

This Autumn issue of the CCTS newsletter contains three articles. The first is by Susan Seymour, who reflects on the background to the current situation in Macedonia and the different social, cultural and perceptual worlds inhabited by the two main ethnic groups there. The second is by Adam Curle, who describes an experiment to 'resocialise' ex-Prisoners of War at the end of World War II and considers its relevance for the twenty-first century. And the third is the review by Michael Randle of Andrew Rigby's new book: 'Justice and Reconciliation: After the Violence'.

Macedonia: Perspectives and Perceptions

Susan Seymour spent most of 1999 and 2000 in Tetovo, Macedonia, helping to set up an agency to provide advice and training to people running their own small businesses. She draws on personal experience to describe the way the ethnic communities lived in separate worlds and how a relatively calm society was destabilized and became the flashpoint of war between armed groups of ethnic Albanians and the Macedonian security forces.

Tetovo is a rather shabby town nestling at the foot of the majestic Sharr mountain range that divides Macedonia from Kosovo, but it is the heartland of the Macedonian Albanian community. According to the (hotly disputed) 1994 census, the population in the Tetovo region was 75% Albanian, 20% ethnic Macedonian and only 5% others, including Turks, Roma and Serbs.

Some of the villages are almost entirely Albanian, especially in the valley behind Tetovo where the armed rebellion started this March and the so-called National Liberation Army has its headquarters. This valley is breathtakingly beautiful. I never tired of walking there, alone or with fellow hikers, who, apart from police, were about the only ethnic Macedonians who ventured beyond one or two popular picnic spots.

Separate worlds

In the town of Tetovo, the ethnic divide was less stark. There were many mixed residential areas and shared facilities and places of work. But family, social and religious lives were entirely separate, as were most of the limited number of arts and cultural events. Almost all cafés and restaurants, despite very similar menus, catered for their own people. Marriage between Macedonians and Albanians was unknown.

The languages of Albanian and Macedonian are unrelated, but while most Albanians know Macedonian, very few Macedonians learn Albanian. The two groups relied for news on different newspapers, radio and TV stations. Generally the quality of reporting was poor and sensationalised. The lead story in the main Albanian paper, Fakti, was invariably about discrimination against Albanians, while the Macedonian media only mentioned Tetovo in connection with crime or interethnic gang fights.

There was no shared history and very few agreed facts. Both groups felt that Tetovo was theirs by right, but felt threatened. Each was a minority,

Albanians nationally and Macedonians locally. Neither could put themselves into the shoes of the others. Their nationality was usually the first thing that people would tell me about themselves. Then I would hear a great deal about their perceptions of one another.

Albanians felt strongly that they were not allowed to use their own language officially. They told me that they were excluded from public sector jobs; that local government, although Albanian-controlled, had no power or money; that the police maltreated them; that their businesses constantly faced obstructions; and that their children were denied a university education in their own language. They saw themselves as working hard in their own businesses, while their taxes and international donor money were spent in the Macedonian part of the country. They envied Macedonians with easy public sector jobs, giving great opportunities for extracting bribes. They did not see that most Macedonians suffered as much as they did from poverty and corruption, nor that jobs in the virtually bankrupt big firms were vulnerable and very poorly paid. They could not comprehend Macedonian insecurities about the way their national identity is denied by many of their Greek and Bulgarian neighbours.

Many Macedonians looked back to a golden age under Tito, when Yugoslavs had been able to travel freely, where jobs were for life and salaries were three or four times higher, allowing most families to own a car, and the full range of household appliances. Now, with high unemployment, young people could not afford to set up their own homes and feared bringing up children in what they saw as an increasingly alien and unwelcoming society. Many wanted to leave and start new lives elsewhere. Macedonians were more likely to make racist comments about Albanians, claiming that they deliberately had large families to change the population balance, that they wanted a greater Albania, and were criminals involved in smuggling drugs and arms. Macedonians saw themselves as more Western, because of their Christianity and better education, and felt they were being held back from acceptance by Western Europe because of the traditional, Islamic culture of the Albanians and their association with organized crime. Actually, in some ways, the Albanians, with their extensive work experience in Western Europe, had a greater understanding of democratic, free market societies than the Macedonians with their nostalgia for paternalistic and autocratic socialism.

