate to defend themselves as well as assist the home nation, to have been trained sufficiently and effectively, to know and understand the cultural context within which they are working, and to have all necessary resources in order to succeed. There would be consensus on timescales, inter-agency co-operation and unity, effective troop deployment and a clear chain of command in theatre. These operations would also receive sufficient funding and political support from contributing nations, where a willingness to respond to crises supersedes diplomatic machinations.
The reality can be very different.
The culture of violence is endemic in many modern societies, as witnessed in the ravaged nation of
Rwanda, the slaughter in the Sudan, the Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the volatility of areas
such as Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir and Iraq. The UN and other security ‘providers’ have
attempted traditional resolution techniques with varied degrees of success. Diplomacy, ceasefire
monitoring, observer missions, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and preventative deployment have
produced mixed results. Modern intervention appears to require different techniques and approaches.
Acting differently
Traditional responses are limited in scope and viability, therefore, and in accordance with the comment of Kofi Annan, “…it has made us review our responsibilities and question our most basic assumptions about the very nature of war and the very high price of peace in the post cold war era.”[5]
In light of this, several different approaches can be proposed as refinements to the more traditional responses attempted to solve modern human security issues, both before and after conflict. These are:
- Conflict prevention measures
- Coercive diplomacy
- The pool of operatives
- The implementation of the modern ‘soldier/diplomat’
Conflict prevention measures
In many recent interventions a response has occurred at the hot stages of a conflict or when a crisis has taken place that is causing, or has caused, all-out warfare, for example in Sierra Leone or the Balkans. It can be argued that too much effort is spent at the tumultuous stages of a conflict, when settlement is at its hardest to achieve, and not enough in pre-emptive resolution tactics or dialogue in the more latent stages of a conflict. This is mainly due to the laborious effort it takes to achieve consensus of thought and action amongst those parties involved in providing support and remedy, but also due to a reluctance to pre-empt the potential for conflict and violence at earlier opportunities. The life cycle of a conflict, be it long or short lived, clearly reveals the capacity for sustainable conflict prevention at all stages of the dynamic.
At the very least the development of lines of communication and sustainable dialogue can, and should, be undertaken at the earliest opportunity. Some might argue that this is a fanciful notion and that, for political reasons, such overt communication with reviled states or individuals would not be countenanced by most nation states. Maybe so, but what can be, and is, countenanced is discreet dialogue, often held in camera, that allows for the possibility of de-escalation using minimum coercion. In this age of action and reaction we have lost sight of the viability of negotiation and persuasive communication; it takes longer and requires foresight and dedication, and these are values that do not mirror the speedy pace of life in the modern world. But its effectiveness has been evidenced: the discreet use of diplomacy by Robert Kennedy in 1962 had a considerable effect in deescalating the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the recent unseen negotiations with Libya have resulted in the international recognition of a once pariah state. Yet it does beg the question as to who conducts and sustains preventative measures. A first inclination is to defer to the United Nations, but it can be argued that in its current organisational form there are no true conflict prevention initiatives in any sustainable and consistent manner. An emphasis on compliance directives, or penalising ‘wrongdoers’ in some way, does not get to the heart of preventing escalation of a situation, or the creation of a possible durable resolution. The situation in Darfur in 2004 has again revealed both nation states and the UN being slow to act; threats of an oil embargo, which would have been damaging, appear to have been shelved. Debate rages about the composition of any deployed military force, with halfhearted attempts at decision-making over this more traditional form of conflict prevention/resolution. Earlier negotiations, some of which appear to involve the infamous janjaweed, dissolved and all parties have been slow to resurrect the dialogue. None of the five proposals offered by UK Prime Minister Blair in October 2004 are new initiatives; they tend to revolve around conventional proposals such as abiding by UN resolutions, and allowing more geographically specific troops into the region. As time drags on and violence escalates, the potential for de-escalation at a ‘lower’ stage of the conflict fades dramatically.
