Committee for Conflict Transformation Support |
CCTS
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The Role of NGOs, National and International in Post-War PeacebuildingReport of a seminar held on 1st November 2001 at Islington Town Hall, Upper Street, London This seminar, the fourth and last in a series on Supporting Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes organised by the Committee for Conflict Transformation Support (CCTS), was attended by 27 people. Sarah Crowther, a lecturer and researcher in the Centre for Development Studies at the University of Wales Swansea opened the seminar with a brief resume of her discussion paper. Her paper draws especially on her research work with development NGOs and, as a newcomer to conflict transformation, she invited the meeting to elaborate on the special characteristics of conflict transformation NGOs and to draw out their own particular experiences. Sarah identified two main aspects of post-war peacebuilding (though she alluded to others):
She argued that NGOs had little role to play in the first of these, because they had no power to enforce particular behaviours or to prohibit others. They might, however, be able to make some contribution to 'checks and balances' in other ways, for example by helping to rebuild communication among previously warring people, as well as between local people and regional or national structures. Their main role was in the second area, where Sarah summarised the particular advantages that are claimed for NGOs: Their voluntary nature, the ethical motivation of their staff and their intimate connection to grassroots values made them a safe and effective channel through which external organisations could support local people and initiatives. They were a more flexible, innovative and cost-effective, as well as a less bureaucratic means of reaching local people than local or national governments; capable, too, of working independently of failing local or national governments and of continuing to be effective even where those governments had collapsed. They could assist in (re)establishing democratic structures in a way that took account of cultural sensitivities (for example by building upon local rituals of bereavement and reconciliation). However, Sarah found little evidence to support these claimed advantages, and felt that they required critical examination, particularly in the light of the amount of money that is given to NGOs in crisis situations. Sarah suggested a number of problems associated with NGOs in country: Unlike governments they had no electoral mandate and were arguably, therefore, less accountable. They did not have defined constituencies who could hold them to account, and only represented limited sections of the population. This was not to say that they could not play an important role in building participatory action, nor to say that Government systems were more effective, but only that other organisations and systems might be equally well-placed to act effectively. NGOs were seldom politically neutral (though often regarded as being so), and might therefore exacerbate conflict, rather than helping to resolve it, by promoting the vested interests of those they support. The growing tendency of government donor agencies to fund NGOs rather than to provide inter-governmental aid (or to do nothing) has led to a massive growth in their size and number, and, said Sarah, to a number of new challenges to their effectiveness: They were more likely to be constrained in how they acted by the priorities and political intentions of their funders. This reduced their responsiveness to local needs, made them easy scapegoats if the initiative failed and might, ultimately, undermine their belief in their own values. Their small scale, compared with international funding agencies, and the growing competition for funds, put them in a weak negotiating position, and made it more likely that they would have to compromise their objectives. The fixed- (and relatively short-) term nature of most international funding made it hard for NGOs to commit to projects for the long-term. It also increased the amount of bureaucratic effort that they needed to put into reporting on current projects and securing funding for future work. Sarah's introduction was followed by a plenary discussion, which was continued in groups during the afternoon and concluded with a report-back plenary session. Sarah's paper proposed some possible questions for group discussion, and it was agreed that groups should follow this general framework, but focus especially on participants' experience of what NGOs (in the most general sense) can do to support peacebuilding. Since most of what was said in plenary addressed the same issues, plenary and group discussions are summarised together below, using headings that loosely follow Sarah's suggested questions, although in a different order: The effectiveness of NGOs in peacebuildingMany participants had examples and experiences of the effectiveness of NGOs in peacebuilding, which they shared and discussed in the group sessions. The nature of what NGOs can do depends on local circumstances. Where there is no tradition of independent popular organising (for example in some Soviet successor states) people may need help acquiring the necessary skills. One example given was from Moldova, where there is an acute shortage of clean water, but where it did not occur to people to get organised and press the local and central authorities to take the necessary action. In such situations, NGOs and other bodies can pass on information and skills to encourage a more active citizenship. It can be hard to mobilise people on mundane, unexciting, issues. However, where people's interests are clearly affected, they sometimes do begin to act collectively. This may provide an opportunity for people from communities in conflict to work together. For example, a town was split when the river that ran through it became the boundary between the two territories of Moldova and Transdniestria. As a result the cement works situated on either bank ceased to function for two years - until finally people from both communities campaigned together to get it working again. This was so obviously in the interests of both communities that the ruling powers could not prevent it. Once people have co-operated on one issue, further co-operation becomes easier and more likely. Some groupings with common concerns, for instance in combating discrimination based on gender or disability, span the ethnic, religious or other divisions and again provide an opportunity for co-operation between divided communities. NGOs can also be helpful in supporting individuals' contribution to peacebuilding. For example a teacher in Bosnia who wished to reduce the perpetuation of conflict among young people was funded to set up an NGO to run a youth centre on the boundary of two conflicting groups. Effective peacebuilding, at whatever level, requires change, which is