Another perspective, which was shared by the more educated and thoughtful people on both sides, is that the elites of their communities were totally corrupt, co-operated with each other in the black economy and colluded to keep ethnicity as the main political issue. In this way they kept people divided on ethnic grounds and maintained their power as the protectors of their kin.

By emphasizing the misconceptions held by the two groups, I realize I am painting a distorted picture, which ignores the extraordinary friendliness, hospitality and helpfulness of most of the people I met. They actually wanted the same things, such as a more honest, fairer and prosperous society, jobs and opportunities to improve the quality of life for themselves and their children. The tragedy was that these people of goodwill did not know that they had so much in common. They did not seem to know how to talk to each other, let alone how to work together to realize their hopes. The legacy of the communist years discouraged the taking of initiative or any independent action not controlled by the party. It left civil society very weak and tragically unable to resist tiny war factions on both sides. While there was a superficial sense of calm and order, corruption was all pervasive, and there was an underlying fear that things could go very wrong. While I lived there, change was very gradual, with some positive moves, but also often setbacks.

The main local controversy was around Tetovo university, which had been founded privately by Albanians, many from Kosovo, following the Serb takeover of the university in Prishtina. As it was never recognized by the Macedonian government, many young people finished their studies with unrecognized diplomas and became unemployed. The EU and OSCE tried to help by financing the

construction of another university, also to be in Tetovo, which would teach in Albanian, but also in Macedonian and English. However, radicals still wanted legalisation and public funding of the existing institution. From personal contacts with academics and students, I came to the view that the unofficial university reinforced ethnic Albanian hostility to the Macedonian state without meeting their aspirations for good quality education. Was this the first war fought about access to tertiary education?

The effect of the war in Kosovo

Tetovo might have muddled through until a gradual pacification of the whole Balkan region allowed improvements in the economy and human rights. Yet, somehow, this sleepy backwater became the scene of violent conflict. It is too soon for a dispassionate analysis of why this happened, but I believe that it was mainly a consequence of external factors which destabilized the community.

The most important among these was the Kosovo war which had a radicalizing effect, particularly on the young Albanians, and seemed to give the message that violence pays.

Refugees tripled the population for three months, stoking inter-ethnic fears, while Macedonians became convinced that NATO favoured the Albanians, thus enhancing their suspicions of everything Western.

Following the war

Following the war the international community promised a great deal to Macedonia, but it squandered the opportunity by ad-hoc, short term, inconsistent interventions. International donors abandoned excellent projects after a year or two on the false supposition that they would be “self-financing” or supported out of mainstream budgets. For example, the Babylon project, which I knew in Tetovo, but also operated in eight other towns, was an out-of-school activity club bringing together children of different ethnic groups to learn and play together. It was an essential element of developing a multi-cultural community but needed to be sustained for a generation. Instead, EU money ran out after a year and the project only survived on intermittent handouts.

Other projects were counter-productive or caused resentment because they unfairly benefited one ethnic group or another, or because the resources ended up in the wrong hands. Equal opportunities and human rights were not as integral as they should have been to all international support and intervention.

What now?

Whether or not full scale civil war is avoided, the Tetovo I knew and loved has gone now. People have been radicalized to the point where they won't be able to go back to life as before. Even if the proposed agreement is adopted and the planned economic reforms are implemented, Macedonians will lose their privileges in Tetovo and will move away, whether forced out, or more gradually as they sell their houses and move to parts of the country where they are in the majority.

Whenever the war in Macedonia finally stops, further international support will probably be offered, but I hope that greater efforts will be made to apply it more consistently, fairly and intelligently in social, political and economic reforms. It will take people a long time to learn that individual human rights matter, not just collective rights. Reform is

needed to develop a state which protects all of its citizens and tries to improve their lives through genuine commitment to economic development and investment. There will need to be a lot of input to improve management skills throughout all institutions, an enormous challenge, even in such a small country. It will also be important to develop a civil society with more independent organizations and to help train activists who believe that they can make a difference, for example in keeping the state up to the mark on its promises. Journalism and the arts need assistance to bridge the language divide. People need to learn new ways of campaigning for change so that they are less tempted to resort to violence. Even then, nothing will really change until there is greater stability in the wider Balkan region and a weakening of the destructive nationalism which has done such damage to all parts of the former Yugoslavia.

Susan Seymour

Social Healing of the Wounds of War

In this article Adam Curle describes an experiment to 'resocialise' ex-Prisoners of War at the end of World War II and considers its relevance for the twenty-first century.