Coercive diplomacy
It can be argued that a more aggressive form of diplomacy would be more efficient in the modern world order. The concept, and reality, of coercive diplomacy implies a dynamic replete with escalatory response, and even threat moves. But it falls short of overt military aggression by sustaining communication links and dialogue even at the most contentious stages. Coercion implies the lower reliance on co-operative moves, or even ‘win-win’ tenets, is more risky in diplomatic terms, and might provoke either stalemate or repulsion. In the risk adverse world that we currently inhabit it is not a popular choice. However, a degree of persuasive diplomatic force at the earlier, or even the post conflict stages, might prove effective in certain on-going dilemmas. Just as various national military working within a multinational peacekeeping force are likely to have different Rules of Engagement within the operation as a whole, then an option for a scale of de-escalatory diplomatic conflict resolution tactics would appear relevant and beneficial.[6]
The pool of post conflict operatives
The reconstruction phase of a conflict naturally necessitates the involvement of many players in theatre as crisis response workers. Experience has also shown that it can be difficult to organise and focus such a diverse group, especially when there is no clear common strategic aim, or if that aim is not appropriate or viable for all operatives in theatre. For example, the polarity of views between military and non-governmental organisational actors can be marked, and raises questions about the exact roles and objectives of these parties in theatre. Evolving military doctrine in the United States and many NATO countries encompasses an objective to play an active part in the post conflict stage, and not to just ‘defeat the enemy’ in a more traditional sense. This has led to friction between the military, the police, and humanitarian workers in certain theatres of operation (for example in Afghanistan) since traditional areas of responsibility are becoming blurred and indistinct.[7]
At the very least these frictions can result in misunderstandings or wounded pride, but at worst can cause problems and issues for those that need to be helped. Save the Children cites a case where the delivery of aid by the US led coalition in Afghanistan’s Zabul province was accompanied by leaflets calling upon civilians to provide intelligence information, or face losing the aid in future. Following protests from humanitarian agencies the leaflets were withdrawn.[8]
How might it be possible for post conflict support workers, ranging from the military through to one man and a truck of donated supplies, to work together in a mutually cohesive manner? An initial, and rather simplistic, response is a change in mindset. Human nature is such that organisations can become extremely insular in both outlook and objective terms, and can lose the ability to see the ‘bigger picture’, preferring to focus on their own needs and concerns. Whilst this is understandable, and even effective, in non-conflict deployments, group cohesion and a concept of ‘common partnership’ proves beneficial in the complicated environment of post conflict reconstruction. Being tough on the problem, and not on the people, focuses attention on the essence of the dilemma to be ameliorated, even if it costs a degree of self-pride or forces interagency rivalry to take a back seat. Of course, every operative has an individual mission and drive, but unless there is an early recognition of the part that every player has to play in the greater ‘good’, then implicit frictions rapidly become explicit and necessarily destructive. Respect and trust that each organisation has its area of expertise and understanding, which can be ‘pooled’ to inform and provide best practice in the field, is another essential realisation. A drive to act in theatre, rather than appraise judiciously (albeit briefly in crisis situations) can lead to poor communication, poor understanding, and poor responses lacking in coordination and effectiveness. This is regrettable when all parties are driven by the core motivation to help, rebuild and sustain.
A way to form a healthy post conflict working environment is to use modern communications, as well as traditional meetings and negotiation, to discover who is in theatre (not always obvious or overt), who needs what, who will be the provider, and who will monitor, assess and make secure. Regular communications both at the ground level and at a wider operational level can help to maintain focus, provide mutually useful information about each agency and for each agency, and help to control the flood of requests and responses required. It also limits the ‘us and them’ factor by raising understanding and recognising discreet areas of responsibility. The hosting and logistical requirements of arranging such communications in theatre can be decided upon in each specific deployment, with the main agencies alternating in taking the lead and initiative in information sharing and communicating. To state what seems an obvious constructive working environment initiative might appear simplistic, but in current circumstances parties jostling for position at the post conflict stage can supersede any integrated response, and reduce effectiveness for all agencies. Even better would be the formation of a ‘code of conduct and responsibility’ to aid all agencies in delineating response, prior to active involvement in any post conflict reconstruction initiatives. This ought to be formed at a strategic level, akin to the concept of writing a broad based mandate for agencies that would be non-context specific, but provide general guidance for all parties once deployed. In essence, this would be an inter-agency Charter that all would construct and devise, and that would provide guidelines on main responsibilities and roles. Once in theatre, then the fundamentals would be already established, but then allow for a flexibility of response and delivery of context specific initiatives. The formation of such a Charter would take time to define, and a high degree of effort to produce in the international arena, but is likely to prove an effective tool on active operations.