hard even if the people concerned really want it, and probably impossible if they don't. In such circumstances, even small steps can be difficult to take, and even harder to measure. This makes peacebuilding work easy to criticise, and may explain the observation of one participant that conflict transformation NGOs like to "dance the workshop dance". This criticism notwithstanding, the skills of conflict transformation are becoming more widely valued. Many international development agencies, for example, now acknowledge that they need conflict transformation training to help them decide how and when to intervene. More than one participant pointed out that NGOs concerned with conflict transformation are, almost by definition, concerned with nonviolent participatory processes, not with enforcement. Their lack of ability (or willingness) to use force to ensure a desired outcome does not mean that there is nothing that they can do by way of providing the checks and balances needed to build peace. Relationships and the choice of local partnersAll groups stressed the importance of timely and thorough research by international NGOs in the conflict transformation field to identify effective local partners. There is a great temptation to choose partners who are easy to work with: because they are English-speaking, or have experience of producing the required paperwork, or understand the 'jargon' of funding agencies, rather than taking a risk with less familiar candidates who may in fact be more worthy of support. Less open to criticism, perhaps, is the tendency of INGOs to choose local partners whose values they share. While such an attitude is understandable, since it is likely to support the desired outcome, it may be that INGOs should be more prepared to work with 'the other side' - those who embody more negative aspects of society - not just with the ones that give immediate hope. In some parts of the world (especially former Communist countries which underwent rapid change towards open markets) there is a danger of supporting local initiatives which are really businesses, because the few local people who feel sufficiently empowered to act are entrepreneurs and care more about the money than the declared objectives of their 'NGO'. One participant suggested that in these circumstances, a group that had shown its readiness to work unfunded if necessary would be a safer choice. It is important to recognise, however, that issues of 'livelihood' and 'job security' are always part of the equation, and not only for national NGOs. The role of the international NGO is to support and facilitate local action: for instance, to 'lend power' to their local partners by creating the space where voices can be heard: both locally (between different interest groups) and internationally (by lobbying, advocacy and information dissemination). An awareness of, and sensitivity to, local partner's needs, as well as to the risks they are taking, is essential. The chosen partner should be able to demonstrate some local validity and accountability. Elected bodies do not necessarily (or even usually) fulfil this requirement. Many elected local and national structures in areas of conflict are corrupt or uninterested, or have a power base that depends on intimidation. In such circumstances, INGOs are more likely to seek out local partners who have the courage and confidence to act differently. More than one group identified 'partnership' as the key: involving a joint assessment of likely gains and a mutual understanding of the values that need to be shared (and those that can safely differ). If the partnership is secure in such a basis of understanding, flexibility within it should be possible. One participant offered the analogy of 'drops in a bucket': as long as it is good water, all drops can be seen as contributing positively, even if their precise colour or flavour varies. Having established such a partnership, the quality of personal relationships between local and international NGOs is an important factor, and handovers need careful planning when key personnel change. Where INGOs move into a region after a crisis, they may leapfrog the careful choice of partners described above. Too often they display a colonial 'we know best' attitude that undermines the work of local NGOs or even displace it completely. Key local workers are often 'poached' to work for external agencies. This is a double blow to the local NGO, as such workers seldom stay in the region thereafter, having been 'internationalised', and attracted by salaries that would be unsustainable locally; and their loss severely weakens the local NGO and leaves it less effective when the INGO pulls out, which inevitably happens before any real solutions have been found. (At least one participant wished that more of the seminar's time had been devoted to issues of neo-colonialism.) According to one participant, the dialogue between different types of organisation is often poor: local organisations talk to each other, international organisations talk to each other, but there is little communication between local and international groupings. This means that INGOs don't make the most of local knowledge. Another participant felt that, while local NGOs often work well together in times of crisis, they tend to fall out when the general situation improves. In South Africa, for example, civic organisations had many differences but were able to co-operate because all were opposed to apartheid. After the new government was elected, the differences became much more important, and co-operation got harder. NGO accountabilityNGOs are ultimately accountable to those people who are supposed to benefit from their programmes, but inevitably they are also accountable to their funders. The tensions that can arise in meeting funders' requirements are covered in a later section. Accountability to the constituency the NGO is attempting to serve was recognised as a serious issue, and there is no single method of ensuring that it occurs. Where good means of communication exist within the society, organisational skills are strong and widespread, and there is a culture of openness and outspokenness, organisations are likely to be held to account. It is such conditions that genuine peacebuilding organisations will be aiming to promote. Nevertheless NGOs, and even community-based organisations, can become isolated from their constituency. Their staffs are usually drawn from an educated elite and to this extent are atypical of the wider society. In situations where there are continuing tensions and conflicts between communities, their peacebuilding efforts may further isolate them from their base in society. If they draw the bulk of their financial support from outside, there is also less incentive for them to consult with, and be responsive to, their base constituencies. 