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The Ethics of Post War Intervention - dilemmas of conflict transformation practice: Panel Presentations
Andy Carl
Andy Carl said he was somewhat envious of organisations like WRI who had such a clear-cut view. CR did intervene in war-torn areas with conflict resolution work in an attempt to change things for the better and, because it was a small organisation, it accepted funding from DFID and intergovernmental bodies.
The particular problem we were discussing was perhaps related to the discomfort of working in asymmetric collaboration with awkward partners, whether governments or funding agencies with a different or contradictory set of ethics or policies. Should practitioners accept money from corporations or governments? The contradictions were evident, but could we live with them?
He then gave examples of the kinds of problems and issues that arose:
- USAID recently put a contract out to tender for 'managing African conflict'. The language of the contract was informed by the discourse of conflict resolution, but the work itself was framed as a business transaction. The contract was taken up by American construction firms (to handle the physical reconstruction) who in turn approached CR and other NGOs to act as 'subcontractors' to handle the peace-building aspects of the work. In this instance CR decided against co-operating. However, sometimes there is a case for going in with one's eyes open to the pitfalls.
- The Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (part of USAID) describes NGOs as 'Private and Voluntary Organisations' (PVOs)2 - indicating that they regard NGOs as special-interest groups. From the US government perspective the 'PVOs' are contracted to implement US policy.
- Similarly the UK government's 'Global Conflict Prevention Pool' see NGOs as complementing British government policies. The pool - a joint UK Foreign Office/MOD/DFID initiative that aims 'to reduce the number of people affected by violent conflict' recently held a meeting to launch a report3 about its work. But it made virtually no effort to publicise the launch, inviting neither MPs nor the press. There was no mention during the meeting of the wars in Afghanistan or Iraq, and one of the speakers, in answer to a question, said he saw no contradiction between the aim of preventing conflict and the British government's promotion of arms exports.
- A number of conflict transformation practitioners (including Andy) recently received an email from someone working for a UK agency who had gone to Iraq to promote the development of civil society. In the course of asking for suitable Iraqi contacts, he suggested that, given the area of Iraq and the size of its population, it should be able to support at least 70,000 NGOs. This mechanistic, and top-down approach was incompatible with the notion that the request for help should come from below, from local groups and partners.
- NGOs that work with 'opposition' groups in areas of conflict risk losing any future funding. In addition (although it has not been applied in this way to date) the UK Prevention of Terrorism Act leaves NGOs open to prosecution if they work with 'terrorist' opposition groups, even when their work is of a peace-building nature.
In this climate, NGOs need to tread carefully if they are to maintain their integrity and their independence. Important issues include:
- Being uncompromising about who we are and what we stand for (defending the 'N' in 'NGO'), remembering that we work for justice, not for profit.
- Engaging in a dialogue on prevention with our home governments and governmental partners before they launch (or support) future wars.
- Being clear about our role when working with partner organisations post-conflict to support 'popular sovereignty' and rebuild civil society.
These issues are particularly challenging when we depend on government funding.
2. See their recent report 'USAID-PVO Dialogue on Working in Conflict' (648.8k pdf) at www.usaid.gov
3. The report is available at www.dfid.gov.uk
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