Security
The deaths of five MSF workers in Afghanistan in June 2004, and the spate of hostage taking of civilian construction workers and humanitarian workers in Iraq in the same year, pose a significant threat to the ability to bring aid to the civil community. Unlike the military or police, these workers are not armed or have any real way to defend themselves and their missions, and the impact of such acts has resulted in the withdrawal of active involvement in on-going operations by organisations such as MSF and the UN. The post conflict reconstruction community faces a serious dilemma: if the tactic of targeting such ‘soft’ targets persists, then how might support to the home nation be best effected, without the presence of vital agencies? One argument might be that, despite the dislike of the humanitarian agencies of military involvement in humanitarian work, in volatile circumstances the military might be the only agency able to provide effective response. This is due to the fact that the military would have the capability to defend themselves, they are armed, and they can act in a more aggressive manner. Whilst a post conflict dynamic remains inherently violent, but an imperative for human assistance exists, then military delivery of such appears the only option. NGOs stress that they do not want to arm themselves, and that they wish to remain distinct from the military on operations in order to carry out their own work in an effective manner. They tend to dislike the military getting involved in any kind of humanitarian assistance. This is understandable, but in the dangerous working circumstances described, the elective departure of such organisations from theatre leaves a vacuum that has to be filled by someone else. Often the only ‘someone else’ left is the military. Therefore to complain that the military should not get involved in humanitarian work is not to see ‘the bigger picture’ in this instance, i.e. getting the help to the people who continue to suffer during episodes of violent response. If humanitarian agencies are forced to leave theatre due a deplorable threat to their operatives, then their remote guidance for the military in the continued delivery of aid would be beneficial and supportive. In quieter post conflict environments, then such work remains the main responsibility of humanitarian aid organisations; however, in volatile countries where workers are placed at unnecessary extreme risk, the military has a capability to fulfil some of the aid responsibilities still required. Humanitarian workers have not been targeted just because they are believed to be allied to the military (it has already been stated that they seek to remain remote from the military on many occasions), but due to more fundamental antagonisms and cultural hatreds, especially as evidenced in Iraq. The seizure of Margaret Hassan, the head of CARE, in Iraq in October 2004 exemplifies this. In such circumstances it is important that humanitarian organisations ask themselves a question: given that it is very sensible not to risk civilian aid workers in such circumstances, does it remain reasonable to dislike aid distribution and support being undertaken by another agency in a period of volatility and during the necessary absence of established aid agencies, in order for a degree of aid relief to be continued? This is a logistical and ethical dilemma for all parties involved.
The implementation of the modern ‘Soldier/diplomat’
Where the military remain in theatre in the post-conflict phase, the necessary re-construction work requires a different working response from traditional war fighting imperatives. Many recent conflicts have necessitated sustained military involvement, and the forces most successful at assistance within a shattered infrastructure are those that possess a range of resolution techniques, particularly negotiation and liaison skills.[9]
Acute consciousness of the all-pervading mission-demands will dictate how a military negotiator is likely to respond in a tactical level negotiation (in the field). At all stages of a negotiation the soldier will be aware of the mission brief, and the mission brief might result in inflexibility in ultimate decision-making for that soldier. When another party is encountered, one of the first objectives will be to ascertain the extent to which that party is a threat to the mission. Soldiers are likely to ask themselves if another’s actions hinder the prosecution of their own orders. The answer to this question is likely to be ‘yes’ in most encounters; for example, people at a roadblock are unlikely to commence a negotiation in a highly co-operative manner. As a soldier explores the situation through conversation, information concerning the armed tactical stance of the other party will be sought constantly also. Even though a soldier will engage in co-operative negotiation when it is deemed appropriate, it is likely that should that negotiation compromise the overall mission brief, then other options might be exercised.
