| Committee for Conflict Transformation Support | CCTS
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| Demilitarising minds, demilitarising societies
Demilitarisation at the surface level Surface level and deep demilitarisation Shifting a conflict from the military to the political arena, from the lethal to the non-lethal, is an important achievement. In the short term, this rarely requires fundamental attitude changes. Rather, the peace deal is likely to reflect a balance of power and may occur either through the victory of one side or through a compromise based on exhaustion. This end of the fighting, however, does allow expansion of other peace-building activities. Earlier, I introduced a distinction between 'surface demilitarisation' and 'deep demilitarisation'. In hardware terms, 'surface' might take the form of arms control, with agreements to monitor and reduce force levels and the quantity of arms held. Deep demilitarisation would then press for disarmament. In terms of human relations, 'surface' might mean keeping the parties apart in the short run, while the deeper level would involve reconnecting them - or perhaps connecting them for the first time. At times, we could interpret surface demilitarisation as primarily being designed to restore the monopoly of violence to constitutionally legitimated bodies (ie either the state or an international force). This legitimisation usually requires reforms of security forces such as: a) dismantling secret (or not-so-secret) centres of power from which crimes have been organised; b) re-training and introducing higher - some would say 'more professional' - standards, such as impartiality; c) making the forces representative of the whole society (which in turn might entail integrating hostile combatants into the same units). 'Deep demilitarisation' seeks to go further than a re-monopolisation of violence: to address causes of violence and offer alternative, non-military approaches. If 'surface demilitarisation' lends itself to being a form of action 'from above', social engineering if you like, 'deep demilitarisation' is impossible without action initiated within the communities in conflict. Ordinary citizens need the civic courage to stand against militarising trends and interests, at least taking the risk of being ostracised as a traitor, sometimes of being eliminated as a danger to the interests of local warlords. The surface/deep distinction is not at all absolute, and the levels are not discrete. At times 'surface' and 'deep' demilitarisation will be interdependent, perhaps complementary parts of a process, perhaps even phases. 'Surface-level', however, is inexorably entrapped in the world of realpolitik, while the deeper level is often looking to change that agenda, searching for forms of civil action and nonviolent alternatives. One topic for discussion should be the interaction between these two levels. The strength of public support might often be a critical factor in determining how far a 'surface-level' reform can go. At the same time, 'surface' reforms can establish a permanent system of accountability to the public. For instance, on the question of police reform, public demands will play an essential role in the attritional struggle at the political and institutional level, while those in charge of reforming the police should be setting up organs such as citizens' review boards. In post-war situations, there will be a number of issues where those in charge have a choice between an authoritarian (military) 'solution' and a solution that goes deeper and depends on civil society. The issue of hate-speak after ethnic war, for example, can be 'resolved' through censorship or through institutionalising the right to reply and convening journalists from all quarters to agree a common code. A further issue where the perspectives of surface and deep demilitarisation may diverge is the extent to which the international soldiers in peace operations engage in community improvement work. From the surface perspective, this is admirable, gains the trust of the local community and often meets an immediate practical need - a new road or bridge or patch of concrete. From the perspective of demilitarisation, it may be seen as inappropriate, as encouraging dependence on the military in general, or as a missed opportunity for a civil development. Converting soldiers into peaceworkers An important goal of surface demilitarisation is reducing the size of the armed forces. In this there is a potential to appeal to the higher motivation of combatants to use their skills for peaceful purposes. Some 'military' values may be considered vital in peace-building, as has been argued by pacifists in the tradition of William James's "A Moral Equivalent of War" (1910) or Gandhi's call for Shanti Sena - 'peace soldiers'. More recently, Alejandro Benda–a, who has been involved in re-training former fighters, echoes their view. While he notes that often "the proclivity towards violence and contempt for life" may carry over into civilian life, he also sees "a number of traits associated with war which are also indispensable in peace-making - dedication, sacrifice, solidarity, discipline, teamwork, administration and organisation."2 There are a number of criticisms to be made, however - both about specific traits but also about these as a set of qualities. The 'martial virtues' come as a package; they are linear, going straight for goal without being diverted by human empathy. Discipline is based on routine, obedience and hierarchy; teamwork and solidarity are based either on having a common enemy or on buddy-buddy behaviour that often takes the form of sexual harassment. The group behaviour encouraged in most armies is far from conducive to building peace. In short, the re-training of soldiers needs a transformational content. Benda–a himself stresses the role of reflection in training: "Human training (accompaniment, as opposed to counselling, based on empathy, including personal and collective psychological rehabilitation) is the groundwork for technical training". Perhaps the clearest example of former soldiers using their skills for demilitarisation is among those NGOs working to clear mines and unexploded ordnance. They firmly contextualise their work within a non-military culture. Paul Davies of the Mines Advisory Group writes: "NGOs have evolved from mere technical service providers to more rounded humanitarian agencies interested in mines and UXO as a development issue in the broadest sense. They have developed multi-media community