The interplay of domestic, regional and international forces in post-conflict peacebuilding
Report of a seminar held on 10th May at Friends House, 173-177 Euston Road, London N1 1RG
This seminar, the third in a series on Supporting Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes organised by the Committee for Conflict Transformation Support (CCTS), was attended by thirty people. Its purpose was to examine the interconnected roles (whether destructive or creative) of local, regional and international forces in addressing the tensions and injustices that follow conflict.
Judith Large, a researcher, trainer, facilitator and long-term associate of CCTS, opened the seminar with a brief resume of her discussion paper. Her paper draws especially on her experience in the Balkans (which led to the publication, in 1994, of The War Next Door, a study of second-track intervention in the war in ex-Yugoslavia) and, more recently, in South East Asia, where she has been working to support recovery after violence in Maluku and East Timor.
Although Judith acknowledged that the subject of the seminar might be viewed at best as esoteric and at worst as impossible, she encouraged participants to 'tackle the impossible' and to view with optimism the opportunities for constructive engagement that it raised. She began by inviting participants to describe peacebuilding, which elicited a broad definition encompassing:
- understanding and resolving power-relations;
- building/transforming institutions;
- changing attitudes (or supporting appropriate attitudes);
- transforming relationships to support functional harmony;
- moving from violence to politics;
- addressing longstanding grievances;
- neutralising greed;
- supporting/introducing various forms of security;
- espousing justice.
She argued that peacebuilding needs to be addressed at each of the 'levels' (individual, national, regional and international) that have been written about by Waltz, Lederach and others, and stressed the importance of understanding not only the actions and interactions at each level but the complexity of interconnections between them.
Recent violent demonstrations in Banja Luka, where thousands of Bosnian Serbs broke up the UN-sponsored ceremony to lay the foundation-stone of a new mosque, illustrate in microcosm the problems associated with the subject of the seminar, as well as showing how long it can take for peacebuilding to overcome grievances. The international reconciliation initiative, intended to symbolise the end of ten years of ethnic intolerance, was unacceptable to local Serbs, who remained resentful of their continuing 'pariah' image and of the inadequate share of international aid that Serbs have received throughout the Balkan region.
Judith articulated the three linked hypotheses that she proposed and illustrated in her paper:
This universal recipe of the UN and other international agencies for post-conflict peacebuilding contains all or most of the following ingredients: democratic institutions and especially multi-party elections; free-market economy; an active civil society, including NGOs and a 'free' and 'independent' press; security sector reform (army, police, judiciary); and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to deal with past atrocities and human rights violations.
The ingredients of this recipe are not, in themselves, necessarily bad: most people would agree, for example, that an independent press is beneficial. But when 'the solution' is imposed, regardless of local circumstances, so that, for example, locally-based social structures are only recognised if they are willing to reorganise as Western-style NGOs, local people become alienated and disempowered. And when the UN, having imposed a solution, interfere with its implementation, for example by determining who may or may not stand in local elections, or by designing a new national flag, then the blueprint effectively creates a new colonialism.
In fact the UN has little experience of peacebuilding - having spent most of its past in a peacekeeping role. Judith argued that seminar participants had useful experience to share with the UN; that the local and cross-community initiatives in which so many participants work are the necessary ingredients for creating locally-tailored 'peace architectures' - living wholes that take account of what is possible and what assistance can be offered and found acceptable.
Judith's introduction was followed by a plenary discussion, which was continued in groups during the afternoon and concluded with a report-back plenary session. Although the discussion sessions were not formally structured, most of what was said addressed in some way Judith's three hypotheses (given above). Plenary and group discussions are therefore summarised together under these three headings as follows:
Imposing a peacebuilding blueprint
The international approach to peacebuilding seems to lead to the imposition of the 'Western' model of the free market economy, democratic elections etc., without regard for local circumstances. UN action is circumscribed by the political and economic policies of the major international powers, which calls into question the degree of independence and open-mindedness that it can bring to the search for a just solution. It also removes some legitimacy from the role of NGO workers, who are perceived as coming in on the UN's coat tails and who are not, therefore, regarded as completely independent.
A number of participants had experienced UN peacebuilding action that reinforced the old power structures that had led to conflict. In East Timor, for example, the UN interacts almost exclusively with the elite Portuguese-speakers; there is no dialogue with 'ordinary' people, and consequently little understanding of their problems. There was also widespread experience of a 'we know best' attitude among international agencies: of a lack of desire for consultation. But as one person pointed out, without the dominance and patronage of the UN in the re-establishment of civil structures, the most likely local outcome might be the resurgence of the old hegemonies, which also ignored the voice of 'ordinary' people.
A further difficulty is the short time-scale (typically only two years) within which international agencies expect to be involved. Peacebuilding is a very long-term process (as experiences after World War II illustrate). In Serbia, for example, people are only now beginning to be willing to express a political opinion; they can't be expected to leap straight into a full 'democratic' model, especially under threat of the withdrawal of aid.
Peacebuilding is particularly difficult after large-scale military intervention. In circumstances where the choice seems to be either to enter in strength to stop the violence or to stand aside and watch it continue, a number of participants felt that the overriding priority was to stop the violence (albeit with more violence), though this raises hard moral questions. There seem to be problems, however, in moving from this type of 'peace enforcement' to constructive peacebuilding, with the international forces relinquishing civil control. (The East Timorese apparently talk about the intervention of the international community as 'the third invasion'!) These problems were returned to repeatedly throughout the day, often with despondency. Should we accept that 'poorly' is the best that we can do, and preferable to doing nothing? Can we hope to do better, or can there never be any universally agreed legitimacy for military intervention? When the intervention is non-military and on a small scale, as it is in Tajikistan, for example, it seems to be possible for local people to retain control of the peace process, and for international agencies to take a more constructive, supporting role.