A military tactical level negotiation in a peacekeeping or volatile context is laced with obvious aggressive intent, and this makes for a specific type of bargaining situation. The potential for armed response, by either side and at any point in a negotiation, can make for a dangerous and provocative negotiating context. This is why peacekeepers are soldiers or police, rather than civilians who would be unused to such aggressive and dangerous contexts. That is not to say that a military negotiator has to be a tough and aggressive negotiator necessarily, but they do have to be aware of their driving concerns on operation, and the possibility of violence.
There is a consensus of opinion that the presence of an international military force in a peacekeeping context tends to enhance the bargaining positions of any relief operators, be they civilian negotiators or military negotiators.[10] It can give a ‘negotiating from a position of strength’ stance, specifically military strength, but can only be effective if the military strength is used when necessary.[11] As Michael Williams states, the presence of the military “…helps a mission to retain its legitimacy and credibility.”12 Liaison and verification become important tasks in the military role in such an operation, but tempered with the recognition that any peacekeeping military force cannot completely dissociate itself from its traditional combat role, as and when required, and its emphasis on upholding the mission itself.[13]
Conclusion
The modern post conflict environment is complex and replete with frustrations, volatility, and uncertainty. Often security issues require the presence of a strong military and police contingent that might run counter to agencies whose raison d’etre is more pacific and altruistic. However, all require one another in terms of support, knowledge and implementation of a common good. As has been discussed, there may be a need to define interagency organisation, communication and roles in a more concrete manner, prior to any deployments. However, this will require tremendous initiatives and detailed discussions within the international community.
Until or unless such support can be granted from the strategic level then to ‘carry gentle peace’ in present conflicts is a heavy, if not dangerous, burden for all concerned.
Unfortunately, it will often also demand the ultimate price from many of its willing bearers.
Notes
[1] See UN Security Council Resolution of 1291 24/2/00 and Resolution 1445 4/12/02 [Back to text]
[2] See UN resolution [Back to text]
[3] Detailed discussion of the nature of military negotiation can be found in Goodwin, Deborah The Military and Negotiation (London:Frank Cass, 2005) [Back to text]
[4] Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809, New York:UN General Assembly/Security Council,21 August 2000,p viii. [Back to text]
[5] Address at University of California, Berkeley, 20 April 1988 [Back to text]
[6] See Jentleson, Bruce.W. Coercive prevention: normative, political and policy dilemmas in Peaceworks 35 (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, October 2000) for further ideas on coercive diplomacy. [Back to text]
[7] See the Save the Children report Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afghanistan 2004 [Back to text]
[8] ibid p40 [Back to text]
[9] For a full analysis of military negotiation refer to Goodwin, Deborah The Military and Negotiation (London: Frank Cass,2005) [Back to text]
10] To win without fighting is the acme of skill. Sun Tzu translated and edited by Samuel B Griffith, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963). The involvement of the military in any situation is a deliberate act to ensure physical safety and security, in a way in which civilians cannot. [Back to text]
[11] authorial emphasis. [Back to text]
[12] Michael C.Williams, Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping, Adelphi Paper 321 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) p 73 [Back to text]
[13] “At the ‘tactical’ level, the consent line is certainly wiggly. If a bunch of Serbs, Croats or Muslims opened fire on a UN military vehicle, or, later, an aid convoy, the British could-and often did-shoot back. ..In the course of the Bosnian war the British UN troops probably killed several hundred local fighters..” C. Bellamy, Knights in White Armour (London: Random House, 1996) p154 [Back to text]
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