Half a century ago, when the Second World War came to an end, the survivors, soldiers and civilians, returned to their homes. But for some, all that remained were the ruins of a home; for yet others, exile or the cold rule of a tyrant. Most had suffered in mind or body, most had lost something – peace of mind, a beloved person, a community, a country, a way of life, happiness. The challenge of a new life in a new world lay ahead, but some could not meet the opportunities or excitement of that challenge. They had suffered too much.

One group facing this challenge were the tens of thousands of British Prisoners of War returning to Britain after five years of captivity in Europe. (These were initially referred to as PsOW, but at some subsequent stage – and in this writing – as POWs). Later we will consider whether what we can learn from them could be applied to the difficulties experienced by others elsewhere whose lives have been disrupted by war and other catastrophes in the twenty first century.

The prisoners of war

As it became clear in 1945 that the war was coming to an end, a group of very senior officers approached the government with an urgent plea that some provision should be made for the 120,000 British POWs who had mostly been captured in 1940. These officers had themselves been captured during World War I and argued that their lives had been ruined because no one had recognised the damaging effect of long-term captivity. Some provision must be made, they said, for the young men who would soon be returning to Britain from German prison camps. With an amazing lack of bureaucratic delay and with the assistance of

two remarkable psychiatrists, A.T. Macbeth (Tommy) Wilson and Eric Trist, the army set up therapeutic bodies called Civil Resettlement Units (CRUs). The task of the CRUs was to help the returned POWs bridge what turned out to be a very wide social gap between captivity and freedom. There were twenty such units, each servicing the needs of some 240 men, usually for a month at a time. (The awful physical plight of captives from South East Asia required special conditions and treatment not provided by the CRUs.)

The first job for Wilson, Trist and their colleagues was to meet the fairly large number of men who by one means or another had managed to return to Britain early. Most of them

had enjoyed a blissful first few weeks, but then after a month or six weeks, their mood had changed. They were depressed, felt they were losing touch with their families, and wanted to return to such minimal military security as was offered by the CRU. They suffered from insomnia, and from loss of appetite and sexual drive. Some had aimlessly left home; a certain number had committed petty crimes. Many felt vaguely guilty for having allowed themselves to be captured, seeing this as failing both the army and their families.

There was no single symptom apart from a strong sense of malaise and dissatisfaction, of being no longer part of society. There was therefore no obvious treatment. The psychiatric staff of the CRU organisation did not feel, however, that these POWs, with the exception of a few individuals, were suffering from any sort of psychological sickness. Wilson and Trist rejected any idea that they were 'ill'; or 'abnormal'. They were, however, unhappy and felt alienated from the society to which they had returned – and in tragic cases this included their wives and other members of their families. They were, in the rather horrible but expressive parlance that evolved, *desocialised* or *unsettled*.

CRUs as transitional communities

The CRU structure provided ample medical and dental facilities for the POWs, but the emphasis of the effort was social: the POWs were to be helped to 'feel at ease', in fact to be *eased into* the social and familial roles in which they had previously felt comfortable but from which they now felt estranged.

Their alienation from normal civilian life had occurred during the whole process of *militarisation*. This is a process which transforms the civilian into the fledgling soldier through an increasing identification with the army unit, a process cemented by the experience of battle in which small-group solidarity and mutual trust is essential to survival. If it happens that the action ends in capture, reliance on the group intensifies. Without their weapons and their military leaders (who, if captured, are sent to other camps), the captives have to depend entirely on each other. It might have been assumed that the outcome would have been a chaotic anarchy. But from the available accounts, it was a tender democracy in which its members followed the mandate of reciprocal respect and care. It seems that this democracy persisted as an ideal socio-psychological form,

one looked back on with nostalgia during periods of painful repatriation.

However, although the culture of the camps was democratic, this was not entirely conducive to resettlement. The POWs were returning to roles – as father, citizen, neighbour, employee, especially perhaps husband – from which they had been progressively and often ruthlessly estranged. How could a sojourn in the CRU help these men recover the sense of being truly part of a society? At present they were still soldiers and must be eased back into more gentle, and – in a different sense – more 'democratic' roles. Wilson and Trist saw that they must also learn to combine the civilian skills of family and occupational life with those of citizenship. The role of the CRU was to serve as a stepping stone between military and civilian worlds, to be a *transitional community*.