'Civil society' and organisation structureSome people found the term 'civil society' too broad and vague to be useful. Should organisations like the Ku Klux Klan in the USA, or the Real IRA be considered part of civil society? Most people seemed to think that they should not, since their methods and ideology were inimical to the whole concept. In Eastern Europe, during the period of communist rule, the term was employed by Vaclav Havel and others to describe a range of groupings, organisations and institutions independent of, and usually critical of, or outrightly opposed to, the existing authoritarian government. The term often still carries these oppositional connotations. There is a tendency, therefore, for governments in fledgling states or fledging democracies to regard civic organisations and the very notion of civil society with suspicion. Better, then, to use the term 'NGO' in the broadest meaning of 'not government': the particular organisational structure is unimportant, and the 'right' structure for a particular job will depend on local circumstances. Organisational structures and alignments are, in any case, not static; they have to 'recreate' themselves as the political context changes. For example, in Palestine NGOs were initially formed by political parties, but a growing number are now working on peacebuilding, challenging state institutions and addressing local issues with grassroots organisations. In Nigeria, during the military regime, most NGOs were essentially 'anti-military'. When the military government fell, these NGOs had to realign, to refocus on democracy. Many key NGO workers moved into government positions, as they did in South Africa post-apartheid. This should not be regarded as a betrayal (though it sometimes is so regarded by those who are left behind): it is the action, not the organisational structure in which it happens, that is important. NGOs are sometimes criticised for being undemocratic, since they are unelected. But democracy is more than elected representation. It implies the ability to take direct political action; and NGOs are 'on the line' when they support such action. Elected local authorities and central governments can sometimes play an important role in peacebuilding. They may be more accountable than NGOs and thus have greater authority and legitimacy. However, in highly polarised situations, local and central governments could be one of the main protagonists, promoting the interests of a particular ethnic, linguistic or national group. In such cases they are part of the problem as well as - potentially - one of the mechanisms for arriving at a solution. And NGOs in post-war peacebuilding are quite likely to be stepping in when state or local government structures have collapsed or are not functioning. INGOs and issues of funding and controlA distinction should, perhaps, be drawn between the role of giant international organisations with large bureaucratic structures suited to channelling aid from outside government and non-government sources, which, Sarah suggested, now predominate in the development world, and that of the smaller bodies which are more common in peacebuilding. (Sarah warned peacebuilding INGOs to take care that they are not swallowed by the large international funders, ethically if not literally, as some development INGOs have been: "...if you doubt the danger of this, ask your local partners how they see you.") International NGOs involved in peacebuilding are generally concerned with building the local capacity for change. They are not dictating terms but trying to support what is needed locally by identifying and helping people and groups who are trying to fulfil these needs. The local groups identify what action is required, and the INGOs attempt to raise the necessary funding, as well as supporting the action in other ways, for example through training, technical advice or 'solidarity'. Like development INGOs, they have had to become more professional and more bureaucratic in recent years, to respond to the demands of funders for the 'correct' paperwork for funding applications and progress reporting. Indeed, this burden is arguably greater for them because they tend to be smaller. Then again, conflict transformation work is almost inevitably long-term, and takes place in complex situations and in parallel with other interventions. Measuring its impact is therefore difficult and, at best, qualitative rather than quantitative. This creates particular tensions when funders require work to be conceived as a 3-5 year project delivering demonstrable results. In these circumstances, INGOs may be in a position to act as intermediaries between funders and local NGOs: to educate funders about the nature of the work and to explain how changes in the situation on the ground might require them to switch the priorities of their work. And they need to argue the case for long-term funding, even when international eyes have moved to a new, more 'fashionable' crisis region. Several participants felt the need for INGOs to enter into more open and critical discussion of funders' practices, and to lobby more actively to attempt to change them. INGOs may have more power than they think in such negotiations. In an environment where competition among INGOs for funding is increasing, it is tempting, too, to gloss over failures and problems and to concentrate on success. This is another area where INGOs need to find more courage. A great deal of conflict transformation work is dependent on government money. While more than one participant reported that the UK Department for International Development (DFID), for example, is sometimes flexible and responsive to changing circumstances, we should bear in mind that international bodies generally look to fund actions that suit them politically, even if their agenda remains unstated. Government funding has more overtly political motives than funding from charities and some other international bodies. Not only must the work proposed by the local NGO be acceptable to the funding government; the source of funding must also be politically acceptable to the local NGO. This is not always the case. US funding in Palestine, for example, is not universally welcome. Government funding can cause discomfort, too, if it is not consistent with other government action, or when international 'agreements' such as Dayton leave little room for flexibility. ClosingAlmost inevitably, given its timing, the meeting ended with a brief discussion about the discomfort of discussing conflict transformation while the British government is pursuing what could be seen as a violent and counter-productive approach to conflict in its onslaught on Afghanistan. CCTS is looking at ways of acting as a committee to influence government policy. Any suggestions should be addressed to either Diana Francis or Paul Clifford. CODEP is also taking some collective action. Seminar participants and other readers of this Newsletter are also encouraged to think of what they can do as individuals: "I could..." rather than "Someone should..."
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