education programmes ... operating first in relief mode (rapid, emergency dissemination of information) but gradually evolving into a development mode that seeks to engage and involve the target communities in constructing and sustaining their own education programs. NGOs have also acted as facilitators in the villages rather than as disseminators of predetermined messages. They have developed data-gathering teams and village agents and integrated these elements of their operation into their clearance responses, thus giving a community-responsive and community-based reality to their operations."3 This example also illustrates a link between essential action for surface demilitarisation and a longer term perspective of peace-building: the actual mine clearing and urgent necessity to inform the community about the need were carried out in a way that contributed to the long-term development of the community. In view of the conspicuous presence of former-soldiers in charge of the logistics in humanitarian agencies, one could suggest too that there might be some value in re-training them with the same long-term perspective. Logistics can be more than a question of how to get material from A to B; it can offer a chance to begin to build durable distribution networks and even of fostering cross-community cooperation. UNMIK and the demilitarisation of Kosovo4 To illustrate some problems of 'surface demilitarisation', let us examine various dilemmas faced by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in demilitarising the Kosova Liberation Army (UÇK): i) The individual level The International Organization for Migration (IOM) registered 25,373 people claiming to be former UÇK combatants, in so doing compiling a socio-economic and demographic profile. The IOM has done well in supporting those who want to return to civilian life. It assesses their training needs and then its reintegration fund provides vocational training or seed money for new projects. It has also compiled lists of employment opportunities. While the IOM has no specific programmes for women former-combatants - a category generally under-represented in post-war registration and with particular difficulties in reintegration into traditional societies - it does have an employment opportunities programme specifically for women. Ball refers to the need to strike a balance between reassuring "the demobilized that they have not been abandoned and avoiding reinforcing their sense of themselves as a special group". The case for directing aid to former combatants rather than to the community where they live is that, because of their military training, unassimilated soldiers pose a threat to law and order. The IOM in Kosovo justifies its programme by pointing out that the former combatants registered claim to be supporting over 200,000 dependents - or at least 10 per cent of the total Albanian population.6 Therefore former-combatants come under the heading of Quick Impact Programmes which, in this case, take place in the context of an overall drive towards economic development.
ii) The collective level UNMIK could not accept UÇK's leadership. The UÇK did not represent the democratic will of the population, meanwhile people wearing UÇK uniforms were prominent in the many acts of revenge and intimidation taking place. Public statements by UÇK leaders condemning such actions did little to restrain them. So UNMIK entered into negotiations with the UÇK on demilitarisation. UÇK conceded that it would surrender 10,000 weapons - rather few for a force of more than 25,000 - and dissolve its own structures. In return, former UÇK combatants would receive preferential recruitment to two bodies being formed under UNMIK supervision - the Kosovo Police Service and the Kosovo Protection Corps (TMK), a civilian service with 3,000 full-time personnel, 2,000 reservists, largely unarmed (it has just 200 small arms to be used in security duties). UNMIK refused to allocate a block of places in the police service to former UÇK fighters, but made two substantial concessions: that military experience would be considered an advantage, and that the UÇK would have a veto over applications from those who had previously served with the police in Kosovo (Albanians from the 1980s or Serbs). Meanwhile UNMIK agreed that the Protection Corps would be led by former UÇK officers, headed by a former UÇK commander. How then are we to analyse this as a move towards demilitarisation? UNMIK would argue that they had a choice of confronting the UÇK with the risk of converting them into enemies, or of enlisting their cooperation and so bringing them more under control. It is still too early to judge the success of their strategy. A sympathetic reading might say that 'robust' action to forcibly dissolve the UÇK would have resulted in Kosovo Albanians closing ranks against the outsiders. Through involving UÇK in the police service and the Protection Corps, UNMIK could also argue that it was a) creating jobs for people who, trained in the arms use, might otherwise be tempted into crime; b) exposing former-combatants to international training; c) putting former-combatants under international supervision; and ultimately d) creating an institution where the different ethnic groups would work together. The more hostile reading regards the protection corps as - in Tim Judah's words - "the UÇK in mothballs". UNMIK is seen as having set up a body with a military structure, many of whose members are engaged in activities that UNMIK is pledged to stop - military preparations (holding arms caches, training), organised crime, and intimidation of ethnic minority groups. Moreover, although corps members have to forswear membership of political parties, the TMK is clearly aligned with those parties rejected emphatically at the recent municipal elections. Further, political intimidation of Kosovo Albanians has not ceased with those elections, is linked by most people to elements of the former UÇK and therefore casts suspicion on the TMK. If former-UÇK has less influence in the police, many police have little to desire to investigate the misdeeds of UÇK-related people and are amenable to 'losing' evidence. Both police and judiciary are seen as lacking independence and impartiality. The UNHCR continues to denounce 'the climate of impunity' that exists in Kosovo. Drawing on this and a study of the attempt to separate the police from the military in El Salvador,7 perhaps the following basic lessons should be emphasised:
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