The CRU curriculum

The permanent staff of the CRUs wore uniforms and were subject to normal (but relaxed and non-doctrinaire) military discipline. The POWs, though nominally soldiers in that they had not been discharged from the army, were all volunteers. Nothing was compulsory. They could come and go as they wished. In fact, perhaps encouraged by the complete lack of restrictions, the great majority took full advantage of available facilities and opportunities. These included:

- Psychiatric treatment if the volunteer felt he needed this. The psychiatric unit was located in an inconspicuous part of the camp to avoid the chance that 'old so and so' might be considered 'a bit potty';
- Help in mastering the complexities of post-war society: the rationing of food, clothing, furniture and so forth; taxation and other financial issues; problems of accommodation;
- Studying employment possibilities – the term used was 'job rehearsal'. A number of businesses, trades, crafts, and so on, generously provided time and skilled practitioners to give volunteers a chance to find out about building, farming, clerical work, the law, teaching, nursing, or various forms of further education;
- Seminars or workshops. These were held fairly regularly with a participating (rather than a chairing or 'facilitating') officer on the staff. The exchanges that took place during these sessions gave volunteers the chance to break down feelings of shyness, or to deal with experiences in a way that could help them to become closer to their families and others in the civilian community;

- Finally, regular weekend home visits – the most important stepping stone. Until towards the end of the (usually) four or five weeks stay at the CRU, the volunteers were not ready to open themselves to family life. However, the security of the CRU experience gradually lowered the barriers. The gap between the stepping stones grew narrower.

Evaluating the CRUs

We now come to the crucial problem of assessing the effectiveness of the CRU system. To what extent did these transitional communities succeed in resettling volunteers who had entrusted themselves to their care? We had carefully considered possible symptoms of deterioration or improvement, but none was very plausible.

I should interpolate that my CRU role was as a research officer. It was particularly important that I should avoid any bias towards the CRU system and my thought constantly returned to many discussions with Wilson and Trist, and also with Ben Morris, Henry Dicks, Isobel Menzies and Harold Bridger. I mention these then eminent names because they may jog the memory of readers who know their work and will the better understand the work of the CRUs.

I had by this time resumed post-graduate work at Oxford where there were a considerable number of ex-POWs within easy cycling distance of my home. It had been decided that the best way to assess the performance of the CRUs would be to study the products of the system, and to compare these with a larger number – larger because there were more to choose from – who had not volunteered for the Units. One hundred and fifty men were selected according to criteria chosen by others of our colleagues. I do not have a list of the criteria, but they were chiefly aimed at ensuring a certain rough balance, for example with regard to age, marital status, and level of education. One hundred of them had been to CRUs; the rest, not. A further forty took part in the study who had not been in the services at all because they were in reserved occupations, though they otherwise conformed to the CRU/nonCRU sample. These comparisons, we thought, should be revealing.

For weeks I spent much of my time with all the members of the samples. We met in their homes, at their places of work, and in pubs (though there was an unfortunate shortage of beer!) At first I didn't know what I was looking for. After a while, however, we began to recognise various patterns of role behaviour and identified 15 illustrative types of relations which we termed Criteria of Social Participation. These included relations with partners, children and other close family members, with neighbours, employers and work mates, and with the wider society. However, the 'local culture' within which people played these parts varied greatly, from warmly close and co-operative to indifferent or hostile. It seemed to me that the men performed their

roles at four different levels of skill and competence which we defined as the statistical *norm*, the ideal or *supranorm*, and two narrow and limited *infranorms*. Looking back at this material with which I was so deeply involved half a century ago, I am struck by how many aspects of human relations, or failures of relations, have remained basically unchanged.

An able statistician, Hugh Murray, who was associated with the development of the CRUs, undertook detailed analyses of the scoring of the Fifteen Criteria of Social Participation (4 for *supernorm*, 3 for *norm*, 2 for *infranorm* 1, and 1 for *infranorm* 2) in relation to the ex POWs and the forty men who had not been in the army at all. This analysis showed that a significantly larger proportion of those who had been to CRUs were better settled than those who had not. To put it simply, this vindicated the CRU experiment; statistically there is a very low probability that some other factor could have been responsible for the result.

