Committee for Conflict Transformation Support |
CCTS
|
The Interplay of Domestic, Regional and International Forces in PeacebuildingII. The stratified preoccupation with imposing standardised structures may impede regeneration of relationships and the range of initiatives and recovery undertaken by locals themselvesIt can be argued that the official framework for peacebuilding is inherently correct.7 Our central question is whether and how it can adequately address the strains and agendas which led to violence in the first place. There would appear to be contradictions between the measures employed to execute peacebuilding mandates and the outcomes they are meant to achieve. Vertical pressure is exerted for implementation in difficult contexts, with banners of "compliance" and "conditionality". Meanwhile lateral pressure in the form of regional forces is also brought to bear on local populations. Roland Paris (1997) argues that the principal flaw in the current official approach to peacebuilding is that "market democracy" is prescribed as a remedy for civil conflict without adequately anticipating the side effects of this remedy: democracy and capitalism are both inherently conflictual and in themselves can destabilise fragile societies. War-shattered states are ill equipped to manage the new strains of "liberalisation". He calls peacebuilding an enormous experiment in social engineering that involves transplanting Western models - "pacification through political and economic liberalisation". (p.56) II.a) Consider post-Dayton Bosnia, where all manner of international agencies operate under a peacebuilding mandate including UNHCR, other UN operatives such as the WHO, UNICEF, UNDP, the World Bank, IMF, military "peace-keepers", and every imaginable NGO - international, national, local. Deacon and Stubbs (1998) refer to this as a kind of "globalism" and suggest that it co-exists with a new kind of feudalism:
Meanwhile many local people work for "civil society" and pluralism, which they once felt they had. Trainers come and go from Croatia once again. Bus loads of visitors from Croatia and Serbia come to see family and friends, telephone lines and transportation increasingly connect the region. "We need more trade with each other," says Nenad (Sarajevo) "and maybe we need to be our own country again". He even notes shyly that American engineers oversaw the rebuilding of a bridge over the river near his home, when he is sure that Bosnian workers were available and skilled enough to help. He feels acutely the international strata imposed on his homeland. Dayton initially established its interlocking network of international policy-making forums as part of a one-year transition to limited Bosnian self-government. The Dayton Agreement assumed that with state and entity elections (under OSCE auspices in September 1996) the external international administration of the state would come to an end. But in December 1997, just one year into this extended consolidation period, the international administration became an open-ended commitment, with no clearly defined point at which even the limited Bosnian self-government, promised by Dayton, could be realised. This extended process of international regulation has involved a 'top-down' approach to peacebuilding. Governing representatives at municipal, canton, entity and state levels have little choice but to follow international policy under the threat of being dismissed from their posts or having sanctions imposed This level of external regulation has even extended to the international take-over of the state-run television station in Republika Srpska and the UN High Representative deciding the national flag of the new country. Some aspects of this, such as the imposition of uniform passports or car licenses have been received positively by the local population. (Chandler, 1999, p.115-116). Chandler argues that while Bosnian politicians are fully accountable to international peacekeepers, there are no mechanisms making international policy-making accountable to the Bosnian people. He takes issue with an International Crisis Group report, which argued for:
II.b) Consider East Timor. On 22 October 1999, on the eve of East Timorese independence, Nobel peace laureate, Jose Ramos-Horta (long exiled independence movement leader) spoke movingly at the Catholic Institute for International Affairs in London. He pointedly remarked that here was an opportunity for the United Nations to do things differently, to be inclusive, to recognise that there was a government in waiting, to take the lead from locals for transition initiatives. How sorely disappointed he must be now. Jarat Chopra resigned as head of the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) on March 6 2000. He spares no words in depicting the imposition of stratified rule in that country:
Indeed, to observers long familiar with the region, UNTAET's centralising tendency seemed to be replicating the Indonesian system of administration. Ironically, even Indonesia's authoritarian government had previously permitted the World Bank's CEP (Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project) in other parts of the archipelago - a measure contested by the UN administration and analysed in depth in Chopra's Survival article. Chopra argues that the problem was rooted in the circumstances of UNTAET's inception. The planning phase in New York involved no genuine contact with, or participation by, East Timorese representatives. On 19 October 1999, East Timorese leaders forwarded to the UN proposals for a transitional administration, outlining a Timorese role in the form of a Transitional Council. They were ignored. A token Transitional Council was established, but it is consultative only, with all decisions being taken by the UN Transitional Administrator. Chopra also points to the importance of cultural forms, observing that the Transitional Administrator had previously initiated the transitional administration in Kosovo, and brought with him an inner circle from the Balkans, "whose members projected a blunt, bullying style, when both the veterans of UNAMET and the traumatised Timorese would have responded better to modesty and genuine concern." (p.32)
