CCTS
Newsletter 11

Surface demilitarisation

Military peacekeepers are often sent in to establish a ceasefire, or to separate opposing parties in a civil war. Even while such intervention is considered necessary, however, it is important to be planning the (re)connection of opponents, and the (re)establishment of civil controls: the rule of law is best enforced as close to home as possible.

In circumstances where international forces maintain a longer-term presence, for example after genocide or protracted civil war, they are often given other, less ostensibly military roles within the community, such as bridge repairs and road building. It was generally agreed that while this work is useful it is better for this job, too, to be performed by local civilians. The objective must be for all reconstruction, whether physical or social, to be conceived and managed locally (though outsiders may be drafted in to assist). A sense of local ownership and involvement in the peace process is crucial. For this reason external (particularly Western) peace workers need to find ways to help local people without 'getting in the way' of local initiatives or inhibiting progress by mis-timing their interventions.

There are two separate tasks involved here. The first is to demilitarise the peace-keeping, in order to increase local ownership of the peace. Clearly, the work of the peace-keeping mission should be restricted to as small an area as possible; but it may not be enough to transfer some of its other roles to civilians (eg the police) because this may simply perpetuate the military attitudes in civilian society. The second and more fundamental task is to demilitarise society itself by changing its attitude towards the violence and its causes. This latter task is the business of deep demilitarisation.

Progress is occasionally made by an apparently spontaneous upsurge of ordinary citizens, as happened in Serbia to overthrow President Milosovic. Such actions need to be harnessed and channelled so that the energy for change is not sidelined or dissipated. There is a danger that 'surface' actions might be obstructive. For example, the money spent on arms to enforce a peace is not available for development and reconstruction; and external intervention can have a negative impact when it ignores the underlying problems that have precipitated the violence, or tries to impose a 'solution' that is counter-cultural, or to force coexistence before it is possible.

International intervention seems inevitably to take a military form. Several participants were keen to find alternative types of intervention, at an earlier stage, before the conflict escalates: suggestions included larger, more determined groups of OSCE observers and the involvement of people trained in conflict resolution to help the local community to avoid military conflict. Sadly, however, it is generally harder to interest international politicians in the longer-term, less goal-oriented solutions that lead to deep demilitarisation. There is more interest in action that leads to political 'quick wins' or which bolsters the justification for military investment at home. International political alliances can also be a barrier to peace (for example, Russia's support for Serbia; Germany's support for Croatia) - providing not only the weapons that allow the fighting to continue but also the political muscle to resist compromise.

While most participants found the distinction between surface and deep demilitarisation useful, there is clearly substantial overlap. It would be a mistake, too, to regard 'surface' demilitarisation as easy. After violence, a larger number of changes may be necessary before one can feel secure. It is necessary to create 'safe spaces' in which people can operate with confidence.

next  |  discussion paper

newsletter  |  ccts