I think it was Eric Trist who spoke of the significance of 'creative casualties'. These were people who had coped with pain, confusion and separation from their loved ones without losing hope or the ability to help and encourage their companions in captivity. These were the men who, after repatriation, scored supranormally in the survey. A further way of expressing the idea would be that these 'creative casualties' had, by surviving threat and hurt, gained an exceptional new awareness and power. Obviously this development does not depend on having been a POW, although this may sometimes have helped.

There are other exceptional people whose inner growth does not depend on comparably demanding conditions.

Contemporary relevance of CRUs

Since the early days of my own career, which was really kick-started by my work with the CRU organisation, I have had the chance to meet creative casualties in many parts of the world. Several of them have in fact been former prisoners, though sadly a far greater proportion of former prisoners become victims.

We cannot, alas, say that the world has become a more peaceful place. Those subjected to violence and those practising it are very numerous. Although the last fifty years have seen a wonderful growth of agencies working for human peace and well-being, there can be no certainty that they are winning the race against violence. Among the losers are millions whose lives have been ruined by wars, economic disruption, injustices, or a damaged environment. These millions need to receive and to give help to their fellow women and men, and to the material world we live in.

I believe that the experience of the CRUs provides grounds for hope and that units of this kind, adapted to suit present day circumstances, might help those

who have experienced the trauma of war and violence in recent years. When this idea first came to me, I turned it nostalgically aside: ludicrous, I thought, too difficult, too big. But I then realised that the basic idea was simple. Throw out the frills and what is left is a frame-work of fundamental principles which remain relevant

The first practical step in applying these principles would be to provide a restorative refuge where people could free themselves from shocking experiences. Here they could be helped by the priests and elders, the creative casualties, the inner shamans. They would be guided away from shame by discovering that many others were also plagued by illusory guilt. They would talk to each other about what, as a result of this process, would no longer be secret degradations. Respected relatives and friends would guide them back into the community of life. The character of each group would depend on the local culture, the types of pain its members had suffered, and the types of inner skills members brought to the group and developed within it. The

healing power of the refuge would come from the trust, confidence and affection that it generated.

Note: The account of the principles and practice of the CRUs is an adaptation of a chapter by A.T.M. Wilson, E.L. Trist and Adam Curle, 'Transitional Communities and Social Reconnection: the Civil Resettlement of British Prisoners of War', in Eric Trist and Hugh Murray (Eds), *The Social Engagement of Social Science, Volume 1, The Sociopsychological Perspective*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 1990, pp.88-112.

Adam Curle

Dilemmas of Reconciliation

This review of Andrew Rigby's new book, Justice and Reconciliation: After the Violence, published by Lynne Rienner, Boulder & London, 2001, has been written by Michael Randle.

The topic of reconciliation is apt to engender pious homilies. Not so in this book in which Andrew Rigby undertakes a rigorous examination of the problems of reconstructing fractured societies in the aftermath of extreme violence and repression.

The dilemmas are manifold. How is the demand for justice to be reconciled with the need to bring the society together and build a different future? Should the past be buried and forgotten, or brought out into the open? How should collaborators be judged and dealt with?

Dealing with collaborators poses particularly difficult questions which Andrew deals with in depth in some of the most interesting passages in the book. Under dictatorship, authoritarian regimes or foreign occupation, a degree of collaboration is virtually unavoidable for the majority of the population, and it is not easy task to determine the degree of culpability of those concerned, or indeed whether in some cases they should be deemed culpable at all. How, for example, is one to judge, an employer in occupied France who contributed to the Vichy or German economy, but also aided the resistance movement, and perhaps even took an active part in it? Would anyone condemn Schindler for the degree of cooperation with the Nazi regime that was the price he had to pay to continue running his factory, enabling him to save hundreds of Jews and others from the gas chambers? And what of civil servants who stay in their posts under an occupation regime but use their inside knowledge to keep the resistance movement informed of what is happening or being planned? Especially in the absence of any advance collective plan of action, the dilemmas facing civil servants and other administrators following a coup or occupation can be intolerable. If they quit they may expose the population to greater suffering. If they

stay in position, they risk becoming embroiled in the system of repression.

Successor governments, too, act under a variety of constraints. Thus the decision as to how vigorously to pursue the leaders and upholders of the old regime will depend to some extent on the balance of forces in the society in transition. Where the institutions and organisations supporting the former regime are still powerful enough to stage a possible comeback, it may be prudent to let matters rest, at least until the successor government is stronger. In 1990, the newly elected government of President Aylwyn in Chile could not have arrested Pinochet and his fellow officers without the near certainty of facing another military coup. Ten years later, and following his arrest – and eventual release – in London, the Chilean authorities felt strong enough to do so, even if he did not in the end stand trial.