As for regional "forces", to the east lies Australia's strategic and economic interests (oil and gas in the Timor Sea, plus exports of every possible commodity to East Timor/UN consumers) and to the immediate west lies the "other half" of Timor, still under Indonesian jurisdiction, with unrepatriated refugees, a porous border, and high profile militia configurations. There is the entire Indonesian archipelago, Indonesian teachers who want to return to Dili, Indonesian activists and NGOs (human rights groups and women's organisations) who have been accepted in East Timor. Jakarta has received independence leaders for first talks. Economic and political revival may depend on renewing these links, and certainly Indonesia is undergoing its own transition period. II.c) Consider Maluku. The Maluku crisis sent shock waves throughout Indonesia. Unlike the severe protracted conflicts in Aceh, Irian (west Papua) and Kalimantan which had clear antecedents in history and grievance, here was a seeming flash fire of violence which no one had predicted. And spread like fire it did, from the outbreak of the Ambon riots in January 1999 to recurring bloodshed in the northern islands. To date there are some 5,000 dead, and estimates of displaced persons vary between 350,000-500,000. From the onset of the violence (seemingly provoked deliberately and documented by a western human rights group which never circulated its report to communities from which it extracted information) local response on Ambon was impressive. Students organised mixed Muslim/Christian teams to visit IDPs, placing volunteers on 24 hour shifts with the most vulnerable, liaising with the local government disaster committee to audit needs and assist with resource distribution. With the impending government response of a "transmigration" (i.e. just move the problem) volunteers interviewed the displaced painstakingly, to look for skills (were they fishermen? farmers? Did they have relatives in other islands?) so that subsequent placements could be as informed as possible. Initially religious leaders attempted cross community forums. But violence widened when first army and police seemingly took sides for their own battles, and then the influx of militant supporters entered the fray. In January 2000 the Government of Indonesia took the considered step of requesting assistance from the international community in order to fully address the needs of the people of Maluku. This was no small step in light of perceived national humiliation over the role of the International community in the loss of East Timor. There is strong anti-western sentiment in Indonesia, and a precarious political/religious power struggle nationally - compounded by economic crisis and impending decentralisation. So in this case a national "blueprint" was devised: (shown below as reproduced in the United Nations Inter-Agency Appeal for the Maluku Crisis, March 2000): Security Reconciliation Prosperity (humanitarian-rehabilitation-development) Here is a case where internationals have had to tread very carefully, lest they be perceived as partisan. Even ICRC was initially denied access in the northern islands. Although the national government has proved slow in delivering, it did manage to change army commander in North Maluku which had beneficial results. There has also been gradual mobilisation of locally generated recovery initiatives and grass roots reconciliation teams. In the case of Maluku the UN brought the potential of resources, but not overall control. There was the possibility of offending (see opening quotation), even of delaying and blocking response. But in a way this has freed locals to take their own initiatives - caught as they are between a well meaning but largely ineffective government, and continual fact-finding missions by equally well meaning internationals. In the words of Oni (student activist on Ambon) "This is an island. Unless you go by boat or plane there is nowhere to run. We need to make our own choices". Ambon City is in total rubble and firmly divided between Christian and Muslim quarters. But people are talking, about jobs, about rebuilding, about how to govern themselves. Indonesian mediators have held first meetings with the police, a mixed force who had totally splintered during the fighting. The governor struggles to maintain a neutral zone around his office. There is talk of a mixed market. Gang leaders speak openly about their wish for jobs. This is not presented as a success story. This is a transition in progress largely "from below", with some external assistance. Indonesians talk a great deal about "horizontal" and "vertical" conflicts. While keeping their options open and liaising with government ministers and INGOs the people of Maluku probably do not place all their faith in help from "vertical" source. They are working horizontally too, thinking (in the words of one mediator) "sideways". But inter-group relations are cultivated up and down the grid form: interactions and process nationally, regionally, locally. At one peak point of fighting last summer a Muslim/Christian delegation from Ambon visited the national palace in Jakarta and presented First Lady, Ibu Sinta, a charter for alternative education for displaced children. They did this with dignity. But when the G.O.I built new housing in a destroyed Ambonese district using Javanese labour, it was torched almost immediately - salt in an old wound of overly centralised control from the mainland. The message is clear: Give us the means and we will self-build.
|