Stifling local initiatives
Judith's paper contains a number of examples of how a uniform approach to peacebuilding can sideline or stifle local action. A number of others were raised in discussion:
When the UN takes over the top jobs, policing, and distribution channels, there is no way in which anything local can grow to replace it. The more 'perfect' or comprehensive the imposed peace, the less scope there is for local initiatives. Similarly, the more prescriptive the blueprint, the more the bureaucracy of funding tends to set both the problems and their possible solutions in concrete, as NGOs are tempted to deliver the paperwork that will ensure funding, rather than express the uncertainties they are feeling. The tendency of funding agencies to support projects rather than processes exacerbates this problem.
International agencies become an important part of the local economic community, thus reducing the initiative for locally based economic development. In Abkhazia, for example, funding from DFID is one of the main sources of income. In this environment, fluency in English frequently becomes the highest valued economic asset. The ensuing 'contract culture', in which local teachers, doctors and other key professionals move to higher paid employment in international agencies, slows down the redevelopment of local civil structures and impoverishes much-needed local services and businesses. Even worse, perhaps, is the tendency of students to seek to escape the problems at home by joining international agencies abroad, thus robbing the country of its future skills base.
Scope for change
The UN is keen to learn. Its current role in Tajikistan, for example, is informed by the recent Brahimi report, referred to in Judith's paper. The challenge, then, is not to blame them for sometimes failing in difficult circumstances, but to analyse and understand the reasons that problems arise and the behaviours that might produce more successful outcomes.
During discussion a number of problems were aired and some possible ways forward were suggested:
- An international force that aims to restore the rule of law must itself behave lawfully (one participant spoke with outrage about the thirteen East Timorese who had been killed by UN cars, not one of which stopped). Some degree of visible local accountability (with the possibility of redress) is needed, especially in very large-scale interventions.
- Short-term forceful intervention to stop violence could usefully be coupled with a resolution to stay long-term and 'hold the ring', providing good offices for dialogue and other support, but otherwise allowing problems to be resolved locally. (In Angola, for example, international action has created more room for local social movements to take hold, even though the violence continues.) This approach minimises the degree of disruption to local initiatives, although it does nothing to change the structures and relationships that caused the conflict and may even appear to legitimise them. The ethical dilemma remains: When is it better to intervene, and by what right do we do so?
- International involvement generally raises hopes and expectations for change among local people. If those expectations are not realised, the resulting feelings of disempowerment and demoralisation can deepen the internal rifts and make long-term peace harder than ever to achieve.
- 'Democratic elections' cannot be called democratic if they take place on the basis of a political situation that is unchanged since before the conflict, or if the UN dictates who can or cannot stand.
- One possible benefit of the Western economic model may be that it encourages people to acknowledge the economic benefits of peaceful coexistence, even with people you dislike!
- There needs to be some agreement about the factors that led up to the conflict if a lasting peace is to be re-established. Intervenors generally don't have an accurate picture, and the short time-scales on which they prefer to work make it next to impossible to develop one.
- Grievances will not disappear unless they are heard, and there is some sense of justice. Peace commissions and tribunals have been successful in some countries; it is important to find a vehicle that is grounded in the local culture. Much value can be gained from addressing 'small' issues that impact day-to-day life.
- The emphasis on structural peacebuilding ignores the importance of the human factors and psychological influences that underpin the cycle of violence (depicted by one participant as shown below):
Unless the fears, pain, anger and grief that form part of the cycle are dealt with before the cycle moves on, the violence will continue or come back. This psychological peacebuilding is a long-term, labour-intensive process and one whose outcomes are difficult to quantify. - People who have been displaced by conflict can, when they return home, often see the scope for change more clearly than those who have never left, and can therefore act as 'ambassadors' or 'truth-tellers'.
- Many of the problems arising from military intervention can be understood in terms of patriarchal cultures and gender constructions - the fear men have that they are not manly enough. We need to find ways of supporting individuals to find the courage to act outside these constraints.
- Some hope can be drawn from the individual human capacity to work for change. Small-scale local efforts can produce significant results, especially if they are given recognition and support. Indigenous peacemakers are too often overlooked, or seen as cultural 'oddities'. (At the same time, we should not expect active participation abroad while accepting apathy in our own countries.)
- Too little attention is given to regional forces in peacebuilding. The interaction of families and friends living in neighbouring countries, the re-establishment of small-scale trade, the bridge-building that can be achieved by regional NGOs, can in some ways produce more concrete results than larger-scale initiatives. This point, as one participant observed, was mirrored in the balance of discussion at the seminar, which also largely failed to touch on the role, positive or negative, of neighbouring countries' governments and of regional intergovernmental organisations (notwithstanding the discussion in Judith's paper of regional peacebuilding work in Maluku).
- The notion of 'levels', though useful, can also be constraining. Everyone acts and interacts with others as individuals - although each person has a different range and power to influence events. We need a better understanding of the interconnections between individuals (and their organisations) working at and moving between 'levels' in order to increase their potential for peacebuilding. Even when individuals or organisations don't knowingly interact in a given situation, the action (or lack of action) of each will affect the impact that the others can make.
- NGO workers need to be braver and more imaginative in their requests for funding for processes (as opposed to projects); the challenge for us is to design staged or rolling reviews that are acceptable to the bureaucrats while delivering what is really needed.