Despite the constraints, there is always a range of options open to successor government and civil society organisations. By means of a succession of case studies, Andrew examines these, succinctly setting the historical and social context in each case and evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the path chosen. The studies range from post-occupation

Europe at the end of World War II, Spain after Franco, several Latin American countries, including Chile and Argentina, following the end of military dictatorship, Eastern Europe post-1989, South Africa and Palestine. Andrew also looks at the role of third parties at both official and unofficial levels and, in a final chapter, makes some general observations and judgements based on the evidence of the case studies, and discusses the possible stages by which a society might achieve a 'culture of reconciliation'.

As one might expect, there are big differences in how various societies have attempted to tackle the problem of 'dealing with the past'. Post World War II, many of the formerly occupied countries pursued severe retributive justice. In Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway, generally regarded as models of liberal democracy, retroactive legislation was passed, introducing the death penalty for extreme cases of collaboration and crimes against humanity. Belgium had the highest proportion of death sentences in relation to the size of its population – 4,170 were condemned, of whom 230 were executed. In France, 6,763 people were condemned, 767 executed. These figures are over and above those summarily executed by partisans or enraged citizens in the immediate aftermath of liberation. In France, the estimated number of such summary executions is estimated to be at least 4,500. Across Europe, too, tens of thousands were imprisoned – 38,000 in France, 40,000 in Holland, 50,000 in Belgium, and 21,000 in Norway, equivalent to 633 for every 100,000 Norwegians. Many later benefited from amnesties, though ironically this meant that some of the more highly placed and responsible collaborators escaped more lightly than those whose offences may have been less grave but suffered the rough justice of the streets.

The Nazi occupation was in many respects uniquely terrible, and some of those executed or imprisoned had been responsible for, or were party to, heinous crimes. That said, the experience serves to draw attention to the relatively lenient policies pursued by successor governments in Latin America, South Africa and Eastern Europe the 1990s. This leniency, as noted earlier, was sometimes the product of weakness on the part of the new governments, fearful of provoking the military and the Right into attempting another coup. But compassion, and a resolve to unite the society in the rebuilding process, played a part too, notably in South Africa where Bishop Desmond Tutu heads the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and promotes the African concept of *ubuntu* – essentially restorative as opposed to retributive justice.

South Africa, however, benefited from studying the reconciliation process in other post-dictatorship countries, and notably the work of the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation in Chile. As a result its Commission was established on a sounder basis. Thus in Chile the new social democratic government in 1990 – because it did not control the Upper House – was unable to repeal the Amnesty Law promulgated by the junta in 1978. In South Africa,

by contrast, people had to apply individually to the Commission for amnesty, and granting it was made conditional on the individual making a full confession by a certain date, thus putting pressure on offenders to come forward. There was a much greater effort, too, in South Africa to involve ordinary people and civil society organisations in the truth and reconciliation process.

Nevertheless, even in the case of South Africa, there is still the question of whether justice has been sufficiently well served by this process, given that restorative justice cannot hope to give back fully what has been lost. There is also a question of how far the bulk of the population, as opposed to the political elites, has been adequately involved in the reconciliation process, and how far the process itself can go as long as the gross structural inequalities that have been carried over into post-Apartheid South Africa continue to exist. To quote Andrew, '...while uncovering the past and acknowledging the truth can be important constituents of the social healing process, reconciliation requires more than truth – it requires a modicum of justice, not necessarily in terms of the punishment of perpetrators of evil but in the constructive sense of action to reduce socio-economic inequality.'

A refreshing aspect of this book is that Andrew is not afraid to speak in his own voice, and to draw on personal and family experiences, and his active involvement in Israel/Palestine, in making his points. Thus in contrast to much academic work, you get a sense of the person behind the writing rather than the projection of some remote, authoritative persona. The result is a book that is both instructive and highly readable.

Michael Randle

Committee for Conflict Transformation Support

A networking committee for the exchange of information, cooperation in the provision of training support, and joint reflection on how to make such support more effective. Current geographical focus of work is in the former Yugoslavia and the Caucasus.

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